Manufactured Responsiveness: The Impact of State Electoral Laws on Unified Party Control of the Presidency and House of Representatives, 1840–1940

Erik J. Engstrom University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Samuel Kernell University of California, San Diego

The modern history of divided government in America suggests that the framers succeeded in creating a government unresponsive to popular passions. Yet in the nineteenth century the party winning the presidency almost always captured control of the House of Representatives. Why and how could nineteenth century national elections be so responsive that they resemble parliamentary outcomes? We identify electoral institutions present in the states that directly linked congressional elections to presidential coattails. Specifically, we estimate the impact of state ballot laws and the strategic design of congressional districts on presidential coattail voting from 1840 to 1940. We find that presidential elections, as mediated by state electoral laws, strongly account for unified party control of the House and the presidency throughout the nineteenth century.

Worried that unified control of government would breed majority tyranny, the Constitution's Framers created separate executive and legislative branches and provided each with the authority to check the excesses of the other. They also sought an electoral remedy by varying constituencies, term lengths, and modes of election across the branches and legislative chambers. The modern history of inconclusive national elections and divided party control of government suggests that they did their job well. From 1948 through 2000 only five of 13 presidential elections found the same party winning the presidency and both chambers of Congress. Equally revealing, only once (Democrats in 1952) did a governing party collapse and wholly surrender control of Congress and the presidency. Limiting comparison to control of the president and the House of Representatives, a pairing more likely to turn up unified outcomes, only seven of 13 presidential elections ended with the same party controlling both institutions.

There was a time in America, ironically not long removed from the Constitution's framing, where same party victory of the House of Representatives and the presidency was commonplace. From the rise of the Whig party in 1840 until the turn of the century, 13 of the 15 presidential elections found the winning presidential candidate's party taking or retaining control of the House.[1] Even more striking are those uphill contests where the opposition party swept both institutions; on eight of the nine occasions when the "out" party won the presidency, it also either took control of the House of Representatives or consolidated its majority from the preceding midterm election. Divided government occurred occasionally but mostly as a result of midterm elections (eight of the 10 instances) when an unpopular administration became a burden for fellow partisans (Holt 1999). This era's tendency toward unified party control becomes all the more impressive when one recognizes that about a quarter of House seats were located in the South, a region that for

Erik J. Engstrom is assistant professor of political science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3265 (engstrom@unc.edu). Samuel Kernell is professor of political science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521 (skernell@ucsd.edu).

The authors thank Gary W. Cox, Jonathan Katz, Georgia Kernell, and anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was generously supported by a National Science Foundation grant to Kernell (SES-0136260).

[1] One of the two exceptions was the 1876 election, where the Democrats won a majority of congressional seats and the popular vote majority for president but lost the election in a contested Electoral College vote count. The other exception was the election of 1848.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, Pp. 531–549

©2005 by the Midwest Political Science Association ISSN 0092-5853

FIGURE 1 Democratic Shares of Presidential Vote and House Seats: Non-Southern States, 1840–1940



Note: The presidential vote percentage is the two-party percentage of the Democratic vote.

much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was insulated from partisan national forces through systematic disenfranchisement of the Republican electorate.[2]

One can detect the basis for these dramatic episodes of party turnover in Washington in the normal relationship between presidential and congressional elections during the nineteenth century. To show this, Figure 1 plots the Democratic presidential vote and House seat shares for non-Southern states from 1840 through 1940.[3] Although congressional elections closely track presidential voting throughout this time period, nineteenth century results appear to have been especially sensitive to—indeed, magnifying—slight shifts in presidential voting. To state this relationship more precisely we have estimated separate swing ratios for the pre and post 1900 series in Figure 1. As suspected, the swing ratio is a steep 3.83 for the nineteenth century compared to the significantly weaker ($p < .05$) and near-linear coefficient of 1.97 during the twentieth century.[4] Since these coefficients are nonlinear (based on logistic transformations of House seats and presidential votes), their dissimilar effects can be better seen in the plotted relationships in Figure 2. As the Democratic vote outside the South crossed the 50% threshold its share of congressional victories rose sharply. Added to its "automatic" southern seats, a narrow Democratic victory in the presidential election could give it control of the House of Representatives. Clearly, nineteenth-century elections appear to have defied the Framers' script for preventing unified party control of the national government.

Traditional explanations for electoral responsiveness point to the degree to which voters' preferences shift uniformly across districts in response to national party teams hotly contesting elections on platforms of ideology and national policy. After comparing the swing ratios of a number of two-party systems, Tufte concluded, ". . . the more nationally oriented the politics of a country or the more nationalized the forces prevailing in a given

[2]With most of the South in rebellion and reconstruction from 1861 through 1876 and subsequently under the grip of Jim Crow-enforced Democratic hegemony, the region's congressional elections were conspicuously unresponsive to national forces and have been excluded from this analysis.

[3]We begin the analysis in 1840 because reliable data for some of our variables are unavailable for the earlier period. Carrying the analysis forward to 1940 provides a sufficient time series for testing the effects of reforms that were largely finished by 1912. Modifying the range of years marginally on either end of this century only slightly alters the estimates reported below.

[4]In both periods the vote-seat relationship for the non-South shows a bias in favor of the Republicans. In the nineteenth century bias is a small −2.37%, increasing to −8.17% after the turn of the century.

FIGURE 2 The Presidential Vote-House Seat Relationship: Non-Southern States, 1840–1940



Note: The vote-seat relationships are estimated using the non-Southern presidential vote and House seats from Figure 1.

election, the greater the swing ratio—other things being equal" (1973, 547). He goes on to explain how classic Westminster-styled parliamentary elections with a nationally oriented electorate and political parties vigorously contesting every seat would yield systematic swings in victories across districts. But this model of responsive elections does not square well with the descriptive facts of America's nineteenth-century elections. Instead, congressional elections were conducted by state and local party organizations that appealed to largely parochial electorates on only a limited variety of national issues. Yet the statistical relationship plotted in Figure 2 for the nineteenth century is steeper than Tufte reports for strong-party, parliamentary elections. This presents the fundamental question we seek to answer in this article: what was present in this era that caused congressional elections to respond so sharply to presidential voting?

In the next section we propose an alternative model based on two electoral institutions in the states—specifically, *consolidated* party ballots and efficient gerrymandering strategies. The first created a strong coattail connection between presidential and congressional voting; the second distributed congressional votes into legislative seats in such a way as to maximize the impact of narrow partisan victories. Together they induced sharp, systematic swings in congressional elections reflecting modest shifts of presidential votes.[5] These institutional arrangements were dismantled during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries leading to the weaker swing ratio for the later era displayed in Figure 2. We test this institutional model with a pooled time-series cross-section analysis of non-Southern state-level elections from 1840 through 1940. Finding that ballot form and districting strategies had their hypothesized effects on state outcomes, we then link this electoral machinery together in a later section to determine if they account for the highly responsive national relationships displayed in

[5]In order for these separate state contests to generate systematic national swings in the parties' congressional fortunes, presidential contests needed to supply a national component to the vote that similarly shifted results across the states. Evidence that state electorates responded similarly to national presidential stimuli is not hard to find. Regressing each state's Democratic presidential vote share on the party's national vote (for the 37 states that had been in the Union long enough to accumulate an electoral record) yields uniformly positive and significant slopes. Some states were more Democratic than others, of course; the intercepts range from –22 to 41% of the vote (the minus sign indicating a Republican advantage) with a median of 6.5%. While some were more responsive to national partisan tides than were others (e.g., border states exhibiting the weakest relationships), all state electorates shifted their party support in the same direction as the national trend.

Figure 1. Confirming that they do, we conclude by considering the implications of state-level electoral institutions for our understanding of America's political development. More generally, the findings remind us that in addition to voter preferences and party platforms one must also take into account such seemingly mundane matters as *how* and *when* votes are cast and *where* they are distributed across districts in order to explain electoral responsiveness.

A Model of Nineteenth-Century Electoral Responsiveness

Any explanation for the extraordinary responsiveness of nineteenth-century congressional elections (and weakening during the twentieth century) needs to take into account that America's national elections were largely the sum of state-level events. In this era of undeveloped national transportation, poor communications, and modestly integrated regionally economies (Wiebe 1967), comparatively few policy demands moved up federalism's ladder to Washington. Reflecting the societal setting, political parties were necessarily confederations of state organizations—themselves frequently riddled by geographically defined factions—that assembled periodically at state and national conventions to select candidates.[6] National campaigns were loosely coordinated efforts of these organizations to select their common standard bearer, largely in order to win control of federal patronage that flowed from the White House. Until late in the century, presidential candidates rarely campaigned personally, leaving state parties the latitude to cast their message in the most favorable light. None of this accords well with the requisite features of "nationalized" elections. Presidential campaigns were not bereft of issues but neither were they the robust national appeals of programmatic parties on which highly responsive elections are frequently viewed as resting.

Instead of basing responsive elections on systematic swings in the preferences of issue voters, we propose an alternative route that emphasizes the role of institutions in cuing and channeling preferences and distributing votes across districts. Specifically, we posit a two-stage model (diagrammed below) in which responsive elections are the joint product of strong coattails induced by consolidated party ballots and robust swing ratios generated by efficient gerrymandering.

Presidential Coattails:
Pres. Vote → Consolidated Ballot → House Vote

Vote-Seat Conversion:
House Vote → Efficient Gerrymanders → House Seats

In the rest of this section we lay out the distinct effects of each institutional mechanism. After testing each causal relation separately in the third section we turn to their cumulative, aggregate effects on elections in the fourth section. We view the joint occurrence of these institutions as more than a historical coincidence. Publicly casting party-supplied tickets rendered elections highly predictable, which, in turn, allowed politicians to engage in rewarding but risky efficient gerrymandering. As ballot reform dismantled the consolidated party ballot at the turn of the century, it presented strategic districters with greater uncertainty about their point estimates for the election prompting them to adopt less risky redistricting practices.

Consolidated Party Ballot

> The [Democratic] gentleman from Georgia says, we [Whigs] have deserted all our principles, and taken shelter under General [Zachary] Taylor's military coat tail," noted Abraham Lincoln in a House of Representatives floor debate over the Whig party's 1848 presidential nomination. He added, "He has no acquaintance with the ample military coat tail of General [Andrew] Jackson? (Safire 1978, 125)

For modern elections presidential coattails refer to a kind of affinity relation in the voter's mind between a political party's presidential nominee and its other candidates running for lower-level offices. Enthusiasm for the presidential candidate presumably prompts a voter to choose other politicians who would help the president achieve his campaign promises (Campbell and Miller 1957). In the nineteenth century presidential coattails typically did not require voters to make this association across offices. Voters cast party-supplied tickets headed by the presidential and vice-presidential candidates and followed by the rest of the party's candidates.[7] Unless a

[6] Research analyzing variance across county or district-level congressional voting for this era has generally failed to identify a sizable national component. See Stokes (1967), Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale (1984), and Kawato (1987). With only uniform variance across locales classified as "national," this methodology, as Claggett, Flanigan, and Zingale acknowledge, leaves open the possibility of nonuniform national effects (Katz 1973).

[7] For a time a few states apparently required that ballots be separated by office. In such instances, the voter bundled several or more ballots, facilitating split-ticket voting. Party tickets were widely distributed by party workers, printed in newspapers and frequently stacked outside the polling station (Argersinger 1992; Bensel 2004).

voter undertook some extraordinary effort to "split the ballot"—such as tearing and submitting parts of different ballots, scratching off names, or pasting different candidate names over those of the party supplied ticket (Bensel 2004; Reynolds 1988)—in full view of party workers stationed at the polling place, coattail voting occurred by default. Party workers ushering voters to the polls could reliably count in their column even those citizens who expressed weak preferences.

Students of electoral history (Ferejohn and Calvert 1984; Moos 1952; Rusk 1970) have previously noted the inherent coattail effects of the party ticket. But generally missed in past scholarship is the fact that not all party tickets induced presidential coattails in House elections because frequently states held these elections on different dates. Until 1872 when federal law consolidated presidential and congressional elections (with minor exceptions), 20 non-Southern states at one time or another separated House and presidential election calendars by one to ten months.[8] During the 33rd Congress (1852), for example, only eight of the 20 states held their congressional and presidential elections on the same day; the other states scheduled their House elections from the preceding August to the following October. In testing the effects of institutional arrangements on electoral responsiveness, it is important to distinguish those elections in Figure 3 where a consolidated party ballot was in place from those "split" ticket systems that arose from different electoral calendars.[9]

From 1888 through 1911 Australian ballot reform swept the nation (Albright 1942; Evans 1917; Fredman 1968). Not all reform provisions entering state codes—laws limiting access of third and fusion parties to the new state-supplied ballot (Argersinger 1992)—were hostile to the existing major party organizations. Yet the reforms of interest appear well designed to weaken state parties by breaking the ticket in a couple of ways. First, the secret ballot removed voters from the steady gaze of party workers, and second, the new state-supplied ballots made it easier for voters to cross party lines in selecting candidates for different offices. The reform ballots took one of two principal formats. The "party column" aligns same party candidates into a column, making it easy for those wishing to vote a straight ticket to do so. Representing a more thorough reform the "office bloc" discourages casual straight ticket voting by locating offices in different areas of the ballot (Burden and Kimball 1998; Rusk 1970). The initial wave of reforms favored the party column, but by the 1920s about half of the congressional elections (see Figure 3) were being decided with office bloc ballots. Below we test for their potentially dissimilar effects on coattail voting.

Efficient Partisan Gerrymanders

Coattail voting represents only the first cog in the electoral machinery manufacturing presidential votes into congressional seats. At least since Elbridge Gerry's day, politicians have viewed districting as an opportunity to influence future elections. Earlier we noted that Tufte's (1973) seminal analysis of electoral responsiveness showed strong swing ratios attending uniform swings in closely contested, narrowly decided national elections. Yet among the couple of dozen vote-seat relationships Tufte reports, the strongest swing ratios arose not in Westminster-style systems but in those nineteenth-century congressional elections held during presidential election years. Noting the sharp difference between swing ratios for nineteenth- and twentieth-century congressional elections, Tufte attributed the weakening relationship to the modern practice of bipartisan gerrymandering aimed at protecting incumbents of both parties. We accept his insight that design matters but argue that it applies equally well in explaining the exceptional responsiveness of nineteenth-century elections. Politicians in this era dedicated themselves to congressional redistricting sometimes to the exclusion of other legislative work. As party control of Ohio's state government flip-flopped repeatedly from 1878 to 1892, the legislature redistricted seven times. In one stretch the state conducted six consecutive elections with six different districting plans (Argersinger 1992, 90; Martis 1982).

Nineteenth-century politicians appear to have calculated political advantage differently than would their risk averse twentieth-century counterparts and in ways that rendered the era's congressional elections highly

[8] Absent federal law, the Constitution leaves administration of House elections to the states. In 1872 Congress attached a provision to the Apportionment Act of 1872 requiring states to hold congressional elections on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Some states were tardy in making the switch. Notably, Ohio continued to hold its congressional elections in October until 1886, Oregon until 1910, Vermont 1914 until, and last, Maine 1960. In 1845 Congress fixed the presidential election day to its current date, the "first Tuesday after the first Monday in November." For an analysis of how separate calendars affected elections during the Civil War see Carson, Jenkins, Rohde, and Souva (2001). The political considerations that might have led state politicians to adopt separate House election calendars remains unexplored and are a subject of current investigation.

[9] With this caveat in mind, we divided the time series in Figure 1 into pre- and post-1900, conveniently the mid point of the ballot reform era, and estimated coattail effects of the presidential vote for the pre- and post-1900 periods. As ballot effects would lead us to expect, the slope of the coattail effect is marginally, but significantly (at .01), stronger for the nineteenth- than the twentieth-century section of the time series, at .74 to .62, respectively.

FIGURE 3 Ballot Format in Non-Southern Congressional Districts, 1840–1940



Note: We compiled this figure by combining information from Dubin (1998) (on dates of elections) and Ludington (1911), Albright (1942), and Walker (1972) (on ballot laws). In a number of instances, we confirmed the timing of congressional elections by consulting various historical state blue books.

responsive to presidential outcomes. Partisan lawmakers during the earlier era were more inclined to construct gerrymanders in which "the dominant party magnifies its popular vote by creating many districts it can reliably but narrowly carry" (Argersinger 1992, 75). Cain (1984) has termed these practices "efficient" gerrymanders since they waste few votes in a party's effort to maximize its seat share—that is, strengthen the swing ratio—by having each district mirror its favorable statewide vote. To return to Ohio's instructive experience, each of the six districting plans effectively converted narrow statewide vote majorities for the controlling party into large seat bonuses to the House of Representatives. In 1886 Ohio Republicans could take special pride in their new district maps that secured them 15 of 21 seats (73%) with only 53% of the statewide vote (Engstrom 2003).[10]

The efficient gerrymander stands in contrast with the more familiar packing strategy of twentieth-century gerrymanders in which supporters of the out-party are concentrated into one or a few districts while in-party supporters are distributed evenly throughout the rest of the state (Cain 1984; Cox and Katz 2002; Owen and Grofman 1988). This ensures a number of easy victories for the in-party while conceding a minimal number of districts to the out-party. It also yields flatter swing ratios.

Why would twentieth-century politicians prefer this alternative to efficient gerrymandering? One familiar argument (Tufte 1973) holds that during the twentieth century, increasingly careerist incumbents (Kernell 1977; Polsby 1968) in the House of Representatives successfully importuned state legislatures to draw district boundaries insulating them from future challenges.[11]

[10]Similarly, Maine's Republicans took advantage of their control of the state government in 1884 to construct congressional districts with razor thin margins. Over the next ten years Republicans won all four seats in every election with only a 54% share of the popular vote on average.

[11]Recent research (Katz and Sala 1996) has associated this era's increasing careerism with ballot reform. In decoupling the fortunes of these officeholders from the vagaries of presidential elections the new ballot gave them an incentive to take direct control of their reelection prospects.

FIGURE 4 Percentage of Seats Redistricted and Average Age of Redistricting Plans, 1840–1940



Note: We calculated these figures from the redistricting dates reported in Martis (1982).

Whether state politicians, some of whom might covet a seat in the House of Representatives, would modify their districting preferences to accommodate these budding professionals remains unclear and conjectural (Cox and Katz 2002, 36).[12]

The answer might also reflect structural changes in electoral institutions that increased the risk of mistakes.[13] Districts with intentionally narrow majorities might in time become narrow minorities, opening the door for a disastrous sweep by the opposition. Efficient gerrymandering required accurate, up-to-date election forecasts for which public voting monitored by legions of "district men" (Silbey 1991, 222) proved an essential asset both in identifying who to turnout and for warding off reneging on prior commitments. Moreover, institutionally induced coattail voting meant that this era's politicians did not have to pay as close attention to some of the subtler aspects of voters' preferences including strength and breadth of support down the ticket. An individual whom a party canvasser scored as only marginally favoring James G. Blaine would be escorted to the voting place and safely counted in the Republican column for the House election. This rationale agrees with nineteenth-century electoral history that finds, "politicians . . . able to predict outcomes with great accuracy" (Silbey 1991, 153) in large part because "the party structure . . . provided them with a range and feel of information that the modern politician with . . . computers and survey data clearly does not have" (Marcus 1971, 10–14; Kernell 2000). The reformed ballot in contrast allowed variations in party loyalty and intensity of preferences to come into play and add an element of uncertainty to the outcome. Voters now privately chose among the parties' individual candidates and could even decide to quit voting as they moved down the ballot into the region of unfamiliar names. Confronted with increased estimation error partisan districters responded rationally (McDonald 1999; Owen and Grofman 1988) by covering targeted districts with extra partisans.

Finally, whether measured by the frequency of redistricting or the average age of existing boundaries Figure 4 exhibits a clear trend away from the frequent fine-tuning of district boundaries that efficient gerrymanders require. Neglect could have arisen from the declining turnover

[12] The increasing importance of seniority within the House (Katz and Sala 1996) might also have motivated state legislators to protect incumbents as a mechanism to direct federal funds and projects back to the state (McKelvey and Riezman 1992).

[13] Although we have already discounted the impact of a highly politicized, narrowly divided electorate nationally shifting its support from one party team to the next over a series of elections—thereby generating sizable swing ratios—one aspect of this argument that might still hold concerns the correlation between an election's swing ratio and closeness. This introduces the possibility that tight races outside the South up until 1896 account for the larger nineteenth-century swing ratios. We tested this alternative by substituting a dummy variable for the 1896 election in place of the date of a state's ballot reform. The resulting pre-post differences in the swing ratio are smaller than those reported in Table 2.

in party control of state governments—itself possibly a result of shortening presidential coattails on state legislative elections after ballot reform—that had triggered redistricting events throughout the nineteenth century (Engstrom 2003).[14] Or it might be simply that since packing strategies involved surplus margins they required less maintenance. Whatever its cause Figure 4 traces the steady decline in congressional districting after ballot reform at the same time swing ratios were turning less responsive (Brady and Grofman 1991; Tufte 1973).

Testing the Effects of Electoral Rules on State Outcomes

Control over the critical institutional ingredients in our model—ballot form, district lines and, until the 1880s, election dates—resided with the states.[15] As a consequence, in any given election year one finds a number of institutional arrangements in place across the nation. Overall Appendix B displays 17 different combinations of state ballot and calendar laws. While such variety across states cautions against inferences of institutional effects from national-level data, it represents a godsend for testing the mediating effects of this electoral machinery in a quasi-experimental setting.[16]

Accordingly, we have pooled the relevant electoral and institutional variables for the 37 non-Southern states for the years 1840 through 1940. Nineteen states entered the Union after 1840, giving us an unbalanced, time-series cross-sectional data structure pairing 733 states with presidential elections.[17] In the fourth section we reaggregate these state-level relationships to assess whether they account for national trends in party control of the House of Representatives.

[14]Yet another possibility, first noted by Burnham (1970), has party turnover declining in state legislatures after the realigning 1896 election sorted voters into safe Democratic and Republican districts. Consistent with this conjecture, a single party captured 23% of the state governments after presidential elections during the nineteenth century compared to 16% from 1900 through 1940.

[15]The effects of other electoral laws, such as party registration, on the nineteenth-century electorate, has been well-documented elsewhere (see Keyssar 2000).

[16]Although these institutions can safely be regarded as exogenous ingredients of any particular election outcome, their substantial effects on outcomes presented here were presumably comprehended by contemporaries and gave rise to strategic alterations, a topic we shall turn to in subsequent research.

[17]Working with state-level seat shares also has the advantage over district level analysis (for example, see Cox and Katz 2002) of obviating the need to take into account that district apportionments did not occur in isolation from others within a state.

Coattail Voting and Ballot Form

To analyze the effect of presidential coattails and differing institutional regimes on House voting we estimate the following equation:

$$\mathrm{DHV}_{it} = a_i + b\mathrm{DPV}_{it} + c(\mathrm{DPV}_{it} * \mathrm{B}_{it}) + d\mathrm{DHV}_{i(t-1)} + e(\mathrm{DHV}_{i(t-1)} * \mathrm{B}_{it}) \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable, DHV_{it}, is the statewide Democratic percentage of the House vote for state i at time t, and the key treatment variable is the Democratic percentage of the state presidential vote (DPV_{it}). The presidential vote is then interacted with those state-level institutional variables hypothesized to mediate the impact of the coattail. The equation is estimated as a time-series cross-section model using OLS with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995). Since changes in institutional rules interest us more than do specific differences in a states' politics we include state fixed effects to control for dissimilar partisan advantages across states.[18]

Equation 1 frames two basic tests for the effects of the state Democratic presidential vote on its congressional vote share.[19] The first test identifies the direct effect of coattail voting on House elections both under the consolidated ballot, $b\mathrm{DPV}_{it}$, and under various alternative ballot structures, $c(\mathrm{DPV}_{it} * \mathrm{B}_{it})$. If differences in state electoral laws mediate presidential coattails then the coefficient for the stand-alone presidential vote term (here representing states with a consolidated party ballot) should be significantly stronger than when it is interacted with either

[18]Simply shifting the intercepts across states will fail to detect any state interactions with the parameters that interest us. We have also checked for the possibility of heterogeneity, across states, via the technique of cross-validation (Beck 2001). Specifically, we reran Equation 1b but dropped one state at a time and examined the model's performance for the excluded state. Most of the mean absolute errors of these predictions fall within a narrow range of 1 to 5 percentage points. The estimates for Rhode Island, Kansas, Arizona, and Montana do not fit quite as well with mean absolute errors above 7. These states are marked by small congressional delegations suggesting that idiosyncrasies inherent in a single, statewide congressional race may alter the election dynamics prevailing elsewhere. Since we are more interested in the general structural properties of nineteenth-century election laws than with modeling the particulars of each states' politics, we have conservatively included these states in the analysis. A similar analysis to check for temporal heterogeneity was done by serially removing election years. The only election that marginally stood out as exceptions was (unsurprisingly) 1896 with a mean absolute error of 7.1 percentage points.

[19]We also include the lagged value of the statewide House vote to directly model the temporal dynamics (and eliminate serial correlation; Beck and Katz 1995). Including a lagged dependent variable along with fixed effects, as we do, can to lead to bias when T is small (Kvist 1995). Given that our average T is nearly 20, however, any potential bias will very likely be small (Beck 2001). Nevertheless, as a check we ran our model without fixed effects and found almost no difference in the coefficients or standard errors.

off-November congressional elections or ballot reform. In Table 1 this is what we find. The consolidated party ballot generates a nearly one-to-one relationship between statewide votes for the two offices when both were present on the ticket. Separate election calendars cut the coattail effect approximately in half from .87 to .51 (Equation 1a). Ballot reform also trimmed presidential coattails, but contrary to our expectation, the office bloc form reduced the relationship no more than did the party column ballot. In Equation 1b we have consolidated these reforms into a single Australian ballot variable. During the first four decades after the spread of ballot reform, the coattail effect lost about a quarter of its impact—from .86 to .64.[20]

A second, indirect test of coattail effects is available by interacting the lagged congressional vote (i.e., the previous midterm vote) with the state's current electoral institutions. Where coattails are hypothesized to be strong, such as states with a consolidated party ballot, the lag effect should be weaker than in settings where presidential from congressional voting were separated. This is precisely what we find in Table 1. Under the consolidated ballot regime, congressional elections did not track past results nearly as closely as they would after ballot reform. The combined weakening of the coattail and strengthening of the lag term presented House members with a much more stable electoral environment for contemplating a career in the House of Representatives. It is probably no coincidence that the proportion of non-Southern incumbents seeking reelection increased sharply (Kernell 2003) during this period.

We also tested a number of control variables that capture important aspects of the broader political setting. With the Democratic vote for both House and president percentaged against a state's total popular vote, the coattail variables (i.e., the presidential vote and its interactions) may be diluted by the presence of third-party candidates in the presidential or congressional races.[21] The positive relationship for the minor party presidential vote indicates that a state's Democratic congressional vote increases with the strength of minor party presidential candidates. This makes sense for a couple of reasons. First, throughout this period, minor party presidential candidates tended to draw votes at the expense of Republican or Whig candidates. And second, Equation 1b controls for the Democratic presidential vote, so that at a given Democratic vote share, the larger the minor party vote the smaller the residual share available to the Whig or Republican candidate. The significant, negative interaction between the minor party presidential vote and the Democratic vote, on the other hand, indicates that the stronger the minor party, the weaker the pull of the coattail. Minor parties occasionally ran House candidates or "fused" their tickets with a major party's nominee. The net effect of the minor party terms (in Equation 1b) reduces the Democratic House vote by one percentage point for each ten-point gain in the minor party vote.

Clearly, the findings indicate that the Australian ballot, whatever its form, weakened the link between presidential and congressional voting. One way to assess the cumulative, national impact of this reform is to ask the counterfactual question: How would the Democratic House vote have differed had ballot reform not occurred? In Figure 5 we simulate this for 1880 (when the 1872 federal law standardizing election dates became "fully" implemented) through 1940.[22] Beginning with the 1912 election, when presidential voting grew more volatile, the two series diverge from 1.4 percentage points on average prior to 1912 to over five percentage points afterward. The1932 election is instructive as an exception to this pattern. Here, the spread between the actual and simulated House votes shrinks to about three percentage points. Reprising Tufte's nationalization thesis, this finding suggests that a charismatic candidate promoting a national policy agenda could generate coattails nearly as long as those induced by consolidated ballots. Clearly though, *normal* nineteenth-century coattails became *exceptional* after ballot reform.

Efficient Partisan Gerrymandering

Coattail voting represented only the first stage in the nineteenth-century manufacture of responsive elections.

[20] Certainly, a unified ballot might allow a degree of upward causation where strong state organizations and candidates for other offices drove party choices and presidential votes. Stable state differences will be tapped by each state's dummy variables in the fixed effects model. More generally, however, our presidential coattail depiction of the relationship reflects the prevailing historical view of the "presidential game" (McCormick 1982) and the fact that only a top-down, national component, such as a presidential campaign, could produce the systematic marginal swings in Figure 1 which our state-level analysis fully accounts for in the fourth section. Moreover, when we regress the statewide House vote on the average House vote in all the other non-Southern states we find a significantly stronger relationship for presidential than midterm election series.

[21] In preliminary analysis (not shown) we tested and rejected other potential covariates including a state's adoption of the nominating primary, a standard spatial autocorrelation term (i.e., contiguous states' election outcomes), national party realignment (Brady 1985; Kawato 1987) and state party realignment (Nardulli 1995).

[22] The hypothetical values for each state's post-reform years were calculated by passing the state's presidential vote through the consolidated ballot coefficients in Equation 1b and adding the state's fixed effects intercept. The weighted state totals were then summed to generate the national vote prediction.

TABLE 1 The Impact of Presidential Coattails on Congressional Voting in the States, 1844–1940

Variable	Equation 1a	Equation 1b
Presidential Vote (% Dem.)	.869**	.861***
	(.066)	(.066)
Ballot Form		
Non-November Election	17.708***	16.542***
(Intercept)	(3.305)	(3.338)
Non-November Election *	−.359***	−.345***
Presidential Vote	(.086)	(.088)
Party Column Ballot (Intercept)	12.579*	
	(6.889)	
Party Column Ballot *	−.248**	
Presidential Vote	(.075)	
Office Bloc Ballot (Intercept)	9.552	
	(7.069)	
Office Bloc Ballot * Presidential	−.210**	
Vote	(.079)	
Australian Ballot (Intercept)		.835
		(2.922)
Australian Ballot * Presidential		−.223**
Vote		(.074)
Political Setting		
Minor Party Vote	.404**	.412**
	(.130)	(.130)
Minor Party Vote * Democratic	−.010**	−.010**
Presidential Vote	(.003)	(.003)
Lag of House Vote		
Lag of House Vote (Previous	.138*	.129**
Midterm)	(.052)	(.012)
Non-November Election * Lag	−.017	−.007
Vote	(.084)	(.084)
Australian Ballot * Lag Vote	.167**	.178**
	(.073)	(.073)
Constant	.433	1.445
	(2.562)	(2.519)
R^2	.781	.779
N	733	733
# of Groups	37	37
Mean Obs. Per Group	19.81	19.81

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01.
Note: Dependent variable is the percentage Democratic of the State's House Vote. Table entries are OLS coefficient estimates (with panel corrected standard errors reported in parentheses). State fixed effects are included in the estimation but not presented in the table.

Vote shares must be transformed into comparable seat shares if presidential coattails were to contribute to unified governments. Above we argue that skilled mapmakers used sharp pencils to draw marginal, yet winnable, congressional districts. After ballot reform they adapted to their more uncertain environment by abandoning efficient gerrymanders in favor of a packing strategy. To test this proposition, we estimate the following

FIGURE 5 Actual and Simulated House Vote in Presidential Elections, 1880–1940



Note: We calculated the simulated House vote by passing the actual Presidential vote through the parameters in Equation 1b assuming that the Consolidated Party Ballot was in place for the entire time-series.

vote-seat relationships:

$$\mathrm{DHS}_{it} = a\mathrm{Partisan\ Bias}_{it} + b(\mathrm{Partisan\ Bias}_{it} * \mathrm{B}_{it}) + c\mathrm{DHV}_{it} + d(\mathrm{DHV}_{it} * \mathrm{B}_{it}) \quad (2)$$

To distinguish efficient from packing strategies consider the vote-seat relationship as comprised of two components—a swing ratio (captured by the coefficients *c* and *d*) and partisan bias.[23] Recall from our discussion of Figure 2 the former measures the sensitivity of legislative seat shares to changes in the vote. Bias refers simply to the intercept term, or as commonly stated the party's expected seat share given 50% of the popular two-party vote. A positive five-percent bias means that the state's Democratic candidates could expect to win 55% of the seats with 50% of the vote.

Following a technique introduced by Cox and Katz (2002) Equation 2 includes a number of interactive terms fashioned to compare the partisan effects of balloting plans drawn before and after ballot reform (B_{it}).[24] If, as we argue, ballot reform altered the redistricting strategies in ways that reduced the responsiveness of congressional

[23]More specifically, we estimate the following standard vote-seat equation:

$$\ln(\mathrm{DHS}_{it}/1 - \mathrm{DHS}_{it}) = \lambda + \rho\,(\ln(\mathrm{DHV}_{it}/1 - \mathrm{DHV}_{it}))$$

where ρ is the swing ratio and λ taps partisan bias. To calibrate partisan bias at 50% of the vote, we pass λ through the following equation:

$$\exp[\lambda]/(\exp[\lambda] - 1) - .05.$$

This is standard procedure in the vote-seat literature (e.g., Brady and Grofman 1991; Cox and Katz 2002; King and Browning 1987).

[24]This classification and indeed, much of the rest of the analysis follows the lead of Cox and Katz (2002) in formulating prior expectations about the bias and responsiveness of redistricting plans according to the political strategies of partisan state politicians. We depart significantly from their analytic approach, however, by not specifying the party that drew the reversion plan. This information is less relevant for bipartisan plans in the nineteenth century, since they occurred less frequently. We also suspect that the failure of reversionary variables in generating significant results reflects the faster decay rate of partisan advantages embedded in nineteenth-century partisan plans. Where Cox and Katz model redistricting strategies for regime periods of 18 and 6 years respectively (1946 through 1970), we are working with a hundred year series with the same redistricting regime in place for an extended time period.

elections, the swing ratios for the pre-reform era should be larger than those for the post-reform era. To test this we have classified all redistricting events according to the partisan control of the state legislature and governor (taking into account veto override provisions).[25] With each party holding a veto redistricting will be less likely to occur under divided control of state government, but when lines were redrawn, these plans should take on a bipartisan cast that reflects each party's option to revert to the current apportionment.

In Table 2 we estimate bias and the swing ratio for each party regime presiding over redistricting. Since marginal changes in the vote near the 50% threshold have the largest impact on seat changes and weaken sharply toward a skewed two-party vote, the vote-seat function is conventionally represented as a logistic. Moreover, because there is likely a correlation across a state's districts in the probability of Democratic victory we, as do Cox and Katz, assume that seat shares follow an extended beta binomial distribution (King 1989; Palmquist 1998).[26]

These relationships confirm that the partisan design of districts rendered the congressional outcomes highly responsive to vote changes before ballot reform and less so after.[27] The vote-seat conversion rates are, as hypothesized, significantly stronger for those redistricting plans passed in the party ticket era (swing ratio of 4.64) than after reform (swing ratio of 3.48). Similarly, districts drawn during divided control of the state government follow our prediction of weaker swing ratios than did their partisan counterparts.

The results for bias are presented in the lower half of Table 2. Because bias is directional (favoring one party over the other), we have split the bias coefficients under unified government according to the governing party that wrote the districting plan. During the era of the consolidated party ballot, unified Democratic plans produced a significant pro-Democratic bias of 3.34% and unified Republican plans, an even greater pro-Republican bias of 6.41%. Unsurprisingly, plans passed during divided government display insignificant levels of bias.

According to these relationships, a statewide vote-share of 50% yielded the Democrats anywhere from 47 to 56% of their state's delegation depending on the partisan origins of the current plan.[28] The post-reform results for bias are a little less straightforward. While bias for

Table 2 The Conversion of Votes into Seats Under Different Districting Plans, 1840–1940

Variable	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Swing Ratio	
Unified Government	4.64**
	(.24)
Unified Government ∗ Australian Ballot	−1.16**
	(.29)
Divided Government	1.72**
	(.52)
Divided Government ∗ Australian Ballot	1.06*
	(.62)
Partisan Bias	
Unified Democrat	3.34*
	(1.72)
Unified Democrat ∗ Australian Ballot	3.89*
	(2.35)
Bipartisan	−2.60
	(3.57)
Bipartisan ∗ Australian Ballot	−2.52
	(5.06)
Unified Republican	−6.41**
	(1.67)
Unified Republican ∗ Australian Ballot	7.93**
	(2.37)
Minor Party Vote	.036**
	(.005)
γ	.061**
	(.008)
N	1,206
Log-likelihood	−6,499.09

*p < .10, **p < .05.
Note: The parameter 'γ' measures the correlation across districts (within a state) of the probability that the Democrats will capture the seat.

[25] In those states where the state constitution provided the governor with no veto (e.g., Ohio until 1912) or a veto that could be overridden by a simple majority (e.g., Missouri until 1874) we classified control according to party control of the legislative chambers.

[26] Using a simple binomial model would possibly lead to inefficient estimates and biased standard errors (King 1989, 119–21). Moreover, the extended beta-binomial model conditions on the number of seats in each state, thus taking into account any heteroskedasticity due to varying sizes of states' delegations (Cox and Katz 2002, 63).

[27] In separate analysis we interacted the bias and responsiveness coefficients with a counter for the time since the last redistricting. Although we suspected that these interactions would mediate the effects of the redistricting regime, the interactions proved generally insignificant. Therefore, for parsimony we have opted to exclude them.

[28] In addition, the estimate of gamma is positive and significant, indicating a correlation across districts, within a state, in the probability of a Democratic victory.

Democratic plans after reform increased to over 7%, bias fell to nearly zero for Republican plans. This discrepancy possibly reflects the geography of the parties' strongholds. Democratic strength in the cities versus Republican dominance in many states' rural areas might have allowed legislators greater latitude in subdividing the more populous and Democratic urban counties where congressional districts had long abandoned the integrity of county boundaries that dictated rural districts in most states.

Nevertheless, the overall pattern of results in Table 2 is consistent with our argument that strategic state legislators assiduously designed districts with narrow margins to maximize their parties' success. Moreover, following the adoption of ballot reform, these politicians generally changed the way they approached redistricting. They laid out district boundaries that generated more predictable and stable results—results less sensitive to the vagaries of presidential elections.

Do State-Level Relationships Explain National Party Control?

The statistical relationships uncovered thus far confirm the individual components of our model: first, nineteenth-century voters, keying on the presidential campaigns, cast coattail ballots for House elections to a significantly greater degree than did their post-reform counterparts; and second, these votes were generally distributed across districts in a manner that accentuated seat gains of the party winning the statewide plurality. The question before us now is whether, in fact, they combine to solve the puzzle of nineteenth-century responsiveness that motivated our inquiry.

There are a number of ways to sum the individual parts of the model and assess its overall performance. The standard approach looks to variance explained—in this instance to variance in a party's seat shares in the House of Representatives as a function of coattails and strategic gerrymandering. By this test our institutional variables perform quite well; specifically, the overall estimates based on combining Equations 1b and Table 2 explain 88% of the variance in the actual Democratic seat shares for the House seats introduced in Figure 1. This compares to 66% of the variance explained by the lag term of seat shares for the non-Southern delegations in the previous Congress. So, knowing only the states' presidential vote gives us a significantly better guess as to the partisan composition of the next House of Representatives than does the make-up of the current House.

In Table 3 we report two additional tests that demonstrate the model's accuracy in generating individual point estimates of Democratic shares for state delegations and Democratic seat shares for individual Congresses. Although we are principally interested in accounting for the highly responsive House elections of the nineteenth century and its subsequent decay in the twentieth, the pervasive cross-sectional variation in institutional provisions (see Appendix B) offers another way to test the model's ability to reproduce particular partisan outcomes—in this instance, the party composition of individual states' congressional delegations. Again using the lag of the Democratic percentage as the benchmark for comparison, the first two columns of Table 3 show the predictive improvement of our model.[29] For most of the nineteenth century our institutional model performs much better. The difference in performance is especially notable during the 1844 to 1888 period when the consolidated ballot was ubiquitous. Our model explains on average 90% of the variance in Democratic shares of state delegations, significantly better than the 81% ($p < .05$) accuracy for the lag benchmark. During the transition period between the party ticket and Australian ballot the predictive accuracy of our model declines slightly, although on average it still outperforms the baseline. Once the Australian ballot is fully in place across the nation (1912–40), however, our model offers no advantage over the lag term. But this null finding also corroborates our institutional story of a significant decoupling of presidential from congressional elections early in the twentieth century.

The second test in Table 3 allows us to assess the accuracy with which state electoral institutions can predict partisan changes in House party delegations from one Congress to the next. For this exercise, we have simply summed the individual predicted seats shares employed for the first test and compared the predicted *changes* in Democratic share in the last column of Table 3 with the actual changes from the preceding Congress in column 5. Once again, our model, informed wholly by a state's presidential vote, outperforms predictions based on the lag term. Finally, we return to where we began our investigation—the consistent occurrence of unified party control of the presidency and House of Representatives. At this stage to assess the overall performance of the institutional model to account for actual party control

[29] Specifically, we ran the following regression for each year: Democratic House $\text{Seats}_{it} = \beta_1 \text{Predicted House Seats}_{it}$. To control for varying state sizes, we weighted each state by the size of their congressional delegation. The numbers reported in the first two columns of Table 3 represent the variance explained by each model for each year.

Table 3 Variance Explained in the Partisan Composition of Non-Southern House Seats, 1844–1940

		Variance Explained in State Democratic Congressional Delegations		Error in Predicted Democratic Share of House Seats		
		Predicted Delegation by:		Difference in Number from:		
	Year	Previous Election	Institutional Model	Actual # of Democratic Seats	Previous Congress	Institutional Model
Consolidated Ballot Years	1844	.80	.92	86	10	−10
	1848	.81	.91	67	3	−15
	1852	.88	.91	106	−14	−15
	1856	.65	.84	71	−34	−11
	1860	.55	.89	52	−1	12
	1864	.72	.83	35	40	21
	1868	.90	.90	62	−11	−6
	1872	.83	.93	61	14	10
	1876	.94	.95	89	33	13
	1880	.88	.93	76	10	10
	1884	.93	.93	106	16	6
	1888	.83	.86	96	10	8
	Average	*.81*	*.90***	*Mean Absolute Error*	*16.33*	*11.44***
Transition Period	1892	.87	.93	135	24	−12
	1896	.55	.80	66	−31	1
	1900	.91	.82	73	13	4
	1904	.77	.80	41	42	13
	1908	.82	.86	80	−5	−12
	Average	*.78*	*.84*	*Mean Absolute Error*	*23*	*8.38***
Australian Ballot Years	1912	.86	.86	178	−39	−50
	1916	.85	.91	115	20	7
	1920	.62	.50	34	54	25
	1924	.88	.80	82	22	−25
	1928	.89	.87	68	25	8
	1932	.73	.91	213	−88	−45
	1936	.96	.93	235	−12	−1
	1940	.93	.99	168	−5	6
	Average	*.84*	*.85*	*Mean Absolute Error*	*33.13*	*20.76***

**Difference is significant at .05.
Previous Election/Congress = Prediction of current Democratic share of the Congressional delegation based on the number seats Democrats held in the previous election.
Full Model = Prediction of current Democratic share of the Congressional delegation generated using the coefficients from Table 1, Equation 1b and then passing the predicted vote through the coefficients in Table 2.

of government, we need simply to add the South's large Democratic and small Republican delegations to the estimates in Table 3. When we do so, the model correctly predicts majority party control of the House in 21 out of the 25 presidential elections between 1844 and 1940. And in those instances where we end up on the wrong side of majority control (1848, 1880, 1888, and 1916), the estimates, nevertheless, come very close; the mean absolute error for these four elections is less than ten seats. In sum, whether measured by overall explanatory power or accuracy in estimating party shares of delegations across the states or in the House of Representatives, state

electoral institutions had cumulative effects in shaping party control in Washington.

Conclusion: Assessing Institutions and History

Responsive elections are those that amplify a party's plurality support with representation in the legislature. Arguably, the most important implication of responsiveness arises in highly competitive two-party elections where a small shift in voters' preferences can yield large swings in the parties' seat shares and with it, turnover the control of government. By these criteria America's nineteenth-century elections were highly responsive and twentieth-century elections less so. Past research has explained electoral responsiveness as a function of nationalization. Programmatic political parties campaign vigorously on platforms of national issues to appeal to voters who are attentive to these issues in their choices. Nationalization is the ingredient promoting homogeneity across electoral districts and allows small changes in preferences to lead, when other conditions are satisfied, to large changes on election outcomes. Since the quadrennial presidential contest represents about the only consistently national ingredient in nineteenth-century elections in America, this era's exceptionally high levels of responsiveness presents an anomaly, or puzzle, for this argument. It is compounded by the counter-trend during the twentieth century that congressional outcomes became less responsive at the same time that American politics became increasingly nationalized.

In this article we have looked for an explanation beyond platforms and preferences to the electoral institutions that cue vote choices and subsequently channel them into districts. In the consolidated party ballot and efficient gerrymandering, nineteenth-century politicians opted for institutions that magnified slight swings in presidential preferences into pronounced shifts of fortunes in House elections. Minor shifts in party preferences reverberated to House elections via coattails and steep swing ratios. As these institutions were dismantled in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries congressional elections became less responsive. Here, in the details of state codes one finds institutions manufacturing a level of electoral responsiveness that conventional theory reserved for highly nationalized, Westminster-styled electoral systems.

These findings remind us that manipulating institutional design can have unintended consequences—some desirable, some not—the significance of which can surpass the original purpose of reform. As nineteenth-century party politicians discovered solutions for their local collective action problems in consolidated ballots and efficient gerrymanders, they were presumably unconcerned that in concentrating their fortunes on presidential contests they staved off balkanization of the party system that a parochial society and robust federalism might otherwise have produced.

Appendix A
Data Sources

Election Results and Rules: The core source for both the statewide presidential and congressional vote is Rusk (2002) and Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan (1972a, 1972b). The major difference between the two data sets lies in their political party codes. Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan code as "major" party those candidates who ran *solely* under a major party label. Rusk expands this coding to those major party candidates who also were listed by another party (e.g., Whig-Free Soilers; Silver Republicans). When these data sources disagreed, we preferred Rusk's revision (see Rusk 2002, 199–202, for a fuller discussion). In a few instances, however, we differed from both Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan as well as Rusk. First, for the 1860 election, we combine the votes for Douglas and Breckinridge, within a state, into a single Democratic presidential vote. Second, for states that had no recorded Democratic presidential vote in 1892, we entered these candidates' Populist votes as a proxy for the statewide Democratic vote. These states are Kansas, North Dakota, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming. Third, we differ in coding the statewide congressional vote for Maryland in 1860 and Kentucky in 1860 and 1864, where we scored Sectional Democrats, Peace Democrats, and the Conservative Party as Democrats. We draw information on the timing and type of ballot reform from Ludington (1911), Albright (1942), and Walker (1972) and for election dates, Dubin (1998).

Redistricting: Data on the timing of redistricting events come from Martis (1982). We exclude the few redistricting events that Martis classifies as "minor" (i.e., involving addition of new counties to existing congressional district). Partisan control of redistricting was created by matching passage dates with party control of the state legislature and the party of the governor (Burnham 1985) taking into account various state veto provisions (i.e., requiring a legislative supermajority for a veto override; Swindler 1973). We were also able in a number of instances to double-check Burnham's data against results printed in the *New York Tribune Almanac* and various historical state blue books. We found no discrepancies.

Appendix B States as Bundles of Electoral Laws

State (Year Admitted)	Ballot Structure	Year Adopted	House Election Calendar (Year of Change)	Redistricting (Year)
Arizona (1912)	Office Bloc	1891	Nov.	
	Party Column	1895		
California (1850)	Party Column	1891	Nov.	1864, 1872, 1884, 1892, 1902,
	Office Bloc	1911	Sep.*(1859)	1912, 1932
			Nov. (1864)	
			Sep.*(1867)	
			Nov.(1868)	
			Sep.*(1871)	
			Nov. (1872)	
			Sep.*(1875)	
			Nov.(1876)	
Colorado (1876)	Party Column	1891	Oct.	1892, 1914, 1922
	Office Bloc	1899	Nov. (1880)	
Connecticut (1788)	Party Column	1909	Apr.*	1842, 1912
			Nov. (1876)	
Delaware (1787)	Party Column	1891	Nov.	
Idaho (1890)	Party Column	1891	Nov.	1918
Illinois (1818)	Party Column	1891	Aug.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1882,
			Nov. (1852)	1894, 1902
Indiana (1816)	Party Column	1889	Aug.*	1842, 1852, 1868, 1874,
			Oct. (1852)	1880, 1896, 1912, 1932
			Nov. (1882)	
Iowa (1846)	Party Column	1892	Aug.	1846, 1848, 1858, 1862, 1872,
			Oct. (1858)	1882, 1886, 1932
			Nov. (1864)	
			Oct. (1866)	
			Nov. (1884)	
Kansas (1861)	Party Column	1893	Dec.	1874, 1884, 1906, 1932
	Office Bloc	1913	Nov. (1862)	
Kentucky (1792)	Office Bloc	1888	Aug.*	1842, 1862, 1882, 1912, 1932
	Party Column	1892	Nov. (1872)	
Maine (1820)	Party Column	1891	Sep.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1884,1932
Maryland (1788)	Party Column	1890	Oct.*	1842, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1902
	Office Bloc	1901	Nov.* (1853)	
			Nov. (1864)	
Massachusetts (1788)	Office Bloc	1888	Nov.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1882,
				1892, 1902, 1912, 1926, 1932
Michigan (1837)	Party Column	1891	Nov.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1882,
				1892, 1914, 1932
Minnesota (1858)	Office Bloc	1889	Oct.*	1862, 1872, 1882, 1892, 1902,
			Nov. (1860)	1914, 1934
Missouri (1821)	Party Column	1889	Aug.	1846, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1878,
			Nov. (1860)	1882, 1892, 1902, 1934
Montana (1889)	Office Bloc	1889	Oct.*	1918
	Party Column	1895	Nov. (1890)	
	Office Bloc	1939		

(*continued on next page*)

APPENDIX B (*continued*)

State (Year Admitted)	Ballot Structure	Year Adopted	House Election Calendar (Year of Change)	Redistricting (Year)
Nebraska (1867)	Office Bloc	1891	Oct.	1882, 1892, 1932
			Nov. (1876)	
Nevada (1864)	Office Bloc	1891	Nov.	
New Hampshire (1788)	Office Bloc	1891	Mar.*	1846, 1850, 1852, 1882
	Party Column	1897	Nov. (1878)	
New Jersey (1787)	Office Bloc	1911	Oct.	1842, 1844, 1846, 1852, 1872,
	Party Column	1930	Nov. (1846)	1892, 1894, 1902, 1912, 1932
New Mexico (1912)	Party Column	1905	Nov.	
New York (1788)	Party Column	1895	Nov.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1884, 1892,
	Office Bloc	1913		1902, 1912
North Dakota (1889)	Office Bloc	1891	Oct.*	1912
	Party Column	1893	Nov. (1890)	
Ohio (1803)	Party Column	1891	Oct.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1872, 1878,
			Nov. (1886)	1880, 1882, 1884, 1886,
				1890, 1892, 1914,
Oklahoma (1907)	Party Column	1890	Nov.	1906, 1914
Oregon (1859)	Office Bloc	1891	Jun.	1892, 1912
			Nov. (1910)	
Pennsylvania (1787)	Party Column	1891	Oct.	1842, 1852, 1862, 1874, 1888,
	Office Bloc	1903	Nov. (1874)	1902, 1922, 1932
Rhode Island (1790)	Office Bloc	1889	Aug.*	1842, 1872, 1882, 1912, 1932
	Party Column	1905	Apr.* (1845)	
			Nov. (1868)	
South Dakota (1889)	Office Bloc	1891	Oct.*	1912, 1932
	Party Column	1893	Nov. (1890)	
Utah (1896)	Party Column	1896	Nov.	1914
Vermont (1791)	Office Bloc	1890	Sep.	1842, 1852, 1882
	Party Column	1906	Nov. (1914)	
Washington (1889)	Office Bloc	1890	Oct.	1908, 1914, 1932
	Party Column	1891	Nov. (1890)	
West Virginia (1863)	Party Column	1891	Oct.	1862, 1882, 1902, 1916, 1930,
			Nov. (1878)	1934
Wisconsin (1848)	Office Bloc	1889	Nov.	1848, 1862, 1872, 1882, 1892,
	Party Column	1891		1902, 1912, 1932
Wyoming (1890)	Office Bloc	1890	Sep.	
	Party Column	1911	Nov. (1892)	

Note: *House election held in odd-years.
The following states initially limited the new ballot to certain localities and later applied it statewide: Kentucky (initially applied only to Louisville, statewide in 1892), Minnesota (initially towns over 10,000, statewide in 1891), Missouri (initially towns over 5000, statewide in 1891), Wisconsin (initially towns over 50,000, statewide in 1893), and Maryland (initially applied to Baltimore, statewide in 1892). The following territorial legislatures adopted a ballot law before official statehood: Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah, New Mexico, and Wyoming. New Mexico (1905–1927) and Missouri (1897–1921) provided separate ballots for each party, but these were printed and supplied by the government, and included secrecy provisions. We code these as party column ballots. For more details on ballot laws see Ludington (1911) and Albright (1942).

References

Albright, Spencer D. 1942. *The American Ballot*. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs.

Argersinger, Peter. 1992. *Structure, Process, and Party: Essays in American Political History*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.

Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. "Time-Series Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 4(June):271–93.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What to Do (and Not to Do) With Time Series Cross Section Data." *American Political Science Review* 89(3):634–47.

Bensel, Richard Franklin. 2004. *The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brady, David. 1985. "A Reevaluation of Realignments in American Politics: Evidence from the House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 79(1):28–49.

Brady, David W., and Bernard Grofman. 1991. "Sectional Differences in Partisan Bias and Electoral Responsiveness in U.S. House Elections, 1850–1980." *British Journal of Political Science* 21(April):247–56.

Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 1998. "A New Approach to the Study of Ticket Splitting." *American Political Science Review* 92(3):533–44.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1970. *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Burnham, Walter Dean. 1985. *Partisan Division of State Governments, 1834–1985* [computer file]. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

Burnham, Walter Dean, Jerome M. Clubb, and William Flanigan. 1972a. *State-Level Presidential Election Data for the United States, 1824–1972* [computer file]. ICPSR

Burnham, Walter Dean, Jerome M. Clubb, and William Flanigan. 1972b. *State-Level Congressional, Gubernatorial and Senatorial Election Data for the United States, 1824–1972* [computer file]. ICPSR.

Cain, Bruce E. 1984. *The Reapportionment Puzzle*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Campbell, Angus, and Warren E. Miller. 1957. "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting." *American Political Science Review* 51(2):293–312.

Carson, Jamie L., Jeffery A. Jenkins, David W. Rohde, and Mark A. Souva. 2001. "The Impact of National Tides and District-Level Effects on Electoral Outcomes: The U.S. Congressional Elections of 1862–63." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(4):887–98.

Claggett, William, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale. 1984. "Nationalization of the American Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 78(1):77–91.

Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan Katz. 2002. *Elbridge Gerry's Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dubin, Michael J. 1998. *United States Congressional Elections, 1788–1997: The Official Results of the Elections of the 1st Through 105th Congresses*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company.

Engstrom, Erik J. 2003. "How Party Competition Constructs Democracy: Strategic Redistricting and American Electoral Development." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego.

Evans, Cobb. 1917. *A History of the Australian Ballot in the United States*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ferejohn, John A., and Randall L. Calvert. 1984. "Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1):127–46.

Fredman, L. E. 1968. *The Australian Ballot: The Story of An American Reform*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Holt, Michael F. 1999. *The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Katz, Jonathan N., and Brian R. Sala. 1996. "Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection." *American Political Science Review* 90(1):21–33.

Katz, Richard. 1973. "The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique." *American Political Science Review* 67(3):817–28.

Kawato, Sadafumi. 1987. "Nationalization and Partisan Realignment in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 81(3):1235–50.

Kernell, Samuel. 1977. "Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation." *American Journal of Political Science* 21(4):669–93.

Kernell, Samuel. 2000. "Life Before Polls: Ohio Politicians Predict the 1828 Presidential Vote." *PS* 33(September):569–74.

Kernell, Samuel. 2003. "To Stay, To Quit or To Move Up: Explaining the Growth of Careerism in the House of Representatives, 1878–1940." Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA.

Kernell, Samuel, and Gary C. Jacobson. 1987. "Congress and the Presidency as News in the Nineteenth Century." *Journal of Politics* 49(4):1016–35.

Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. *The Right to Vote*. New York: Basic Books.

King, Gary. 1989. *Unifying Political Methodology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, Gary, and Robert X. Browning. 1987. "Democratic Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections." *American Political Science Review* 81(3):1251–73.

Kvist, Jan F. 1995. "On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Various Estimators in Dynamic Panel Models." *Journal of Econometrics* 68(August):53–78.

Ludington, Arthur C. 1911. *American Ballot Laws, 1888–1910*. New York State Education Department, Bulletin No. 448: University of the State of New York, Albany.

Marcus, R.D. 1971. *Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded Age 1880–1896*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Martis, Kenneth. 1982. *Historical Atlas of United States Congressional Districts*. New York: Free Press.

McCormick, Richard P. 1982. *The Presidential Game*. New York: Oxford University Press.

McDonald, Michael P. 1999. "Redistricting, Dealignment, and the Political Homogenization of Congressional Districts." PhD. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego.

McKelvey, Richard D., and Raymond Riezman. 1992. "Seniority in Legislatures." *American Political Science Review* 86(4):951–65.

Moos, Malcolm. 1952. *Politics, Presidents, and Coattails*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Nardulli, Peter F. 1995. "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 89(1):10–22.

Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. 1988. "Optimal Partisan, Gerrymandering." *Political Geography Quarterly* 7(1):5–22.

Palmquist, Bradley. 1998. "The Extended Beta Binomial Model in Political Analysis," Presented at Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Political Science Review* 62(1):144–68.

Reynolds, John F. 1988. *Testing Democracy: Electoral Behavior and Progressive Reform in New Jersey, 1880–1920*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.

Rusk, Jerrold G. 1970. "The Effect of Australian Ballot Reform on Split-Ticket Voting: 1876–1908." *American Political Science Review* 64(4):1220–38.

Rusk, Jerrold G. 2002. *A Statistical History of the American Electorate*. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.

Safire, William 1978. *Safire's Political Dictionary*. New York: Random House.

Silbey, Joel. 1991. *The American Political Nation, 1838–1893*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Stokes, Donald. 1967. "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces." In *The American Party System: Stages of Political Development*, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 182–202.

Swindler, William F. ed. 1973–1988. *Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions, Volumes 1–11*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications.

Tufte, Edward. 1973. "The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems." *American Political Science Review* 67(2):540–54.

Walker, Jack L. 1972. *Diffusion of Public Policy Innovation among the American States* [computer file]. ICPSR.

Wiebe, Robert. 1967. *The Search for Order: 1877–1920*. New York: Hill and Wang.