Latino Political Participation 25 Years After the Passage of Proposition 187: Opportunities and Continuing Challenges

Marisa Abrajano[†][*] and Lisa García Bedolla[**]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

***

INTRODUCTION

In November 1994, Proposition 187, which called for denying education, health care, and social services to undocumented immigrants and their children, was approved by about 60% of California voters.[1] The campaign surrounding Proposition 187 garnered national media coverage and fomented the largest mass youth protests the California Latino community had seen since the 1960s.[2] Schools were the location for much of this political activity. In mid-October 1994, junior high and high school students in Orange, Los Angeles, and Ventura Counties began walking out of school en masse.[3] According to the *Los Angeles Times*, more than ten thousand students walked out in protest during October and November.[4] Students also organized and participated in rallies, teach-ins, and petition-signing drives. They walked precincts and worked phone banks until election day. Most of these students were Latino.[5]

The campaign around Proposition 187 and its aftermath is one key reason why the state of California turned resoundingly from "Red" to "Blue."[6] Although a permanent injunction was placed on Proposition 187, and the proposition was never implemented because a federal judge found it to be unconstitutional,[7] its long-term political ramifications were significant. Fundamentally, the mobilization around Proposition 187 activated a new generation of Latino leaders, many of whom were on college campuses when the proposition was on the ballot. They cut their political teeth organizing the marches, walkouts, and other opposition efforts. For many of them, that experience brought

---

[1] LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA, FLUID BORDERS: LATINO POWER, IDENTITY, AND POLITICS IN LOS ANGELES 18 (2005) [hereinafter FLUID BORDERS].

[2] *See* Amy Pyle & Simon Romero, *Latino Youths Say Prop. 187 Fuels New Campus Activism*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1994, at EVB10 ("Not since the East Los Angeles 'blowouts' of 1968 . . . has an issue so coalesced local Latino students.").

[3] *See, e.g.*, Simon Romero, *1,500 Students Leave Class in Protest Against Prop. 187*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1994, at OCA29; Beth Shuster & Chip Johnson, *Students at 2 Pacoima Schools Protest Prop. 187*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at EVA1.

[4] *See* Amy Pyle & Greg Hernandez, *10,000 Students Protest Prop. 187*, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at OCA1.

[5] *See* Jon D. Markman, *Prop. 187's Quiet Student Revolution*, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at B3.

[6] *See* Alex Nowrasteh, *Proposition 187 Turned California Blue*, CATO INST. (July 20, 2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/proposition-187-turned-california-blue [https://perma.cc/69ZR-93C9] (postulating that Proposition 187 was an integral part of shifting the state's politics).

[7] Patrick J. McDonnell, *Prop. 187 Found Unconstitutional by Federal Judge*, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1997, at A1.

them into politics, sometimes for the first time. Two prominent Speakers of the California Assembly — Antonio Villaraigosa and Kevin de León — see their efforts to defeat Proposition 187 as the catalyst to their political careers.[8] In addition to bringing new Latino activists into the political sphere, Proposition 187 also moved existing activists to change their approach to electoral politics. As State Senator and labor leader Maria Elena Durazo said, "Prop. 187 was a big factor in reminding us [political activists] that we had to do something on the electoral level that was different, and it helped to radicalize the immigrant community in a broad, broad way."[9]

That activation of the immigrant community coincided with a huge influx of new citizens into the California electorate as a result of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). IRCA legalized unauthorized immigrants who could prove they had arrived in the country before January 1, 1982.[10] It is estimated that IRCA provided legal permanent resident ("LPR") status to just over 2.7 million unauthorized immigrants.[11] Just over 1.4 million of those, or 53%, lived in California.[12] Once granted LPR status, individuals have to wait five years before applying for citizenship.[13] They then need to wait for their citizenship applications to be processed. This can be a lengthy process. From a timing perspective, it meant that IRCA LPRs were becoming citizens, and therefore eligible to vote, right around the time that Proposition 187 was on the ballot. It is estimated that, as a result, a million new Latino voters were added to California's electoral rolls

---

[8] *See* Libby Denkmann, *California's Prop 187 Vote Damaged GOP Relations with Immigrants*, NPR (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/08/777466912/californias-prop-187-vote-damaged-gop-relations-with-immigrants [https://perma.cc/H7EG-L2BC]; Fabian Núñez, *How Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric Drove My Generation into Politics: Trump's Cynical Policies Make the Same Mistake that California Republicans Made 20 Years Ago*, ZÓCALO (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2017/08/08/anti-immigrant-rhetoric-drove-generation-politics/ideas/nexus/ [https://perma.cc/M47W-CUHK].

[9] MANUEL PASTOR, STATE OF RESISTANCE: WHAT CALIFORNIA'S DIZZYING DESCENT AND REMARKABLE RESURGENCE MEAN FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 77 (2018).

[10] Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 245A(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2019)).

[11] PEW CHARITABLE TRS., IMMIGRATION AND LEGALIZATION: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATES AND LOCALITIES 25 (2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2014/immigrationandlegalizationreport2014pdf [https://perma.cc/L8KG-6326].

[12] *Id.*

[13] 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2019).

during the 1990s.[14] These voters were not able to influence Proposition 187's passage because they were not yet naturalized and registered to vote. That would change slowly over the course of the 1990s.

Proposition 187 was followed by two other ballot measures that were on the ballot during the 1990s that Latinos and immigrants viewed as direct attacks on their communities. Proposition 209 passed in 1996. It prohibited state governmental institutions from considering race or ethnicity in public education (including admission to higher education), public employment, and contracting.[15] Proposition 227 passed in 1998 and prohibited the use of bilingual education in the state's K-12 public schools.[16] Scholars have characterized this period as one of racial threat, defined as a moment when the dominant group sees the non-dominant group as threatening and takes steps to minimize that threat.[17] Studies indicate that those naturalized Latinos who registered to vote during the 1990s were more inclined to vote than naturalized Latino voters who registered during previous decades.[18]

Many political pundits hailed the passage of Proposition 187 as the awakening of the "sleeping giant" (i.e., the Latino electorate) in California politics.[19] And while Latino political mobilization and participation certainly increased in the wake of Proposition 187,

---

[14] Carla Marinucci, *New Voters in State Are Mostly Latino*, S.F. CHRON., May 1, 2000, at A1.

[15] LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 209: PROHIBITION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION OR PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT BY STATE AND OTHER PUBLIC ENTITIES (1996), https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/1996/prop209_11_1996.html [https://perma.cc/2RDD-NED5].

[16] *See* LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, PROPOSITION 227 (1998), https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/1998/227_06_1998.htm [https://perma.cc/SGN2-WNRP]. Proposition 227 made it unlawful for public school students in California to receive in-language instruction for more than one year. After that year, students were expected to receive instruction only in English. In practice, many schools developed "sheltered English" classes to help these students access subject matter content. But their access to instruction in their home language and to teachers who had bilingual teaching credentials decreased significantly after the passage of Proposition 227. For an overview of the proposition's impact, see generally Patricia Gándara et al., *English Learners in California Schools: Unequal Resources, Unequal Outcomes*, 11 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 1-52 (2003).

[17] For a full definition of "racial threat," see Xia Wang & Natalie Todak, *Racial Threat Hypothesis*, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0204.xml [https://perma.cc/524L-JCK4].

[18] Adrian D. Pantoja et al., *Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos*, 54 POL. RES. Q. 729, 729-30 (2001); *see* Hector Tobar, *In Contests Big and Small, Latinos Take Historic Leap*, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A1.

[19] *See* Pantoja et al., *supra* note 18, at 730.

twenty-five years later, Latinos' turnout rates and share of the eligible electorate still continue to lag behind those of non-Latino whites in California as well as nationwide. Consider the following fact — while Latinos comprise 35% of the state's population, they are only about 19% of all likely voters.[20] Moreover, if we compare the rates of turnout in the 2016 presidential election, Latino turnout was 48%, whereas turnout amongst white voters was significantly higher at 65% (see Figure 1). Despite the increasing share of the Latino electorate in both California and nationwide, their turnout rates in presidential elections have remained fairly stagnant, hovering from mid-forties to a high of 49% in 2016.[21] We see in Figure 2 that the turnout gap is even more acute in midterm elections. From 1978 to 2014, the turnout gap between white and Latino eligible voters went from fifteen to twenty-eight points. In 2018, Latino turnout surged, but a fifteen-point gap with whites remained.[22] We must remember this is the gap among *eligible* voters and therefore is not related to the proportion of non-citizens within each ethnoracial group. This turnout gap in both presidential and midterms elections has persisted for the last two decades.[23]

---

[20] *California's Likely Voters*, Pub. Pol'y Inst. Cal. (Aug. 2019), https://www.ppic. org/publication/californias-likely-voters/ [https://perma.cc/TU7Z-7Q59].

[21] In midterm elections, Latino turnout among eligible voters is even lower, and has ranged from a low of 27% in 2014 to a high of 32.3% in 1998 and 2006. Cal. Civic Engagement Project, The Strength of the Latino Vote: Current and Future Impact on the U.S. Political Landscape 4 fig.5 (2018), https://static1.squarespace. com/static/57b8c7ce15d5dbf599fb46ab/t/5b4471e02b6a28965add49da/1531212267682/ FINAL+-+UnidosUS+CCEP+Brief+1+July+9+2018+%282%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHN9-LTTT]. The discrepancy between the estimates provided in Figure 1 and Figure 2 can be attributed to the fact that the underlying data sources for these figures are distinct.

[22] *See infra* Figure 2.

[23] *See infra* Figure 1 & Figure 2.

Figure 1. Presidential Election Turnout, Eligible Voters, 1980-2016

Source: Current Population Survey, November 2016 and earlier reports

Figure 2. Midterm Election Turnout Among Eligible Voters, 1978-2018

Source: Current Population Survey, November 2018 and earlier reports

Despite the surge in political activism following Proposition 187, the reality is that the Latino electorate's full political potential has yet to be realized. Scholars and practitioners have generally devoted considerable time and attention to examining the following three areas: 1) getting eligible Latinos to naturalize; 2) increasing the number of registered

Latino voters; and 3) mobilizing greater number of Latinos to vote on Election Day.[24]

In this study, we focus on the third area — get out the vote ("GOTV") efforts that are designed to increase voter turnout. The scholarly research indicates that not all voters can be mobilized in the same manner, and this is particularly true for low-propensity voters[25] such as Latinos.[26] García Bedolla and Michelson argue that it is the interpersonal interaction a target voter has with a trusted messenger that is key to the effectiveness of mobilization efforts; those efforts without that personal contact were not effective. Based on findings from Proposition 268 mobilization experiments conducted in California — to date the most comprehensive study of voter mobilization efforts among voters of color — they argue that those interpersonal connections are key to moving low-propensity voters of color to the polls.[27]

Our question is, absent that interpersonal interaction either face-to-face on the doorstep or on the phone, can text messages be effective in mobilizing voters if: (1) they come from trusted messengers (i.e., community-based organizations with a strong local reputation); or (2) they allow target voters to interact with canvassers in a personalized way, even if it is not in person? We addressed these questions by conducting five distinct GOTV text message experiments that compared how this approach worked with Latino voters compared to other voters of color in California. Four of these experiments took place in a very low-turnout election setting, the 2014 midterm election, whereas the fifth experiment was conducted in a more high-salience, high-turnout electoral setting — the 2016 presidential election.[28] Two of the

---

[24] *See* MARISA A. ABRAJANO & R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ, NEW FACES, NEW VOICES: THE HISPANIC ELECTORATE IN AMERICA 74-89 (2010); *see also* LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA & MELISSA R. MICHELSON, MOBILIZING INCLUSION: TRANSFORMING THE ELECTORATE THROUGH GET-OUT-THE-VOTE CAMPAIGNS 1-3 (2012) (researching mobilization efforts and get-out-the-vote campaigns among new and low-propensity voters).

[25] Although campaigns and scholars define the term "low-propensity voter" differently, in general, it refers to those voters who turn out to vote in less than half of the elections for which they are eligible to vote.

[26] *See* GARCÍA BEDOLLA & MICHELSON, *supra* note 24, at 2.

[27] *See id.*

[28] Presidential elections tend to be the high-water mark of electoral turnout in U.S. elections. *See* Thom File, *Voting in America: A Look at the 2016 Presidential Election*, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 10, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2017/05/voting_in_america.html [https://perma.cc/5EG7-9Q5Q] (noting that in 2016 about 61% of the U.S. citizen voting age population ("CVAP") turned out to vote). Scholars call elections "high salience" when they are in the news and on the minds of voters. In 2014, an exceptionally low turnout and low salience midterm

experiments were focused on Latino voters exclusively; the others used a more general message to all voters, including Latinos.

We found that the text message efforts were not effective with Latino voters, particularly if they were low propensity. Similar to other studies,[29] our results suggest that both the context of the election as well as one's vote propensity matters in the effectiveness of traditional text messages as a mobilizing tool. Of the four experiments that used the traditional text message platform, a statistically detectable effect was evident in only one of them. A meta-analysis of these four experiments indicates a treatment effect of 2.3 percentage points, again consistent with past research. The findings from the new interactive peer-to-peer text messaging platform suggest that the interaction target voters have with canvassers does matter; as such, it makes it a promising tool for mobilizing Latino voters and other voters of color. To our knowledge, this is the first set of studies to compare the effects of these different texting platforms among diverse voters within varied geographic and electoral settings.

I.   CAN TEXT MESSAGES MOBILIZE VOTERS?

There are relatively few published studies reporting the impact of text messaging on voter turnout. Dale and Strauss were the first to examine whether text messages could serve as effective reminders in mobilizing voters.[30] They hypothesized that impersonal text messages could indeed exert a positive effect on turnout, since they serve as noticeable reminders about the upcoming election. To test this hypothesis, the authors conducted a nationwide field experiment in the 2006 general election that assigned voters to either a control group or two different treatment groups.[31] These were "warm" texts insofar as the targets were voters who had opted in to receive reminder texts from the participating organizations.[32] The first treatment was a text message focusing on an appeal to civic duty, whereas the second treatment was a text message that attempted to mobilize voters by informing them it was a "close

---

election, the CVAP turnout rate was 42%. *See* U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2014 (2015), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-577.html [https://perma.cc/FH9C-D9U3].

[29] *See* GARCÍA BEDOLLA & MICHELSON, *supra* note 24, at 31-33.

[30] *See* Allison Dale & Aaron Strauss, *Don't Forget to Vote: Text Message Reminders as a Mobilization Tool*, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 787, 787 (2009).

[31] *See id.* at 787-88. The sample size of the study was N = 8,053. *See id.* at 787.

[32] *See* Donald P. Green et al., *Field Experiments and the Study of Voter Turnout*, 23 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 27, 33 (2013).

election." The civic duty message had a slightly larger impact on turnout than did the close election message (3.3% versus 2.7%). When the hotline was not included, impact was also larger (3.7% versus 2.4%). Amongst newly registered voters, effects were lower at 2.3%.[33] Thus, the findings from their study suggest that text messages can successfully mobilize voters.

Malhotra et al. build on Dale and Strauss's noticeable reminder theory by testing the effects of "cold" text messages (no prior contact), conditional on subjects' voting histories as well as the salience of the election.[34] They employed two different experiments with California voters. Overall, turnout among those who received the text message increased slightly less than a percentage point (0.8-0.9), but the base rate of turnout in the control group was quite low. Thus, they argue that the magnitude of their effect is comparable to that of Dale and Strauss. When disaggregating voters by their vote propensity, they find that high-propensity voters were more responsive to text messages than were low-propensity voters in a low-salience election setting, which was the statewide special election held in May 2009.[35] Those voters in the study that were habitual voters (voters who vote in more than half the elections they are eligible for) and received a text message were 16% more likely to turnout than non-habitual voters. Finally, in the higher-salience election, which happened a year later in June 2010, casual or occasional voters experienced a 2.3% boost in turnout after receiving a text. By cleaning out auxiliary contact, the authors find that "cold text messages represent an effective mobilization strategy," particularly with habitual voters.[36]

A number of studies conducted outside the United States sought to find if similar effects hold in other national contexts. Looking at the impact of text messages on Norwegian-born and immigrant voters in Norway, Bergh et al. found that text messages had the greater impact on immigrant voters, with an intent to treat ("ITT")[37] effect of four to five percentage points for those voters compared to an effect of about 0.4

---

[33] *See* Dale & Strauss, *supra* note 30, at 797-98.

[34] *See* Neil Malhotra et al., *Text Messages as Mobilization Tools: The Conditional Effect of Habitual Voting and Election Salience*, 39 AM. POL. RES. 664, 666-69 (2011).

[35] *See id.* at 675.

[36] *See id.* at 676.

[37] The intent to treat ("ITT") effect is simply the difference in turnout between the treatment and control groups. For example, if 50% of the treatment group and 48% of the control group turned out, the ITT would be 2 percentage points.

percentage points for Norwegian-born voters.[38] Their findings seem to support Dale and Strauss' noticeable reminder theory in that voting reminders, particularly for first-time immigrant voters and those in the host country for a shorter period of time, can have a significant effect on turnout.

Bhatti et al. offer additional insights from four text experiments conducted in two elections in Denmark.[39] The ITT effects they find range from 0.33 and 1.82 percentage points, with a pooled effect of 0.74 percentage points. In their study design, they vary the timing and the content of the messages delivered. They find that messages sent just before Election Day produced a larger ITT effect than those messages that were delivered on Election Day. Relevant to our study, they find that sending multiple text messages failed to yield a larger ITT effect, and neither did varying the content of the messages.[40] These studies offer further evidence of the mobilizing potential of GOTV text messages in different electoral contexts and across different samples of voters.

Beyond the published studies, a number of organizations have worked with the Analyst Institute to test the impact of text messaging on voter mobilization. Because this work is not public nor subject to peer review, we report here only on those studies that are publicly available, with those caveats. Vote.org conducted a series of experiments in the 2016 general election looking at the effect of "cold" text messages on voter registration and turnout. In the registration experiment, they found the SMS program increased registration by a statistically significant 0.3 percentage points and turnout also by 0.3 percentage points.[41] Using Hustle (a peer-to-peer texting program), they tested the effectiveness of "cold" text messages with two different scripts — one that provided polling information and another that asked voters to make a plan for voting. Their results indicated that only the

---

[38] *See* JOHANNES BERGH ET AL., INST. FOR SOC. RES., GETTING OUT THE VOTE: EXPERIMENTS IN VOTER MOBILIZATION AMONG IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES IN NORWAY 30 (2016), https://samfunnsforskning.brage.unit.no/samfunnsforskning-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2442442/75953_Rapport_12_innmat_FINAL%2bWEB-1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/Q7JE-6PA2].

[39] *See* Yosef Bhatti et al., *Moving the Campaign from the Front Door to the Front Pocket: Field Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Phrasing and Timing of Text Messages on Voter Turnout*, 27 J. ELECTIONS, PUB. OPINION & PARTIES 291, 291 (2017).

[40] *Id.*

[41] *See* ANALYST INST., VOTE.ORG SMS VOTER REGISTRATION TEST RESULTS 1 (June 22, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wDO8oReryb8pSVLSY-mlOt2WxLui49AJ/view [https://perma.cc/33MT-U8EH].

polling location messages increased turnout by 0.2 percentage points, an effect similar to that of non-partisan mail programs.[42]

## II.	Using GOTV Text Messages to Mobilize Latinos and Voters of Color

The research conducted on text messaging, therefore, suggests that it is most effective among those who vote the most often; the research also suggests that text messages can have a mobilizing effect on young voters. Electoral context seems to matter, but there seem to be mixed results in terms of the effectiveness of a "warm" or "cold" text, receiving multiple messages, or sending particular types of messages. These studies were also carried out by very different types of organizations, whose relationships varied across their targeted voters.

For our study, we built on this research to base our hypotheses on those findings and what we know about how ethnoracial group members' social position may affect mobilization efforts focused on voters of color. Because ethnoracial group members belong to social groups that have been historically excluded from the polity, we argue that getting them engaged in politics may require different strategies than those found to be effective among white voters. Numerous scholars, including Rogers Smith, have shown how citizenship and inclusion in the U.S. polity was defined ascriptively in terms of both race and gender classifications.[43] These studies demonstrate the many

---

[42]	*See* ANALYST INST., VOTE.ORG HUSTLE SMS GOTV TEST RESULTS MEMO 1 (June 22, 2017), https://drive.google.com/file/d/11q15q03ETKW1jXhSMYoypqbcbX8GlP96/view [https://perma.cc/3YFA-QDFA]. In an unpublished paper, Dale and Strauss examined the impact of text message mobilization, finding texts produced an ITT effect of 3.1 percentage points. *See* Dale & Strauss, *supra* note 30, at 796 n.15. They do not find significant differences across youth from different ethnoracial backgrounds or across the various types of messages they tested. The Analyst Institute has conducted other text message tests with a variety of organizations. Overall, text messages have been found to increase turnout by somewhere between two and five percentage points. But again, those studies are not publicly available, so we do not report them in the text.

[43]	*See* ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 470-71 (1997); *see also* MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 13-14 (1998); ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP (2003) (discussing the ways in which political communities develop within the United States and the role that race, among other factors, plays in forming political community). *See also generally* DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, THE RACIAL STATE 11-12 (2002) (looking at American democracy and citizenship through the lens of critical race theory); DESMOND KING, MAKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 1-6 (2000) (describing the parallel historical progression of race and U.S. immigration law and policy); MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL

ways that discourses of political inclusion and exclusion were the product of explicit public policies, particularly U.S. immigration policies, which were designed to maintain the United States as a white Protestant nation and to materially privilege the white population.[44] These ascriptive understandings, in turn, have been found to affect the development of political thought within ethnoracial communities, as well as approaches to and engagement with political and collective action.[45] For example, if a "voter" in the United States is conceptualized as a propertied white male, as has been true for the majority of U.S. history, then individuals who are not propertied, white, or male may have more difficulty "seeing" themselves as voters.

Social position also carries numerous implications for an individual's ability to exercise individual-level agency. As Masuoka and Junn point out, "the notion that there is uniformity in political agency — in one's ability to participate, to be mobilized by political parties and elites, to consider political alternatives, to seek and consume political information, to form positions on political phenomena" is widely held by public opinion scholars, but "agency at the individual level is constrained by relative group position."[46] They ably demonstrate that what results is a systematic variation on a vast array of public opinions and topics. This seems a simple and obvious point, but the fact of the matter is that scholars often interpret group-level differences as a reflection of individual identification with an ethnoracial group rather than a product of their structural position (as a group member) within society in the United States.

We hypothesize that if the mode of mobilization (in this case, text messages) comes from an organization with strong levels of trust in the local community, that trust may help to make that mobilization effort more effective. Thus, the critical theoretical question is whether SMS text messages from a trusted organization are sufficiently "personal" that they can be an effective voter mobilization tool for voters of color.

ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 3 (2004) (discussing the origin of the term "illegal alien" in American society and the development of U.S. immigration law).

[44] *See* IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 133-46 (1996); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS 24-39 (1998).

[45] *See* DAVID G. GUTIÉRREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 9-10 (1995); *see also* MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES xi-xiv (2001); GARCÍA BEDOLLA, FLUID BORDERS, *supra* note 1, at 1-7; LISA GARCÍA BEDOLLA, LATINO POLITICS x-xii (2d ed. 2014); MICHAEL JONES-CORREA, BETWEEN TWO NATIONS: THE POLITICAL PREDICAMENT OF LATINOS IN NEW YORK CITY 7-9 (1998).

[46] NATALIE MASUOKA & JANE JUNN, THE POLITICS OF BELONGING: RACE, PUBLIC OPINION, AND IMMIGRATION 25 (2013).

Since Gerber and Green's groundbreaking study,[47] the field experimental literature has grown exponentially. Hundreds of field experiments have shown that in-person methods, on the phone or on the doorstep, are the most effective in turning out voters.[48] Indirect methods, like direct mail and robocalls, when they do not include social persuasion messages, are less effective. As such, Green and Gerber consider the effectiveness of text messaging an anomaly.[49]

Thus, although text messages are cost-effective in their ability to target large numbers of voters, it remains to be seen whether this GOTV strategy works for low-propensity voters of color. We also have yet to test the effectiveness of interactive texting platforms — those platforms that allow a voter to interact with a live canvasser in real time via text — on voter turnout. In *Mobilizing Inclusion*, the most comprehensive experimental study of ethnoracial voter mobilization to date, García Bedolla and Michelson find that personal methods are the most effective in turning out low-propensity voters of color.[50] They argue that only in-person contact is powerful enough to cause the internal cognitive shifts necessary to change a low-propensity voter's behavior on Election Day. They reason that "the mobilization conversation, because it takes the form of an interactive narrative that evokes norms of civic duty and community purpose, can intervene in an individual's existing personal narrative and modify that person's set of self-understandings, moving her or him to adopt a voter cognitive schema."[51]

Although outreach via text messages does not include an actual conversation by the canvasser with the targeted voter, the fact that the message was sent by a trusted community organization with whom the voter has a relationship may personalize the contact. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that SMS text messages from a trusted community organization will be more effective than those from a national group, such as Vote.org. In addition, given how important personal interaction is to mobilizing ethnoracial, low-propensity voters, our second hypothesis is that the interactive texting platform should exert an even greater positive impact on turnout than traditional SMS text messages.

---

[47] *See generally* Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, *The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment*, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 653 (2000).

[48] *See, e.g.*, Donald P. Green & Alan S. Gerber, Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout 17 (3d ed. 2015).

[49] *See id.* at 101.

[50] *See* García Bedolla & Michelson, *supra* note 24, at 13-16, 172.

[51] *Id.* at 15.

III.   RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to test the effectiveness of GOTV text messages on voters of color, we conducted four GOTV text message field experiments with community organizations in California during the November 2014 election and one during the November 2016 election.[52] All of these organizations were engaged in non-partisan voter outreach. With the exception of one group, GOTV text messages were sent in addition to an in-person canvassing campaign. In all of the experiments, we partnered with local, community-based organizations who were working to mobilize voters. Our text message tests varied from previous studies in three important ways: (1) our partner organizations were engaging in voter mobilization among very diverse groups of mostly low propensity voters; (2) our partner organizations were, in large part, targeting these voters in a low-salience midterm election, which is again a different electoral context than was the case in many of the previous studies; and (3) we tested SMS text message effects as a GOTV contact on top of in-person canvassing campaigns.[53]

Table 1 summarizes the five GOTV text experiments. In the first four SMS text experiments, the groups targeted a set of low propensity voters in their geographic area. Targeting was conducted in different ways across the groups. The Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles ("CHIRLA") focused on newly registered Latino voters and Latino voters they defined as low-propensity — having voted in three or fewer of the last five statewide elections. Mi Familia Vota ("MFV")

---

[52] The four 2014 experiments were not preregistered because doing so had not yet become established practice for experimental research. The 2016 study was not a traditional experiment; we conducted the analysis after the fact since the random assignment was carried out by the Relay program. Given that, registering the project after the fact seemed inappropriate.

[53] Because it is illegal to send an SMS text message without a person opting in, mobilization organizations are most likely to develop their texting opt-in lists within the context of a canvassing campaign or other contact (this rule does not apply to the new relational texting programs, Relay and Hustle). Once voters have been initially contacted as supporters, and have agreed to opt in, it makes logical sense to test whether a follow-up GOTV text would work as the final GOTV contact for the voter, instead of as an additional in-person contact just before Election Day. But we do have to consider what we expect the impact of that additional contact to be. Some scholars contend that additional contact could result in "diminishing returns" where the impact of the subsequent contact is diluted by previous outreach. *See* Green et al., *supra* note 32, at 34. The "synergy hypothesis" posits voters will be more receptive to contact once they have been contacted by an organization. *See id.* We argue that for low-propensity voters in a low-turnout midterm election being contacted by a trusted organization, the synergy hypothesis makes more sense as an expectation of the impact of a GOTV text message after a canvass contact.

targeted newly registered Latino voters and Latino voters who voted regularly in presidential elections but not midterm elections. Strategic Concepts in Organizing and Policy Education ("SCOPE") targeted voters living in south Los Angeles, most of whom are low-income and of color; they defined low-propensity as voters who were newly registered and had voted in no more than three of the last five statewide elections. Oakland Rising focused on voters living in the Oakland "flats" — the areas with the largest numbers of low-income voters of color. They targeted voters of all propensity levels.

Table 1. Summary of Text Message GOTV Experiments

Group	# of Study Participants	Election Year	# Text Messages Sent	Geographical Area	Target Group
CHIRLA	3,211	2014	2	San Joaquin Valley, Antelope Valley, San Fernando Valley, San Gabriel Valley, Inland Empire	Low-propensity Latinos
Mi Familia Vota	3,551	2014	2	Riverside, Indio, Fresno and Modesto	Low-propensity Latinos
SCOPE	2,239	2014	1	South Los Angeles	Low-propensity African-Americans and Latinos
Oakland Rising	1,310	2014	6	East and West Oakland	Supporters and targeted voters in Oakland
WPUSA	18,869	2016	1 initial peer-to-peer	Silicon Valley	Low-propensity voters in Silicon Valley

In all these experiments, target voters were asked, either on the phone or at the door, to opt in to receiving a text message from the organization contacting them. Those voters who opted in to receive a text were then randomly assigned to either receive the text message intervention or not.[54] All those assigned to treatment were sent at least one text message (more detail may be found in Table 1).[55] These texts were therefore "warm" in the sense that the recipients had to have interacted with a canvasser and given the group permission to text them before they received the text. To ensure that random assignment generated treatment and control groups were balanced in terms of observable characteristics, we conducted several randomization checks

---

[54] Randomization was accomplished using a random number generator and assigning those numbers to each target recipient.

[55] See Appendix *infra* for balance checks.

for each of these experiments.[56] The data confirm the randomization exercise produced experimental groups that were balanced with respect to vote history and relevant demographics.[57] In addition, because choosing to opt in to receive a text was not random, we use inverse probability weighting in our analysis.

The 2016 Relay experiment with Working Partnerships USA ("WPUSA") was a bit different. This platform does not require that recipients opt in before receiving a text message. WPUSA loaded its target list into the Relay platform. Their targets were low-propensity voters — new registrants or those voters who voted in no more than three of the past five statewide elections — in Santa Clara County. Once the list is loaded, Relay randomly assigns voters to receive a text from a canvasser. The innovation with this platform is that, unlike with the SMS text platforms our groups used in 2014, text recipients can text back and interact with a canvasser in real time. But, these texts should be considered "cold" in the sense that the recipients did not have any relationship with WPUSA prior to being texted. Our treatment group is comprised of those that were assigned to be texted; our control is the remaining voters who were not contacted. Since this is not a traditional type of randomized experiment, we use propensity matching to analyze the data (we discuss this in more detail below). But we should note that the assignment to treatment in this case was random.

As Table 1 demonstrates, there was significant variation in the number of text messages sent by each group (ranging from 1 to 6), the geographic location of their target voters, the groups of voters targeted, and the content. The timing of these text messages also varied. SCOPE was the only group to send only one GOTV text message, which it sent to recipients on Election Day. The full scripts as well as information on the timing of the messages are available in the appendix.[58] We appreciate that these differences likely affect our results. We believe it is nonetheless worthwhile to analyze across these different texting campaigns for two reasons: (1) they reflect how community organizations are using texting in the "real world"; and (2) they highlight the fact that experiments measuring the impact of particular interventions may actually reflect very different implementations of that

---

[56] These randomization checks only included the text message opt-in sample; they did not include the larger target universe.

[57] Only one variable came back unbalanced: the MFV experiment contained fewer voters aged 18-29 in the treatment group than in the control group.

[58] None of the SMS text messages were personalized. Since they were sent with a mass texting program, respondents also could not respond and interact with a canvasser.

intervention; it is important to consider the possibility that we will therefore have heterogeneous treatment affects using the same tactics given these other differences. That is why we agree with Green, McGrath, and Aronow that using meta analyses across multiple experiments helps to ascertain the actual impact of these strategies.[59] As they point out, "[t]he voter turnout literature is in many ways well-suited to meta-analysis insofar as the outcomes are measured along the same metric (percentage point increases in turnout), and the treatments within a given domain are relatively similar."[60] They also point out the "file drawer" problem, where only studies with a large effect are reported. We address that here by including all our experiments in our meta-analysis, including those with no significant ITT effects. We report those findings in Table 3, below.

It is also worth noting that two of the groups, CHIRLA and MFV, both focused on low-propensity Latino voters and were sending texts to voters in areas where they had not previously engaged in voter mobilization work. SCOPE and Oakland Rising ("OR") were organizing in fairly compact geographic spaces where they had been mobilizing voters around elections for some time. Thus, the type of voter the groups were targeting and the nature of the relationship these organizations had with those voters varied across the participating groups. It is also worth noting that OR is distinct from the other groups in the number of messages sent. In general, the content of the text messages was relatively similar across the SMS experiments. They all encouraged individuals to vote on Election Day, with some providing links to polling place locations and other information.

The one experiment that is distinct from all others is the one fielded in the 2016 general election. We conducted this experiment with WPUSA to test a new peer-to-peer text messaging platform, GetThru (formerly known as Relay). It differs from traditional SMS text messages because GetThru is a texting platform that allows for real-time interactive conversations between canvassers and text recipients.[61] The SMS platforms were generally used by organizations to send one-time or multiple messages. But because those messages were sent using text batching companies, recipients could not respond to those messages and subsequently interact with a live person. Rather, any replies would

---

[59]   *See* Green et al., *supra* note 32, at 31.

[60]   *Id.*

[61]   *See* GETTHRU, https://www.getthru.io/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UU9F-2FCL]. At the time that this experiment was conducted, the platform was known as Relay. It may also be a more appealing alternative to traditional SMS texts since targets are not required to opt in in order to receive a message. *See id.*

simply be ignored. The new platforms allow canvassers to send texts directly to voters and those messages can be replied to, making it possible for the canvasser and voter to interact via text. The scripts used in the text message all began with the canvasser introducing themselves as being part of the organization, and then asks them whether they plan to vote.[62] Subsequent responses were tailored by the text canvasser to keep the voter engaged in the conversation.

IV. RESULTS

We begin with a comparison of the turnout rates for the group of individuals assigned to each experimental condition (see Table 2). The ITT results indicate that the treatment groups generally voted at higher rates than did the control groups; the ITT effect ranged from as small as -0.1% (for CHIRLA) to as large as 10.9% for Oakland Rising.[63] For MFV, the treatment group turned out at a rate of 28.3% and the control group at 25.8%, so the ITT was 2.5%. In the case of SCOPE, the ITT effect was 3.7%. For our experiment conducted in the 2016 general election, turnout rates were much higher with the control group at 73.5% and the treatment group at 74.3%.

We next performed a bivariate linear regression analysis where individual voter turnout is estimated as a linear function of the experimental treatment condition, using a dummy variable to denote assignment to the treatment group (the control group is the reference category).[64] We include covariates in our analysis.[65] We controlled for gender, age, vote propensity, and whether the target voter was Latino (since that was the most common ethnoracial group targeted with this outreach). We calculated vote propensity as the number of times the target voter had voted over the course of the previous four statewide elections: June 2014, November 2012, November 2010, and June 2010.

The regression estimates reveal that only the OR campaign exerted a statistically significant effect on turnout.[66] Receiving a text message

---

[62] See Appendix *infra* for the content of the various text messages.

[63] We should note that the phone lists the groups used varied in terms of quality, even though everyone opted in. The bounce rates (which are texts that are undeliverable) were: CHIRLA 10.7%; MFV < 1%; Oakland Rising 9.2%; SCOPE 11.8%. One difference that may help explain the variation is that MFV was able to have target voters enter their phone numbers directly into mobile devices, thus minimizing error.

[64] See Table 2 *infra* for a summary of the results.

[65] See Appendix *infra* for the full model results.

[66] Since the nature of the target list (almost entirely youth aged 18-29) and the randomization method were so different for WPUSA, we did not analyze the results

from OR elevated turnout by 10.9 percentage points, an effect that is statistically significant at the *p* < .05 level, using a two-tailed test. We note that the magnitude of this effect is considerably higher than the two previously published GOTV text message experiments.

Table 2. The Effect of Text Messages in CA's 2014 and 2016 General Elections

Organization	% Turnout Control (N)	% Turnout Treatment (N)	ITT
2014 General Election			
Oakland Rising	42.5% (134)	53.4% (1176)	10.9%*
CHIRLA	38.5% (377)	38.4% (2834)	-0.1%
Mi Familia Vota	25.8% (361)	28.3% (3190)	2.5%
SCOPE	33.2% (277)	36.9% (1962)	3.7%
2016 General Election			
WPUSA	73.5% (2,814)	74.3% (16,055)	0.8%

Note: * denotes statistical significance at p < .05 level (two-tailed). These estimates (except WPUSA — see footnote 66) control for the following covariates: vote propensity, age, gender, and race/ethnicity (Latino). The results for the full model may be found in Table A5 in the Appendix.

As we mention above, because a voter choosing to opt in to receive a text was not random, we also conducted our analysis using inverse probability weighting. Those results are summarized in Table 3. We can see that applying the weights does not significantly change the results; the OR experiment remains the only experiment with a statistically significant effect.

---

using linear regression with covariates. Instead, we focused on using propensity matching to try to derive a sense of the program's impact.

Table 3. Inverse Probability Weighting Estimates

Group	Average Treatment Effect Coefficient	Standard Error	p-value	N
Oakland Rising	0.10	[.01,.18]	0.01	1310
CHIRLA	0.01	[-.04, .06]	0.73	3211
Mi Familia Vota	0.01	[-.04, .06]	0.66	3551
SCOPE	0.01	[-.03,.06]	0.56	2289

Note: These estimates control for the following covariates: vote propensity, age, gender, and race/ethnicity (Latino).

The fact that OR's texting campaign was unique in terms of the number of text messages sent could help to explain the magnitude of the effect. Moreover, the electoral context for their text message efforts was quite different than for our other experiments. Despite the overall very low turnout in California in November 2014, electoral salience was quite high in Oakland in that election. The city had a very competitive mayoral race and two important initiatives on the ballot — a local measure to increase the city's minimum wage and Proposition 47, a sentencing reform ballot initiative that was very high-profile in Oakland. Finally, OR was targeting both high- and low-propensity voters in these communities. Thus, our results seem to support earlier work that finds that text messaging is most effective among habitual voters in high salience elections.

We also performed a fixed effects meta-analysis on these text experiments to determine the size of the treatment effect across all four text experiments.[67] We excluded the WPUSA experiment from this analysis given the very distinct nature of this text messaging effort. Analyzing the results in this way, we find that the GOTV texts had a positive and statistically significant 2.3 percentage point impact on voter turnout ($p < 0.05$, two-tailed), a result that is similar to previous findings.[68] Our findings suggest that text messaging is likely an effective

---

[67] See Table 4 *infra* for a summary of that analysis. For information on fixed effects meta-analysis, see Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation 362 (2012).

[68] Our test of homogeneity failed to reach statistical significance at $p < .01$ level, indicating that the treatment effect was distinct across the studies. The q-statistic was 4.052 with a p-value of .256.

strategy with low-propensity voters of color, but electoral salience and context seem to matter.

Table 4. Linear Probability Estimates and Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Text Messages on Voter Turnout

Organization	Treatment Coefficient	Confidence Interval	p-value	N
Oakland Rising	0.10	[.02,.18]	0.02	1310
CHIRLA	0.01	[-.04,.06]	0.9	3211
Mi Familia Vota	0.01	[-.04,.06]	0.3	3551
SCOPE	0.02	[-.03,.07]	0.2	2289
Meta-Analysis (excludes WPUSA)	0.023	0.01	0.03	—

Note: The models were estimated with the following covariates: age, Latino, gender and vote propensity.

Our final set of results stems from a more in-depth analysis of the WPUSA experiment. In the WPUSA experiment, voters were randomly assigned to receive the initial text message. But, our hypothesis is that the potential impact of these messages stems from the target voter's interaction with a canvasser. However, some individuals are more likely than others to respond to the initial text message. Given the unique nature of the mobilization interaction, we estimated the treatment effect among the sub-group of text recipients who responded to the first text message they received by conducting an OLS regression and two matching models (propensity score and coarsened exact). We are able to approximate a causal effect by statistically controlling for observable confounders in the OLS model and by pruning the data to achieve highly similar groups based on observable characteristics in the matching estimates.

The OLS model controls for all available demographic data from the voter file as well as additional demographics that were provided by the data vendor (e.g., age, ethnoracial background, marital status).[69] In both matching models, text responders (n = 942) were matched to control subjects (n = 3,696) along these same covariates. The results from these models are available in Figure A1 of the Appendix.

---

[69] We received the data from Political Data, Inc. ("PDI"), who include supplemental demographic information to the voter file. See Appendix *infra* for the full list of covariates.

As the estimates from Table 5 suggest, conditional on observable covariates, having a text interaction with a canvasser (defined as responding to at least one text) led to a positive impact on the probability of turnout. The estimated effect ranges from +15.2% in the propensity score match to +18.3% in the coarsened exact match.[70] These findings suggest that responding to the initial GOTV text message is associated with a 15%-18% increase in the likelihood of voting. Thus, this interactive platform appears to be a promising mobilization tool for low-propensity voters of color. That said, the analysis may suffer from omitted variable bias and thus, they are merely suggestive of the way that interactive texts can affect turnout. Future research should build upon these findings and pay special attention to the effect of social interaction on voter turnout, whether in person or not.

Table 5. Estimated Effect of Text Interaction on Pr (Turnout) in November 2016 Election

	OLS	Propensity Score Matching	Coarsened Exact Matching
Treatment Coefficient	0.153*	0.152*	0.183*
Standard Error	0.015	0.017	0.027
N Treated	942	941	327
N Control	3696	756	567

Note: * denotes statistical significance at p < .0001 level (two-tailed)

CONCLUSION

Our experimental findings provide several important insights about using technology as a way to mobilize voters, particularly Latino voters and other voters of color. First, we expand upon previous studies by focusing on the effectiveness of GOTV texts on low propensity voters of color who are contacted by a trusted organization. We also contribute to the existing research by examining the effectiveness of a new platform that makes texting an interactive and more personalized process.

Our findings also support earlier work noting the importance of electoral salience in the effectiveness of GOTV text messages, particularly in comparison to a more politically charged and polarized environment such as the elections immediately following the passage of Proposition 187. Relatively speaking, the 2014 general election in

---

[70] See Appendix *infra* for the full analysis and full list of covariates.

California was a difficult environment for voter mobilization due to its off-year status, relatively few contentious ballot measures, low information, and modest interest and intensity around the race for governor. These factors stand in stark contrast to the highly politicized electoral context that characterized the mid- to late 1990s in California. Such an environment, as we have seen, is critical to mobilize low-propensity voters like Latinos to the polls.

Across the state, and in comparison to turnout in the midterm elections of 2010 and 2006 (when 37.8% and 37% of registered voters cast a ballot), the statewide rate of voting in the 2014 general election was 42.2%. Latino turnout during this midterm election was even lower at 27.2%. These factors help to explain the context in which these experiments took place, with the exception of our Oakland experiment, where a local election generated a great deal of enthusiasm within the city limits and the text campaign targeted high- and low-propensity voters. We also offer some suggestive evidence from the 2016 general election regarding the effectiveness of new peer-to-peer text messaging platforms that enable canvassers to interact personally and possibly develop relationships with voters. We believe that this is a fruitful line for future research.

Our results suggest that a relatively impersonal contact like a text message works for habitual voters. However, for new or infrequent voters that are in need of a greater cognitive shift, interactive peer-to-peer texting may be an effective strategy. Thus, it is essential to continually revisit the effectiveness of GOTV tactics using technology, particularly those that evolve so rapidly from one campaign cycle to another. As Green and Gerber note, there is still much to be learned about these relatively new types of campaign outreach.[71] Finally, our study also underlines the importance of testing GOTV strategies with diverse groups of voters with different voting propensities, in distinct geographic spaces, and during different types of elections, in order to ascertain whether they operate in the same ways.

---

[71] *See* GREEN & GERBER, *supra* note 48, at 162-64.

APPENDIX

Figure A1

Tables A1-A4. Balance Tables

MFV Text Experiment

	Treatment	Control	T-value (control-treat)	Pr(|T| > |t|)
Voted in the Past 4 Elections (Nov 2010-June 2014)	0.6%	0.2%	-0.87	0.38
Age 18-29	42.7%	49.3%	2.4	0.02*
Age 30-44	27.6%	25.5%	-0.86	0.39
Age 45-60	20.2%	19.1%	-0.48	0.63
Female	51.2%	53.5%	0.81	0.42
N	3,190	361	---	---

* statistically significant at p < .05 level

CHIRLA Text Experiment

	Treatment	Control	T-value (control-treat)	Pr(|T| > |t|)
Voted in the Past Four Elections (Nov. 2010-June 2014)	0.5%	0.3%	–0.62	0.53
Age 18-29	29.2%	29.4%	0.09	0.92
Age 30-44	20.4%	16.8%	–1.65	0.10
Age 45-60	38.9%	40.3%	0.55	0.58
Female	54.6%	52.7%	–0.71	0.48
N	2,777	374	—	—

OR Text Experiment

	Treatment	Control	T-value (control-treat)	Pr(|T| > |t|)
Voted in the Past Four Elections (Nov. 2010-June 2014)	13.7%	11.8%	–0.61	0.54
Age 18-29	20.8%	20.7%	–0.03	0.97
Age 30-44	44.3%	40%	–0.94	0.34
Age 45-60	23%	26.7%	0.94	0.35
Female	50.7%	56.3%	1.23	0.22
Latino	9.4%	11.1%	0.64	0.52
N	1,193	135	—	—

SCOPE Text Experiment

	Treatment	Control	T-value (control-treat)	Pr(|T| > |t|)
Voted in the Past Four Elections (Nov. 2010-June 2014)	10.2%	7.6%	–1.4	0.15
Age 18-29	25.7%	25.2%	–0.20	0.83
Age 30-44	21.9%	26.7%	1.92	0.054
Age 45-60	27.3%	25.5%	–0.70	0.48
Female	53.4%	48.6%	–1.63	0.10
Latino	32.7%	34.2%	0.53	0.59
N	1962	227	—	—

Table A5. Linear Probability Estimates (Full Models)

	OR	**SCOPE**	**CHIRLA**	**MFV**
Text Message Treatment	.10 (.04)	.02 (.025)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.02)
Voted in Past Four Elections	.43 (.06)	.49 (.03)	0.42 (.12)	.59 (.03)
Female	.004 (.02)	.04 (.02)	0.9 (.02)	–.01 (.01)
Latino	–.001 (.04)	.01 (.019)	—	—
Age 18-29	–.30 (.05)	–.31 (.03)	–.28 (.03)	–.27 (.03)
Age 30-44	–.09 (.04)	–.22 (.03)	–.17 (.03)	–.20 (.03)
Age 45-60	–.06 (.05)	–.13 (.03)	–.07 (.12)	–.06 (.03)
N	1310	2289	3151	3551