The Ebb and Flow of Empire

Realism and the Hundred Years' War

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[1] Lucas, 1929.
[2] Allmand.
[3] Allmand.

Chapter One

Through the annals of history, there has never existed a society that did not know war. From triremes to stealth bombers, from slings and stones to Little Boy and Fat Man, warfare has been a universal feature of the human condition. What causes this condition? Is there a single cause to all warfare? Can one theory or model explain why war has been constant despite developments in communications, culture, and prosperity over the course of history?

A specific example: for eight hundred years, the two main cultures of Western Europe fought on the plains between the Swiss Alps and the North Sea. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the power consolidation of the Capetian kings of France blended seamlessly into the expansion of the Valois, at the expense of the (German) Holy Roman Empire. Cardinal Richelieu, advisor to the French king during the Thirty Years' War of the early seventeenth century, directed French policy to capitalize, through expansion, on the turmoil that the Reformation had brought to Germany. In the seventeenth century France's King Louis XIV brought his armies to German soil, as did Napoleon Bonaparte in the early nineteenth. The nineteenth century saw the end of the Holy Roman Empire, the unification of German states, and a reversal of momentum as German armies marched westward – a feat repeated twice in the first half of the twentieth century.

Why? Can the reasons that Kaiser Wilhelm II violated Belgian Neutrality in 1914 be the same ones that lured the armies of France's King Philip VI to that same territory in the 1330's? Implicit in this inquiry is a question about the significance of the Medieval/Modern divide (traditionally placed at the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648). Was there a fundamental shift in human values from medieval to modern times which altered the reasons that humans went to war? Did modern man fight his brother for different reasons than medieval man? This is the question this thesis will attempt to answer – do the causes of war in a feudal system, where sovereignty is not based on territory and where loyalties overlap, differ from the causes of war in a modern system of clearly defined nation states?

Addressing this issue serves two purposes. First, an answer to this question can provide answers about the causes of feudal warfare. Secondly, this question will test the universal applicability of modern theories of war.

The Question

In order to test the validity of a theory, its core assumptions must be valid – that is, its necessary preconditions must be present. This thesis will seek to establish the presence or absence of the core tenets of the dominant theory in international relations: Realism.

Realist theory is a large umbrella under which many differing, even contradictory, doctrines fall. It is therefore necessary to define Realism by those core tenets which are shared from one side of the umbrella to the other. For the purposes of this paper, then, Realism is defined as a theory of international relations which identifies, as the fundamental causes of warfare, the anarchic nature of the international system and the need of actors in the system to engage in self-help as the only means of guaranteeing their security. In other words, the absence of a higher, institutional authority, holding the allegiance of all actors in the system, creates a security dilemma whereby actors are left to guarantee their own security against other actors who are trying to accomplish the same feat. It is in using self-help to gain security relative to other states that wars arise, as states battle back and forth for relative security gains.

If realism is to be operable in a feudal setting, anarchy and self-help must be discernable trait of the international system. That is, there must be no institution or actor higher than the feudal lord to which a conflict is brought and settled. The actors must also be free to engage in self-help, constrained neither by normative concerns nor a higher authority. A more extensive definition of both anarchy and self-help will be given below.

The Hundred Years' War will serve as the setting for this analysis. The extraordinary duration of the war will allow for a wide range of test cases to examine. Spanning the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, the Hundred Years' War was fought during the so-called "High Medieval Period" during which feudal traditions were most clearly defined, prior to the development of anything which might resemble a modern nation-state.

The aim of this paper, then, is to test for the presence or absence of Realism's core tenets in Europe during the Hundred Years' War. Was the system anarchic? Were the actors free to engage in self-help? If the answer to both of these questions is "yes", then we can begin to test the value of Realism as an interpretive tool of feudal international relations. Otherwise, no such test can be conducted.

Literature Review

Realists

As articulated by Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics*, Realism is currently the dominant theory in international relations. In this book, Waltz stresses that seeking the causes of war by looking at individuals or states is incomplete. This method he dismisses as reductionism – an attempt to assess the whole by assessing its parts. The shortcoming of this tactic is that it leaves the analyst with no knowledge of the group or system as an entity in itself. Instead, Waltz urges political scientists to look to the system in which states function and relate for an adequate explanation of the causes of war.

When Waltz looks at this system, he notices that it is characterized by anarchy: the lack of an authority higher than the individual members, which are each formally recognized to be equals of one another. Waltz contrasts this condition with that of hierarchy, as experienced within a state:

> Nationally as internationally, contact generates conflict and at times issues in violence. The difference between national and international politics lies not in the

use of force but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it. A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the right to use force – that is, to apply a variety of sanctions to control the use of force by its subjects. If some use private force, others may appeal to the government. A government has no monopoly on the use of force, as is all too evident. An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the *legitimate* use of force, and legitimate here means that public agents are organized to prevent and to counter the private use of force. Citizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do that. A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is. [emphasis original][1]

In a domestic situation, two citizens bring a conflict to the government (via police or civil courts), and the use of force by any litigant is prohibited. Moreover, the decisions of the government are binding. However, in the international system, there are no authoritative police or courts to which states can bring a conflict. There is always the possibility that a conflict between states will extend to the use of force.

The last four sentences of the above-cited quote explain the second fundamental assumption of Realism: the anarchy of the international system compels states to seek their own protection in the event of a conflict escalating to violence. This is so because there is no mechanism to prevent such a conflict escalation. States then build military capabilities or mutual alliances for protection against potential aggressors. This is a system of self-help, whereby states recognize that there is no external force (another state, a central authority, a moral code) which will protect them. States must then be prepared to protect themselves, or risk annihilation.

Waltz argues that anarchy is thus the permissive cause of war because its presence and its consequences mean that war is always possible.

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[1] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 103-104.

Constructivists

A strong, competing theory is that of Constructivism, as articulated by Alexander Wendt in his article, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power Politics."[2] Specifically, Wendt takes issue with Waltz's assumption that self-help follows automatically from anarchy.

Wendt argues that the international system (like any system of inter-actor relationships) contains institutions, such as collective security, self-help, or altruism. Wendt claims that such institutions are built on processes, and that they are not *a priori* given. An institution of altruism is built, for example, on a process whereby actors gain mutual trust, and do not fear each other, leaving open the possibility that they can encourage and assist each other to meet each other's needs. It is critical to examine the processes by which these actors (be they individuals or states) relate, in order to understand the institutions that are built between them.

Wendt sees actors as looking on each other through a perspective of meanings. An actor, attaches a meaning – friend, enemy, brother, mother – to another, and interprets the actions of the other in that light. The bases for these meanings are the roles that the actors play with respect to one another and the experiences they have of each other's actions. These roles are assigned based on collective meanings, shared by both or all actors. And these meanings derive from shared norms or values.

Audie Klotz, in her article, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," defines these norms. They are not to

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[2] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 2 (Spring, 1992).

be seen as "an ethical alternative to or constraint on self-interest,"[3] meaning that we are

not to concieve of an actor as debating the merits of obeying a moral code or pursuing his

own interest. Instead, Klotz states that norms have more of an explanatory role – that an

action is better interpreted by understanding the fabric of social norms in which the action

was undertaken.

As both Klotz and Wendt argue, these roles and identities, as determined by

common norms, in turn, shape interests. Thus the norms play what is called a constitutive

role. Rodney Bruce Hall and Fredereich Kratochwil, in their article, "Medieval Tales:

Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History,"[4] insist on a difference between what they

call regulatory norms and constitutive norms. The former act like what Klotz called "an

ethical alternative to or constraint on self-interest," making themselves aware to the

decision-maker. The latter, in contrast, are imperceptible to the actor, subconciously

limiting an actor's options, and thereby altering his decisions. For our purposes, since it

makes no practical difference whether an actor obeyed a norm because of its appeal to his

moral sense (he was forced to choose between pursuing self-interest or obeying a social

norm) or because of the limited options he entertained (his self-interest was shaped by the

norm in the first place) – the potential constraining effect would remain the same – no

distinction will be made in this paper between the two.

Focusing specifically on self-help, Wendt argues that self-help is not a natural or

automatic byproduct of anarchy, but instead is the result of "selfish" identities which

actors attach to themselves and others, based on a preconception of "me against the

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[3] Audie Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and the U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa," *International Organization*, Volume 49, Issue 3 (Summer, 1995), p. 460.
[4] Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Medieval Tales: Neorealist 'Science' and the Abuse of History," *International Organization*, Volume 47, Issue 3 (Summer, 1993).

world." Anarchy does not ensure the rise of such preconceptions, they are the result of

processes whereby one state made itself threatening to the other, and actions,

interpretations, and reactions all reinforced this preconception. Wendt provides a diagram

to demonstrate how actions and meanings reinforce one another to create an institution:

INSTITUTIONS   PROCESS

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┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ State A with identities│       │ (1) Stimulus requiring   │
│ and interests          │       │     action               │
└──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────┘
                                           │
                                 ┌──────────────────────────┐
                                 │ (2) States A's definition │
                                 │     of the situation      │
                                 └──────────────────────────┘
                                           │
┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ Intersubjective       │        │ (3) State A's action      │
│ understandings and    │        └──────────────────────────┘
│ expectations possessed │                  │
│ by and constitutive of │       ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ A and B                │       │ (4) State B's interpretation│
└──────────────────────┘        │     of A's action and     │
                                 │     B's own definition of │
                                 │     the situation         │
                                 └──────────────────────────┘
┌──────────────────────┐                  │
│ State B with identities│       ┌──────────────────────────┐
│ and interests          │       │ (5) State B's action      │
└──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────┘
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State A has a preconcieved idea of identities and of its interests. These shape its

definition of a stimulus involving state B, and it acts accordingly. This action alters or

reinforces the common understandings shared by A and B, which in turn, alter B's

definition of its own identity and interests, and of the stimulus. State B then acts

according to its understandings, altering or reinforcing the common understandings, and

restarting the cycle again with State A. Thus Wendt argues that identities, and the

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[5] Wendt, p. 406.

interests they shape, are themselves shaped by a process of interaction. Once a process is established, it is difficult to escape it because of the modes of thinking which are engendered as a consequence of actions. Thus Constructivists argue that institutions such as self-help are constructed and shaped by norms and actions, not given or assumed.

Constructivists insist that, although the modern world is one of self-help, examining a world with significantly different social norms and understandings would demonstrate that other institutions (collective security, altruism, etc.) are possible under anarchy, too. Constructivists point out that Medieval Europe is just such a world, social norms and identities having changed drastically to their present form at the Medieval/Modern divide during the Seventeenth Century. Thus they seek to demonstrate that the constructed institutions of feudalism are the alternative to self-help which will prove Wendt's theory.

John G. Ruggie, in a critique of Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* entitled, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,"[6] states that the Medieval to Modern shift is the "most important textual change in international politics this *milennium*."[7] He criticizes Waltz for failing to explain such a shift. The difference, Ruggie argues, between the two social orders is one of differentiation. In other words, the ideas and concepts by which the units are distinguished from one another are completely different now than they were in Feudal Europe. In the Modern world, actors (states) are distinguished on the basis of territory, over which a state has sovereignty, and the right and responsibility to defend. A state is the final judge of events which occur involving its citizens on the land over which it is

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[6] John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Tranformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Sunthesis," *World Politics*, Volume 35, No. 2 (Jan., 1983).
[7] Ruggie, p. 273.

sovereign. In the Medieval world, however, the differentiaion was functional – units were distinguished from one another based on the role they played. A priest worshipped, a farmer farmed, an artisan created, knights fought, and so on. There was no need for one actor to guarantee its security against another because that function was left up to the fighters – the knights who fought for the security of all. Furthermore, territory was not associated with sovereignty; it was considered to be private property. Although the system was anarchic, just as is the modern one, it does not follow that the notion of exclusive sovereignty was the basis of differentiation between units.

This concept of functional differentiation provides the non-"selfish" identity which Wendts seeks to establish. Medieval Europe, according to the Constructivists, is the proof that institutions such as self-help and sovereignty are constructed because the system then was anarchic like the Modern one, and yet these institutions are not present. Thus Constructivist theory rests in large part on the ability to prove that the Medieval world was, in fact, different than the modern one.

Realists, II

Markus Fischer takes up the challenge presented by Constructivists. In his article, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourses and Conflictual Practices,"[8] Fischer recognizes the importance of the Medieval test. On the one hand, proving the substantive, normative differences between Medieval and Modern discourse might validate the Constructivist attack on Realism. On the other hand, demonstrating that, despite the differences in discourse, self-help and power politics still characterized Medieval Europe

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[8] Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 2 (Spring, 1992).

would not only cripple Wendt's hypothesis but would also take a step toward supporting Realism's claim to be a universal tool for understanding inter-actor relationships in an anarchic system.

Fischer starts by acknowledging the differences between Feudal and Modern discourses. He then proceeds to demonstrate that this discourse was only superficially professed, covering a system of self-help and power politics where actors behaved not unlike modern states. Fischer concludes that fuedal bonds were nothing more than alliances, to be broken as interests demanded; and that the concept of justice conformed to the maxim that might makes right, enshrining power distribution as the determining factor in inter-actor conflicts.

In the end, Fischer claims that his findings corroborate Realism as a universal tool for understanding international relations. His evidence supports his claims about the "unalterable essence of human nature,"[9] which will provide for an egoist identity and the need for self-help in every anarchical situation. Thus, he claims that the Medieval/Modern divide is epiphenomenal and the causes of war in a Feudal system are the same as they are in a Modern system of nation-states.

Thesis

This paper will take the position that a Realist explanation of warfare can be applied to Feudal Europe as well as to the modern international system. I will show that the system during the Hundred Years' War was, in fact, anarchic, and that actors were not

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[9] Fischer, p. 465.

significantly constrained by feudal norms from pursuing their interests in the name of self-help.

While the conclusion of this paper is similar to Markus Fischer's, the difference in methodology makes it an original and helpful contribution to the overall discussion between Realists and Constructivists. Fischer's piece is a critique directed at Constructivism. He formats his article to address and disprove Constructivist claims. To this end, Fischer employs anecdotal and general evidence from the body of complete Medieval European history, spanning the Continent as well as the centuries. In this way, his work is open to criticism that he uses selective evidence – that he had such a wealth of evidence from which to choose that he was able to select evidence which would support his claim, omitting that which did not.

However this thesis is structured differently. Instead of taking a negative approach to Constructivism, it is examining the evidence for a confirmation of Realist assumptions. Furthermore, by systematically following a single actor over an extended period of time, a much more accurate and complete historical account can be given.

Structural Overview

In Chapter Two of this paper, I will provide a historical background of the Hundred Years' War, to acquaint readers with the context of the evidence I will provide. I will introduce here the principal actors of the conflict, discuss its immediate origins, and

give a brief summary of the progress of the war – for the duration that will be examined in later chapters.

In Chapter Three, I will demonstrate the anarchical nature of the Feudal international system. I will do this by examining the attitudes of the English and French antagonists toward the Church Universal, the only body which might be considered for a role of common authority. Evidence and statements regarding respect for the Church will be examined, as will the actions of both parties regarding Church-sponsored negotiations and truces. The period examined will start with the beginning of the war in 1337 and extend until the Great Schism in 1378, when the church could no longer be considered universal. In the end, I will demonstrate that the Church was not a respected common authority with the means of enforcing its decisions – and that therefore, it was not an obstacle to anarchy. Thus, conflict resolution was the responsibility of the principal actors: the English and French Kings.

In Chapter Four, I will demonstrate that the actors in the Feudal system had the responsibility and the freedom to pursue their own interests and maintain their own security. I will do this by examining the history of the Low Countries, mainly Flanders, in the years preceding the Hundred Years' War and in its early stages. This method has the advantage of providing evidence that a given actor consistently follows its self interest, much like a modern state. I chose the Low Countries because of their central location between France, England, and the Empire. Although each duke or count was a vassal to either the king of France or the Holy Roman Emperor, their central location gave them the opportunity to auction off their allegiances to the highest bidding of all three monarchs. As opposed to Fischer's methodology – describing general conditions across a

span of centuries – it is more convincing to track a single group of actors over a specific period of time, examining their actions and motivations. The historical record will show that the various Lowland counts and dukes (and other players further down the vassalage chain) consistently followed their self-interest, whether it was in accordance with Feudal discourse or otherwise. In this, the actions of the Low Countries follow closely what one would expect of a modern state.

In Chapter Five, I will analyze what it means for Constructivism to lose its primary test case. Furthermore, I will attempt to preempt any possible criticisms of my thesis there. I will examine the importance of my findings – the improved historical understanding, the theoretical implications, the potential for the testing of Realism in Feudal Europe, and the implications for the future of the current international system.

Chapter Two

Before searching the evidence for traces of Realism's core tenets, it is necessary to understand the context of that evidence. Chapters Three and Four examine events in the years prior to and in the early part of the Hundred Years' War. To better understand those narratives, it is important to know some basic history about the Hundred Years' War.

Principal Actors

The English – Since the Norman Conquest in 1066, English kings owned land on the Continent – a swathe of land from the English Channel down to Pyrenees known as the Angevin Empire. For the bulk of the time examined in this thesis, England was ruled by Edward III of the house of Plantagenet.

The French – The French monarchy, under the Capetians, steadily increased its power and land holdings. It was French policy to consolidate all the land from the Pyrenees and the Holy Roman Empire. And, from the twelfth century, when the Empire's power began to wane, the Capetians extended their influence beyond the traditional borders of France. Between 1337 and 1378, France was ruled by Philip VI, John II, and Charles V.

The Holy Roman Empire – The Holy Roman Empire was the erstwhile successor of the Western Roman Empire. On Christmas Day, 800, Charlemagne was crowned Holy Roman Emperor – ruler of all lands between the Iberian Peninsula, the Baltic Sea, and the Danube, including England and Italy. Upon his death in 814, however, the Empire was split in three by the Treaty of Verdun – Germany, France, and Italy (roughly) – and the Empire was no more. In 962, Otto I, king of the German duchies, renamed the German lands the Holy Roman Empire and resurrected the title of Holy Roman Emperor, fulfilling the concomitant duties only nominally.

By the fourteenth century, the Empire had lost much of the power it had wielded during the tenth and eleventh centuries. The extent of its authority into the Lowlands (the western frontier of the Empire) was unexercised at best, negligible at worst. The Emperor was not primarily concerned with the war between the English and French kings, only insofar as it presented him an opportunity to pursue his interests. The Emperor did wish to check France's eastward expansion, but he was willing to sacrifice this goal in the pursuit of other ones, such as quelling uprisings in the southern regions of the Empire and resisting the demands of the papacy. The Emperors during this time were Lewis IV of Bavaria, Charles IV of Luxembourg, and Wenceslas of Luxembourg.

The Flemings – Flanders, the county bounded by the Schelde River and the North Sea, was a county overlapping the divide between Empire and France, between Germanic peoples and Latin peoples, between Flemish tongue and Walloon tongue. It was therefore bound to play a leading role in any conflict between the French king and the Emperor.

The three main weaving towns of Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres made Flanders the strongest economic power north of the Alps. These cities were dependent upon imported, English wool as the basis of their weaving industry. This link created political tension because Flanders was economically dependent on England, but, as since Flanders was a fief of the French crown, its count was politically subordinate to the king of France.

Furthermore, social conflict was rife. Flanders was the most densely populated area north of the Alps at the time, with approximately fifty people per square kilometer.[1] This dense population engendered the robust economy, which allowed for the Flemish towns to be extraordinarily large. The size of the cities put economic pressure on the rural countryside, driving down agricultural prices.[2] The cities also repressed the industries of the outlying rural areas by monopolizing the weaving trade.[3] In addition, there was class conflict within the cities. The economic power of the artisans made it possible for them to demand more political power from the patrician landholders, which they did in 1302 (Bruges and Ghent) and 1325 (Ypres).[4]

For the most part, the counts of Flanders sided with the artisans in their class conflict with the patricians because the count was traditionally pitted against the patricians for political control of the county. Moreover, the counts were hostile to the increasing presence of the French kings, but Louis of Nevers, count of Flanders from 1322-1346 was a staunch ally with Philip VI. The first reason for this atypical association was the French heritage, via his mother's bloodline, of Count Louis. Secondly, by the 1330's and 1340's, the political power of the artisans had increased so much as to

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[1] Henry Lucas, "Diplomatic Relations between England and Flanders from 1329 to 1336," *Speculum*, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Jan., 1936), p. 60.
[2] David Nicholas, "Economic Reorientation and Social Change in Fourteenth-Century Flanders," *Past and Present*, Volume 0, Issue 70 (Feb., 1976), p. 8.
[3] Nicholas, p. 10.
[4] Nicholas, p. 15.

THE LOW COUNTRIES AND ADJACENT PARTS
AT THE
OPENING OF THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

The bold line is the border between France and Germany (The Holy Roman Empire) as per the Treaty of Verdun. Counties to the left of the line (Artois, Flanders) are fiefs of the French king. Counties to the right (Hainault, Brabant, Holland, etc.) are fiefs of the Holy Roman Emperor.

threaten that of Count Louis within his own county. He therefore sought support from his feudal lord, the French king, to help him retain control of the county.

Other Lowland Principalities – The other Lowland counts and dukes (namely the duke of Brabant, and the counts of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland) were not vassals of the French crown, but increasingly felt its presence. These principalities also had economic ties with England, even if their industries were not as strong as that of Flanders. Hainault directly bordered France to the south of Flanders. Holland and Zeeland were the coastal counties to the northwest of Flanders. Brabant was a territory in the middle of the Low Countries, bordering on every other principality. Duke John III of Brabant and the Counts William of Hainault, Holland, and Zeeland are the primary players from these territories.

The Church Universal – From Clement V in 1304 through Gregory XI in 1378, the Pope resided at Avignon, in southern France. Under John XXII and Benedict XII, the aim of the church was to prevent war between France and England because such conflict would preclude the assembly of a joint crusade to the Holy Land, the planning of which was underway. After plans for this crusade were abandoned in the face of endless warfare, the popes sought to end the conflict and establish peace for its own sake. To this end, the church was involved in every truce negotiation and peace talk from the war's outset until the Great Schism of 1378. The popes during the time under examination were Benedict XII, Clement VI, Innocent VI, Urban V, and Gregory XI.

Reign Timeline

England

Edward I   '07   Edward II   Edward III   '77   Richard II

France   Philip IV   '05   Louis X   Philip V   Charles IV   Philip VI   '46   John II   '64   Charles V
'14 '16   John I   '22   '22   '28   '50

Flanders   Guy   '04   Robert III   Louis III   Louis IV

Hainault   '37   '45 '47
John   '04   William I   '12   William II   William III   Margaret II   '55

Brabant   John I   John II   '97   John III   Henry VII   Lewis IV   Wenceslas
'91   '08   '14   '14 '16

Holy Roman   Adolph   Albert I   '34   '42   Charles IV   '52   Wenceslas
Empire   '96   '04

Papacy   Boniface VIII   Clement V   John XXII   Benedict XII   Clement VI   Innocent VI   Urban V   '78   Gregory XI
'47   '62   '70

1290   1300   1310   1320   1330   1340   1350   1360   1370   1380

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Causes of the War

It is not amiss to consider the Hundred Years' War as a protracted French civil war. The dukes of Aquitaine, Brittany, and Burgundy stood in opposition to the consolidation and extension of the authority of the Capetian kings, which was, by necessity, encroaching upon these nobles' ancient rights of governance.[5]

Since the eleventh century, the kings of England ruled over an Angevin empire that stretched from the Channel to the Pyrenees[6], including Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, Poitou, and Aquitaine. This last duchy had come under English control through the marriage of Henry II to Eleanor of France.

In 1204, King Philip II of France conquered Normandy and Anjou and won them for the French crown. Try as he did, King John of England could never recover these lands. In 1259, England's King Henry III signed the Treaty of Paris with Louis IX of France. Henry III recognized French feudal rights to Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Touraine, and Poitou. In exchange, Louis IX gave Henry III the title of Duke of Aquitaine and made him one of twelve "peers of France" – thereby making the king of England a vassal to the king of France[7].

However, to have a sovereign king serve as a vassal to another king led to bad, confusing law. For instance, the actions of the English king became subject to the courts of Paris because of the English king's status as Duke of Aquitaine. This meant that Edward I of England could not defend his interests with regard to Flemish wool trade against encroachment by France's Philip IV without being called to court for acts of

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[5] Christopher Allmand, The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450, p. 11.
[6] Allmand, p. 7.
[7] John Le Patourel, "The Origins of the War," The Hundred Years War, ed. Kenneth Fowler, pp. 29-30.

HOLLAND

Rhine

Sluys

Ypres

FLANDERS

BRABANT

Meuse

Coblenz

Tournai

HAINAULT

Moselle

ARTOIS

Cambrai

Crécy

Amiens

PONTHIEU

Somme

Thiérache

ENGLISH CHANNEL

Rouen

Reims

Cherbourg

Caen

Marne

Meaux

Channel Is.

Cotentin

Paris

Seine

NORMANDY

Chartres

CHAMPAGNE

DUCHY OF
BURGUNDY

COUNTY OF
BURGUNDY

MAINE

Orléans

Loire

BRITTANY

Tours

BERRY

Auray

ANJOU

TOURAINE

Saône

POITOU

Poitiers

BOURBON

Lyon

SAINTONGE

LIMOUSIN

AUVERGNE

La Rochelle

Limoges

BAY

PÉRIGORD

Rhône

OF

Dordogne

Bordeaux

BISCAY

Agen

Avignon

DUCHY OF
GUYENNE

Garonne

LANGUEDOC

Bayonne

ARMAGNAC

Toulouse

KINGDOM OF
NAVARRE

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

– – –   Boundary of the kingdom of France in 1337

     English possessions

1   France in 1337

treason against his lord. In 1294, this led to war between these two monarchs, which ended inconclusively in 1297.[8]

Between 1303 and 1337, both sides repeatedly attempted to solve the conflict through negotiations. However, a crucial difference in perspectives hampered these talks. The English envisioned the conferences to be conferences between equals whereas the French clung to the sovereignty which the French king claimed over the lands, turning the talks into a courtroom procedure, where the French king sat as judge.[9] Clearly the monarchs were at an impasse. It was in this legal situation that Philip VI confiscated Aquitaine in 1337, as the opening act of the Hundred Years' War. His justification for doing so was that "'the king of England, duke of Aquitaine, peer of France, count of Ponthieu' (i.e. King Edward III), who was the liegeman of the king of France by reason of the duchy, peerage and county, had received and given aid to Robert of Artois, who was the 'capital enemy' of the king of France and who had been banished from the kingdom 'for many crimes.'"[10]

There were other issues at play from the beginning of this war. The death of Charles IV of France in 1328 without any heirs created a dynastic problem. Was Edward III, Charles' nephew through his sister, Isabella (Edward's mother), the rightful successor to the throne? He and his mother certainly thought so, and they laid such a claim in 1328. However, the French peerage were not keen on the prospect of having the English king sitting on the French throne. They therefore chose one of their own, Philip of Valois, cousin of Charles IV, to become king of France. They justified this through a decision of dubious legality that the French crown could not pass through a woman. It is important to

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[8] Allmand, p. 9.
[9] Le Patourel, p. 35.
[10] Le Patourel, pp. 28-29.

m.Edward II
(1307-27)

Edward III
(1327-77)

Edward,   Lionel,   John of Gaunt,   Edmund,   Thomas,
'Black Prince'   d. of Clarence   d. of Lancaster   d. of York   d. of Gloucester

Richard II   Henry IV
(1377-99)   (1399-1413)

Henry V —m.—
(1413-22)   m.Richard II

Henry VI
(1422-61)   ■ = English   ▓ = French

note, however, that this succession dispute was not a cause of the war. Edward III

refrained from assuming the title of king of France until much later, when it suited his

strategic interests[11]. Other issues included English economic interests in Flanders (wool)

and Bordeaux (wine), which were threatened by a consolidation of French power.

However, neither of these issues was the true *causus belli*, in an immediate sense. It was

specifically Philip VI's confiscation of Aquitaine, as a culmination of feudal struggles

between the king of France and the duke of Aquitaine (King of England), which opened

the Hundred Years' War.

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[11] Allmand, p. 10.

Summary of Hundred Years' War

Edward III's first campaigns on the Continent, to defeat Philip VI and cause him to relinquish Aquitaine, began in 1339. After constructing a vast Lowlands alliance, including a treaty in 1338 with the Holy Roman Emperor, Lewis the Bavarian, by which Edward III was named Vicar General of the Holy Roman Empire, the English army met the French army at Le Flamengerie. The armies, however, departed the battlefield without fighting and gave up campaigning that year.

In 1340, Jacob van Artevelde, Captain of Ghent, persuaded Edward III to assume the title of French king in order that they might be justified in establishing an Ango-Flemish alliance. Henceforth, the war was to take on a dynastic scope. Armed with this new alliance, Edward III laid siege to Tournai in Autumn of 1340. However, discord among his allies – namely between van Artevelde and Duke John III of Brabant – and a shortage of funds forced Edward III to accept the Truce of Esplechin.

Having never provided Edward with anything of substance, other than an Imperial title, Lewis of Bavaria rescinded that title from Edward III in 1341, abrogating their alliance. Lewis sacrificed his alliance with Edward III so that he might win support for his struggles in Italy from Philip VI.[12]

Also in 1341, the theatre of the war shifted to Brittany, where a dispute over who would succeed as Duke of Brittany caught the attentions of the warring monarchs. Edward III and Philip VI each backed a claimant with the support of their respective

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[12] H. S. Offler, "England and Germany at the Beginning of the Hundred Year's War," *The English Historical Review*, Volume 54, Issue 216 (Oct., 1939), p. 624.

armies. In 1343, after numerous battles on the peninsula, both combatants accepted the Truce of Malestroit.

The focus of the war then shifted south to Aquitaine itself, where there had been skirmishes and raids since the beginning of the war. Henry of Grosmont, a close friend and trusted lieutenant of Edward III, led major expeditions to win much of Aquitaine back under English control. All the while, this action drew the bulk of the French military south.

With the north coast of France now vacant of French troops, Edward III, in 1346, landed a massive invasion on the beaches of Normandy and proceeded to march toward Paris, much like the Allied forces would do six centuries later. The original plan was for this army to join a smaller, Anglo-Flemish army coming from Flanders. These armies were supposed to meet slightly before the arrival of the French army from the south, led by Philip VI's son, John. However the French army engaged Edward's army before he could link with the auxiliary force. In a surprise victory, Edward III crushed the French army at Crècy in 1346. After this battle, with the French army in shambles, Edward III marched north and captured the vital port city of Calais in 1347.

Fighting continued on and off in Picardy, Brittany, and Aquitaine for the next ten years. In 1350, Philip VI died and was succeeded by his son, John II. Then in 1355, Edward the Black Prince, Edward III's eldest son and heir to the English throne, led a grand expedition in the southwest part of France, capturing castles and defeating pockets of the French army. The two full armies met at Poitiers in 1356 where, again, the English army soundly defeated the French army. In this battle, King John II was captured and taken to London.

0   50   100   150 miles

ENGLISH CHANNEL

Dover

Sluys

Calais

Guines

FLANDERS

Montreuil

Crécy

PONTHIEU

Amiens

Rouen

Oise

Channel Is.

Caen

Cocherel

Seine

Marne

Paris

NORMANDY

Brétigny

MAINE

Le Mans

Orléans

Brest

BRITTANY

ANJOU

DUCHY OF BURGUNDY

Auray

Loire

Tours

TOURAINE

Cher

Bourges

BERRY

Allier

Saône

Poitiers

POITOU

La Rochelle

AQUITAINE

Brignais

Rhône

BAY

OF

BISCAY

Angoulême

Dordogne

Bordeaux

Lot

Saint-Sardos

Garonne

Agen

ALBRET

Toulouse

Montpellier

Bayonne

ARMAGNAC

LANGUEDOC

NAVARRE

Nájera

English possessions

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

2 France in 1360

In London, prospects for peace were discussed between the two monarchs, but no plan could be drawn that would please both the English parliament and the French peerage. It was not until 1360, with Edward's armies laying siege to Paris, that the French peers acceded to a peace treaty, which produced the Treaty of Bretigny.

In 1369, after nine years of skirmishing and continued violence, Charles V, son of John II and king of France since 1364, again confiscated Aquitaine, claiming that Edward had broken the peace. Thus war began anew.

There were, however, no battles in this next phase of the war. English armies freely roamed the French countryside, while the French armies contented themselves to lay siege to minor castles in Aquitaine. In 1376, Edward the Black Prince died of illness, unable to succeed his father to the throne of England. Instead his son, Richard II, became king of England in 1377, upon the death of Edward III.

In 1378, the papacy was moved from Avignon to Rome by Gregory XI, who died soon thereafter. He was succeeded by an Italian, Urban VI, the first non-Frenchman to sit as Pope in over seventy-five years. Predictably, this upset the majority French nobles, who, backed by Charles V, responded by electing an anti-pope. Thus arose the Great Schism in the church which lasted for the next four decades, severely crippling the church as a universal institution.

This is the extent of the history which this paper will examine. The war ended in 1453. Betrayed and isolated by his ally, Duke Philip II of Burgundy, King Henry VI could muster neither the troops nor the funds to resist France's Charles VII. The latter invaded Normandy and Aquitaine, expelling the English from the continent forever –

completing the consolidation of French power between the Pyrenees and the Empire as had so long been the goal of the French kings.

Chapter Three

This chapter will outline the truces and peace negotiations of the Hundred Years' War from its inception until the Great Schism of 1378. Other than the ratified Peace of Bretigny from 1360-1369, England and France were at war from 1337-1453. And of these 116 years, more than half were – nominally – spent at truce[1]

Prior to the Great Schism, every truce talk and peace negotiation was mediated by the papacy. Thus examining these talks, and the effects and observances of these truces will be instructive in evaluating the authority of the Church Universal in Europe at this time. Were these truces forced on the warring parties by the Pope, and then observed diligently? Was there at least stigma and consequences to a breach of truce? Or were the actors their own sovereigns, immune to and indifferent toward papal decrees and legal agreements?

If the church were a universally recognized central authority with the moral authority or raw power to enforce decisions then this would bear out in the evidence. An examination of the attitudes towards truces and their observance and enforcement would yield a picture of relations quite similar to that of a domestic society. However, if this were not the case, if there were no such institution, then this, too, would be clear from the evidence. Sovereigns would act as their own highest authority, breaking agreements with no fear of repercussion, flouting the authority of the church. The evidence which follows

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[1] Kenneth Fowler, "Truces", *The Hundred Years War*, ed. Kenneth Fowler, p. 184.

will show that this latter situation was the case. The church had no enforceable authority – the system was anarchical.

The narrative stops at the Great Schism of 1378 because of the effect that it had on the papacy. As will be discussed, the Schism ended the role of the church as mediator of negotiations. Since this is an analysis of papal authority, the following discussion is only concerned with those peace talks of which the church was a part. Therefore, other than a brief discussion of the Hundred Years' War's conclusion in 1453, this chapter will deal solely with evidence from the first forty years of the war.

Truces and Peace Negotiations; 1337-1378

A prime example of papal impotence is the descent into war in 1337. Pope Benedict XII, adhering to the policy of his predecessor, John XXII, strove to maintain peace in Europe in order that he might organize a crusade. However, try as he might, he was not able to avert the war between Edward III and Philip VI.[2] In fact, the measures Benedict took to prevent war – advocating truces, refusing marriages, using his friendship with Philip VI to influence the course of the war – merely accelerated the pace at which war approached.

The main obstacle standing in the way of Benedict's success was his nationality. He was French, just as all of the Popes after Benedict, until the Great Schism under Gregory XI, were Frenchmen. Furthermore, Benedict resided in France, at Avignon,

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[2] Henry S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326-1347*, 1929, p. 237.

instead of at Rome.[3] Naturally, this led to distrust in England of the Pope's efforts toward

peace,[4] and to a tarnished papal reputation.[5] "From the outset it was widely held among

Englishmen that the papacy favoured France."[6] King Edward III, at times, considered

Benedict XII and Philip VI to be enemies in league against him.[7]

Moreover, the Pope, and his subordinate clergy, tended to nurture English

suspicions through their close ties with the French court. John XXII had allowed Philip to

levy a tax on church properties in France, revenues from which would enter the royal war

treasury – a privilege which was not extended to Edward III.[8] In 1328, Philip sent the

Abbot de Fécamp, the man who would become Pope Clement VI, to London to demand

Edward's homage for his Aquitaine fief. In this request, he was flatly refused by

Edward's mother, Queen Isabella.[9]

This distrust, of course, had a deleterious effect on the Pope's negotiating

position. In May of 1337, Benedict used his friendship with Philip VI to persuade him to

postpone his confiscation of Aquitaine and extend a truce, in hopes that peace could still

be maintained. However, Edward considered this action a ruse by the collaborating

French king and French Pope. He refused to acknowledge this truce and continued in his

preparations for war.[10] However, it is incorrect to conclude that Edward III withdrew his

representatives from peace negotiations at Avignon. To the contrary, he maintained their

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[3] Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, p. 35.
[4] Alfred H. Burne, *The Crecy War*, 1955, p. 21.
[5] John Barnie, *War in Medieval Society: Social Values and the Hundred Years War 1337-99*, p. 12.
[6] Barnie, p. 52.
[7] Perroy, p. 101.
[8] Perroy, p. 98.
[9] Perroy, p. 81.
[10] Perroy, p. 92.

presence there, as a ruse to buy him preparation time. When he was militarily ready, he withdrew his negotiators and revealed his hand.[11]

Edward was forced to accept a truce offer from the Pope in 1338. However, this was not a result of the Pope's bargaining position, but because of financial strains faced by the English king. This truce lasted for six months, and it gave Edward the time he needed to raise funds and an army for his 1339 campaign – quite the reverse of what Benedict had intended.[12] Furthermore, this truce gave Edward III the opportunity to ally with Lewis of Bavaria, Holy Roman Emperor. Lewis had been declared in 1314, upon his disputed election to the Imperial throne, to be a heretic and a usurper, a true enemy of the church. This was a judgment with which Edward III privately agreed,[13] but it was not enough to stop him from entering this alliance. Aghast, the Pope chastised Edward for this alliance, but to no effect.[14] This episode clearly exposes the weakness of the Pope's position. Not only did his condemnation carry so little weight as to not deter Edward, who agreed with the judgment, to abide by it, but the Pope also had no means of causing Edward by force to do that which he could not make him do by decree – abide by the papal condemnation of Lewis of Bavaria.

In 1339, Benedict XII begged with Edward III not to assume the title of King of France because of the added ferocity a dynastic struggle would bring to the war. However, Edward once again ignored the pleas of the peace-minded Pope.[15] With his new, Flemish allies – acquired via his assumption of the French crown – Edward besieged the fortress of Tournai in the fall of 1340, against the express demands of Pope

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[11] Perroy, p. 101.
[12] Perroy, p. 98.
[13] Offler, p. 610.
[14] Lucas, 1929, p. 333.
[15] Lucas, 1929, p. 371.

Benedict XII.[16] Soon, however, money ran tight,[17] and his allies began to quarrel,[18]

forcing Edward to accept the Truce of Esplechin. Edward III had been poorly prepared

for this siege, and both sides were too exhausted to continue the fight. Thus the Truce of

Esplechin was accepted as an escape route by both parties on September 25, 1340.[19] That

neither side saw this truce as a prelude to peace is evident in the fact that both Edward III

and Philip VI took advantage of the interval to increase their forces and prepare for the

resumption of hostilities.[20]

      The war then shifted to Brittany, as the result of a succession dispute in which

Edward III and Philip VI took opposing sides. The monarchs' armies were preparing for

their first direct face-off of the war when the Pope prevailed upon them to accept a truce.

Philip was eager to accept because of the consistent string of losses the English armies

had inflicted upon him and his allies; he feared yet another. Edward was also eager to

accept because the French army greatly outnumbered his own, and his forces were

trapped between the oncoming French army and the city he was besieging – Vannes.[21]

Thus the Pope was able to arrange the Truce of Malestroit in November of 1342. Philip

VI immediately set off for Paris to wait out the three-year truce. However, Edward

remained at Vannes for weeks, suspecting that Philip VI would break the truce and attack

the English by surprise.[22] Clearly, the English monarch did not put too much trust in the

power of the Pope's truces. No agreement or papal decree could protect his forces against

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[16] Lucas, 1929, p. 419.
[17] Lucas, 1929, p. 426.
[18] Perroy, p. 106.
[19] Burne, 1955, p. 63
[20] Lucas, 1929, p. 450.
[21] Burne, 1955, p. 85.
[22] Burne, 1955, p. 85.

attack. Finally, in February of 1343, Edward III was convinced that Philip would not break the truce, and he left for home.[23]

Edward's distrust highlights the problem of enforcing truces. The Truce of Malestroit explicitly called for a *status quo ante* to apply to all garrisons in Brittany. Much like in modern diplomacy, inspection teams were established to assess the power of garrisons and to monitor that they did not increase their provisions or munitions.[24] Clearly the moral force of the Pope alone was not sufficient to order the acts of combatants. Even this inspections system was, however, wildly ineffective. Inspecting wardens were often lied to, led in circles, or outright denied access to the garrisons. In Brittany, both Philip and Edward wantonly flouted the terms of the truce. Philip seized and executed Breton nobility who opposed him. This led Edward to occupy Vannes, which was supposed to be under the neutral administration of the Pope, who apparently could not ensure its neutrality. In June of 1343 (less than a year into the three-year truce), Edward landed at Brest and hostilities began anew[25] – despite the continued negotiations to extend the truce, which existed at this point, in name only.[26]

As Edward prepared for his invasion of Normandy in 1346, he again had to contend with peace pleas from Pope Clement VI. The execution of his ambitious invasion required the deception of many. Through 1345 and into 1346, Edward maintained his representatives' presence at truce talks as cover. He figured, the longer he could keep Philip and the Pope talking about peace, the more time he would have to prepare for an invasion. (However, he was not aware that Philip VI was partaking in the same ruse. All

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[23] Burne, 1955, p. 86.
[24] Fowler, p. 189.
[25] Burne, 1955, p. 86.
[26] Perroy, p. 115.

the while, the French king had been building a fleet in the channel for a massive raid on southern England.) Burne comments on this phenomenon, "As for the morality of preparing for a possible war under the cloak of pacific utterances, this has been an almost normal procedure throughout recorded history. An aggressor will obviously do all he can to prevent his potential opponent strengthening his forces *pari passu* with his own."[27] It is thus discernable that the morality of these combatants tended toward victory, and not the respect of the papacy. Edward even lied to the church authorities in London, informing them that he was leaving for Aquitaine when, in fact, he was launching an invasion of France's northern coast.[28] After the landing, while Edward was marching through Normandy on Paris, the Pope sent two cardinals to meet the English king at Lisieux and plead with him for peace. These cardinals were ignored and sent away; Edward's need for playing diplomatic games was passed – his ruse had succeeded.

After Edward's victories at Crècy and Calais, the Pope, once again, sought to convince Edward to settle for peace. Edward was suspicious of Clement's loyalties[29]: during the siege of Calais, Philip had tried to buy time to evacuate his overextended army, and, in this, he had been aided by the same two cardinals who met Edward in Lisieux.[30] In the end, Edward agreed to a nine-month truce.[31] However, this truce, like the one at Malestroit, became one in name only. Battles continued in Picardy, Brittany, and Aquitaine.[32]

In 1353, Pope Innocent VI established a semi-permanent diplomatic station in Guines. However, once again, Edward was wary of the intentions of the Pope. The

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[27] Burne, 1955, pp. 137-138.
[28] Burne, 1955, p. 137.
[29] Perroy, p. 127.
[30] Burne, 1955, p. 215.
[31] Burne, 1955, p. 217.
[32] Burne, 1955, p. 224.

presiding official of the mission was the Cardinal of Boulougne, the uncle of the French

king, John II. But by 1355, Innocent's efforts to negotiate a lasting peace failed, and both

sovereigns prepared for war again.

Edward the Black Prince, son of Edward III and heir to the throne, prepared an

expedition to reclaim castles in Aquitaine which had been lost to French aggression.[33] In

this effort, the prince was so successful as to worry the Pope in Avignon, who sent

emissaries for peace. The prince brushed them off as his father was wont to do.[34]

On the eve of the Battle of Poitiers in 1356, Pope Innocent again sent two

cardinals to Edward the Black Prince in a last ditch effort to avert the battle. The

cardinals (the same two from Limieux and Calais) approached the prince from the French

lines[35] with the proposition of a 24 hour truce to hammer out a way to avoid bloodshed.

Again like his father, the prince accepted the truce for his own purposes – it would allow

him the necessary time to make last minute preparations and secure his army against his

foe.[36] When the cardinals approached the English the next day for an extension of the

truce, since no agreement had been made between the armies, the Black Prince suspected

them of trying to buy time for John II to reinforce his already larger army.[37] The prince

summarily rejected the cardinals and began to carry out his battle plans.

After the English victory at Poitiers, the combatants agreed to a two-year truce,

the Truce of Bordeaux. Predictably, English and French forces continued to fight

throughout the truce. There were direct conflicts in Brittany, where the English forces

refused to acknowledge the truce until they began to lose momentum, at which time they

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[33] Burne, 1955, p. 246.
[34] Burne, 1955, p. 255.
[35] Burne, 1955, p. 290.
[36] Perroy, p. 130.
[37] Burne, 1955, p. 291.

claimed protection under the Truce of Bordeaux.[38] Moreover marauding bands of English

troops, detached from the main armies, ravaged the French countryside, going where they

pleased. Burne calls these groups "bodies of disbanded soldiers," who "roamed through

France, seizing castles, living on the country and pillaging as they pleased, *for there was*

no strong central authority or army to prevent them" [emphasis added].[39] Fowler concurs

with this assessment, saying that the warfare of the Free Companies "and the fact that the

arrangements for the enforcement of the truces were becoming increasingly complex and

far-flung, was a mark of the fact that warfare had become endemic and that *the central*

authorities were powerless to stop it" [emphasis added].[40]

In 1560, the English army was visible from the walls of Paris. Papal legates

emerged from the city to discuss the possibility of peace with Edward III. Knowing that

he was as close as he had ever been to obtaining his objective of conquering all of France,

Edward dismissed such suggestions. Consequently, the English army settled down to a

siege of the French capital. Eventually, the French delegates met the English and spoke of

terms more agreeable to Edward III. They then signed the Treaty of Bretigny.[41] The

Truce of Chartres was signed at this time to act as a "ceasefire" until such time as the

Treaty of Bretigny was ratified, five months later. But even this truce was impossible to

enforce against the Free Companies, who continued to ransack the countryside.[42]

The Treagy of Bretigny notwithstanding, the kings continued their politicking –

the French king persuaded Pope Urban V to refuse a marriage between Edward III's son

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[38] Burne, 1955, p. 325.
[39] Burne, 1955, p. 322.
[40] Fowler, pp. 190-191.
[41] Burne, 1955, p. 344.
[42] Fowler, pp. 191-192.

Edmund and Margaret of Flanders.[43] Moreover, Edward III refused to pay Urban V his

papal dues, as was expected of him as a vassal of the Holy See.[44] Also, English armies

took actions against French allies in Brittany and Spain. This was enough for Charles V,

then king of France, who declared Edward III to be in breach of the Treaty of Bretigny,

and invaded Aquitaine in 1369, thereby formally ending the Peace of Bretigny.

In 1370, Charles V's armies were making headway in Aquitaine, slowly expelling

the English. In the face of a strong, advancing army, the Bishop of Limoges, a clergyman

who was a close friend of Edward the Black Prince and whom the latter had placed in

charge of the town of Limoges, threw open the town and welcomed the French army.[45]

This treachery by a close friend and member of the supposedly neutral church infuriated

the prince, who marched on and sacked Limoges.[46]

In 1375 the combatants signed a truce important for its implications to diplomatic

history. For the first time, the signatories had the idea that the maintenance of peace

would be enforced by the reduction of forces.[47] This was a huge advance in diplomacy

because it saw the wisdom that reliance upon legal documents and papal decrees was not

sufficient to the maintenance of peace. Documents and decrees would not stop an armed

king who desired war over the status quo. If that king were to be disarmed, his desire for

war would have no conduit to action; that king would have no means of attaining his

desire for war. However, this diplomatic revolution merely shifted the enforceability

issue from actions to resources. In other words, it was just as hard to keep an armed

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[43] Perroy, p. 153.
[44] Perroy, p. 179.
[45] Barnie, p. 76.
[46] Burne, *The Agincourt War*, 1956, pp. 20-21.
[47] Fowler, p. 194.

aggressor at bay with a legal document as it was to use a legal document to force said aggressor to disarm.

Gregory XI became the Pope in 1370. He sought peace between England and France so that he could move the papacy back from Avignon to Rome, where he would be better able to manage the church's current conflict with the Holy Roman Empire.[48] To this end, he strove to arrange meetings for truces at Calais in 1372 and at Bruges in 1373. However, he was denied in these efforts by the French and English kings, neither of whom desired peace.[49] In 1378, after failing to make peace, Charles V lost the support of Gregory XI. As a result, the Pope moved the papacy back to Rome as he had wanted, disappointed in his failure to end the forty-year conflict. Thus ended a 75-year string of French popes (all of whom had been surrounded by a majority of French cardinals)[50]. It is easy to see where English suspicions of papal partiality arose.

Soon after moving back to Rome, Gregory XI died, replaced by Urban VI, an Italian. Urban VI strove to purge the papacy of its inordinately heavy French influence. Desiring to save their prestige, the French cardinals convinced Charles V to support them in electing an anti-pope, Clement VII. The nature of this Great Schism sheds light on the authority and independence of the church. The moral authority of the Church Universal lies in its universality and it cannot function without unanimous secular support. In 1378, Charles V supported Clement VII because he was French, whilst the English Parliament supported Urban VI because he was not.[51] These secular divisions stripped the papacy of

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[48] Perroy, p. 166.
[49] Richard Vaughan, *Philip the Bold*, p. 10.
[50] Perroy, p. 171.
[51] Bernard Guenée, *States and Rulers in Later Medieval Europe*, p. 169.

its moral authority. Anyone whom the Pope opposed could question his authority by

siding with the anti-pope, and vise versa.[52]

Prior to the Great Schism the popes had been self-interested, but relatively

impartial – despite English assertions to the contrary.[53] Fowler says that the pre-Schism

papacy was akin to the modern United Nations in regards to its position as mediator in

peace talks.[54] However, also like the UN, the church did not have an independent means

of enforcement by which to make its decisions binding. It relied on its moral force alone,

which, as has been presented above, did not carry much weight.

With the advent of the Great Schism, each pope actively encouraged war. The

enemies of the sovereigns which supported him were, by necessity, the supporters of his

papal rival. Neither Pope could win the outright leadership of the church without the

military victory of his patron monarch and subsequent defeat of his enemy's patrons.[55] As

a result, the both popes were absent from all peace conferences and even worked to

thwart them for the next forty years. In 1380, the Cardinal of Ravenna, subordinate of

Urban VI (the Italian pope), worked actively to break up an alliance between Emperor

Wenceslas and the Valois kings and arranged a marriage contract between the emperor's

sister and Richard II, king of England.[56]

Whether arguing for peace or war, the papacy, in the end, was largely irrelevant to

the conduct of the war. The Pope had no armies with which to enforce the truces and

treaties he negotiated. This is a far cry from Waltz's definition of hierarchy as one,

centrally recognized institution having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. In such

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[52] Perroy, p. 172.
[53] Perroy, p. 172.
[54] Fowler, p. 185.
[55] Perroy, p. 172.
[56] Perroy, p. 173.

a system, where there is no central authority strong enough to wield such a monopoly, enforcement is left up to the individual actors. The only enforcement against the use of force is, itself, a use of force. When wielded by a signatory to a truce, such enforcement differs from a breach of truce only on a chronological basis. No substantive distinction can be drawn. In other words, if Charles V wishes to attack Edward III, truce or no truce, Edward III will respond by fighting back. Defense becomes indistinguishable from enforcement. The only way to prevent Charles V from going to war is by going to war with him. Clearly, truces and efforts by the various popes towards peace were irrelevant. The English and French kings fought when it suited their interests, and they abstained from fighting only so long as it suited their interest. To these ends, the monarchs used the papacy, the papacy did not command a position of authority.

When peace finally did come, in 1453, it came not from an effort by then Pope Nicholas V. In 1450, the armies of Henry VI were expelled from Normandy, and in 1453, Charles VII's French armies marched into Bordeaux and drove the English off the Continent for good. Henry VI had neither the resources or the will to continue the struggle for what had been English Continental holdings. Accordingly, no treaty was made to end the Hundred Years' War. There was no renunciation of Henry VI's claim to the French Throne (inherited from his predecessors, back to Edward III). There was no resolution to the question of the English king's homage for Acquitaine because Acquitaine no longer belonged to the English king.[57] In the end, no law ended the Hundred Years' War. Only the lack of ability and will to fight was enough to keep the French and English monarchs from fighting. They stopped fighting when peace became more valuable to them than possible gains from war.

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[57] Burne, 1956, p. 347.

Conclusion

Thus it becomes clear that the feudal system was anarchic during the Hundred Years' War. Papal pleas for peace were ignored, flouted, and abused. The truces that were agreed upon either represented the mutual interests of the warring monarchs, or they, too were flouted, ignored, or abused. No claim can be made on the church's behalf to be that central institution, recognized by all to be the final word in conflict resolution. The French and the English kings had no illusions about the church, or any central institution, having a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. It is clear from the actions of both dynasties that they considered their own use of force to be quite legitimate.

Having thus demonstrated that there was no institutional constraint upon the pursuit of self-help, I will discuss in Chapter Four, what possible normative constraints may have existed.

Chapter Four

What follows is a discussion of events in the Lowlands in the years prior to the Hundred Years' War and in its early stages. This was the period of time in which the Low Countries held the attention of the three most powerful European actors: the kings of England, the kings of France, and the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire.

While the narrative follows activities in Flanders – because of that county's paramount political and economic power – the actions, alliances, and attitudes of other actors will also be discussed. The following discussion is not to be read as an exhaustive history of Flemish politics during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Instead, this chapter paints a picture of the nature of international relations (defined here as relations between actors in an anarchical system) in Europe during this period.

It will become evident that the Lowland counts, dukes, and princes behaved in a fashion remarkably similar to modern nation-states. Alliances were formed and broken as interests between actors corresponded and then diverged. Homage, that particularly feudal act, was often included as a treaty term in non-aggression and mutual defense pacts. The situation is aptly described by Henry S. Lucas, whose book, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War; 1326-1347*, provides the bulk of historical background for this chapter. Examining the historical evidence, including Lucas' narrative, it becomes apparent that there exists no overarching theme or pattern to the actions of the Lowland principalities other than that "each one acted as best suited his

interests and was greatly influenced by the actions of his neighbors."[1] The history

presented by Lucas as well as other historians whose works contributed to the historical

information in this chapter describes an attitude of unabashed self-service and

unprincipled egoism which prevailed among the political actors of this era. The notion

that feudal norms shaped the interests of Medieval actors will be significantly discredited

by the historical information that follows.

I. The Avesnes/Dampierre Rivalry and the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge

A bitter succession dispute developed between the houses of Avesnes and

Dampierre when Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault left his county to his wife,

Johanna, who had no heirs. Her younger sister, Margaret, thus came into inheritance of

the counties. However, she had sons by two different men. These two lines of sons thus

competed for the counties held by their mother. In 1237, Pope Gregory IX declared the

Avesnes line of sons illegitimate and ineligible for the inheritance of the counties. Not

satisfied, the Avesnes sons appealed to the emperor, Frederick II (of whom the disputed

lands were a fief), who declared them legitimate. With the complication of contradictory

declarations by the Pope and the emperor, the matter stewed until 1246, when it was

brought before the French King, Louis IX, who had been Count Baldwin's lord.

Louis IX made the decision that the territory should be split between the litigants

– "John d'Avesnes was to receive Hainault and its dependencies, while Guillaume de

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[1] Lucas, 1929, p. 579.

Dampierre, [Margaret's] son by a second marriage, was to have Flanders...".[2] Louis IX

desired the territory to be split, pursuant with traditional French policy of weakening

possible opponents. Taking no account of the legality of either party's claims, nor

integrity of the late Count Baldwin's lands, Louis decided the issue purely on the basis of

French interests. The Capetian dynasty of France was expanding its powers into the Low

Countries, and Louis IX was thus employing the age-old strategy of divide-and-conquer.

Flanders, a Medieval European economic powerhouse, would be much easier to control

having thus weakened it by separating it from Hainault. Furthermore, Louis improved his

position in Flanders *vis a vis* the Empire because the Flanders was a fief of the French

king and Hainault was a fief of the Emperor. By separating the two, Louis IX removed

any chance of the Emperor (as Count Baldwin's lord via his position in Hainault) from

interfering in the affairs of Flanders and the French king's ambitions there.

Recognizing this policy for what it was, John d'Avesnes sought support of the

emperor, in whose domain this issue squarely lay. Dampierre, therefore, was forced into

the arms of the French King.[3]

However, as the conflict wore on into the 1290's, Guy de Dampierre, Guillaume's

son, became weary of an intrusive French presence in Flanders: the French king, Philip

IV, had involved himself more and more into Flemish politics.

Flanders was perennially beset with social unrest. "No other community in

Northern Europe presented such a variety of apparently insoluble social and political

problems,".[4] When Philip IV took advantage of discord between Count Guy and the

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[2] Lucas, 1929, p. 31.
[3] Lucas, 1929, p. 39.
[4] Lucas, 1929, p. 76.

patrician families of Flanders – offering to assume suzerainty over the town of Ghent –

Guy became alienated from and resentful of his erstwhile ally.

Count Guy thus sought support with Edward I of England, with whom the towns

of Flanders were inextricably linked through the wool trade. Edward I was eager to check

French gains because he was embroiled in conflict over his holdings in Aquitaine. Adolf

of Nassau, the emperor, also saw danger in this unprecedented power grab by the French

king; he threw in his lot with Edward I and Count Guy. Edward I set about constructing a

vast alliance which would ring around France and constrain Philip IV. One count which

Edward I could not convince to side with him against Philip IV was Count John

d'Avesnes of Hainault, who saw an alliance with Philip IV as the best way to acquire his

objectives in Imperial Flanders.[5] Thus the evolution of the conflict witnessed a

pronounced flip. The house of Dampierre had been a vassal and ally of the French king,

and the house of Avesnes a vassal and ally of the Emperor, and then they traded because

their interests shifted. Clearly the vassalage tie had been nothing more than a bond of

convenience, freely discarded by both parties when the political winds changed.

The English king's strategy was a familiar one. Like his predecessors before him,

and as Edward III would do fifty years later, Edward I sought to surround France with

hostile opponents. However, this strategy floundered on the nature of politics in the Low

Countries. The enmity and distrust between these nobles was stronger between each other

than between any one of them and the king of France.[6] In the summer of 1297,

antipathies arose between the count of Flanders, the count of Holland and the duke of

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[5] G. Barraclough, "Edward I and Adolf of Nassau. A chapter of Mediaeval Diplomatic History," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Volume 6, Issue 3 (1940), p. 244.
[6] Barraclough, p. 226.

Brabant, and Edward I was distracted by domestic political concerns; the alliance failed

to materialize, leaving Flanders isolated against an aggressive Philip IV.

Thus it was with ease that a French army marched into Flanders in the summer of

1302. The Flemish patricians welcomed the invaders, hoping that the French army would

support them in their opposition to Count Guy. However, on July 11, the Flemish

craftsman militia dealt the French army a crushing defeat at the town of Courtrai. This

unexpected defeat drove the French out of Flanders, and spurred the Flemings on the

offensive. They turned north and invaded Zeeland and then Holland (which had allied

with Philip IV). However, the Flemish army was overextended and was therefore

defeated in battle. This ended Flemish aggression, and peace was discussed.[7]

As a result, in 1305, the new Flemish Count, Robert III of Bethune, was forced to

sign the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge. This harsh treaty forced the Flemish Count to pay an

indemnity and greatly increased the political role of the French king in the county. Philip

IV came into possession, as part of the treaty, of a string of castles in Walloon Flanders.

Lastly, the three great Flemish towns – Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres – were ordered to

completely dismantle their fortifications (and leave themselves at the mercy of the French

king). This was an order, however, that was never obeyed; neither Count Robert nor the

merchant burghers placed enough trust in the motives of the French suzerain to be

without the means of defense against him.[8] A primary cause of distrust was Philip's

consistent friendship with the Avesnes house – at this time led by Count William (I of

Hainault, and III of Holland and Zeeland).[9]

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[7] Lucas, 1929, p. 42.
[8] Henry S. Lucas, "The Low Countries and the Disputed Imperial Election of 1314," *Speculum*, Volume 21, Issue 1 (Jan., 1946), pp. 76-77.
[9] Lucas, 1946, p. 81.

The Avesnes and Dampierre dynasties continued to feud off and on for the next ten years, namely over which house owned the territory of Zeeland (currently in possession of William d'Avesnes). Count Robert of Flanders was assisted by his son (and heir), Count Louis of Nevers, while Count William of Hainault and Holland (and Zeeland) consistently sought the endorsement of the French king. It was in this atmosphere of isolation and conflict that Louis of Nevers sought the imperial crown in 1314, thinking his election would give him the power and resources to settle the Lowlands disputes in the favor of his father. Count William also entered the election, seeking to use imperial clout and resources to settle the dispute in his favor.[10]

Count Robert resisted submission to the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge, which vexed Philip IV and threatened to start war anew. In 1313, Philip IV amassed troops on the Flemish border as a show of force to Count Robert. He went so far as to call for Robert's and Louis of Nevers' presence in his court to demand that they abide by the terms of the treaty. Count Robert, however, remained intransigent.

When, in 1315, Count Robert refused to pay homage to the new French king, Louis X, his fief was declared forfeit and preparations were made for battle. Louis X invaded Flanders again from the south, and Count William of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland invaded from the north with 50,000 troops. Edward II was even persuaded to blockade Flanders from the sea. But when the indecisive Edward II reneged on his commitments, and support from surrounding counties and duchies, such as Brabant, failed to materialize, the invasion was aborted.

Thus, through persistent unwillingness to yield to his lord to whom he nominally owed obedience, the Count of Flanders successfully resisted the harsh terms of the Treaty

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[10] Lucas, 1946, pp. 85, 97.

of Athis-sur-Orge. These terms were generally recognized as unenforceable, and therefore of no consequence. In 1320, having thwarted the oppressive treaty to his satisfaction, Count Robert made peace with Philip V, the successor to Louis X. Consequently, Louis of Nevers, having succeeded his father as Count of Flanders, was convinced by Charles IV (successor of Philip V), to sign a treaty with Count William of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland, thereby ending the feud between the houses of Avesnes and Dampierre.

As an instructive side note, peace between the Avesnes and Dampierre families had a detrimental effect on relations between the French king and Count William. In the 1290's John d'Avesnes had sought support from the French king. for his case against Dampierre. With this issue settled, the Count of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland reverted to the original Avesnes position of resenting French intrusion into the Lowlands. In 1328 the friendship between the king of France and the house of Avesnes was severed and animosity reigned between them. Counts John and William had been willing to tolerate the expansion of French power so long as it had favored their claims in Zeeland and Imperial Flanders. But once those claims were settled, no interests compelled Count William to tolerate the invasive French presence.

II. The Consolidation of French Power in the Low Countries

The policy of the French kings regarding the Lowlands is remarkable in its consistency. For centuries, the Capetian, and then the Valois, kings sought to expand France's borders eastward, at the expense of the Lowland principalities and of the empire. The justification for this policy lay in the use, by Medieval administrators, of the term *Gallia* when referring to the holdings of the French kings. However, the strict definition of *Gallia* was a territory encompassing the Lowlands, the Rhineland, and other non-French lands. Opportunistically, the Capetian and Valois kings took advantage of the misuse of this term and found in it legitimization for their expansion of French borders. They sought to expand France to fill the limits of the ancient *Gallia*.[11] In the Fourteenth Century, French kings from Philip IV to Philip VI acted with this strategic aim.

In 1328, Philip VI, the first Valois king, succeeded Charles IV as king of France. From the inception of his reign, he was forced to pay attention to the Low Countries, specifically Flanders.[12] Since 1322, Louis of Nevers, desiring to avoid the constant battles and defeats suffered by his father and grandfather (Robert and Guy, respectively) at the hands of their French suzerains, had adopted a policy of submission to the French crown. It was thus that a calculation of interests, not any measure of legality, drove the Flemish count to obey his lord. As a result, the Flemish townspeople had, also since 1322, been in a state of revolt against Count Louis. Led by the rebel William de Deken, the Flemish burghers were rebelling against the French king's presence in Flanders and against their Count for allowing it.

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[11] Offler, p. 612.
[12] Lucas, 1929, p. 79.

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Naturally, a Flanders struggling to rid itself of its French (and Francophile) overlords caught the attention of Edward III of England. Capitalizing on this attention, William de Decken sought to persuade Edward III to assume the title of French king – to which he had a reasonable claim (see Ch. 2 above). By thus "allying" with Edward III (who, in his role as French king, would also serve as lord to the Count of Flanders), the Flemings sought to enlist the English king to protect them against Philip VI.. Furthermore, the English wool trade – upon which the Flemish merchants' livelihoods depended[13] – would be less vulnerable to political fluctuations if supplier and buyer were allied. This episode highlights the common notion that feudal ties of lord and vassal were nothing more than strategic alliances When these efforts failed to persuade him, de Deken offered Edward direct lordship of Flanders if he should assist the rebels in overthrowing Louis of Nevers.[14] However, Edward was too distracted by Scottish rebels to offer such assistance.

Concurrently, Count Louis sought counterrevolutionary assistance from Philip VI. In 1328, the French king assembled a military expedition of French troops, Flemish troops loyal to Count Louis, and troops of Count William of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland (this was prior to their aforementioned falling-out). This coalition army marched into Flanders and defeated the rebels at Cassel. William de Deken was taken to Paris and executed for treason, and the rebellion was thus ended.

In his first years in office, Philip VI enjoyed a growing political prestige because of his diplomatic and military successes in consolidating and expanding his realm. Respect follows power and Philip VI, who could have otherwise been a weak king

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[13] Nicholas, p. 8.
[14] Lucas, 1929, p. 81.

because of the uncertain nature of his succession to the throne, showed himself to be purposeful and successful, winning him the respect of his peers and obedience of his vassals. A powerful indication of this was Edward III's refusal to press his claims to the French throne. To do so against a popular and respected king would have been political suicide. In fact, Philip's power was so great as to compel Edward to pay homage to the French king for Aquitaine – the issue of which had been a thorn of contention between the two monarchies for over a century.

Both flowing from and contributing to his strong political position, Philip VI sought, throughout the 1330's, to vigorously pursue expansion eastward. In doing so, he was building upon the actions of his predecessors. "In the Argonne the process of penetration which had taken the French frontier under Philip [IV] up to the Meuse [had been] continued under his successors, whose goal [became] Verdun. French 'safeguard' was imposed on this imperial city in 1315, 1318, and 1327, and though there was some pretence of respecting imperial rights the value of this formality can be gauged from the French claim inserted in all three treaties: *quod ipsa civitas est infra regni nostri limites situata.*".[15] Having thus absorbed Verdun, Philip VI turned his attentions northward, performing acts of administration and acting as arbiter of law in Ostrevant, a dependency of Hainault considered to be imperial territory since the twelfth century.[16] This greatly displeased Count William, and the difficulties between these two men can be partly attributed to this imposition of the French crown.

In 1333, Philip VI met with Henry XIV, duke of Lower Bavaria, at a time when Henry was pursuing the abdication of Emperor Lewis. Philip promised to support

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[15] Offler, 615. "Because this city is situated within our king's boundaries" [Translation is my own]
[16] Offler, 615.

Henry's efforts if Henry, as emperor, would accept the usurped territories as being within the legal borders of France. A tentative agreement was made. In essence, Henry was willing to ratify French aggressions, in recognition of the growing power of the French monarch, in his own pursuit of the Imperial throne. Although Duke Henry was never able to overthrow Lewis of Bavaria, this anecdote "gives a clear indication of the aims which French policy was engaged in realizing piecemeal during Lewis the Bavarian's reign".[17] Lastly, in 1337, Philip VI pressured the owners of strategically important castles in Cambrai into selling them to him. These combined efforts comprised a policy of expansion which was not misunderstood by the Lowland princes.[18]

Certain of these princes, like Count William of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland, began to take positions in opposition to the French king. Count William felt betrayed by Philip VI since he had provided the latter with loyal and consistent support since the days of his Regency, fought valiantly for the king at Cassel, and provided diplomatic assistance in relations with the English king. In "repayment," Philip VI had usurped Count William's authority in Ostrevaant, forced entry into Cambrai, and given him no assistance in Solesmes and Fimsy – areas of concern for Count William.[19] As a result, William, and other counts who suffered similar situations, began to draw close to Edward III. For the second time, the Count of Hainault, this time William, shifted his alliances as the result of cost-benefit analysis: it was no longer worth the cost of abuse by Philip VI to benefit from that king's power in common interests.

The primary aim of Philip's policy was the creation of a friendly bloc of Low Countries that would support him in a war against Edward and nullify the latter's

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[17] Offler, 614.
[18] Offler, 614.
[19] Lucas, 1929, p. 110.

Lowland diplomatic efforts. The counts of Flanders and Namur and the Bishop of Liège were currently unwavering in their support. The addition of the Duke of Brabant to this alliance would connect Namur and Liège to Flanders, thus creating Philip's desired contiguous bloc. In 1332, Philip played upon the rivalries of the Low Countries and the Duke of Brabant's vulnerability (Brabant was the only territory to border upon every major Lowland principality) by creating a coalition which attacked Brabant in pursuit of the individual coalition members' goals. In the subsequent truce, Philip forced Duke John to ally with him, thus completing his coveted bloc.

In 1333, Flanders' Count Louis and Duke John of Brabant entered into a mutual defense treaty whereby each pledged to defend the "honor and subjects" of the other against all enemies, excluding both France and the empire.[20] Immediately upon signing the document and ceremonially confirming the alliance, Duke John made clear that he had no intentions of abiding by its terms. He refused to give up his claim to disputed territories. Concurrently, the duke imprisoned three merchants from Ghent who had been traveling through Brabant.[21] This treachery coincided with Edward III moving the wool staple – at Duke John's behest – from (Flemish) Bruges to (Brabançon) Antwerp.[22]

This was the last straw, and Count Louis prepared to go to battle against Duke John. A second coalition of counts antipathetic to Duke John arose and attacked him in 1334.[23] Philip VI strove to stop this battle because it threatened his new alliance bloc but he was unsuccessful in doing so. By inciting the first war for his own interests, Philip had opened old disputes and hatreds which could not be contained. Accordingly, Philip's

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[20] Lucas, 1929, p. 133.
[21] Lucas, 1929, p. 134.
[22] Lucas, 1929, p. 136.
[23] Lucas, 1929, p. 145.

dream of a countervailing alliance to Edward's in the Low Countries fell apart as his allies went to war with one another.

After eight months of war, Philip VI initiated the strongest intrusion into the Lowlands ever by a French king. He ordered that the fighting stop, that all alliances be annulled, and that all prisoners be freed and terms of trade restored to their antebellum status. He took it upon himself to unilaterally decide all territory disputes, to arrange marriage bonds, and to regulate the structure of future relations between Duke John and his neighbors.[24] All of these decrees, issued with the implied enforcement of the French military, amounted to the 1334 Treaty of Amiens. Philip's power in the Low Countries was at its apex.

III. The Diplomacy of Edward III and the Captaincy of Jacob van Artevelde

As mentioned above, it was traditional English policy, extending back to the reign of Richard I,[25] to create an alliance which surrounded the lands of the French kings. In constructing such an alliance in the 1330's, Edward III relied on friendships with Count William of Hainault, Holland and Zeeland and Duke Reginald of Guelders. In addition to these, Edward III persuaded the Duke of Brabant and the counts of Berg, Juliers, Limburg, Cleves, and Marck to join him in military opposition to the French king.[26] In

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[24] Lucas, 1929, pp. 161-166.
[25] Michael Jones, "The Last Capetians and Early Valois Kings, 1314-1364," *New Cambridge Medieval History VI, c.1300-c.1415*, ed. Michael Jones, p. 401.
[26] Perroy, p. 96.

the Spring of 1337, the envoys of Edward III and the counts of Juliers, Guelders, and

Hainault, Holland and Zeeland signed a mutual defense pact which provided for all to

defend the empire's western border against French aggression.[27]

The wiliest of these new allies was Duke John III of Brabant. As mentioned

above, Duke John had requested of Edward, as a prelude to negotiations, that the English

wool staple be moved to Brabant. It will be recalled that Philip VI was also pursuing the

allegiance of Duke John in his attempt to construct a pro-French bloc in the Low

Countries. Furthermore, Brabant bordered both Flanders and the lands of the Bishop of

Liege. These two territories were loyal to Philip VI, and therefore Brabant would be

vulnerable to attack if the Duke were to openly side with Edward III. Thus he sought

major concessions to make an alliance worth this risk, which Edward was happy to grant.

Having thus obtained his economic demands, Duke John pledged his "unconditional

support" of Edward III.[28] But the wiliness of the duke is evident in Henry Lucas'

description of this pact: "*On paper, at least*, the duke of Brabant was now fully

committed to Edward's support" [Emphasis added].[29] Lucas makes it clear that Duke

John did not consider his own word to be binding, and that he might find it fit to shift his

allegiances if circumstances changed.

The most glaring absence from Edward III's Lowland alliance was the county of

Flanders. As stated before, Count Louis was squarely allied with Philip VI, signifying the

count's fear and respect of his suzerain's power. In trying to induce a break between the

Flemish count and the French king, Edward III played upon latent Flemish social

[27] Lucas, 1929, p. 208.
[28] Lucas, 1929, p. 215.
[29] Lucas, 1929, p. 216.

tensions. In 1336, Edward III placed a wool embargo on Flanders,[30] crippling the

English-wool-dependent Flemish economy.[31] This produced, as predicted, social unrest in

Flanders as violence and starvation loomed.[32] In this situation, the Flemings had three

options. They could continue to fulfill their feudal obligations to Philip VI, though this

allegiance was the cause of the present dilemma. They could break with Philip VI and

support the English king, but this was not acceptable to Count Louis, who sided with his

kinsman, the French king, in exchange for support against the patrician landowners and

the evermore powerful artisan class. Lastly, they could pursue a course of neutrality,

risking reprisal from Philip VI, but bringing them some amount of relief from Edward

III.[33]

Faced with the possibility of losing his most powerful vassal, Philip VI took steps

to discourage any thoughts of waywardness among the Flemings. He punished harshly

any merchant suspected of trying to relieve the wool embargo. To this end, he ordered

Count Louis to seize any pro-English or pro-neutrality agitators. Count Louis promptly

arrested Soheir de Courtrai, an advocate of relations with Edward III.[34] Later, Philip VI

sent his own officers into the county to investigate the Flemings' loyalty.[35]

Moreover, Philip VI was not opposed to positive measures of securing the

friendship of Flanders through enticements. He lifted some outstanding debts that were

owed him, but they were not enough to ease the economic conditions – since the

Flemings never had any intention of paying such debts. Such a gesture was purely

symbolic. Although Philip VI attempted to alleviate economic strain by importing wool

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[30] Perroy, p. 95.
[31] Nicholas, p. 8.
[32] Lucas, 1929, p. 201, and Nicholas, p. 17.
[33] Lucas, 1929, p. 221.
[34] Lucas, 1929, p. 224.
[35] Lucas, 1929, p. 226.

into Flanders, French wool was neither plentiful enough[36] nor of good enough quality[37] to be of any use in the Flemish market. Thus the French king had nothing worthwhile with which to retain his Flemish vassals' loyalty. With no material enticements to back up his legal claims to his Flemish fiefdom, that loyalty was certain to vanish.

In August of 1337, Philip VI and Count Louis signed an official alliance.[38] The count promised to remain a loyal vassal of Philip VI and to use resources from both French and Imperial Flanders to come to the king's aid against all aggressors. For his part, Philip VI promised to protect Count Louis from the emperor and never to make peace with Emperor Lewis or Edward III without including the count on the terms. This had no effect among the Flemings, however, because of the lack of respect and loyalty with which they esteemed their count.

Meanwhile the crisis situation in Flanders had not abated. Information on the number of guards present in the towns depicts a tense atmosphere in which riot and full rebellion were anticipated.[39] In January of 1338, the city of Ghent elected captains, chief of whom was Jacob van Artevelde,[40] a master draper and member of the "bourgeois aristocracy."[41] Van Artevelde was notable because of his appeal to both the merchants and the gentry. Therefore, he derived political power from his unique ability to span social class and provide for a solidarity of interests among traditionally hostile factions.[42]

Van Artevelde boldly led Ghent toward a policy of neutrality between England and France. This decision was the result of a realistic appraisal of Flanders' economic

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[36] Lucas, 1929, p. 259.
[37] Nicholas, p. 7.
[38] Lucas, 1929, p. 225.
[39] Lucas, 1929, p. 264.
[40] Henry S. Lucas, "The Sources and Literature on Jacob Van Artevelde," *Speculum*, Volume 8, Issue 2 (April, 1933), p. 135.
[41] Lucas, 1933, pp. 145-146.
[42] Lucas, 1929, p. 266.

dependence on England and her feudal dependence on France.[43] Recognizing the advantage to following such a strong lead, the other major cities of Bruges and Ypres quickly fell in line with this policy; the major Flemish cities were thus unified. A declaration of neutrality was risky not only because of the break it implied with the suzerain, but its blatant defiance of the authority of Count Louis. Furthermore, this dramatic policy shift greatly encouraged Edward III, who began to open negotiations with the Flemings for the lifting of the wool embargo. Ghent was clearly emerging as the leader of Flanders.[44]

Why, it might be asked, did the Flemings opt for a policy of neutrality rather than outright alliance with Edward III? There are two reasons for this particular policy. Firstly, the Flemings may have anticipated that allying with Edward would provoke Philip VI to attack, in which he would surely be successful against an economically weakened Flemish artisan class. The Flemings hoped that a policy of neutrality would be less provocative – a hope which pans out as we shall see later, when Philip VI is forced to accept this neutrality as a matter of fact. Secondly, outright alliance with England may not have been in the Flemings' best interest. They might have hesitated from committing themselves to Edward III prematurely when they could gain the desired economic concessions without having to do so. Thus the Flemings under van Artevelde pursued neutrality as a policy calculated to best serve their interests, not because of any lingering loyalty to Philip VI.

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[43] Lucas, 1929, p. 268.
[44] Lucas, 1933, p. 146.

To no one's surprise, the defection of his most important Lowland fief incensed Philip VI,[45] as the Flemings' had worried it might. He began to fortify his garrison at Tournai, close to the border between France and Flanders. He publicly executed Sohier de Coutrai, to the dismay of the Flemings. He threatened to enforce those terms of the 1305 Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge which stipulated that the walls of Ghent were to be demolished. Lastly, he convinced the pope to have the people of Ghent excommunicated for their treason and disloyalty to their suzerain.[46]

Philip VI immediately recognized that such belligerency on his part would surely drive the Flemings into the hands of the English and out of their present neutrality – neutrality thus became a bargaining card for the Flemings. Begrudgingly, he faced the reality of the situation and conceded the fact of Flemish neutrality.[47] It speaks well of the power of Jacob van Artevelde and of the Flanders he led that "the French king, Philip, was induced to accept such a policy from vassal subjects who were bound by feudal contract to support their suzerain."[48]

In the summer of 1338, England and Flanders entered into a non-aggression pact. The Flemings pledged not to support Philip VI his the current war with England (which had been officially declared by Parliament in 1337).[49] Furthermore, the Flemish towns were to provide no support to Count Louis in his efforts to regain control of his county. Edward III promised that no English troops would enter Flanders – in which case the Flemings were free to join their count in defense of their county against England. Lastly,

[45] Norman Davies, *Europe, A History*, p. 420.
[46] Lucas, 1929, p. 273.
[47] Lucas, 1929, p. 276.
[48] Lucas, 1933, p. 146.
[49] Lucas, 1929, p. 281.

the trade of wool between England and Flanders was reopened. Thus van Artevelde's policy accomplished its primary aim – the end of economic crisis.

IV. Edward III as Vicar of the Empire and then King of France

A long series of negotiations between Edward III and the emperor, Lewis of Bavaria, came to fruition in September of 1338 when the emperor conferred upon the English king the title of "Vicar of the Roman Empire *per Alemanniam et Galliam et universas earum provincias sive partes.*"[50] The powers Edward thus gained were exactly where the Empire was enduring French aggression. Thus, it becomes clear that this was a marriage of convenience for both Edward, who gained authority over his desired allies, and Lewis, who now got someone else to take care of defending his western border against French aggression. Opposition to France served as a mutual interest for the English king and the Emperor.[51] Both sovereigns realized the imperative nature of an aggressive alliance between Edward and the towns of Flanders. There are no grounds to the assumption that Edward's actions in pursuit of an Imperial sanction were governed by principle or loyalty to Lewis the Bavarian. Indeed, Edward even agreed, privately, with the pope that the emperor was reigning without legitimacy.[52] He simply disregarded the morality of serving under an illegitimate emperor because of the enhanced diplomatic position it gave him in the Lowlands.

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[50] Offler, p. 612. "for Germany and France and all of their constituent parts." [Translation is my own.]
[51] Offler, p. 612.
[52] Offler, p. 610.

Immediately, Edward summoned all of his vassals to come and pay him homage as representative of the emperor. All Lowland princes, except for the staunchly pro-French bishop of Liege, did so, even Count Louis.[53] Showing their independence from their count, the towns of Bruges, Ghent, and Ypres each sent representatives as well.[54]

There was one other, crucial advantage Edward III gained by accepting the title of vicar general. By the beginning of 1338, English funding for the war was running low, and Edward looked to be unable to fulfill the financial promises that were part of his system of alliance agreements.[55] This sapped the enthusiasm of some Lowland princes for their support of Edward's campaign. Even support from allies to whom Edward owed no money began to wane because the first group of allies had cooled to him, weakening his position. None of these princes wished to be allied with a weak English king against a vengeful French one, with nothing to say for themselves. Only strength and the promise of victory made an alliance with Edward III worth the risk.[56] Thus conferral of the title of vicar enhanced Edward's diplomatic position. Edward's allies were made to obey him under penalties of treason against the empire, penalties which Edward III, as vicar could and wished to enforce. The Emperor himself had so long had his attentions drawn south of the Alps that his authority was not coercive in the Lowlands. The vassalage ties between the Lowland princes and the Holy Roman Emperor were negligible so long as they were not enforced. They were not enforced because the Emperor had no interest in committing the resources necessary to do so. Edward III, who had a vested interest in the

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[53] Perroy, p. 102.
[54] Lucas, 1929, p. 293.
[55] Lucas, 1929, p. 245.
[56] Lucas, 1929, p. 282.

Lowland princes honoring vassalage ties to his ally, provided that enforcement, bringing meaning and power to an otherwise purely nominal feudal link.[57]

Evermore fearful of losing Flanders to Edward III, Philip VI was persuaded by van Artevelde to revoke the terms of the oppressive 1305 Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge[58] – a striking example of legality bending to power concerns. The strength of van Artevelde's power in Flanders was an embarrassment to Count Louis. Because of his relatively weak position within his own county, the Count was relegated to acting as a mouthpiece for all decisions made by the towns – despite his opposition to those very decisions. Thus, in February of 1339, Louis led armed assaults on Ghent and Bruges.[59] When these failed, he fled Flanders and joined the entourage of Philip VI[60].

Van Artevelde began to realize that the French king would never fully accept Flemish neutrality and that he was in fact bringing pressure to bear again on Flanders to bring it back into the French fold. Therefore, in November of 1339, van Artevelde turned to Duke John of Brabant, currently an ally of Edward III, for a mutual defense treaty. The treaty, signed in December of that year, was made in the name of commerce and industry. The signatories agreed to defend each other against aggression and "not to undertake any offensive combat without the consent of the other."[61]

In the face of Philip's hostility, it was a natural step for a treaty with an English ally (Duke John) to engender an alliance with the English king.[62] In order to facilitate such an alliance, van Artevelde suggested that Edward III should assume the title of French king, to which he had laid nominal claim since Philip's accession in 1328.

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[57] Offler, p. 618.
[58] Lucas, 1929, p. 319.
[59] Perroy, p. 104.
[60] Lucas, 1929, p. 321.
[61] Lucas, 1929, pp. 251-252.
[62] Lucas, 1929, p. 358.

At the most basic level, this decision was made for protection of Flanders against Philip VI. In 1339, Edward III had begun his first campaigns against French armies at La Flamengerie,[63] and the Flemings feared an attack from the French king. Therefore, they looked to Edward III for protection.[64] The assumption of the French throne by Edward was thus a way of legitimizing this alliance, allowing the Flemings to circumvent feudal obligations to Philip VI.[65] Lucas describes this decision: "the security of their economic life weighed more with the Flemings than the idea of loyalty to their natural lord."[66]

This episode illustrates the way in which feudal norms and self-help interact. The position of this thesis is not that feudal norms play no role in Medieval affairs, but that they play a subordinate role. The Flemish pressure on Edward III to assume the title of French king is an instance in which both forces are at play. Ruggie[67] and perhaps even Wendt[68] would concede that self-help characterizes the modern international system. Yet even in this system, states are forced to seek legitimacy for their actions.[69] The same can thus be true of the Medieval system without invalidating the assertion that feudal norms are subordinate to self-help. Egoistic interests provided the ends (alliance with England against a belligerent France) while feudal norms dictated the means (Edward's assumption of the title of French king as legitimizing factor of his alliance with Flanders).

The Flemings held out hope that Edward's assumption of the French throne would entice Count Louis from Philip's court, since Edward III, as French king, would be willing to give the count the territories of Walloon Flanders that his predecessors had lost

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[63] Burne, 1955, pp. 47-49.
[64] Perroy, p. 105.
[65] W. Mark Ormrod, "England: Edward II and Edward III," *The New Cambridge Medieval History VI, c.1300-c.1415*, ed. Michael Jones, p. 279.
[66] Lucas, 1929, p. 363.
[67] Ruggie, 1983. This is the implication behind his article, pp. 273-285.
[68] Wendt, 1992, p. 394. His statement here leaves it unclear.
[69] Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22.*

to the Capetians. However, this did not happen because Louis, undoubtedly, resented the role of figurehead to which the van Artevelde government had relegated him. He saw allegiance to Philip VI as the only means to bring the Flemish political situation back to its pre-usurpation state.

Through Edward's assumption of the French crown, the Hundred Years' War changed from a feudal war over Aquitaine to a dynastic struggle for the throne of France. However, it is crucial to remember that Edward's dynastic claims were never the *causus belli*, they were merely means to a strategic end – securing an alliance with the most powerful Lowland fief of the French king; the county of Flanders.

V. The Shift in English Strategy Away From a Lowlands Alliance

In 1340, Edward III lay siege to Tournai, and upon his failure to take the city, he was forced to accept a truce. In 1341, a succession dispute in Brittany received the attentions of the warring kings, and the focus of the war moved to that peninsula (Burne, 66). Edward III then pursued a strategy of spreading the French army thin across a plane stretching from Calais to Brittany to Bordeaux.[70] Accordingly, the efforts of the English king shifted south to Aquitaine in 1344. Having thus spread the French army across all of France, Edward III landed on the beaches of Normandy in 1346 and marched on Paris. The intention was to combine with an Anglo-Flemish auxiliary force coming from Flanders and meet the French king in battle. But the battle happened without the allied

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[70] Burne, 1955, p. 89.

armies ever meeting when Edward's armies crushed the French forces at Crècy in 1346 (Perroy, 119).

It became clear as Edward's focus shifted away from the Low Countries, that their strategic value to him decreased greatly. Jacob van Artevelde's "support and that of Flanders had been virtually necessary for Edward as long as the king remained in the Low Countries."[71] However, when English strategy changed, the role of Flanders, as such, in the Hundred Years' War was marginalized.

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[71] Lucas, 1929, p. 589.

Chapter Five

The preceding chapters have set forth a historical narrative of the Hundred Years'
War. The purpose of that narrative was to provide an answer to two questions: Was the
system of actors at that time characterized by anarchy? And were the actions of
participants in that system governed more by egoistic "self-help" or by feudal norms of
communal discourse? Both questions were essentially asking the same thing: Was there
any constraint on actors against their pursuit of their own interests? The first question
sought institutional, explicit, legal constraints. The second sought implicit, cultural
constraints.

Chapter Three addressed the first question. Forty-two years of history were
examined, looking specifically at the constant peace negotiations which were organized
and promoted by the Church Universal, the only plausible candidate for an alternative to
anarchy. The consistency with which both English and French kings disregarded the
Pope's decrees, ignored his pleas, lied to him, and challenged and mocked his inability to
enforce truces and treaties is striking. The French kings considered the Pope a tool to be
used in diplomatic combat, the English king considered his impartiality, and thus his
legitimacy, suspect. Neither king expected the other to abide by the Pope's terms because
neither of them considered those terms to be binding. Neither king feared the Pope's
ability to enforce the peace.

Chapter Four answered the second question. By examining 110 years of relationships that the Low Countries had amongst themselves and with the three great monarchs, the chapter aimed to determine to what extent egoism governed their actions. Would they pursue their own self-interest when it conflicted with feudal discourse? When actors acted in accordance with feudal norms, what was their motivation for doing so?

Once again, the evidence is consistently in support of Realist claims. Actors pursued their interests with abandon. The narrative provides evidence of this: Louis IX shrewdly split Count Baldwin's lands; the houses of Avesnes and Dampierre switched allegiances back and forth between the French king and the Holy Roman Emperor as their needs demanded, Count Robert defied a decree from his lord by rendering its terms unenforceable through his resistance; Philip VI pursued the expansion of his influence into lands clearly recognized as within the legal sphere of the Holy Roman Emperor; John of Brabant signed treaties in bad faith and maneuvered between warring parties as best suited his immediate needs; Edward III starved the people of Flanders into breaking their feudal obligations to the French king (their county was his fief, for which they, like their count, owed him obedience); the Flemings disregarded and disrespected their count in betraying his lord, the French king. These are just the major examples. Constructivists speak volumes about culture and context. The historical evidence clearly indicates that the culture of this time was one of shrewd egoism, not one of communal, feudal norms. Each of the actors considered himself to be alone, fighting for his security *vis a vis* the others, To this end, each one lied, created and broke alliances, and blatantly infringed on each others' legal rights. When they did follow feudal discourse, it was because concrete

penalties for doing so outweighed the benefits of defection, or because some material interest could be gained by obedience to feudal law.

Clearly, Constructivist claims regarding Medieval Europe as unexplainable by Realist assumptions are misguided. Thus, answering the primary question of this thesis, yes, the core tenets of Realism were as present in Medieval Europe as they are in the Modern system of nation-states. Realists can make plausible claims about the causes of warfare in a feudal society as well as in the modern one.

Potential Criticisms

Is the period that this thesis is examining too late for the system to be considered truly feudal?

With some exceptions, the narrative of this thesis covers the early and mid-fourteenth century in northwestern Europe. This era falls squarely within the confines of what is commonly called the Medieval period, and not close enough to the Medieval-Modern divide to be readily confused with the latter.

Although the Hundred Years' War occurred in the late Medieval period, no historian would venture to describe the system as even proto-modern. True, the war marked the descent of feudalism,[1] exposing scale constraints on this social organization that had never before been tested. Moreover, seeds of nationalism were planted in a

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[1] Allmand, pp. 92-93.

system that had previously considered itself to be universal.[2] Lastly, Edward III switched

his method of raising his army from one of invoking feudal obligation to one of voluntary

military service in the 1330's.[3]

However, there was no alternative to feudalism at that time, and that

contemporaries saw the system as dead is doubtful; Central and Western Europe

languished in this mode for at least a century after the end of the Hundred Years' War in

1453. As for nationalist tendencies, Allmand describes the phenomenon as a consequence

of the widespread destruction wrought by the war,[4] and therefore not a condition present

at the war's outset. Barnie clarifies that these tendencies cannot be considered

nationalism as such until the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[5] And while

methods of raising arms may have begun to change, these were merely the vanguard of

future developments; major social institutions and notions of homage remained as they

had for centuries.

Lastly, it is accurate, in one sense, to describe feudalism as breaking down from

as early as the ninth century.[6] But by what sense are we to define feudalism, if it is, from

its very inception, on the decline? Merely pointing to its gradual decline over the course

of six centuries is not enough to invalidate any investigations into that system which rely

on its feudal nature. Clearly some threshold must be recognized, at which point the

system had declined so much as to no longer resemble feudalism but instead another form

of socio-political organization altogether. In the majority of the historical literature, there

is such a distinction, drawn in the seventeenth century. Thus the early fourteenth century

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[2] Barnie, p. 97.
[3] Ormrod, pp. 281-282.
[4] Allmand, p. 136.
[5] Barnie, p. 97.
[6] Susan Reynolds, *Feifs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted*, p. 21.

is a period well within the confines of feudalism, declines and modernizing changes notwithstanding.

Cannot unity of mores between Medieval and Modern times be attributed to a common European culture?

Constructivism is a theory that relies primarily on notions of common culture and mutually recognized conceptions. If it is proven that Medieval Europe does not provide an alternative to Realism's self-help, then it is plausible to conclude that egoism is a function of European culture, influenced by Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions.

This could very well be true. However, it was the scope of this thesis only to determine whether anarchy and self-help could be detected in Medieval Europe. Having located and identified these variables, it is still to be determined whether Realism can be applied as an analytical tool in other, non-state systems – say, the warring states period of Chinese history, or India from the sixth to the tenth centuries, or the warring Mayan tribes in the fifth century. Such further research is suggested here, but outside the scope of this paper. The purpose of this thesis was not to judge Realism's universal applicability, but to determine whether feudal Europe posed an obstacle to the Realists' claim or universality. The evidence presented indicates clearly that it does not.

Do the abnormal levels of social unrest in Flanders make it a biased choice as test case?

It is definitely true that Flanders suffered more social tensions than any other Lowland state. However, the mere fact that Count Louis III was allied with Philip VI, when his father and grandfather had opposed the French monarchs, and he himself had

done so in 1314, discourages the conclusion that Flemings were biased toward defection on their feudal loyalties. Even if they were, Louis' loyalty to Philip is an anomaly that has been explained as a function of his egoist pursuit – he wished to quash the usurpation of his power by van Artevelde and the burghers.

No, Flanders' unique position as premier economic power, as the only French vassal in the Low Countries, and as the subject of the majority of relevant literature, is what makes Flanders a prime test subject for this paper. For 110 years, from the succession dispute at Count Baldwin's death until the Battle of Tournai, the counts and people of Flanders were presented with options. Find support with the Emperor, the French king, or the English king? Pursue economic interests or feudal fidelity? Were the people to cooperate with their count or rebel against him? Over the span of this time, no single path was taken. All of the above options were exercised at one time or another, however immediate interests demanded – a clear breakdown of norms (whether constitutive or regulatory) as a conditioning factor of behavior. It is thus that Flanders is an optimal case to judge whether egoism or feudal norms was the overriding concern of the average feudal actor.

Relevance

There are many implications arising from the conclusion of this paper. Firstly, Constructivism loses its test case. Constructivists like Ruggie have been imploring

Realists to examine the Medieval world and see how different it is from the modern one. But upon examination, the Medieval world, in respect to anarchy and self-help, appears very much the same as the modern one. If Constructivists are to disprove Waltz's assumption that anarchy necessarily leads to self-help, they will have to find a new test case to make their position anything more than theoretical.

Understanding the strong similarities between Medieval international relations and the modern kind allows the modern historian to gain a clearer understanding of Medieval history. Specifically, wars can be described in terms of power distribution between actors. Alliances between actors can be examined with an eye toward the balance of power. In short, the similarity of the two systems allows for the historian and the international political scientist to formulate larger theories about the causes of warfare and its consequences.

The findings of this paper are relevant to more than the historical debate. Supporting and strengthening Realists' claims that their theory is a universally applicable tool for explaining the causes of warfare, these findings have relevance to the future of modern international relations. There are many who currently think the modern system of nation-states is in a noticeable decline. In fact, the system that many predict will take its place has many parallels with feudal Europe: supranational institutions, multi-national NGO's, and MNC's, all commanding loyalties from people on a non-territorial basis. Thus many see a future international system without borders or states as we know them. In this hypothetical world of conflicting loyalties and overlapping jurisdictions, an theory which has already proven itself with regards to explaining feudal warfare may be

relevant. Thus the findings of this paper take steps toward proving the potential relevance of Realist theories of international relations well into the future.

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