

Economic Interdependence and the First World War*

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Abstract

The First World War is generally viewed by both advocates and critics of commercial liberal theory as the quintessential example of a failure of economic integration to maintain peace. Yet this consensus relies both on methodologically flawed inference and an incomplete accounting of the antecedents to the war. Crucially, the war began in a weakly integrated portion of Europe with which highly integrated powers were entangled through the alliance system. Crises among the highly interdependent European powers in the decades leading up to World War I were generally resolved without bloodshed. Among the less interdependent powers in Eastern Europe, however, crises regularly escalated to militarized violence. Moreover, the crises leading to the war created increased incentives for the integrated powers to strengthen commitments to their less-interdependent partners. In attempting to make these alliances more credible, western powers shifted foreign policy discretion to the very states that lacked strong economic disincentives to fight, thereby creating conditions that undermined the deterrent effect of trade ties among the western powers. Had globalization pervaded Eastern Europe, or the rest of Europe been less enmeshed in events in the East, Europe might have avoided a “Great War.”

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1 Introduction

The relationship between economic interdependence and military conflict is among the most studied and debated in the international relations literature. Scholars who argue that economic ties reduce the likelihood of conflict have struggled to reconcile this view with the outbreak of World War I. The conventional wisdom among political scientists is that World War I constituted a failure of economic integration to maintain peace.¹ Even prominent advocates of liberal theory view the First World War as an unfortunate contradiction to the general argument that trade inhibits conflict.²

These arguments are important for several reasons. First, they bear on our understanding of the causes of war and peace, and on more pragmatic issues of policy in an increasingly globalized, but still fractious world. Whether interdependence encourages states to resolve differences diplomatically or not contributes to expectations about the future of international affairs. If interdependence at the turn of the last century failed to inhibit the most general conflict up to that time, then it may fail to perpetuate peace in the new century. Second, the First World War also serves as a “critical case” for proponents and critics of liberal theory. The liberal argument will be strengthened to the degree that economic integration a century ago can be reconciled with the outbreak of general war in Europe in 1914. Finally, World War I is an inherently important case, implying (as others have

¹Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,” *International Organization*, Vol. 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597–624; Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5–41; Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Paul A. Papayoanou, “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 42–76; Paul A. Papayoanou, *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “Commercial Liberalism Under Fire: Evidence from 1914 and 1936,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 1996–97), pp. 4–50; David M. Rowe, “World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe,” *International Organization*, Vol. 53 (Spring 1999), pp. 195–231; Jack S. Levy, “War and Peace,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons, eds., *The Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2001) pp. 350–67; David M. Rowe, “The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War,” *Security Studies* Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 407–47; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001); Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 1–14; Frank Zagare, *The Games of July: Explaining the Great War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011), pp. x.

²Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 2nd ed. (New York: Putnam, 1933); Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (New York: Basic Books 1985); Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, “Interdependence and Conflict: An Introduction,” in Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, eds., *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003); Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR Theory?: Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era,” *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2007), pp. 370–403. Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal Theories of International Relations: A Primer,” Typescript. Princeton University.

already pointed out) that explanations for its advent and expansion deserve careful scrutiny.

Recasting the outbreak of the First World War in a light more favorable to liberal theory is actually less difficult than the prevailing consensus would suggest. At the very least, World War I is not a particularly compelling example of the failure of liberal trade theory, and it may even indicate the strength of the liberal perspective. The conventional wisdom about interdependence and World War I seems peculiar in light of three historical facts. First, the turn of the century saw a series of intense crises among the interdependent states of Western Europe that nevertheless did not result in open warfare. Second, despite these growing tensions among the Western powers, the fighting in 1914 actually began among the less-interdependent powers of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Third, during the same period in which the highly interdependent European powers were generally able to resolve their crises without resorting to war, the less-interdependent powers were typically unable to do so. These observations indicate that there may indeed have been a relationship between interdependence and the pacific settlement of disputes during this era. These facts also suggest that the role of interdependence in the outbreak of war in 1914 may be better understood in the context of the relationship between interdependence and conflict in the era leading up to the war.

We argue that the relationship between economic interdependence and the outbreak of World War I has been broadly misinterpreted and that interdependence did not really fail in 1914. World War I did happen, of course, but it is no coincidence that it began among states that were less well-integrated into the global economy than their key alliance partners. There is much evidence to suggest that economic linkages served an important role in averting escalation to warfare in the series of crises that led up to the Great War. However, these crises created an incentive for more integrated countries, most importantly Germany and Russia, to show an increasing resolve to support their weaker, less interdependent, allies, Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Tight alliance ties then effectively handed the foreign policies of interdependent powers over to countries that were less well-integrated into the world economy. Economic integration was not capable of forestalling conflict where integration had yet to occur. Nor could interdependence prevent war, once started, from spreading through competing networks of military alliance commitments that made it much more costly for Western powers to exercise available economic linkages to the greatest pacific effect.

This paper begins by explaining the various theories that argue that interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict, as well as theories opposed to this view. Second, we discuss shortcomings of treating the outbreak of World War I as a failure of interdependence. Third, we describe interdependence in the two economic subsystems of Europe prior to the war. In the fourth section, we compare crisis behavior in the highly interdependent and less-interdependent portions of Europe during the period 1871 to 1913. Fifth, we discuss the July crisis and the outbreak of war in 1914. We conclude by using the evidence from our analysis to further refine commercial liberal theory.

2 War and Interdependence

Theories of interdependence argue that economic relationships that span international borders influence the conflict propensity of states. Nations inclined to war can be deterred, informed, or transformed by the value of economic linkages. Critics of interdependence argue that economic ties do not have powerful pacifying effects on world politics, either because the stakes are insufficient to deter conflict, or because some aspect of the causal logic offered by liberals and others is incorrect.

The most traditional approach to the relationship between economic relations and conflict focuses on explaining how economic ties linking nations change the incentives of actors in the international system. Beginning in the modern era, scholar-statesmen like Richard Cobden and Norman Angell and others argued that interdependence, primarily in the form of interstate trade, raises the opportunity cost of war, thus making contests less likely. The logic of these arguments is that a war between trading partners would likely disrupt that trade, forcing states to seek other markets. This would require a shift to different, less lucrative, trade partners.³ Others argue that as trade increases states can achieve gains more efficiently through economic means, rather than through warfare. In other words, when states can grow their economies through international commerce, there is a decreased incentive to attempt to do so through territorial conflict.⁴ Open

³Richard Cobden, *Political Writings of Richard Cobden*, vol. 1. (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1903[1867]); Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 2d ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933); Francis Delaisi, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (London: Noel Douglas, 1925), pp. 57–78; Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality,” *World Politics*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (October 1973), pp. 1–27; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 8–13.

⁴Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

financial and goods markets may also create similar disincentives for states to fight.⁵

The notion that international trade is associated with decreased likelihood of conflict has found significant empirical support. A series of studies using events data found that higher levels of trade interdependence (defined as trade/GDP) are associated with lower probabilities of interstate war.⁶ Others have built on this research to demonstrate that the finding is robust to alternate specifications of the temporal domain⁷ and unit of analysis.⁸ The relationship between trade and conflict is likely more complex than initially theorized. First, it may be the case that high levels of trade dependence embolden a state's opponents.⁹ Responding to this critique, McDonald (2004) argues that we must shift our focus from aggregate trade flows to the extent to which states pursue free trade policies. Thus, he argues: "Free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic privilege-protective barriers to trade-that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and creates a mechanism by which the state can build supportive coalitions for war."¹⁰ Dorussen (2006) offers another important theoretical refinement, noting that the opportunity costs of conflict created by different types of trade vary significantly. "Trade is less likely to have an effect on conflict," he argues, "if exporters or importers expect only minor problems with finding alternative markets." Two factors he points to in raising the opportunity

⁵Robert O. Keohane, "Economic Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., *The Economic Limits to Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Arthur A. Stein, "Governments, Economic Interdependence, and International Cooperation," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 3, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: Norton, 1997).

⁶Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1980); Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1986), pp. 23-38; Solomon W. Polachek, "Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions," in Walter Isard and Chale H. Anderton, eds., *Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), pp. 89-120; Solomon W. Polachek and Judy McDonald, "Strategic Trade and the Incentive for Cooperation," in Manas Chatterji and Linda Forcey, eds., *Disarmament, Economic Conversion and Peace Management* (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 273-84; John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1997), pp. 267-93.

⁷William K. Domke, *War and the Changing Global System* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988).

⁸Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade, and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁹James D. Morrow, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 481-8; Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict," *International Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2001), pp. 391-438.

¹⁰Patrick J. McDonald, "Peace through Trade or Free Trade?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2004), pp. 547-72, 549.

costs of conflict created by trade are lower factor mobility and higher asset specificity.¹¹ Finally, the effects of trade interdependence may be contingent on the mediating effects of democracy.¹²

One strain of research focuses on ways that trade may make conflict less likely through other mechanisms besides the opportunity costs of war. Solingen (1998), for example, argues that trade allows domestic actors to build cross-national coalitions that both promote greater interdependence and cause convergent transformations in state preferences.¹³ Along related lines, Papayoanou (1999) argues that economic relations create strong domestic-level interests that delimit a leader's ability to credibly counter external threats or challenges.¹⁴ Building on these arguments, several scholars have constructed what is sometimes known as the "commercial peace" or "capitalist peace." They argue that interdependence mollifies the effects of states' security dilemmas by creating common interests and reducing uncertainty. While the bulk of the work on interdependence and conflict focuses on trade,¹⁵ other forms of transnational economic relations are also crucial. Gartzke et al. (2001) argue that, along with trade, interstate monetary policy cooperation and capital flows reduce the likelihood of conflict by allowing states in crisis situations to send costly signals without needing to resort to violence or crisis escalation that may precipitate violence.¹⁶ Building on this, Gartzke (2007) argues that interdependence—defined as including trade, development, open financial markets and monetary policy coordination—reduces conflict by (1) aligning states' interests, which gives them less to fight over; (2) providing a means of peacefully securing resources; and (3) allowing states to foresee the costs of fighting, which facilitates bargaining and compromise.¹⁷

¹¹Han Dorussen, "Heterogeneous Trade Interests and Conflict: What You Trade Matters," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50 (2006), pp. 87-107, 90.

¹²Paul A. Papayoanou, *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Christopher Gelpi and Joe Grieco, "Economic Interdependence, the Democratic State, and the Liberal Peace," in *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate*.

¹³Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Centurys Dawn: Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

¹⁴Papayoanou, *Power Ties: Economic Interdependence, Balancing, and War*.

¹⁵See also Harry Bliss and Bruce Russett, "Democratic Trading Partners: The Liberal Connection," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1998), pp. 1126-47; Solomon W. Polachek, John Robst, and Yuan-Ching Chang, "Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Trade-Conflict Model," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 405-22; Mark J. C. Crescenzi and Andrew J. Enterline, "Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2001), pp. 409-31; John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and Michael L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2003), pp. 371-93.

¹⁶Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict."

¹⁷Erik Gartzke, "The Capitalist Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (2007), pp. 166-91. See also William Reed, "Information and Economic Interdependence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 47,

A significant group of scholars, however, have posed important criticisms of interdependence theory. At a theoretical level, several scholars have argued that interdependence and conflict are unrelated. Even if economic factors matter, they argue, decisions to initiate conflict are primarily based on security and military concerns.¹⁸ Morrow (1999) provides two arguments against the causal connection between trade and conflict. First, he notes that if trade reduces the likelihood of aggressive behavior by one state, this would strategically have the effect of increasing the likelihood of aggressiveness by another state, thus nullifying the effect of interdependence in inhibiting conflict. Second, Morrow argues that firms in a given state should rationally anticipate when conflict with other states is more likely and strategically reduce their trade with firms in those states.¹⁹ As a result, trade may be endogenous to conflict or the direction of causality may be the reverse of that theorized by commercial liberals.²⁰ Keshk et al. (2004) investigate the problem of reverse causality, finding evidence that it is more likely that conflict affects trade than vice versa.²¹ Similarly, Ward et al. (2007) argue that prior statistical findings are the result of geographical proximity, dependence among militarized disputes with the same initiator or target, and higher-order dependencies in dyadic data. Accounting for these, they find no relationship between trade levels and conflict.²²

Going a step further, some work has suggested that trade increases, rather than decreases, the likelihood of conflict, a result that would support the Marxist view that capitalism leads to conflict, as well as some socialist perspectives and other liberal critics. Generally speaking, capitalism and economic development may generate demands for imperialistic territorial conquest. As commerce grows, states compete over scarce resources and may use military means to obtain them. States may

No. 1 (2003), pp. 54-71; Patrick J. McDonald, *The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, The War Machine, and International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

¹⁸Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and Inter-national Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case," *International Organization*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (August 1984), pp. 597-624; Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, vol. 1, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)

¹⁹Morrow, "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?"

²⁰Rafael Reuveny, "Bilateral Import, Export and Political Conflict Simultaneity," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (2000), pp. 131-58.

²¹Omar M. Keshk, Brian M. Pollins, and Rafael Reuveny, "Trade Still Follows the Flag: The Primacy of Politics in a Simultaneous Model of Interdependence and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66 (2004), pp. 1155-79.

²²Michael D. Ward, Randolph M. Siverson, and Xun Cao, "Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2007), pp. 583-601. See also Hyung Min Kim and David L. Rousseau, "The Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New Tests of the 'Liberal Peace', 1960-88," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 5 (2005), pp. 523-43; Cullen F. Goenner, "Uncertainty of the Liberal Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 5 (2004), pp. 589-605.

also use trade and military force together in order to maintain their colonial holdings. Economic ties may create rivalries as partners become more concerned with dividing the gains from the trade than with mutual gains.²³ Several political scientists have built on these arguments, noting that trade may increase conflict by creating competition over relative gains.²⁴ There is also some empirical support for this proposition, although it is controversial. Using a measure of trade salience, Barbieri (1996) finds statistical support for this proposition for the period 1870-1938.²⁵

3 World War I as a Test of Liberal Theory

The causes of the First World War have long been an important topic of debate and conjecture among students of international politics.²⁶ The case appears particularly problematic for those claiming that interdependence reduces the likelihood of war. In the four decades prior to the Great War, Europe experienced a dramatic increase in the levels of interdependence, especially among several of the major powers. Liberal theory, therefore, would appear to predict a low probability of war among interdependent European states, and a low probability that wars would spread to countries with globalized economies. That interdependent states engaged in a war of unprecedented

²³John A. Hobson, *Imperialism* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1938[1905]); V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, (New York: International Publishers 1970[1916]); Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1945); Richard Rubinson, "The World-Economy and the Distribution of Income Within States," *American Sociological Review*. Vol. 41, No. 4 (1976), pp. 638-59. Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

²⁴Michael Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 16 (1991), pp. 73-113; Joanne Gowa, *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

²⁵Katherine Barbieri, "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of International Conflict?," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1996), pp. 29-49. See also Katherine Barbieri and Gerald Schneider, "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 387-404. For critiques of these criticisms, see John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1999), pp. 423-42; Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, "Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict Debate," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2003), pp. 553-71.

²⁶Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-46; Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 1986), pp. 151-75; Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 187-215; Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 120-50; Jack S. Levy, "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pp. 151-86; Keir Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory," *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 155-91.

intensity thus bolsters the view that interdependence is not an important determinant of conflict.²⁷

Several scholars have attempted to defend or explain away the onset of war in 1914 in light of the apparent contradiction with liberal theory. Oneal and Russett (2001) argue that the effects of interdependence are conditional on democracy. Thus, these effects did not function in the lead-up to the war because Germany, a key player in the crisis, was not sufficiently democratic. They also argue that, although economic interdependence was much greater during this period than in prior eras, it was nonetheless not sufficiently deep as to prevent a major conflict, a point Rosecrance (1986) also makes. Rosecrance, repeating an argument posed by Angell, claims in addition that European leaders misperceived both the value of interdependence and the costs of a potential war.²⁸ McDonald and Sweeney (2007) provide a detailed analysis delineating the relationship between interdependence and the outbreak of World War I. They argue that most theories of commercial liberalism incorrectly focus on levels of trade flows rather than on trade protection. They find that during the period 1865 to 1914, lower levels of trade protection were associated with a reduced propensity toward conflict, showing that interdependence (following their definition) was associated with peace during this era. In addition, they note that economic conflict between Germany and Russia, in the form of rising tariff rates, preceded the outbreak of war. “Rather than ask why higher levels of interdependence or international trade failed to prevent the war, we explore how government regulation of the economy enabled it. Together these analyses challenge conventional wisdom by showing how this earlier era of globalization does not undermine the foundations of Liberal IR theory. Free trade promoted peace between states during the nineteenth century.”²⁹

In this paper, we build on McDonald and Sweeney (2007) in asking to what extent the outbreak of World War I can be viewed as a failure of interdependence. We differ in how we define interdependence, adopting the more conventional association between trade flows and conflict, rather than examining protectionist measures, which strike us as closely associated with the very forces

²⁷E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations.”

²⁸John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State*, p. 18-19, 88-99.

²⁹McDonald and Sweeney, “The Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory?”, p. 373.

propelling states to war. We also differ from McDonald and Sweeney in our focus on the competing interconnectedness of alliance ties and their role in overcoming the pacifying effect of national economic interest that deterred conflict among interdependent states prior to World War I.

On the surface, it would seem clear that interdependence failed to function as predicted by liberal theory at the advent of the First World War. Yet there are flaws in the connections drawn by both critics and advocates of liberal theory that make the conclusion that World War I challenges liberal theory empirically suspect. Existing uses of World War I to falsify the pacific effects of interdependence are flawed in three ways. First, the fact that war occurred between interdependent states in one important case only demonstrates that interdependence is not sufficient by itself to guarantee interstate peace; interdependence could still reduce the overall likelihood of war. Second, focusing on the outbreak of World War I to test this theory is problematic because it is a case chosen based on the dependent variable, the outbreak of war. War may be made very unlikely and nonetheless occur. If we are to look back afterward and conclude that the likelihood of war was not much affected by mitigating factors, then we are committing the classic *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy. We can gain greater explanatory power by examining variation in this dependent variable over the relevant period. Third, the conventional wisdom – that Europe was interdependent but nonetheless went to war – overlooks crucial variance in the independent variable. Europe in 1914 was not uniformly interdependent, but consisted of several highly interdependent powers, other powers that were significantly less reliant on economic relations with their neighbors, and still other states that were minimally integrated into this system. We discuss all three issues below.

First, while a probabilistic theory cannot be disproved with a single case, a reasonable observer might counter that some cases are particularly worthy of explanation. Liberal theory is deeply flawed if it cannot account for a contest as catastrophic as World War I. We agree completely. Treating a war in which over 10 million people died as an outlying case in which a probabilistic relationship failed would be intellectually unsatisfactory or misleading. World War I was not a blip.

The second flaw with using 1914 to test theories of interdependence, however, is more consequential. While many have claimed that in neither qualitative nor quantitative research is it

appropriate to choose cases based on the dependent variable,³⁰ others argue that doing so is valid when one is particularly interested in explaining a specific case or outcome.³¹ We take no issue with the study of World War I as a unique historical phenomenon or with including interdependence as a possible explanatory variable when attempting to explain what did or did not contribute to its outbreak. Instead, our concern is that scholars have made erroneous inferences in using the Great War to falsify liberal theory more generally. Doing so uses the July 1914 crisis as a “hypothesis testing” case, which is among the most difficult and controversial types of case study.³² It is one thing to study a case in order to understand what led to a particular outcome in that case; it is a wholly different undertaking to use the case to test a hypothesis meant to represent general tendencies of a variable across a great many cases. While King, Keohane and Verba (1994) doubt that valid inference can be drawn from testing a hypothesis with a single case, others argue that doing so is valid for crucial or critical cases, often referred to as most likely and least likely cases.³³

Conducting a hypothesis-testing case study of a probabilistic theory based on a most/least likely logic requires analysts to define their case based on the independent variable rather than the dependent variable. As George and Bennett argue, “In a most likely case, the *independent variables* posited by a theory are at values that posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome” (emphasis added).³⁴ What makes the outbreak of World War I relevant to theories of interdependence is not just that it was a war, but that it was a war that involved several powers that were formerly highly interdependent. Thus, in order to use this case to test the hypothesis that interdependence reduces the probability of conflict, we must define it in terms of an era of high European interdependence and study conflict behavior in the period and region as a whole. As Stevenson argues, “to concentrate

³⁰Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)

³¹Henry E. Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004)

³²Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), Vol. 7, ; Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-18).

³³Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science.” As Levy argues, “The inferential logic of least likely case design is based on the “Sinatra inference”—if I can make it there I can make it anywhere. The logic of most likely case design is based on the inverse Sinatra inference—if I cannot make it there, I cannot make it anywhere.” “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” p. 12.

³⁴Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), p. 121.

exclusively on the events of 1914 provides too narrow a basis for understanding early-twentieth century crisis behavior. We need to study the confrontations that did not end in fighting as well as the ones that did.”³⁵ Put another way, when defining a case analysts must ask themselves: “What is this a case of?”³⁶ We argue that an answer of: “This is a case of war” may allow us to understand the causes of that war, or possibly the causes of war in general. Yet only by defining the case as “a case of high interdependence and war” can we understand whether this factor makes war less likely. To do otherwise, to test this hypothesis by defining the case as the outbreak of war in July 1914, is to commit a fallacy as significant in turn as it would be to dismiss the war as an “outlier.”

Defining the case in this way brings us to the third flaw in the conventional wisdom: the role of the explanatory variable. The notion that World War I represents a crucial failure of interdependence seems to rely on the view that it is a most likely case for testing the hypothesis. World War I, as we noted above, is often cited as evidence against commercial liberalism. On its face, the case involves a period of significant and increasing interdependence followed by a war and thus presents a problem for those who argue that interdependence promotes peace. If instead *even this case* offers some support for liberal claims, then this is powerful evidence in favor of the liberal perspective. Yet, treating 1914 alone as a most likely case in the traditional sense overlooks several historical facts that are inconsistent with framing the case in this way. First, not all of Europe was economically interdependent during the pre-World-War-I period; indeed, this factor varied in crucial ways across both space and time. Beckett explains this difference as follows: “[t]he rapid pace of change wrought by industrialization in western Europe sharpened the contrast with most of the states of central, southern and eastern Europe. These remained in effect peasant societies.”³⁷ Second, the war did not begin among the most interdependent states in Europe but instead among their less interdependent allies. A more clear-cut most likely case to test liberal theory would have occurred if the war had begun between Germany and Russia or France. Certainly, Austria-Hungary and Serbia were supported and possibly encouraged by their allies, but the fact remains that, despite rising tensions in the West, war in 1914 was begun on the banks of the Danube, not

³⁵Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997), pp. 125-62, 154.

³⁶Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference”.

³⁷Ian F.W. Beckett, *The Great War*, second edition, (London: Pearson, 2007), p. 5.

the Rhine. Interdependence may have played a more important and nuanced role than is widely recognized, as exhibited by the pattern of initiation, joining and non-joining by European states.

Our research design is intended to provide a more accurate assessment of whether the outbreak of World War I constitutes a failure of interdependence. In order to provide an answer that avoids the shortcomings outlined above, we address two sub-questions. First, is there historical evidence that interdependence made the war less likely than it would have been otherwise? Second, if so, why did war finally break out in 1914 despite these effects? We begin by analyzing crisis behavior in Europe in the era prior to World War I. This allows us to observe multiple cases of crises that vary both along the dependent variable of crisis outcome (e.g., escalation or de-escalation) and the key independent variable of interdependence. While it is possible to define any previous point in history as beginning the lead-up to the war, many historians begin their study of the war's origins in 1871, following Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian War. As we demonstrate, crises among the highly interdependent powers, most importantly Britain, France, Germany and Russia, were generally resolved peacefully during this era, despite important differences among these powers. By contrast, crises among the less interdependent powers of Europe in this period often led to war.

We continue our analysis by examining the July 1914 crisis. We do so for two reasons. First, as mentioned above, regardless of the methodological arguments one might make to the contrary, it is important to understand why interdependence failed to prevent a wider war in 1914. Second, deviant case analyses can be useful for the refinement and extension of hypotheses.³⁸ By examining July 1914 within the broader context, we hope to provoke a refinement or extension of liberal theory.

While our research design has several advantages, it also has limitations. We cannot conclusively demonstrate that interdependence “worked” in 1914. Instead, we focus on showing that the widely accepted view that interdependence failed to promote peace is poorly supported by evidence and inference.³⁹ Ideally, we could go further and “process trace” our argument, providing detailed narratives showing that de-escalation among interdependent states in crisis resulted (at least in

³⁸Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” in Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196; Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference.”

³⁹Liberal theory does not argue that non-interdependence is a cause of war (i.e. increasing the likelihood of conflict), but rather that interdependence is a cause of peace, reducing motivations to fight below what they might be otherwise.

part) from concern among key decision makers over jeopardizing economic relations. We provide a number of examples in discussing events in the period that support our claims. However, beyond space limitations inherent in an article-length manuscript, there is an important reason that evidence of this type may be less prevalent in studying interdependence than for other causes of war and peace. Interdependence is a *negative* cause, said to discourage fighting that might otherwise occur. As such, its impact is much more likely to be latent than overt. Decision makers have no particular reason to mention economic ties in choosing to go to war, if in fact interdependence tends to point in the opposite direction. Leaders of nations that do not fight may also refrain from highlighting factors such as economic ties that represent vulnerabilities in bargaining and highlight the decision to back down. More generally, while fewer discussions about trade might be construed as proof that leaders were unaffected by economic considerations, the leaders that are most affected by interdependence will tend to refrain from entering crises altogether, making assessments of their (non)actions far from transparent. Indeed, as we discuss later, leaders in competition have incentives to adopt measures that mitigate or downplay the inhibiting effects of economic dependencies. In short, the absence of evidence cannot be interpreted as evidence of absence. The conventional narrative on economic interdependence and World War I relies heavily on material attributes and incentives (i.e. there was a war, thus economic factors failed to deter war) to judge the inefficacy of economic interdependence. We focus on the same factors to support our argument, at least initially.

One thing we can demonstrate is that a correlation exists between interdependence levels and conflict in Europe during this era.⁴⁰ The correlation is important for two reasons. First, the relationship casts *prima facie* doubt on the view of 1914 as an adequate “most likely” test of commercial liberalism. If it is truly a most likely case with which to test the theory, appropriately defined in terms of the independent variable, then a finding that crises among interdependent states during this era tended to result in conflict would provide strong evidence against liberal theory. If they did not, however, then this would suggest that the role of interdependence in the origins of World War I deserves greater attention. Second, the correlation between trade and peace is useful

⁴⁰McDonald and Sweeney have already demonstrated that states with higher levels of trade protection were more likely to engage in conflict in 1914. “The Achilles’ Heel of Liberal IR Theory?”

for counterfactual analysis.⁴¹ By identifying the most salient sources of tension during the era, it is possible to predict *ex ante* where war would have been most expected if interdependence and war are unrelated. By then comparing crisis behavior in response to such tensions among highly and weakly interdependent groups of states, we can use the groups as counterfactuals for the other.

4 Interdependence in Pre-World War I Europe

We define economic interdependence broadly, as consisting of both trade flows and capital flows. States we refer to as highly economically interdependent are those with economies that relied relatively heavily on international trade and the exchange of capital. Groups of interdependent states are those connected by dense cross-border economic flows, while less interdependent states are closer to autarky. While data are not available for every state we evaluate in each year, we possess enough information to develop key conclusions regarding categories of states, their relative levels of interdependence, and the effects of economic linkages on conflict during this period.

It is possible to think of Europe during this era as consisting of two distinct economic subsystems. The first is a highly interdependent group consisting mostly of Western powers, most importantly Germany, France and the United Kingdom, but also Russia. The second subsystem is a significantly less interdependent group of Eastern European states, including the Ottoman Empire, its successor states and again Russia. Scholars generally agree that between 1871 and the beginning of World War I many European powers became increasingly economically interdependent, particularly in terms of increased trade and capital mobility. The highly interdependent states in Europe were mostly in the West, including France, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Other powers, such as Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia were significantly less developed economically and less integrated into the global economy, although Russia was heavily dependent in economic terms on the Western powers. The least economically integrated and developed of the European powers at the time were the Ottoman Empire and its various successor states, as well as the Iberian states. The key Western powers of Britain, France and Germany constituted a highly economically

⁴¹David Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1991), pp. 169-95.

interdependent group to which Russia was also attached. Austria-Hungary was connected to this group, largely via its economic relations with Germany, but its economic ties to other Western nations were far less significant. By contrast, no such economically interdependent group existed in the East. The key Eastern powers – Russia, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and its successor states – conducted relatively little of their economic relations with each other.⁴²

We use the trade levels of the key powers during this era to illustrate our separation of Europe into two subsystems. As the discussion above suggests, several dimensions of monadic economic development and dyadic economic relations are argued to reduce the risk of conflict. Perhaps the most analyzed of these dimensions is trade. In the pre-World War I period, trade levels increased dramatically in many countries, yet a handful of countries dominated the global trading system. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate using data from the Correlates of War Project,⁴³ the United Kingdom, Germany and France were the key trade powers in Europe at the time. In a second tier were Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary, all with trade levels of over a billion 2008 U.S. Dollars by the outbreak of the war. The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states, however, traded relatively little.

Similar trends can be observed in the levels of dyadic trade dependence during this era. Scholars have debated whether dependence should be measured as dyadic trade relative to income or dyadic trade relative to total trade.⁴⁴ We need not weigh in on this debate, however, as GDP data are

⁴²Albert Fishlow, “Lessons from the Past: Capital Markets During the 19th Century and the Interwar Period,” *International Organization*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Summer 1985), pp. 383-439; Papayoanou, “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I.”; Peter J. Katzenstein, “International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes,” *International Organization*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 1975), pp. 1021-34; R. Rosecrance, A. Alexandroff, W. Koehler, J. Kroll, S. Laqueur, and J. Stocker, “Whither Interdependence?,” *International Organization*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 425-71; Norrin M. Ripsman and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “Commercial Liberalism under Fire”; David F. Good, “The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income Estimates for the Habsburg Successor States, 1870-1910,” *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 869-91; Lee A. Craig and Douglas Fisher, *The Integration of the European Economy, 1850-1913* (New York: MacMillan, 1997); John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Johnson, *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950: From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Globalization and the Great Divergence: Terms of Trade Booms, Volatility and the Poor Periphery, 1782-1913,” *European Review of Economic History*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2008), pp. 355-91; Christopher Blattman, Jason Hwang, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Winners and Losers in the Commodity Lottery: The Impact of Terms of Trade Growth and Volatility in the Periphery 1870-1939,” *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 82 (2007) 156-79.

⁴³Katherine Barbieri, Omar Keshk and Brian Pollins, Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 2.0 (2008).

⁴⁴Erik Gartzke and Quan Li, “Measure for Measure: Concept Operationalization and the Trade Interdependence-Conflict Debate,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2003), pp. 553-71; Katherine Barbieri and Richard Alan Peters II, “Measure for Mis-measure: A Response to Gartzke & Li,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 6 (2003), pp. 713-19.




Figure 1: Trade Levels in Western Europe 1870-1913

generally unavailable for the period.⁴⁵ We define trade dependence for country i on country j as:

$$Dependence_{ijt} = \frac{x_{ijt} + m_{ijt}}{TotalTrade_{it}}, \quad (1)$$

where x_{ijt} represents the total exports from country i to country j in year t ; m_{ijt} represents the

⁴⁵Katzenstein reports the following ratios of monadic trade to GDP for the pre-World-War-I period: France, 53.7%; Germany 38.3%; Italy, 28.1%; United Kingdom, 43.5%. “International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes,” p. 1032. Relying on newer data, Papayoanou reports that “[f]or the three biggest European powers, total trade (exports and imports) as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) was 38 percent for Germany, 52 percent for Great Britain, and 54 percent for France in the years leading up to World War I, and *much of their trade was with one another*” (emphasis added). “Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I” p. 55. Finally, Huberman and Lewchuk rank 16 European countries (not including the Balkans) in terms of monadic trade over GDP in 1913. Only Portugal (13%) ranks lower than Austria-Hungary (16%). Michael Huberman and Wayne Lewchuk, “European Economic Integration and the Labor Compact, 1850-1913,” *European Review of Economic History*, Vol. 7 (2003), pp. 3-41.




Figure 2: Trade Levels in Eastern Europe 1870-1913

total imports to country i from j in year t ; and $TotalTrade_{i,t}$ is the trade of country i in year t .

Table 1 provides the dyadic levels of trade dependence among the key states in 1913. It should be noted that there are missing observations in the COW data set for this period, so we are not able to calculate trade dependence for all of the relevant dyads.⁴⁶ A few patterns are evident in these data. First, the largest dyadic trade relationships by sheer volume generally involve trade within Western Europe, between the West and Russia, and between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The dyadic data show that these powers were also highly trade interdependent. By 1913, for example, Russia depended on Germany for 45% of its trade, while Germany conducted 13% of its trade

⁴⁶COW provides no data on Serbian trade in 1913. Monadic trade in 1912 is reported at only 37 million 2008 USD.

with Russia.⁴⁷ The extent of economic interdependence between Germany and Russia was a key factor in shaping their crisis bargaining incentives, as we explain in greater detail below. Among the four Western powers and Russia, the average trade flow in 1913 was 290 million 2008 USD, while the average dyadic trade dependence was 10.3%. Put another way, this group of states was highly interdependent. By contrast, the volume of trade flows between the Eastern powers remained minor throughout this era, reaching an average in 1913 of 17 million 2008 USD. Most of the dyads in the East were much less trade dependent on each other, the few exceptions being countries that conducted significant portions of their trade with Austria-Hungary. The average dyadic trade dependence among the Eastern powers was only 5% in 1913, most of which results from Ottoman and Bulgarian dependence on Austria-Hungary. Although we cannot calculate the trade dependence between Austria-Hungary and Serbia using these data, the consequences of the Pig War, discussed in greater detail below, suggest that trade was low between them by this period.

5 European Crises 1871-1913

Wars often appear inevitable in retrospect, but few wars seemed more unlikely to contemporaries in the preceding years than World War I. Journalists at the time, and historians in later periods, emphasize that Europe, or at least the West, had largely discounted the danger of a major conflagration by the summer of 1914. Why should this be so? Certainly, European history did not suggest that peace was inevitable, or even particularly durable. Warfare had been such a regular feature of European politics that it is hard to escape the conviction that war was overdue. One reason for optimism in the West about the durability of peace was that stability had been tested several times and found to be robust. A series of crises involving Germany, France, Britain and Russia had appeared to take Europe to the brink of war, but each crisis had abated as the mutual benefits of existing commercial relations asserted themselves. The general view was that diplomacy, civilization, or mutual interest made it clear to affected leaders that war was not in their interest.

In part for these reasons, few conflicts have received more careful attention from historians and

⁴⁷“Between 1905 and 1914 Russo-German trade was immensely important, with Russia sending 44 per cent of her exports to Germany and receiving 47 per cent of her imports from Germany.” Beckett, *The Great War*, p. 28; see also William Jannen, Jr., *The Lions of July: Prelude to War, 1914* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996), p. 83.

Table 1: Dyadic Trade Dependence in 1913

Country A	Country B	Total Dyadic Trade	Dependence A-B	Dependence B-A
Bulgaria	Ottoman Empire	1.98	2.78403	0.69814
Italy	Bulgaria	1.98	0.16915	2.78403
France	Bulgaria	3.37	0.11408	4.73847
United Kingdom	Bulgaria	4.67	0.08	6.56637
Bulgaria	Russia	6.05	8.50675	0.41027
Germany	Bulgaria	10.15	0.20499	14.27165
Austria-Hungary	Bulgaria	12.93	1.04397	18.18054
Russia	Ottoman Empire	27.62	1.87299	9.73873
Italy	Ottoman Empire	28.94	2.47238	10.20415
France	Austria-Hungary	31.96	1.08194	2.58046
France	Ottoman Empire	34.14	1.15574	12.03766
Austria-Hungary	Ottoman Empire	37.14	2.99869	13.09545
Germany	Ottoman Empire	40.89	0.82582	14.41769
Austria-Hungary	Russia	51.45	4.15408	3.48896
Italy	Russia	53.68	4.58596	3.64019
United Kingdom	Austria-Hungary	57.92	0.99221	4.67647
United Kingdom	Ottoman Empire	60.85	1.04241	21.45552
Austria-Hungary	Italy	92.35	7.45636	7.88959
France	Italy	100.28	3.39478	8.56706
France	Russia	117.42	3.97502	7.96257
United Kingdom	Italy	148.7	2.54734	12.70365
Germany	Italy	191.83	3.87423	16.3883
United Kingdom	Russia	276.28	4.73288	18.73529
France	Germany	344.71	11.66946	6.96181
United Kingdom	France	416.4	7.13324	14.09638
Germany	Austria-Hungary	458.5	9.25993	37.01939
United Kingdom	Germany	583.31	9.99253	11.78061
Germany	Russia	670.34	13.53828	45.45757

students of international affairs than the First World War. So much has been said and written about the Great War that key aspects are substantially understood. The lasting interest in World War I clearly stems in part from its size. But this “war to end all wars” only grew by increments, after the perennial, if much smaller, conflict in the Balkans had already established itself. Yet, it is still important to remember that the Great War *did* begin in the Balkans. If one wants to know why World War I became so large, then it is reasonable to explore joining by the major European powers. If instead one wants to know how and why World War I began, as a war, then it makes more sense to focus on Serbia and Austria-Hungary. The point is precisely that war in the Balkans was no surprise and requires no special explanation. In the same era that disputes tended to be

peacefully resolved in the West, conflict on the edges of Europe tended to flare up repeatedly. But the rest of Europe had managed to keep these contests localized. The expansion of a Balkan war is what citizens in the West had discounted, and when the expansion came, it came as a surprise.

5.1 The Highly Interdependent Subsystem

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe were marked by considerable tensions and a number of crises, including crises both between states that were highly economically interdependent and between those that were minimally so. Three major sources of tension were at the root of these crises, and each was exacerbated by changes in the balance of power. The first source of tension was Germany's occupation of Lorraine and (to a lesser degree) Alsace, both captured from France during the Franco-Prussian War. To many in France, relations with the Reich could not be normal so long as these territories remained in German hands. A second source of tension involved the competing colonial ambitions of the major powers. Few territories were left to conquer, even as Germany increased its drive for colonial expansion after unification. Finally, after decades of decline, the Ottoman Empire no longer possessed the strength to maintain dominance over its European possessions. This, and the accompanying rise of Balkan nationalism, threatened not only Turkey's interests but also those of the other powers in the region, especially Austria-Hungary and Russia.

Changes in the balance of power, and the competing ambitions associated with them, led to frequent clashes among European states, but these disputes generally did not escalate to war when conflicts involved states that were economically interdependent. To begin with, despite the bitter rivalry between Germany and France, the two powers remained at peace for over forty years after the Treaty of Frankfurt. What makes the era so remarkable is that both nations spent these decades girded for war, having created specific plans for invading each other – Germany the Schlieffen Plan and France Plan XVII, diluted versions of which were eventually executed in August of 1914.

Significantly, the competition for colonies among the European powers led to a series of crises. It should be noted that it was the interdependent Western powers that featured most prominently in the struggle for colonial empire. Yet, none of these crises resulted in a European war. Britain and

France, long-time rivals both on the Continent and in terms of their global possessions, experienced two near-war crises during this era. In 1893, France sent gunboats to Bangkok to demand that Siam cede a large portion of its territory (most of which later became Laos). Siam, a British client state, requested support from London. Rather than backing its protégé against its chief historical adversary, the British prevailed on the Siamese to cede the disputed region to the French. In return, France promised to make no future demands for additional territory in the region, relieving the danger of future disputes among the interdependent European powers at the expense of English prestige and French ambition. Again in 1898 France and Britain nearly went to war, this time as a result of the Fashoda crisis. A standoff between the two countries was caused by competing attempts to extend their spheres of influence in East Africa. After several months, the French withdrew their troops, and the governments agreed on a division of the region among themselves, ending the last major source of colonial tensions between them.⁴⁸ In both crises, one of the major powers backed down or declined to intervene, apparently deciding that war was not worth the cost.

Tensions between Germany and France were also heightened by colonial competition. First, in 1905, the Kaiser visited Tangier and gave a speech promoting Moroccan independence, provoking the French authorities. France moved troops to the German border while Germany called up its reservists, but the crisis was resolved through an international conference before it became highly militarized. The Germans reluctantly backed down in humiliation when only Austria-Hungary supported their position. As David G. Herrmann writes of the crisis, “[t]he Moroccan confrontation, which hung in the balance for eleven months, marked the beginning of a series of diplomatic trials of strength that continued until the outbreak of the First World War, each escalating from its predecessor and helping to drive the European powers into two opposing and increasingly armed camps.”⁴⁹ A second serious Moroccan crisis erupted in 1911 when Germany sent the gunboat *Panther* to Agadir in response to France’s attempt to take full control of Morocco by advanc-

⁴⁸James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Politics: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 175-200; Darrell Bates, *The Fashoda Incident of 1898: Encounter on the Nile* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

⁴⁹David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 37. See also Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914”; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 55-93; Richard F. Hamilton, “The European Wars: 1815-1914,” in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., *The Origins of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), p. 85.

ing 15,000 troops to Fez. Even if the war could be contained, its effects on European commerce and capital flows could be catastrophic, as many in Europe recognized.⁵⁰ Again, the European powers negotiated, and again the Germans backed down. Neither the Kaiser nor German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg were interested in war over Morocco. Turner writes that three factors contributed to this decision: (1) the German navy was relatively weak and could not take on the French, who were supported by the British; (2) neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia had a significant interest in Morocco, allowing the conflict to be settled among the three Western powers; and (3) “French withdrawal of short-term loans from the Berlin market, led to heavy falls on the stock exchange and demands from German financiers for a lessening of tension.”⁵¹ The latter of these factors provides a strong indication that the close economic relations between Germany and France contributed to preventing a conflict. Stevenson writes that “once Wilhelm II had ruled that war must be avoided, Germany again accepted a diplomatic setback in preference to provoking hostilities or to bluffing.”⁵²

Disputes between the other interdependent powers were also generally resolved peacefully during this period. For example, in the Dogger Bank incident during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian navy fired on several British fishing boats in the North Sea, mistaking them for Japanese men-of-war after receiving false reports of a Japanese naval presence in the area. Although, as Remak argues, “if some sort of apparatus for the measurement of hostility between nations were to exist, Anglo-Russian relations, in the half century or so before 1904, might receive its highest score,”⁵³ the British chose not to retaliate. This decision is particularly striking given that the British were formally in alliance with the Japanese (although Britain was not committed to providing support unless Japan became involved in a conflict with two other powers). Had the British retaliated, leading to a war with Russia, we can easily imagine many analysts calling such a war “inevitable” in retrospect. Similarly, while the British-German rivalry grew in intensity during this period, fueled partly by Germany’s post-unification ambitions for colonial empire, this rivalry did not result in war until 1914. On multiple other occasions—most notably the Boer War, in which Germany chose

⁵⁰See notes 39 to 43 and accompanying text.

⁵¹Turner, *Origins of the First World War*, p. 19.

⁵²Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” pp. 139-40.

⁵³Joachim Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1967), p. 40.

to remain neutral—disputes that could well have led to a general war were resolved peacefully.

In summary, between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I, four salient major power rivalries led to frequent disputes that were invariably, and often surprisingly, resolved peacefully: (1) France and Germany; (2) Britain and France; (3) Britain and Russia; and (4) Britain and Germany. In addition, it should be noted that the economically interdependent states in the Benelux and Scandinavia maintained peaceful relations during this era both with each other and the major powers, unlike in previous eras. Remak sums up relations among these powers as follows:

Germany did restrain her ambition for decades. Britain and France showed that no matter how ancient their enmities and how present their imperial rivalries, it was perfectly possible to find a formula for accommodation. Germany and France reached no similar agreement, yet talks between the two never ceased. Strong forces in both countries worked toward reducing tensions, and by 1914, they had reached an understanding concerning spheres of economic interest. . . . Great Britain and Germany, real though their naval and colonial rivalries were, similarly continued to explore the possibilities of a détente. . . .⁵⁴

Why, then, did these powers, which had motives for war along with detailed plans for fighting, refrain from doing so for several decades? There were likely many causes of the enduring peace among these powers. Yet, as many historians have argued, economic relations were a key factor in maintaining the peace. Taylor notes that: “The decisive cause was, no doubt, economic. The secret that had made Great Britain great was a secret no longer. Coal and steel offered prosperity to all Europe and remade European civilization. The dream of Cobden seemed to have come true. Men were too busy growing rich to have time for war.”⁵⁵ Arguing against the Marxist hypothesis that economic interests make war more likely, Ferguson notes that “there is scarcely any evidence that these interests made businessmen want a major European war.”⁵⁶ In addition, he points out that “[i]f there was a war which imperialism should have caused it was the war between Britain and Russia which failed to break out in the 1870s and 1880s; or the war between Britain and

⁵⁴Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, p. 57.

⁵⁵A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford History of Modern Europe, 1954), p. 255.

⁵⁶Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 32.

France which failed to break out in the 1880s or 1890s.”⁵⁷ Others go further, arguing that business interests actively opposed war. Remak writes that “divergent national interests in the field of commerce did not make for armed conflict; in times of crisis, 1914 included, businessmen on all sides were among the strongest advocates of peace.”⁵⁸ Likewise, Hamilton argues that “[i]f business had been dominant, if ‘the bourgeoisie’ had been in power, the war would not have happened.”⁵⁹

Relations between France and Germany provide a useful illustration. During this era, finance and manufacturing became highly integrated, levels of trade grew significantly, and unprecedented amounts of capital flowed across their borders. A key example is the German finance of iron mining in the French region of Longwy-Briey (a region the Germans later controlled during the war to their strategic advantage). As Turner notes, “so far from being bitter rivals French and German capitalists were happy to cooperate.”⁶⁰ Neither nation was willing to concede key claims against the other; France wanted its northeastern territories returned, and Germany was tired of being shut out of colonial expansion. Still, neither would sacrifice mutual economic benefits to pursue these disputed objectives, at least not through direct confrontation and not as isolated issues. While interdependence is certainly not the only explanation for the long peace between Germany and France, it appears to have been a factor in reducing the incentives for conflict between them.

Other factors could have encouraged peace among the integrated (Western) powers during this era. For example, it could be claimed that the integrated powers had strategic incentives to capitalize on peace. As beneficiaries of the status quo, perhaps England and France were simply seeking to perpetuate conditions experienced in the Concert of Europe. Yet, if some Western nations were also status quo powers, other integrated nations were revisionists. Germany was unhappy with its limited allocation of colonies, for example, while Russia was distressed with the treatment of its allies by another status-quo power, Austria-Hungary. Even France and the United Kingdom had differences in other regions, if not in Europe directly. Indeed, Austria-Hungary demonstrates that a desire to maintain the conditions that had brought peace in a previous epoch

⁵⁷Id., p. 39.

⁵⁸Joachim Remak, “The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” in H.W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*, second edition, (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 87.

⁵⁹Richard F. Hamilton, “On the Origins of the Catastrophe,” in *The Origins of World War I*, pp. 469-506, 469.

⁶⁰L.C.F. Turner, *Origins of the First World War* (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 13.

may well have exacerbated tensions in the decades before World War I. It remains the case that the integrated powers of Europe responded differently to the important tensions that did arise, while less integrated powers in the same region reacted with force. The strategic argument thus begs the question of why the highly integrated powers exhibited a preference for peace, regardless of their status quo or revisionist preferences, while the less interdependent powers, as shown below, did not. Maintaining the view that strategic preferences accounted for peace before 1914 also requires explaining why these preferences changed in 1914. Indeed, any theory of the pre-war peace must account for the changes that resulted in war in 1914. In Section 6, we explain what was different in 1914 in a manner that is both consistent with the pacific effects of economic relations, but also suggests that the relationship between commerce and conflict is more nuanced than many theories suggest.

5.2 The Weakly Interdependent Subsystem

As the interdependent powers set a pattern of peace, other European states often escalated their disputes to war, particularly in the Balkans. The underlying reason for the tension in the Balkans during this era was the rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, which, accompanied by the rise of nationalism in the region, led many Balkan nations to seek independence. In addition to Turkey's interest in maintaining its European possessions, Russia and Austria-Hungary also had key strategic interests in the region. Russia generally supported the rise of Balkan nationalism because (1) Russia had a long-time rivalry with Turkey and ambitions for access to the Mediterranean; and (2) pan-Slavism was increasingly influential in Moscow. The multi-national Austria-Hungary, however, was threatened by rising Balkan nationalism, and faced a security dilemma especially with respect to Serbia.⁶¹ As Farrar writes: "what would preserve Austria-Hungary as a great power would provoke Serbian nationalism, and what would satisfy Serbian nationalism would threaten Austria-Hungary as a great power. Thus coexistence seemed virtually impossible and conflict almost inevitable."⁶²

⁶¹Benjamin Miller and Korina Kagan, "The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 51-85.

⁶²L.L. Farrar Jr., "The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1972), pp. 1-23, 10.

Again, however, what appears inevitable in retrospect may have been less so in actual practice. If there was much to impel conflict in the Balkans, there was also a considerable basis for clashes among the Western powers, as we have already discussed. There were strong motives for war both in the West and in the Balkans; what seems most distinct about the Balkans was the general absence of a positive motive for peace. Lacking the commercial incentives to cooperate that saturated relations in the West, Eastern nations were prone to see the strategic calculus as zero-sum.

Other countries participated in driving or mediating festering Balkan disputes, a process that increasingly enmeshed the foreign policies of European powers with their Balkan protégés. Nations outside the region began to “tie their hands” with alliance commitments in order to bolster the leverage of Balkan partners. Ironically, the great German statesman Bismarck made it clear that Germany’s interests in the region were decidedly limited: “For us, Balkan questions can never be a motive for war.”⁶³ Similarly, Bismarck famously stated that conflicts in the Balkans were not “worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.”⁶⁴ Yet, the reputations of foreign powers seemed increasingly to be tied to their actions in the region, even as discretion over wider European foreign policy was increasingly handed over to local officials through tightening alliance commitments.

Several conflicts in the late-nineteenth century exhibited the tendency of crises to escalate to warfare in the region. Early conflicts included the Serbian and Montenegrin war of independence against Turkey in 1876, the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, the Serbo-Bulgarian War in 1885 and the Greco-Turkish War in 1897. In the direct lead-up to World War I, the first crises of note were the Pig War between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, followed by the Bosnian annexation crisis. After Serbia, seeking to reduce its dependence on Austria-Hungary, increased French imports and created a customs union with Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary responded in 1906 by refusing to import Serbian livestock. Serbia found markets elsewhere, consequentially dramatically reducing Austro-Serbian trade,⁶⁵ which, in turn, meant that trade was unlikely to prevent war between the two states.

The Pig War also led to Austria-Hungary’s decision in 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina,

⁶³Quoted in Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, p. 14.

⁶⁴Quoted in Laurence Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 91.

⁶⁵Hall notes that the Pig War “ended Serbian economic dependence on Austria-Hungary.” Richard C. Hall, “Serbia,” in *The Origins of World War I*, p. 92.

both of which it had administered under the 1878 Treaty of Berlin. Serbia had sought to use Bosnia and Herzegovina as an outlet to the Adriatic in large part to overcome the Austro-Hungarian blockade of Serbian goods. Austrian annexation understandably threatened both Russia, which would have preferred that the territories remain independent, and Serbia, which preferred them to be Serbian. Russia, still recovering from its war with Japan, was in no position to fight.⁶⁶ Russian officials actually took the extraordinary step of informing the Austrians of their intention not to intervene even if Austria-Hungary occupied Belgrade.⁶⁷ Germany notified Russia that it would declare war on Russia and France in the event of Russian mobilization. As a result, Russia backed down, forcing Serbia to withdraw its protest of the annexation. Mombauer writes that “[g]iven the fact that Germany gave unconditional support for Austria-Hungary over this Balkan matter, it was primarily Russia’s mediating influence on Serbia that prevented war on this occasion.”⁶⁸

The Bosnian crisis is notable for at least three reasons. First, Russia suffered a significant humiliation by backing down, both in the eyes of the major powers and with respect to Serbia, which began to doubt Russia’s support for its ambitions.⁶⁹ Second, this crisis, like that of Morocco in 1905, indicated to participants that the side showing greater resolve got its way.⁷⁰ With the expansion of commerce beginning in the late 1800s, European powers were faced with larger variation in losses associated with war. As we discuss in greater detail below, the strategic game between the integrated powers became increasingly like Chicken rather than the more traditional Prisoners’ Dilemma, ironically increasing incentives for participants to emphasize commitment strategies. Indeed, Germany could reasonably draw the conclusion that, if it committed to war, Russia was likely to back down, and conflict would be averted. Third, the crisis is an example of conflict between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente being courted by Austria-Hungary, rather than by Germany. As Lafore argues, the Dual Alliance tied Germany “to a state whose future involved

⁶⁶G.J. Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918* (New York: Bantam Dell, 2006), p. 21-22; Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*, p. 117-22.

⁶⁷Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” p. 135.

⁶⁸Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), p. 10.

⁶⁹Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, p. 48; Ronald Bobroff, “Behind the Balkan Wars: Russian Policy toward Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, 1912-13,” *Russian Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 76-95.

⁷⁰Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” p. 135.

securities of a very different kind from Germany's."⁷¹ This point is crucial as it demonstrates that Germany's foreign policy was becoming increasingly tied to that of Austria-Hungary.⁷²

The immediate consequence of rising tensions in the Balkans was a pair of regional wars fought in 1912 and 1913. In 1912, a coalition made up of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria declared war on Turkey, seeking to drive the Turks completely out of Europe. Many in Europe predicted the conflict would spread to the rest of the continent, especially because Austria-Hungary was expected to intervene in order to repel the Serbians from the Sanjak of Novibazar, a region it had previously administered under the Treaty of Berlin and which Serbia captured from the Ottomans during the fighting. Similarly, Russia was expected not to back down, as it had earlier in the Bosnian crisis.

It seemed improbable that Austria-Hungary, which had been willing to precipitate a major crisis for the minor and gratuitous purpose of annexing Bosnia, should not hold back in the face of the loss of positions always described as vital; or that Russia, which would almost surely have been willing to fight in 1908 had its armies been strong enough, and had told the Serbs in that year that in eighteen months they would be fully prepared, would now abstain from the defense of interests always previously described as vital."⁷³

A general war was again averted, this time because Germany declined to support Austria-Hungary's ambitions and because Russia eventually also backed down. At first, Russia mobilized forces along its Western frontier (although Russia claimed this was unrelated to the war). In Germany, however, the leadership, apparently maintaining Bismarck's disinterest in the Balkans, decided not to support Austria-Hungary. Once the Germans made their decision, the Russians also withdrew, perhaps in part because Germany's abandonment of Austria-Hungary allowed Russia to back down while still saving face. Thus, despite an interest in avoiding further humiliation, the

⁷¹Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, p. 97.

⁷²On the Bosnian crisis generally, see Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, pp. 151-59; Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, pp. 46-48; Stevenson, "Military and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914."

⁷³Lafore, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, p. 170. Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, notes that Russia recognized that "failure to support Serbia again would mean, the Russians thought, the end of Russian prestige in the Balkans and the beginning of a possible new diplomatic alignment there." p. 55.

Russians told the French that “even if Austria should attack Serbia, Russia will not fight.”⁷⁴

A similar crisis arose in 1913 when the winners of the First Balkan War fought over the spoils captured in the previous conflict. Specifically, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria each fought for a greater share of Macedonia, with the war later expanding to include Montenegro, Romania and the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, threatened again by the specter of Slavic nationalism, reacted slowly to unfolding events, but eventually mobilized troops along the Serb and Russian borders. Once again, the conflict was prevented from spreading through the diplomacy of the interdependent states. Joll argues that Britain was successful in negotiating the end of the conflict and the independence of Albania because, “to the annoyance of the Austrians, the Germans decided that they would not put their whole weight behind the Austrian efforts to limit Serbia’s gains.”⁷⁵

The two Balkan Wars are significant for several reasons relevant to the outbreak of war in 1914. First, building on the earlier conflicts in the region, they showed that Balkan disputes were generally settled by fighting, a pattern far different from that of the interdependent powers. Indeed, the interdependent powers were often critical in mediating disputes and in helping to terminate recurrent regional wars. Second, the cycle of Balkan conflicts showed the potential for small, less-interdependent states to exploit security relationships with more interdependent allies. Obviously, alliances pose the risk that a state may be entrapped into war.⁷⁶ In the Balkans, Serbia, Bulgaria and others arguably used to their advantage the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as the desire of Germany, Britain and France to avoid a major war.⁷⁷ As Remak argues,

⁷⁴Quoted in William C. Wohlforth, “The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance,” *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1987), pp. 353-81, 359. As Turner argues, “[i]t therefore appears that if Russia had resorted to military measures in support of Serbia’s claim to an Adriatic port then a world war would have broken out in 1912.” *Origins of the First World War*, p. 43.

⁷⁵Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 52. See also Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Détente and Deterrence: Anglo-German Relations 1911-1914,” *International Security*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (February 1986), pp. 121-50; Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918*, p. 25.

⁷⁶See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (1990), pp. 137-68; David A. Lake, *Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). For a similar argument, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July, 1984), pp. 461-95.

⁷⁷Williamson has argued that Austria-Hungary used the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand as a pretext for pulling Germany into a war with Serbia. Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., “Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (June 1974), pp. 17-34; Samuel R. Williamson, “The Origins of World War I,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No.7 (Spring 1988), pp. 795-818. Tunstall provides evidence that Austria-Hungary wanted a war, although a limited one with Serbia. Graydon A. Tunstall, Jr., “Austria” in *The Origins of World War I*, pp. 112-49.

“under the alliance system, as it then stood, minor powers were in a position to make very major decisions.”⁷⁸ Third, the crises showed that Germany and Russia were the pivotal states in the alliance system; their decisions on whether or not to support their smaller allies were the key to limiting or expanding the size of wars.⁷⁹ Joll notes that “the Balkan quarrels had not escalated into a European war because the Germans were not prepared to give their ally a free hand against Serbia.”⁸⁰ But, equally, the crises did not escalate because the Russians also appeared willing to back down in certain situations. Fourth, the Balkan Wars continued a trend of increasingly militarized conflicts in which the more militarized side was regularly the winner. This encouraged leaders on all sides to use brinkmanship tactics and to adopt commitment mechanisms, such as ever tighter alliance ties, in the hope that their opponents would be the ones to back down.⁸¹

Taken together, these effects of the Balkan Wars created increasing incentives for the great powers to solidify their alliance relationships in the region. The European alliance system was arguably created by the great powers as a deterrent to reduce the likelihood of war. This was the case beginning with the Bismarckian system created in the 1870s and 1880s, designed to protect the newly unified Germany from its neighbors, but also with the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, designed in part to deter each other. The dilemma facing the great powers in the early twentieth century was how to effectively signal their resolve to fight in order to deter the other side. In several crises, leaders used the sunk cost method to send a costly signal by mobilizing troops. Leaders also signaled resolve by creating domestic audience costs by making hawkish statements in the midst of crises, resulting in humiliating consequences when the loser was eventually forced to back down.⁸²

Winning at the Chicken game involves commitment. To increase their resolve, great powers

⁷⁸Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, p. 63. Elsewhere, he notes that “[t]he alliance system, for instance, did contain a major danger of escalation; large nations, as has often been pointed out, were likely to be drawn into the quarrels of their lesser allies.” “The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” in *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*, p. 87.

⁷⁹Holger H. Herwig, *The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and The Battle that Changed the World*, (New York: Random House, 2009), pp. 3-73; Annika Mombauer, “German War Plans,” in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., *War Planning 1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 48-79.

⁸⁰Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 53.

⁸¹Many historians and political scientists have referred to crisis bargaining during this period as a game of brinkmanship. For examples, see Sagan, “1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability”; Remak, “The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” in *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*, p. 95; Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” p. 155.

⁸²See generally James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 68-90.

such as Germany and Russia were increasingly forced to limit their options in crisis situations.⁸³ As Schelling explains, decision makers in a crisis can improve expected payoffs by constraining their ability to act with discretion.⁸⁴ German and Russian leaders tied their hands in two ways during this era. First, they increasingly ceded decision making authority to the military by putting in place processes that, once an initial decision was made to begin hostilities, made it costly for civilian leaders to back down. As a result, Joll writes, “the general staffs were taking decisions which often committed them to irreversible military actions if war threatened: and consequently in a crisis the freedom of action of the civilian ministers was often more circumscribed than they themselves realized.”⁸⁵ The second way in which German and Russian leaders limited their options was by tightening alliance commitments. For example, after failing to support its ally in the Second Balkan War, Meyer argues that German policy was that “[n]ever again must Vienna have reason to doubt the value of its alliance with Germany.”⁸⁶ The effect of tightening alliances, however, was that of chain-ganging. Tighter alliance commitments allowed the weaker partner to draw on the power of the stronger partner in crisis bargaining, thereby increasing the prospects for diplomatic success.

However, this leverage also increased the hazard that a great power would be drawn into a larger dispute. Maurer notes, for example, that “[i]t was clear to Russian decision makers that a confrontation with Austria-Hungary entailed running the high risk of conflict with Germany.”⁸⁷ In an effort to increase the leverage of their allies, the foreign policies of the interdependent powers were gradually being signed over to allies in the Balkans, which lacked both economic ties and interests in maintaining a wider peace in Europe. The result of this “chain ganging” of the foreign policies of Germany and Russia was that their leaders faced an increasingly difficult choice between honoring alliance commitments or losing credibility in European affairs. The former put in jeopardy the trade and capital networks that now fueled their increasingly destructive military machines,

⁸³See Farrar, “The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered,” for a similar argument.

⁸⁴Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); see also Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests.”

⁸⁵Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 56.

⁸⁶Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918*, p. 25.

⁸⁷John H. Maurer, *The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), p. 72.

while the latter threatened to nullify their ability to achieve gains diplomatically, without the need to use force. Credibility and support for their partners required increasingly binding commitments, but these in turn created increasingly diametric alternatives for the integrated great powers. Backing down meant suffering increasing reputational costs, while failing to do so required that their counterparts would suffer a similar fate. Ironically, interdependence actually accentuated this logic, as the high stakes for a contest and previous experience convinced both sides that their opponents would be the first to blink. Again and again, Balkan crises failed to spread as either Germany or Russia chose to back down. This reassured the interdependent powers that the European system was robust to such crises and that, in future crises, someone (else) would act with greater discretion.

We thus offer three main points about the period between the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. First, disputes among the highly interdependent powers were generally resolved peacefully in the pre-World War I era. Second, disputes among the less-interdependent powers generally escalated to wars, except where the (interdependent) great powers saw it in their interests to intervene to mediate disputes and prevent them from drawing in other powers. Finally, as a result of a series of crises, leaders in Germany and Russia, the pivotal states in the alliance system, increasingly found the need to bind their fates, and the fate of Europe, to that of their allies Austria-Hungary and Serbia. That a general war did not break out before 1914 is, in many ways, attributable to German and Russian decisions to back down rather than to support regional allies. This in turn led to excessive confidence that wider war would be averted, in no small part because all involved recognized the mutual economic benefit of avoiding a wider contest. Strachan summarizes the era aptly:

“These tensions – colonial, navy and coalition – were the underpinnings of the crisis of July 1914. But none of them in any direct sense related to the Balkans or to Austria-Hungary. The war did not begin over another clash between Germany on the one hand and Britain and France on the other, and, if there had been such a clash, it would – on past form – have been a prolonged crisis and resolved by negotiation not force of arms.”⁸⁸

⁸⁸Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 41.

6 The 1914 Crisis

In 1912 and 1913 Germany and Russia backed down from war. Why did 1914 end differently? While the conflict-reducing effects of interdependence may have subsided with growing tensions on the continent, this in itself is a tacit acknowledgement that interdependence inhibits conflict, at least for a while. Both Russia and Germany honored their alliance commitments to the point of starting a general war. As others have argued, German support for Austria-Hungary enabled the latter's action against Serbia, and the war would not have spread were it not for Russian intervention.⁸⁹ Meyer writes that “[a]ny Austrian action against Serbia was sure to be of concern to Russia, and Vienna alone was not nearly powerful enough to deter the Russians from intervening or to deal with their enormous army if they did intervene.”⁹⁰ The question then becomes why Russia and Germany made these decisions in 1914. Scholars have spent the better part of a century analyzing the decisions that turned the crisis into a world war. Our aim here is not to conduct such an analysis, but to interpret the sequence of events in terms of the logic of escalation and crisis bargaining.

Two points are worth making. First, the series of crises leading to the war created incentives for the key players, Russia and Germany, to appear to be willing to escalate to a wider war, if necessary, in support of their Balkan allies. This, in turn, increased uncertainty; both German and Russian officials had reason to suspect that their counterparts might be bluffing. Second, the pacific effects of interdependence had important consequences for crisis bargaining. Germany and Russia each attempted to convince the other that it must back down by showing increasing resolve to support its less-interdependent ally. Austria-Hungary and Serbia had weaker economic disincentives to go to war, which is precisely what made these tightening alliance commitments stronger signals of resolve. Indeed, the need to forge ever tighter alliance ties may be explained in

⁸⁹Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy, “Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies,” in Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy, eds., *Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), Vol. 2, p. 162; David Stevenson, *Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), pp. 13-14; Richard C. Hall, “Serbia,” in *The Origins of World War I*, pp. 92-111; Strachan, *The First World War*, p. 12; Maurer, *The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure*, p. 115.

⁹⁰Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918*, p. 33. Richard Ned Lebow argues that “[t]he principal difference between the Balkan crises of 1908-9 and 1914 was Russian willingness to go to war in support of Serbia in 1914.” “Contingency, Catalysts and Nonlinear Change,” in *Explaining War and Peace*, p. 102.

part by the disincentives interdependence posed for both threatening and carrying out major war.

Europe in 1914 thus reveals a nuanced relationship between interdependence and the likelihood of war. The logic of commercial peace finds significant support in the crisis bargaining witnessed in Europe leading up to the war. At the same time, economic disincentives for war also led to military integration designed in part to overcome these very same disincentives. Alliance ties formed and strengthened between highly and weakly interdependent powers led to decision making that appeared to overlook economic ties, as weakly interdependent powers were given increasing influence over the foreign policies of nations that, by themselves, preferred commerce to conflict.

A few aspects of the Chicken game that characterizes the crises leading up to World War I are worthy of additional attention.⁹¹ There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in a standard two-player Chicken game: one in which player A swerves and one in which player B swerves.⁹² Yet, these equilibria assume that players are fully informed about what the other will do. The assumption of full information is inconsistent with the larger logic of brinkmanship and tying hands commitments through alliances. If the players are uncertain about each other's intentions, then a more complex set of outcomes is possible. If, for example, A over-estimates B's willingness to swerve, then the worst possible outcome can ensue.⁹³ With incomplete information, equilibria can occur in the Chicken game in which neither player swerves, as it seems happened with Russia and Germany in 1914.

More generally, the iterated Chicken game played by Russia and Germany leading up to the war created increased incentives to convince the other to back down by signaling a resolve to fight. Having learned in previous crises that the other state could be brought to heel, especially in the face of firm resolve, each state was intent on pushing the other to its limit.⁹⁴ Austrian leaders believed that giving Serbia an ultimatum supported by Germany would reduce the risk

⁹¹cf. Stephen Van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 80-117.

⁹²Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, "The Game of Chicken," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 10, No. 10 (1966), pp. 10-28. A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists where each player swerves with some probability.

⁹³Glenn H. Snyder, "'Prisoner's Dilemma' and 'Chicken' Models in International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1971), pp. 66-103.

⁹⁴Stevenson, "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914." Advances in military mobilization logistics also enabled leaders to generate ever greater risks using brinkmanship tactics. Beckett, *The Great War*, p. 29.

of Russian intervention.⁹⁵ The Kaiser, in a change in policy from the Balkan Wars, decided to support Austria-Hungary unconditionally, recognizing that failure to do so risked the destruction of the alliance.⁹⁶ As Levy notes, “German decision-makers hoped and expected that an Austrian *fait accompli* against Serbia in the immediate aftermath of the royal assassination, backed by German warnings to Russia, would minimize the likelihood of Russian intervention.”⁹⁷ German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow famously remarked that “the more determined Austria shows herself, the more energetically we support her, so much the more quiet Russia will remain.”⁹⁸ Prior to the assassination, Stevenson notes that the Kaiser met with Franz Ferdinand and urged Austria-Hungary to go to war with Serbia, believing that Russia would stay out of the fight.⁹⁹

Russian officials, for their part, were convinced that Germany and Austria would relent if pushed far enough. Russia did not want to appear weak, having already lost the Russo-Japanese war and in the 1908-09 Bosnian crisis.¹⁰⁰ Vigorous Russian support, in turn, strengthened Serbian resolve.¹⁰¹ As Joll puts it, “[t]he Austrians had believed that vigorous actions against Serbia and a promise of German support would deter Russia: the Russians had believed that a show of strength against Austria would both check the Austrians and deter Germany. In both cases the bluff had been called, and the three countries were faced with the military consequences of their actions.”¹⁰² Similarly, Lafore writes that “while the Germans thought Russia must and could be prevented from interfering, the Russians thought that Austria must be persuaded or threatened into abandoning

⁹⁵Williamson, “The Origins of World War I,” p. 810; Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 21.

⁹⁶Farrar, “The Limits of Choice: July 1914 Reconsidered,” p. 11.

⁹⁷Jack Levy, “Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914,” p. 160. Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer, 1984), pp. 58-107.

⁹⁸Quoted in Imanuel Geiss, *The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), p. 123. Herwig refers to German actions in 1914 as a “game of bluff.” Holger H. Herwig, “Germany” in *The Origins of World War I*, p. 177.

⁹⁹David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 25-26. Strachan notes that “[t]he German ambassador in St. Petersburg fed such optimism. Russia would stay out of any war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia because it had not yet recovered from the events of 1904-5 and it could not risk another revolution.” Strachan, *The First World War*, p. 14.

¹⁰⁰D.C.B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1983); Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 55; William R. Thompson, “A Streetcar Named Sarajevo: Catalysts, Multiple Causation Chains, and Rivalry Structures” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 453-74. Remak notes that “[t]his time, the alternative to active military aid might indeed have been a grave diminution of Russian influence not only in Serbia but throughout the Balkans.” Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, p. 136.

¹⁰¹Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914.”

¹⁰²Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, p. 21.

its project. The two notions were precisely incompatible.”¹⁰³

Russia was the first to significantly mobilize troops. Germany responded by declaring war on Russia. Historians have debated the reasoning for Germany’s decision for decades, mostly famously following Fischer’s argument that Germany courted the war and was largely responsible for it.¹⁰⁴ We will certainly not settle this complex and enduring debate here, but we can perhaps contribute two points. First, to the extent Germany appeared to be pushing Austria-Hungary toward war, our argument suggests that Germany may have done so not because it sought war but because it sought to convince Russia to back down. Second, once Russia had mobilized, Germany’s options were perhaps quite limited. If a major power war were to be fought, Germany preferred that it be fought immediately rather than waiting for the French and Russians to have more time to mobilize.¹⁰⁵ As Meyer points out, “[a]n open-ended postponement of hostilities . . . would have destroyed Germany’s chances of defeating France before having to fight Russia.”¹⁰⁶ Indeed, as Fearon argues, “part of what made the Russian mobilization in 1914 an informative signal of Russia’s willingness to fight was that it was under-taken in the knowledge that it would increase Germany’s incentive to choose preemptive war.”¹⁰⁷ Thus, that the Kaiser opted for war in July 1914 may not indicate that Germany had a preference for war (which would be damaging to commercial liberal theory). Rather, it may indicate that, Germany opted for a war that, given the series of events that preceded the decision and limited its options, seemed the best possible option.

To be clear, it was far from inevitable that both Germany and Russia would back their allies in 1914. It was entirely possible that at least one patron would back down again, as had hap-

¹⁰³Lafare, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, p. 233.

¹⁰⁴On the Fischer controversy, see generally *The Origins of the First World War: Great Power Rivalry and German War Aims*; Annika Mombauer, *The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus* (London: Pearson, 2002); Matthew Stibbe, “The Fischer Controversy over German War Aims in the First World War and Its Reception by East German Historians, 1961-1989,” *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2003), pp. 649-68.

¹⁰⁵Ferguson, *The Pity of War*, p. 153.

¹⁰⁶Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War, 1914 to 1918*, p. 93. See also David Stevenson, *Armaments and the Coming of War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 418; Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War*, pp. 227-28; Annika Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 203-204. Lieber provides a different argument: “The newest evidence about decisionmaking during the July crisis, however, suggests that German leaders did not lose control of events on the eve of war, but rather capitalized on what they viewed as a golden opportunity to start the war they wanted.” “The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,” p. 184.

¹⁰⁷James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pp. 577-92, 580.

pened previously. Yet, each succeeding crisis increased the incentive for Germany and Russia to heighten their commitments, adding to the cost of backing down and increasing the danger of war. Interdependence could have reduced the likelihood of a major contest. Arguably it did, which paradoxically caused the interdependent powers to seek more credible ways to backstop the demands of their Balkan allies. Less interdependent than their patrons, Austria-Hungary and Serbia had weaker disincentives for going to war. Given rising attachment to globalization, adding credibility to Russia and Germany's claims required delegating significant decision-making authority to Serbia and Austria. As a result of these incentives, the highly interdependent European subsystem became increasingly entangled with the less interdependent European subsystem through alliance ties.

A wider war may still have been avoided, even with Germany and Russia committed to an expanded Balkans conflict. Most importantly, France and Britain had not yet joined the war. The question remained whether they too would honor their alliance commitments.¹⁰⁸ At least one determinant of the conflict may have been the ambiguity of the British position on intervention and the German assumption that the British would remain neutral, in part to protect its commerce.¹⁰⁹

There is even evidence that the relationship between interdependence and conflict remained in effect during the war. Consider the European states that were convinced to enter the war after August of 1914: Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Portugal. While each joined the war for different reasons, with the possible exception of Italy none of these states was significantly interdependent before the war began. And, in Italy's case, it entered the war because of significant territories offered her in Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland by France and Britain, suggesting that a large offer such as this may have been required to outweigh the importance of other economic concerns. Furthermore, while little attention is paid to the European states that remained neutral, it is worth noting that among these were the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, all highly economically interdependent states. Denmark deserves particular attention because it had fought wars with Germany in the 19th century, and the sovereignty of Southern Jutland was unresolved, so

¹⁰⁸Remak, *The Origins of World War I: 1871-1914*, notes that, "if, for instance, the Austrians had been certain beyond a doubt that an attack on Serbia would be an attack on Russia, or if the Germans had been altogether convinced that to invade France would, undoubtedly, involve them in war with England, might not history have taken a happier course?", p. 89.

¹⁰⁹Jack S. Levy, "The Role of Necessary Conditions in the Outbreak of World War I," in *Explaining War and Peace*; but see Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," pp. 135-136.

a salient dispute existed between the two countries. Yet, as Bludnikow notes, Denmark maintained its neutrality “to be able to enjoy the advantages of its extensive international trade and shipping.”¹¹⁰ The Netherlands, whose neutrality was not a foregone conclusion, also chose to remain neutral for economic reasons.¹¹¹ Thus, a pattern emerged in which less-interdependent states chose to enter the war, generally seeking territorial gain, while interdependent states preferred to remain neutral, enjoying lucrative commerce.¹¹² No exception to the trend, the United States attempted similarly to pursue trade and avoid the conflict for much of the war, until this became impossible under the combined impact of Allied political machinations and German submarine warfare.

7 Conclusions

One’s understanding of the relationship between interdependence and World War I hinges on the following counterfactual question: if interdependence did not reduce the likelihood of conflict, where would we have expected fighting during the era leading up to the war? As the analysis above suggests, rivalries involving Germany, Britain, Russia and France were among the most intense of the period and could well have resulted in major contests, as they had in the past and as was expected by many at the time. Yet, war did not begin among the interdependent powers. During the period of greatest commercial expansion, interdependent powers were less likely to go to war with each other, despite having the means and the motives to do so – motives so strong that few students of history would have been surprised if war had in fact broken out on several occasions. Among weakly interdependent powers, in contrast, wars took place frequently, in patterns that seem both timeless and familiar. If interdependence is ineffective, therefore, we must ask ourselves why World War I began among the less interdependent powers and not in the interdependent West.

Just as interdependence is said to increase the incentives for peace by making war more expen-

¹¹⁰Bent Bludnikow, “Denmark During the First World War,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October 1989), pp. 683-703, 683.

¹¹¹I. N. Gallhofer and W. E. Saris, “Strategy Choices of Foreign Policy Decision Makers: The Netherlands, 1914,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1979), pp. 425-445; Amry Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 4.

¹¹²The only significant exception is Spain, which although poor and minimally interdependent, remained neutral. Its decision may be due to the fact that it had little to gain from the conflict, being geographically isolated from the main fronts and having already lost all of its colonial possessions (unlike Portugal, which fought to hold on to them).

sive, widening the difference in payoffs between cooperating and not cooperating, so too alliances operate by making war *less costly*, discouraging aggression or increasing leverage by making it more expensive for allies to fail to intervene in contests involving security partners. It is not clear which effect—the conflict-inhibiting impact of commerce or the conflict-inducing effect of alliance ties—was more intense for the nations of Europe in 1914. We can, however, make the following comparisons. First, the *benefits* of interdependence varied among countries, ranging from the nearly autarchic relationships among Balkan powers to the significantly integrated commercial powers. Second, the *costs* of backing down for European powers almost certainly increased over time, as leaders observed their opponents backing down in previous crises and as alliance ties became increasingly leveraged through tighter commitments. Russia and Germany repeatedly showed a preference for discretion rather than mutual destruction. Yet, tightening alliance ties increasingly vied with crosscutting economic dependencies for the attention and loyalty of national leaders. It was only as alliance ties solidified and policy making was increasingly shifted to the less-interdependent powers of the Balkans that the interdependent powers appeared to become less attentive to the economic consequences of a wider war. Even this risk was discounted by key actors who expected their opponents to crumble under pressure, in part *because* interdependence increased the cost of war.

The analysis provided here suggests that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the 1914 crisis is in fact a particularly weak case against commercial liberalism. Economic interdependence significantly affected crisis bargaining during the lead-up to the war. The system of alliances, created to deter opponents and reduce the likelihood of great power war, had an important and unintended consequence that manifested itself through a series of growing crises: it created an incentive for the leaders of the interdependent powers to shift foreign policy discretion away from themselves and toward powers less closely integrated into the economic system. Importantly, this logic implies that there are conditions under which states can take actions to avoid conflict that, paradoxically, may make conflict more likely. States that are highly economically integrated may thus have an incentive to integrate militarily with states that are weakly integrated into the global economy. This in turn can produce unintended results. We hope to explore this potential refinement to commercial liberalism in future research.

Our analysis further suggests that conventional methods of inquiry may tend to ignore the kinds of relationships responsible for the outbreak of World War I. Only by looking at the network of ties between highly and weakly interdependent powers can we appreciate the role of this structure in the era's crisis behavior.¹¹³ Focusing solely on economic interdependence paints an incomplete and misleading picture, omitting important ways in which the economically developed major powers were connected to less-interdependent states through alliances. This level of complexity makes it difficult for scholars to create parsimonious theories, although several scholars have begun to use network theory and methods to do just this.¹¹⁴ We hope scholars will build on our argument to refine claims about how economic interdependence interacts with other ties to affect war and peace.

¹¹³Schroeder makes a similar point about the war: "The disaster in 1914 did not derive therefore from a failure by industrialists to understand the political logic and requirements of economic integration or even the failure or refusal of politicians, military men, various interest groups, and broad publics to appreciate the long-range advantages of peaceful international cooperation over unrestrained competition and conflict. It lay rather in the structure of international politics." Paul W. Schroeder, "Economic Integration and the European International System in the Era of World War I," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4 (October, 1993), pp. 1130-37, 1134.

¹¹⁴Michael D. Ward, Randolph M. Siverson, and Xun Cao, "Disputes, Democracies, and Dependencies"; Han Dorussen and Hugh Ward, "Trade Networks and the Kantian Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (2010), pp. 29-42; John A. Vasquez, Paul F. Diehl, Colin Flint, Jürgen Scheffran, Sang-Hyun Chi and Toby J. Rider, "The Conflict Space of Cataclysm: The International System and the Spread of War 1914-1917," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2011), pp. 143-68; Yonatan Lupu and Vincent A. Traag, "Trading Communities, the Networked Structure of International Relations and the Kantian Peace." Manuscript, University of California.