Responsive Governance in the European Union
Christina J. Schneider
December, 2016
Abstract
Are European governments responsive to their national electorates? I argue that the politicization of European affairs pressures EU governments to signal political responsiveness in European cooperation. EU governments are more likely to defend positions that favor their domestic constituents, and they will bargain harder to achieve successful negotiation outcomes, especially prior to national elections. I test the empirical implications of my theory using data on the bargaining behavior and negotiation success of 28 EU members in European legislative negotiations, and original data from a survey experiment in Germany. The findings suggest that EU governments signal responsiveness during elections periods. They are more likely to defend their initial positions, and they are also more successful before elections. Voters respond favorably to these signals of responsiveness. They prefer politicians who take their favored positions on policy issues, defend these positions, and who shift the final outcomes closer to the favored position.Keywords:
European Union, national elections, responsive government, negotiations, cooperation