Accession Rules for International Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-off?
Christina J. Schneider, Johannes Urpelainen
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, No. 2. (May, 2012), pp. 290-312.
Abstract
Powerful states often allow unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail the powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature has attributed this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, we demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also incorporates a strategic component. We formally show that unanimous accession rules can profit powerful states by creating uncertainty as to the minimal level of reform that enable accession. If accession is valuable enough and the membership candidate is uncertain about the resolve of weak states, it plays safe by implementing ambitious reforms that improve the efficacy of the international institution. In this case, a legitimacy-efficacy trade-off does not exist, as the unanimity rule enhances legitimacy while allowing powerful states to induce significant reforms from applicants which maximizes the current members' benefits from membership.Keywords:
international institutions, accession rules, unanimity, uncertainty, reforms