

TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLINE

Appendix C: Additional Implications

Due to space limitations, we use this appendix to outline some additional implications of the theoretical model.

The Sources of Disagreement

The model reveals that the Guardianship Dilemma is triggered by the asymmetric information that militaries hold about the nature of the threats facing the state. One might wonder, however, why the military would not reveal its private information to the rulership. While we abstract away from this question in the model, it is easy to identify circumstances under which military actors will withhold or misrepresent information about the threat environment. A root cause of these asymmetries is the fact that militaries and political elites often want different things. Militaries tend to crave institutional autonomy, and discretion over spending and personnel decisions in particular (Finer, 1988; Huntington, 1957). Alternatively, we show that constraints on the military are crucial for leaders who are trying to manage the Guardianship Dilemma when facing intermediate threats. Because the ruler's beliefs about the threat environment are a key driver of these constraints, military agents have an incentive to misrepresent the true threat environment when they expect that revealing this information would lead to restrictions. Since rulers know that the armed forces possess this incentive, they are likely to be skeptical of the assessments produced by the military, even when the armed forces are providing accurate reports about the threat environment. Rulers can, of course, seek strategic assessments from other sources. In fact, regimes often create independent, redundant security and intelligence services for this purpose. Yet as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser discovered in the Six-Day War of 1967, poor threat assessment due to contentious civil-military relations is a problem that can be hard to overcome (Brooks, 2008).

While restrictions on the autonomy of military institutions imposed by rulers are an important source of acrimony in civil-military relations, the model reveals that efforts to achieve civil-military harmony may backfire. Maintaining control over the resources that flow to the military and the characteristics of its personnel are essential levers for political elites who seek to avoid defection by the armed forces. However, these efforts compromise the military's institutional autonomy and may otherwise hurt its corporatist interests. In this, the model offers a logical basis for the type of civil-military strife that has troubled many states. Yet paradoxically, the model predicts that *attempts to appease the military can lead to a coup*, since providing any $T_i^*(m, \theta) > T$ will trigger disloyalty by the armed forces. This puts rulers in a tough position, since keeping the armed forces constrained is sometimes

necessary to ensure their loyalty, but may also perpetuate the military's incentive to misrepresent the threat environment.

The Military Caste

The model reveals that rulers are better by picking military leaders from among groups that benefit from life under their current regime. However, one may wonder what might happen if rulers lack the kind of politically-salient cleavages that can be leveraged for political purposes. In other words, what if there is no readily-available group that derives privilege from the regime?

Since higher b_i are always better for R when the loyalty constraint is binding, R might want to create a privileged caste from which to draw her generals. That is, if $\bar{b} < b^*$ so that no existing group derives sufficient benefits from the status quo to ensure G 's loyalty at the optimal level of resources required to deal with the external threat, R is strictly better off creating such a group, $\bar{b} = b^*$, and appointing a general from it. If benefits are intended to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces, it makes sense to allocate goods directly to these agents, as a ruler could do by creating and privileging a military caste. This logic is consistent with one prominent example of military privilege. President Hosni Mubarak sought to ensure the loyalty of the Egyptian armed forces by providing military personnel with access to better economic opportunities and other benefits than were available in private life, to the point where the military was allowed to engage in for-profit ventures, including the production of Jeep Wranglers (Roston and Rohde, 2011).

Powerless over the Purse?

Since we have posited the existence of the power of the purse, it is important to consider how our argument would change if the government did not possess it; that is, if the military is in direct control of its budget. This sort of affair is only common in military regimes where the government itself is controlled by the armed forces. The problem a junta faces is actually in some sense even more severe because the ruling officers have to worry about being displaced by others while simultaneously being constrained in their ability to reduce the military's budget in order to prevent that outcome. Since the junta cannot starve itself — after all, doing so would negate the reason for grabbing power in the first place — it might be forced to replace potentially disloyal officers with less competent ones. Thus, we would expect to see purges in the military after a coup. Moreover, when these purges are impractical (e.g., because the officers command significant loyalty on their own or because sacking them would jeopardize the legitimacy of the junta in the eyes of the armed forces), we would expect military regimes to succumb to coups with far greater frequency than non-military ones. Indeed, the potentially destabilizing effects created by military control over the budget may be one reason why military regimes tend to

be short-lived, and why some militaries are so eager to return to the barracks after a more favorable political regime has been installed (see Magaloni, 2008; Geddes, 2004).

Creating Threats: The Diversionary Incentive

The relationship between large external threats and the security of the regime is counterintuitive, and has significant implications for understanding when rulers are likely to behave aggressively. Although we do not explore the possibility in this model, where the size of the external threat is exogenous, rulers can affect the size of that threat through their actions. In this context, the fact that large threats have a loyalty-inducing effect has another, less salutary implication, since political elites may sometimes provoke opponents in order to defend against a coup.

This dynamic is similar to studies of diversionary war in the sense that states' rulers may pick fights abroad in order to increase the security of their regime at home. However, the behavior implied by our study is different in two key ways. First, in studies of diversionary war, rulers survive by reducing the willingness of the public to replace the regime, either by creating a "rally around the flag" effect or by using conflict as an opportunity to demonstrate their competence (Levy, 1993; Smith, 1996; Tarar, 2006). The circling of the wagons effect supplied by our theory suggests instead that external threats provide regime security by creating a situation in which the armed forces are deterred by a challenge from a third-party, such that these forces will remain loyal even if they might otherwise wish to overthrow the government.

Second, the diversionary war literature focuses on the behavior of regimes vis-a-vis the threat to their rule posed by mass unrest, rather than the military. In fact, scholars have tended largely to ignore the agency of armed forces when connecting domestic instability to the likelihood of conflict. Among the few studies that do explore the diversionary incentive in the context of civil-military relations, however, evidence suggests that rulers are quite responsive to concerns about their armed forces, though the exact mechanism driving this relationship remains unclear.¹ Our model offers a novel explanation for the observed link between civil-military strife and the use of force that does not depend on public opinion, and which is potentially applicable for a range of regime types.

The Permanent Siege

Rulers in coup-prone states may need also enduring threats. The game outlined by the model ends when the external threat is faced. In practice, however, whoever is in charge of the state must continue to rule after the threat is realized. This is potentially important: if the military's loyalty is tied to the presence of a threat, the

¹See Miller and Elgün (2011); Powell (2014); Belkin (2005); Dassel and Reinhardt (1999).

defeat of this threat could put the regime in grave danger. A general that would be loyal when the state faced a threat would not remain so once the threat from that opponent has disappeared (since $T = 0 < T_i^*(m, \theta)$ whenever $m > 0$ and $\theta > 0$). The regime could resolve this problem by deposing the general or completely depriving the military of resources, but doing so may often be difficult for rulers.

The problem does not exist, however, for rulers who can keep the threat environment elevated. There are two basic strategies for ensuring a permanent external threat. Regimes can cultivate multiple external threats, ensuring that if one enemy is defeated, the state must then deal with others. Alternatively, the rulership can create rivalries with opponents, ensuring that the threats which induce military loyalty persist across time. This suggests that civil-military concerns may limit the aims of belligerents in conflict, in the sense that defeating an opponent completely may reduce the safety of the regime by freeing the military to act against the rulership.

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