Figure 2: Risk of War Equilibrium, Low-Cost S_2.

Corrected Figure 1b from Branislav L. Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," *American Political Science Review*, 99:4, p. 540. The hand-drawn plot does not represent correctly the plot obtained from the numerical estimation. The difference is in the downward bend of S_1's payoff which occurs at the transition from the War/Compel type equilibrium to Risk-1, and not at the transition from Risk-1 to Risk-2. This plot is from the working paper, which reproduces the graph obtained from the program. I thank Anna Coenen, an undergraduate from Berlin, for spotting the problem.

Figure 2: Probability of War and Optimal Allocations by S_1

Corrected Figure 2 from Branislav L. Slantchev, "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," *American Political Science Review,* 99:4, p. 543. The original figure incorrectly plotted the probability of war function to go to zero at .40 instead of .35 (the original article text is correct though).