

**POLI 243**  
**International Security**

Winter 2002

9:00-11:50

<http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev/courses/is/>

SSB 353

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SSB387

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**DESCRIPTION:** This course is intended for graduate students who have already taken the international relations core seminar. Knowledge of basic theories will be assumed. The goal is to expose the students fully to a comprehensive view of international security, with some reference to the past of the discipline, but mostly emphasizing the current state of the art theorizing in the area by providing a unifying conceptual framework for analysis.

**REQUIREMENTS:** The course requirements consist of class presentations (25%), participation (25%), and a paper (50%). The paper must be original research and is intended to fulfill the requirement for the comprehensive examination. Students must clear the topic with me first. I am not interested in reading lengthy literature reviews: Students will be expected to demonstrate ability to (i) identify a potential topic, (ii) formulate a plausible research design, (iii) carry out, at least in draft form, the required research. This is the most important accomplishment you can expect to take from this course.

**GUIDELINES:** This is a seminar and considerable participation by students is expected. The class format will be that of student presentations and discussions. Each student will be assigned a set of different readings and will be responsible for presenting them to the rest of us. Usually, between 3 and 4 papers can be usefully presented and discussed, although we shall probably be able to handle a few extra ones here and there. Everyone will be expected to come prepared to intelligently discuss the ideas, scope, and research design in the various readings.

I am not interested in critiques! I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. Graduate students are trained as attack dogs and are usually fairly good at being picky about obscure details. I could not care less. What I want to see is students understand how the different topics relate to each other, what the underlying strategic situation they describe, how one goes about developing theories, and how one can improve upon existing work.

**READINGS:** The readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. The articles will be made available for download from the course website, either through JSTOR or locally. The following books are *strongly* recommended for purchase; we shall go over them in detail.

- Powell, Robert. 1990. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale UP.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1995. *Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton UP.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1990. *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd Edition. New York: The Free Press.
- Rotberg, Robert I., and Theodore K. Rabb. 1989. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Jervis, Robert. 1970. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*. New York: Columbia.

## **SCHEDULE:**

WEEK 1: ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING AND GAME THEORY

WEEK 2: DYNAMIC CONSISTENCY, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, BARGAINING

WEEK 3: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF WAR

WEEK 4: BARGAINING THEORIES OF WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF PEACE

WEEK 5: CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

WEEK 6: CRISIS BARGAINING

WEEK 7: DOMESTIC POLITICS

WEEK 8: ALLIANCES

WEEK 9: ARMS RACES AND ARMS CONTROL

WEEK 10: REVIEW OF STUDENT PAPERS



## International Security

POLI 243

Course materials, syllabi, and other resources.

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### Organizational

- [Course Syllabus](#)

### Weekly Readings

1. [Organizational Meeting & Game Theory](#)
2. [Dynamic Consistency, Asymmetric Information, and Bargaining](#)
3. [Structural and Decision Theories of War](#)
4. [Bargaining and Strategic Theories of War](#)
5. [Conventional Deterrence](#)
6. [Nuclear Deterrence](#)
7. [Crisis Bargaining](#)
8. [Domestic Politics](#)
9. [Alliances, Arms Races, and Arms Control](#)

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## Readings for Week 1

### Organizational Meeting & Game Theory

PS 243

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1. [An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory](#)

Robert Gibbons

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Winter, 1997), pp. 127-149.

2. [A Nontechnical Introduction to Bargaining Theory](#)

Abhinay Muthoo

Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Essex, 2000.

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## Readings for Week 2

### Dynamic Consistency, Asymmetric Information, and Bargaining

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1. [The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice](#)

Randall Calvert

Journal of Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2. (June, 1985), pp. 530-55.

2. [Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England](#)

Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast

The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 4. (December, 1989), pp. 803-32.

3. **The Strategy of Conflict**

Thomas C. Schelling

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

4. **The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics**

James D. Morrow

In David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. Strategic Choice in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 77-114

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## Readings for Week 3

### Structural Theories of War

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1. [Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay](#)

Richard K. Betts

International Security, Vol. 24, No. 2. (October, 1999), pp. 166-98.

2. [The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace](#)

Jack S. Levy

Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1. (1998), pp. 139-65.

3. [Changing Aspirations, Limited Attention, and War](#)

Paul A. Anderson and Timothy J. McKeown

World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1. (October, 1987), pp. 1-29.

4. [The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation](#)

Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski

In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.) Handbook of War Studies. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1989.

5. **Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure, Expectations, and War**

Charles F. Doran

In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.) Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 2000.

6. **Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change**

Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson

In Manus I. Midlarsky (Ed.) Handbook of War Studies II. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 2000.

7. **Theories of General War**

Jack S. Levy

World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3. (April, 1985), pp. 344-374.

8. **The Causes of War**

Geoffrey Blainey

New York: The Free Press, 3rd Edition, 1988.

9. **The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars**

Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Editors)

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Read pp. 15-149.





## Readings for Week 4

### Bargaining Theories of War

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#### 1. **Arms and Influence**

Thomas C. Schelling  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

#### 2. [Rationalist Explanations for War](#)

James D. Fearon  
International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3. (Summer, 1995), pp. 379-414.

#### 3. **In the Shadow of Power**

Robert Powell  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. Chapters 3 and 4.

#### 4. [Bargaining Theory and International Conflict](#)

Robert Powell  
Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 5. (2002), pp. 1-30.

#### 5. [The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev

Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

6. [\*\*The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States\*\*](#)

Branislav L. Slantchev

American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1. (March, 2003).

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## Readings for Week 5

### Conventional Deterrence

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#### 1. [The Rational Deterrence Debate](#)

George W. Downs

World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2. (January, 1989), pp. 225-237.

#### 2. [Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence](#)

Robert Jervis

World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2. (January, 1989), pp. 183-207.

#### 3. [Asymmetric Deterrence](#)

Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour

International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1. (March, 1993), pp. 1-27.

#### 4. [Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence](#)

D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 2. (May, 1991), pp. 305-334.

5. **Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World**

Barry Nalebuff

World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3. (April, 1991), pp. 313-335.

6. **Deterrence and Bargaining**

R. Harrison Wagner

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2. (June, 1982), pp. 329-358.

7. **Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence**

Jack L. Snyder

World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3. (April, 1978), pp. 345-365.

8. **Deterrence and International Conflict**

Paul K. Huth

Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2. (1999), pp. 25-48.



## Readings for Week 6

### Nuclear Deterrence

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1. [Rational Deterrence and Crisis Stability](#)

Jean-Pierre P. Langlois

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4. (November, 1991), pp. 801-832.

2. [Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentives to Strike First](#)

R. Harrison Wagner

American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 3. (September, 1991), pp. 727-749.

3. [Minimal Nuclear Deterrence](#)

Barry Nalebuff

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 32, No. 3. (September, 1988), pp. 411-425.

4. **Nuclear Deterrence Theory**

Robert Powell

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

5. [The Delicate Balance of Terror](#)

Albert Wohlstetter

RAND Research Paper, P-1472 (December, 1958).

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## Readings for Week 7

### Crisis Bargaining

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1. [Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model](#)

James D. Fearon

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2. (June, 1994), pp. 236-269.

2. [Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes](#)

James D. Fearon

American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3. (September, 1994), pp. 577-592.

3. [Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation](#)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Ethan R. Zorick

American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 1. (March, 1997), pp. 15-27.

4. [Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining](#)

James D. Morrow

International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2. (June, 1992), pp. 153-172

5. [Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining](#)

James D. Morrow

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 4. (November, 1989), pp. 941-972.

6. [Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games](#)

Jeffrey S. Banks

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 3. (August, 1990), pp. 599-614

7. [Looking for Audience Costs](#)

Kenneth A. Schultz

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1. (February, 2001), pp. 32-60.

8. [Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record](#)

Russell J. Leng

American Political Science Review, Vol. 78, No. 2. (June, 1984), pp. 338-355





## Readings for Week 8

### Domestic Politics

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#### 1. **Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations**

George W. Downs and David M. Rocke  
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995

#### 2. [Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games](#)

Robert D. Putnam  
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460.

#### 3. [Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Trying Hands versus Sinking Costs](#)

James D. Fearon  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1. (February, 1997), pp. 68-90.

#### 4. [Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises](#)

Kenneth A. Schultz  
American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4. (December, 1998), pp. 829-844.

5. [Guns, Butter, and Anarchy](#)

Robert Powell

American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1. (March, 1993), pp. 115-132. (Also Chapter 2 in the book.)

6. [An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace](#)

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith

American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4. (December, 1999), pp. 791-807.

7. [International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints](#)

Ahmer S. Tarar

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3. (June, 2001), pp. 320-340.

8. [Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations](#)

James D. Fearon

Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1. (1998), pp. 289-313.



## Readings for Week 9

### Alliances, Arms Races, and Arms Control

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#### 1. **Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control**

George W. Downs and David M. Rocke

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990

#### 2. [Arms Races and Negotiations](#)

Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjöström

Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, Penn State University, 2001.

#### 3. [Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs](#)

James D. Morrow

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2. (June, 1994), pp. 270-297.

#### 4. [Alliance Formation and General Deterrence](#)

Gerald L. Sorokin

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2. (June, 1994), pp. 298-325.

5. [Alliance Formation and War](#)

Alastair Smith

International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4. (December, 1995), pp. 405-425.

6. **Alignment Decisions in the Shadow of Power**

Robert Powell

In the Shadow of Power, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.  
Chapter 5.

7. [Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security](#)

James D. Morrow

International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2. (Spring, 1993), pp. 207-233.

8. [Alliances: Why Write Them Down?](#)

James D. Morrow

Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3. (2000), pp. 63-83.