
POLI 243
International Security

Winter 2007

12:00-2:50p

<http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev/courses/ps243/>

SSB 104

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SSB104

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DESCRIPTION: This course is intended for graduate students who have already taken the international relations core seminar. Knowledge of basic theories will be assumed. The goal is to expose the students fully to a comprehensive view of international security, with some reference to the past of the discipline, but mostly emphasizing the current state of the art theorizing in the area by providing a unifying conceptual framework for analysis and modern quantitative studies including strategic structural models.

REQUIREMENTS: The course is entirely based on student participation. You have to read everything in the “required” section and, if you feel you are lacking background information, the relevant material in the “suggested” section. The latter is also useful if you want to pursue some venue among the week’s topics in more detail. You may opt to write a paper for this course. The paper must be original research and is intended to fulfill the requirement for the comprehensive examination. Students must clear the topic with me first. I am not interested in reading lengthy literature reviews.

GUIDELINES: This is a seminar and considerable participation by students is expected. Everyone must come prepared to intelligently discuss the ideas, scope, and research design in the various readings. I am not interested in critiques! I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. Graduate students are trained as attack dogs and are usually fairly good at being picky about obscure details. I could not care less. What I want to see is students understand how the different topics relate to each other, what the underlying strategic situation they describe, how one goes about developing theories, and how one can improve upon existing work.

READINGS: The readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. For published work, everything can be found online. For unpublished manuscripts, I will make sure you can locate a copy online as well. We shall organize our schedule as follows:

Week 1 Models, Rational Choice, and Progress in IR (p. 3)

Week 2 Structural Theories of War (p. 4)

Updated: March 7, 2007

- Week 3** Behavioral Theories of War and Peace (p. 6)
- Week 4** Bargaining Theories of Crisis, War, and Peace (p. 8)
- Week 5** Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence (p. 10)
- Week 6** Domestic Politics: Two-Level Games and Survival of Leaders (p. 11)
- Week 7** Alliances: Public Goods, Burden-Sharing, and Security (p. 12)
- Week 8** Arms Races: Dynamics and Empirics (p. 14)
- Week 9** Bounded Rationality, Emotions, and Evolutionary Psychology (p. 16)
- Week 10** Recent Advances in Statistical Modeling in IR (p. 18)

SCHEDULE:

WEEK 1: MODELS, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND PROGRESS IN IR

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1985. "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View." *International Studies Quarterly*, 29(2):121-36.
- Singer, J. David. 1961. "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics*, 14(1):77-92.
- Moul, William B. 1973. "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 6(3): 494-513.
- Zinnes, Dina. 1980. "Three Puzzles in Search of a Researcher." *International Studies Quarterly*, 24(3):315-42.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1992/93. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security*, 17(3):5-58.
- Clarke, Kevin and David M. Primo. 2006. "Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach." Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester.
- Kahler, Miles. 1998. "Rationality in International Relations." *International Organization*, 52(4): 919-41.
- Moe, Terry M. 1979. "On the Scientific Status of Rational Models." *American Journal of Political Science*, 23(1): 215-43.
- Walt, Stephen M. 1999. "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security*, 23(4): 5-48.
 - Powell, Robert. 1999. "The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies." *International Security*, 24(2): 97-106.
 - Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and James D. Morrow. 1999. "Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions." *International Security*, 24(2): 56-73.
- Rubinstein, Ariel. 2006. "Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist." *Econometrica*, 74(4): 865-83.
- Myerson, Roger B. 1992. "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science." *Rationality and Society*, 4(1): 62-73.
- Johnson, James. 1996. "How Not to Criticize Rational Choice Theory: Pathologies of 'Common Sense'." *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 26(1): 77-91.

WEEK 2: STRUCTURAL THEORIES OF WAR

Required Readings:

- Brecher, Michael, Patrick James, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1990. "Polarity and Stability: New Concepts, Indicators, and Evidence." *International Interactions*, 16(1): 49-80.
- Thompson, William. 1987. "Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30(4): 587-615.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik. 1994. "Emergent Polarity: Analyzing State Formation and Power Politics." *International Studies Quarterly*, 38(4): 501-33.
- Wayman, Frank Whelon. 1984. "Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns among Major Powers, 1816-1965." *Journal of Peace Research*, 21(1): 61-78.
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Michael P. Sullivan. 1983. "The Distribution of Power and the Onset of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27(3): 473-94.
- Moul, William B. 2003. "Power Parity, Preponderance, and War Between Great Powers." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47(4):468-89. (Corrected Table 7 in 47(5): 706.)
- Doran, Charles F., and Wes Parsons. 1980. "War and the Cycle of Relative Power." *The American Political Science Review*, 74(4):947-65.
- Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. "The Illusion of Cycles in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(4): 455-76.
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Stability and the Distribution of Power." *World Politics*, 48(2): 239-67.
- Niou, Emerson M. S., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1990. "Stability in Anarchic International Systems." *American Political Science Review*, 84(4):1207-34.
- Tessman, Brock F., and Steve Chan. 2004. "Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(2): 131-53.

Suggested Readings:

- James, Patrick. 1995. "Structural Realism and the Causes of War." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39(2): 181-208.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 1991. "The Possibility of Cycles in International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(4): 477-80.
- Huth, Paul, D. Scott Bennett, and Christopher Gelpi. 1992. "System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(3): 478-517.
- Moul, William B. 1988. "Balances of Power and the Escalation to War of Serious Disputes among the European Great Powers, 1815-1939: Some Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science*, 32(2): 241-75.

- Mansfield, Edward D. 1992. "The Concentration of Capabilities and the Onset of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(1):3-24.
- Kohout, Franz. 2003. "Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation." *International Political Science Review*, 24(1): 51-66.
- Bremer, Stuart. 1992. "Dangerous Dyads: Interstate War, 1816-1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36(2): 309-41.
- James, Patrick, and Michael Brecher. 1988. "Stability and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry." *Journal of Peace Research*, 25(1): 31-42.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. "Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 25(4): 541-68.
- Wohlforth, William C. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security*, 24(1): 5-41.
- Gilpin, Robert. 1988. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4): 591-614.
- Spiezio, K. Edward. 1990. "British Hegemony and Major Power War, 1815-1939: An Empirical Test of Gilpin's Model of Hegemonic Governance." *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(2): 165-81.
- Levy, Jack S. 1985. "Theories of General War." *World Politics*, 37(3): 344-74.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability." *International Organization*, 39(4): 579-614.

WEEK 3: BEHAVIORAL THEORIES OF WAR AND PEACE

Required Readings:

- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
(Chapters 4 and 5, <http://www.press.umich.edu/titleDetailLookInside.do?id=23490>)
- Kim, Woosang, and James Morrow. 1992. "When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 36(4): 896-922.
- Werner, Suzanne and Amy Yuen. 2005. "Making and Keeping Peace." *International Organization*, 59(2): 261-292.
- Fey, Mark and Kristopher Ramsay. 2004. "Mutual Optimism and War." Manuscript. Department of Politics, Princeton University.
- Gartzke, Erik, and Michael W. Simon. 1999. "'Hot Hand': A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries." *Journal of Politics*, 61(3): 777-798.
- Siverson, Randolph M., and Harvey Starr. 1990. "Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War." *American Political Science Review*, 84(1): 47-67.
- Wittman, Donald. 1979. "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 23(4): 743-763.
- Fortna, Virginia Page. 2003. "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace." *International Organization*, 57(2): 337-372.
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement." *American Political Science Review*, 90(4): 749-764.

Suggested Readings:

- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium." *Security Studies*, 14(4): 565-606.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd Edition. New York: The Free Press.
- Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 1996. "The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985." *American Political Science Review*, 90(2): 239-257.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1994. "Peace, War, and the Balance of Power." *American Political Science Review*, 88(3): 593-607.
- Kim, Woosang, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. 1995. "How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(1): 51-65.
- Ramsay, Kristopher. 2006. "Settling it on the Field: Battlefield Events and War Termination." Manuscript, Department of Politics, Princeton University.
- Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner. 1996. "Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(2): 235-260.
- Levy, Jack S. 1987. "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." *World Politics*, 40(1): 82-107.
- Iklé, Fred Charles. 2005. *Every War Must End*. 2nd Revised Edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Addison, Tony, and S. Mansoob Murshed. 2002. "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking." *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(4): 487-501.
- DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Jack S. Levy. 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(6): 675-704.
- Starr, Harvey, and Randolph Siverson. 1998. "Cumulation, Evaluation, and the Research Process: Investigation the Diffusion of Conflict." *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(2): 231-237.
- Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics*, 30(2): 167-214.

WEEK 4: BARGAINING THEORIES OF CRISIS, WAR, AND PEACE

Required Readings:

- Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(3): 599-614.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1999. "War Is in the Error Term." *International Organization*, 53(3): 567-587.
[Correction: Damon Coletta and Erik Gartzke. 2003. "Correction: Testing War in the Error Term." *International Organization*, 57(2): 445-448.]
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2002. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review*, 47(4): 621-632.
[Correction: <http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev/published/Convergence-E024.pdf>]
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power." *Games and Economic Behavior*, 15(2): 255-289.
[An easier exposition in Chapter 3 of Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.]
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "War and Incomplete Information." Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization*, 60(1): 169-203.
[The following paper will be helpful to understand this one: Powell, Robert. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power." *American Political Science Review*, 98(2): 231-241.]
- Leventoğlu Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2006. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War." Manuscript, University of California San Diego.

Suggested Readings:

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49(3): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D. 1996. "Bargaining Over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power." Manuscript, Stanford University.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(3): 469-484.
- Goemans, Hein. 2000. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4): 941-972.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 813-29.

- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review*, 74(1): 123-133.
- Gibbons, Robert. 1997. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(1): 127-149.
- Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. "A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory." *World Economics*, 1(2):145-166.
- Garfinkel, Michelle and Stergios Skaperdas. 2000. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(6): 793-807.

WEEK 5: CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Required Readings:

- Fearon, James D. 1997. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1): 68-90.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2007. *Military Coercion*. Book manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of California-San Diego. [Read chapters 3-5.]
- Nalebuff, Barry. 1986. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." *World Politics*, 43(3): 313-335.
- Powell, Robert. 1990. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Read chapters 2-4.]
- Huth, Paul, and Bruce M. Russett. 1984. "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980." *World Politics*, 36(4): 496-526.
 - Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1989. "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." *World Politics*, 41(2): 208-24.
 - Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 1990. "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." *World Politics*, 42(3): 336-369.
 - Huth, Paul, and Bruce M. Russett. 1990. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference." *World Politics*, 42(4): 466-501.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1992. "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4(2): 115-141.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(2): 236-269.

Suggested Readings:

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises." *American Political Science Review*, 99(4): 533-547.
- Zagare, Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. 2000. *Perfect Deterrence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Danilovic, Vesna. 2002. *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Huth, Paul. 1988. *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- O'Neill, Barry. 1989. "Game Theory and the Study of the Deterrence of War." In P. Stern, et al. (eds.) *Perspectives on Deterrence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 1982. "Deterrence and Bargaining." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 26(2): 329-358.
- Wu, Samuel S. G. 1990. "To Attack or Not to Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34(3): 531-552.

WEEK 6: DOMESTIC POLITICS: TWO-LEVEL GAMES AND SURVIVAL OF LEADERS

Required Readings:

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1995. "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review*, 89(4): 841-855.
- Chiozza, Giacomo, and Hein Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still 'Ex Post' Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(3): 604-619.
- Kurizaki, Shuhei. 2007. "Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy." *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. "Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs." *International Studies Quarterly*, 50(2): 445-477.
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining." *American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 419-433.

Suggested Readings:

- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review*, 88(3): 577-592.
- Goemans, Hein. 2000. "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5): 555-579.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 43(4): 979-1002.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*, 42(3): 427-460.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization*, 53(2): 233-266.
- Schultz, Kenneth. 1998. "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." *American Political Science Review*, 92(4): 829-844.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and Alastair Smith. 2002. "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46(2): 175-200.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review*, 92(3): 623-638.
- Kilgour, D. Marc. 1992. "Domestic Structure and War Behavior: A Game-Theoretic Approach." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(2): 266-284.
- Smith, Alastair. 1996. "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems." *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(1): 133-153.

WEEK 7: ALLIANCES: PUBLIC GOODS, BURDEN-SHARING, AND SECURITY

Required Readings:

- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties." *International Organization*, 57(4): 801-827.
- Gartzke, Erik and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2004. "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies." *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 775-795.
- Morrow, James D. 1993. "Arms Versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security." *International Organization*, 47(2): 207-33.
- Sandler, Todd, and Keith Hartley. 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39(3): 869-896.
- Christensen, Thomas J., and Jack Snyder. 1997. "Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 919-922.
- Fang, Songying, and Kristopher W. Ramsay. 2006. "Burden-Sharing in Non-Binding Alliances." Manuscript, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota.

Suggested Readings:

- Sandler, Todd. 1993. "The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(3): 446-483.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002. "Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944." *International Interactions*, 28: 237-260.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2000. "Reevaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5): 686-699.
- Schweller, Randall L. 1997. "New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining, Not Refuting Waltz's Balancing Proposition." *American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 927-930.
- Levy, Jack S. 1981. "Alliance Formation and War Behavior: An Analysis of the Great Powers, 1495-1975." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25(4): 581-613.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley. 2003. "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3): 427-439.
- Smith, Alastair. 1995. "Alliance Formation and War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 39(4): 405-425.
- Morrow, James D. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(4): 904-933.
- Morrow, James D. 2000. "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 63-83.

- Bennett, D. Scott. 1997. "Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1984." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(3): 846-878.
- Snyder, Glenn H. 1984. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics*, 36(4): 461-495.
- Kim, Woosang. 1991. "Alliance Transitions and Great Power War." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(4): 833-850.
- Gates, William R., and Katsuaki L. Terasawa. 1992. "Commitment, Threat Perceptions, and Expenditures in a Defense Alliances." *International Studies Quarterly*, 36(1): 101-118.
- Gonzales, Rodolfo A., and Stephen L. Mehay. 1991. "Burden Sharing in the NATO Alliance: An Empirical Test of Alternative Views." *Public Choice*, 68(1-3): 107-116.
- Conybeare, John A. 1994. "Arms versus Alliances: The Capital Structure of Military Enterprise." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(2): 215-235.

WEEK 8: ARMS RACES: DYNAMICS AND EMPIRICS

Required Readings:

- Ward, Michael D. 1984. "Differential Paths to Parity: A Study of the Contemporary Arms Race." *The American Political Science Review*, 78(2): 297-317.
- Majeski, Stephen J. 1985. "Expectations and Arms Races." *American Journal of Political Science*, 29(2): 217-245.
- McGinnis, Michael D. 1991. "Richardson, Rationality, and Restrictive Models of Arms Races." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 35(3): 443-473.
- Sample, Susan G. 1997. "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(1): 7-22.
 - Diehl, Paul F., and Mark Crescenzi. 1998. "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate." *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(1): 111-118.
 - Wallace, Michael D. 1998. "Comments on the Articles by Sample and Diehl & Crescenzi." *Journal of Peace Research*, 35(1): 119-121.
- Wallace, Michael D. 1982. "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses." *International Studies Quarterly*, 26(1): 37-56.
 - Altfeld, Michael F. 1983. "Arms Races? — And Escalation? A Comment on Wallace." *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(2): 225-231.
 - Wallace, Michael D. 1983. "Arms Races and Escalation—A Reply to Altfeld." *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(2): 233-235.
- Glaser, Charles L. 2004. "When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming." *International Security*, 28(4): 44-84.
- Intriligator, Michael D., and Dagobert L. Brito. 1984. "Can Arms Races Lead to the Outbreak of War?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 28(1): 63-84.

Suggested Readings:

- Kydd, Andrew. 2000. "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(2): 228-244.
- Sample, Susan G. 1998. "Military Buildups, War, and Realpolitik: A Multivariate Model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(2): 156-175.
- McCubbins, Mathew D. 1983. "Policy Components of Arms Competition." *American Journal of Political Science*, 27(3): 385-406.
- Lichbach, Mark I. 1989. "Stability in Richardson's Arms Races and Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Arms Rivalries." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(4): 1016-47.
- Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. 1990. *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Gray, Colin S. 1971. "The Arms Race Phenomenon." *World Politics*, 24(1): 39-79.

- Garfinkel, Michelle R. 1990. "Arming as a Strategic Investment in a Cooperative Equilibrium." *American Economic Review*, 80(1): 50–68.
- Morrow, James D. 1989. "A Twist of Truth: A Reexamination of the Effects of Arms Races on the Occurrence of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33(3): 500–529.
- Anderton, Charles H. 1989. "Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Perspectives." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33(2): 346–367.
- Intriligator, Michael D., and Dagobert L. Brito. 2000. "Arms Races." *Defence and Peace Economics*, 11(1).
- Moll, Kendall D., and Gregory M. Luebbert. 1980. "Arms Races and Military Expenditure Models: A Review." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 24(1): 153–185.
- Glaser, Charles L. 1997. "The Security Dilemma Revisited." *World Politics*, 50(1): 171–201.
- Sample, Susan G. 2002. "The Outcomes of Military Buildups: Minor State vs. Major Powers." *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(6): 669–691.
- McGuire, Martin. 1977. "A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 59(3): 328–339.
- Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjöström. 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations." *Review of Economic Studies*, 71: 351–369.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Military Expenditures: Threats, Aid, and Arms Races." Manuscript, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford.

WEEK 9: BOUNDED RATIONALITY, EMOTIONS, AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Required Readings:

- Shepard, Graham H. 1988. "Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969-1984: A Second Test of Interpersonal Generalization Theory." *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(1): 91-123.
- Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky. 1988. "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review*, 82(3): 719-736.
- Farkas, Andrew. 1996. "Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3): 343-361.
- Levy, Jack S. 1992. "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." *International Studies Quarterly*, 41(1): 87-112.
- Hermann, Margaret. 2001. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework." *International Studies Review*, 3(2): 47-81.
- George, Alexander L. 1969. "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly*, 13(2):190-222.
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. "Rethinking Allison's Models." *American Political Science Review*, 86(2): 301-322.
- Crawford, Neta C. 2000. "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships." *International Security*, 24(4): 116-156.

Suggested Readings:

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- Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics." *American Economic Review*, 93(5): 1449-1475.
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