

#### WEEK 4: BARGAINING THEORIES OF CRISIS, WAR, AND PEACE

##### *Required Readings:*

- Banks, Jeffrey S. 1990. "Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games." *American Journal of Political Science*, 34: 599-614.
- Gartzke, Erik. 1991. "War Is in the Error Term." *International Organization*, 53(3): 567-587.  
[Correction: Damon Coletta and Erik Gartzke. 2003. "Correction: Testing War in the Error Term." *International Organization*, 57(2): 445-448.]
- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2002. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations." *American Political Science Review*, 47(4): 621-632.  
[Correction: <http://polisci.ucsd.edu/slantchev/published/Convergence-E024.pdf>]
- Powell, Robert. 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 15(2): 255-289.  
[An easier exposition in Chapter 3 of Powell, Robert. 1999. *In the Shadow of Power*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.]
- Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Ahmer Tarar. 2005. "War and Incomplete Information," Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." *International Organization*, 60(1): 169-203.  
[The following paper will be helpful to understand this one: Powell, Robert. 2004. "The Inefficient Use of Power." *American Political Science Review*, 98(2): 231-241.]
- Leventoğlu Bahar, and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2006. "The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War," Manuscript, University of California San Diego.

##### *Suggested Readings:*

- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, 49(3): 379-414.
- Fearon, James D. 1996. "Bargaining Over Objects that Influence Future Bargaining Power." Manuscript, Stanford University.
- Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science*, 44(3): 469-484.
- Goemans, Hein. 2000. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Morrow, James D. 1989. "Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining." *American Journal of Political Science*, 33(November): 941-72.
- Slantchev, Branislav L. "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace." *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(4): 813-29.

- Slantchev, Branislav L. 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States." *American Political Science Review*, 74(1): 123-133.
- Gibbons, Robert. 1997. "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(1): 127-149.
- Muthoo, Abhinay. 2000. "A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory," *World Economics*, 1(2):145-166.
- Garfinkel, Michelle and Stergios Skaperdas. 2000. "Conflict Without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(6): 793-807.