

## OUTLINE OF LECTURE 9: BRINKMANSHIP

1. The nuclear revolution
  - a) Massive Retaliation
  - b) moral opprobrium (nuclear v. non-nuclear)
  - c) credibility problem (nuclear v. nuclear)
  - d) Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
  - e) what to do if threat is “too big”?
2. Crisis bargaining
  - a) Game of Chicken
  - b) risk and commitment
  - c) severing communications
  - d) preemption and disaster
3. How to make big threats credible?
  - a) strategic irrationality
    - Nixon’s Madman Theory
    - George W. Bush v. Kim Jong Il
    - provocability and vindictiveness
  - b) threat that leaves something to chance (brinkmanship)
    - modified chess game analogy
    - shared risk of disaster
    - autonomous generation of risk
    - blurring the brink
  - c) limited retaliation
    - splitting threat in small steps
    - bargaining through gradual escalation
    - McNamara’s “No Cities” Doctrine
4. An example: Six Day War of 1967