

POL 443  
The Analytics of Conflict

www.princeton.edu/~bslantch/courses/aoc

Fall 2008

M 1:30p-4:20p

Robertson Hall 008

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**DESCRIPTION:** Conflict is very destructive and does not seem to be a particularly good way to resolve disputes. Yet we see people engaging in it at all levels, from individuals, to larger groups, and entire societies. Why? Is conflict behavior irrational or can we make sense of it? The goal of this course is to introduce students to rigorous reasoning about conflict in an accessible manner. We will examine various explanations of conflict in great detail, and use them to explore substantive themes like the democratic peace, ethnic conflict, nuclear deterrence, and terrorism among others.

**PREREQUISITES:** This course is intended for advanced undergraduate students who have already taken at least one course in international relations. I will assume basic familiarity with fundamental approaches.

**REQUIREMENTS:** You will be evaluated according to your performance in four areas: participation (15%), preparation of references (5%), presentation and discussion (30%), and final examination (50%). You must complete all four components to pass the course.

**FINAL EXAMINATION.** During our first meeting, you will get to choose one particular war from a list I will provide. This list will have half as many entries as there are students in the class, which means that each war will get two students writing about it.

Your final exam will be to write a paper that explains the causes of that war. You will be expected to discuss at least three possible explanations suggested by the theories covered in class and to select the one that seems most persuasive given the evidence you find. The paper is due in print to me by noon on Monday, January 19. It must be double-spaced, with 1-inch margins all around, and in size 11 point typeface. There is no length requirement but if your paper exceeds 40 pages (references and footnotes not included), it is certainly too long.

**REFERENCE LIST PREPARATION.** You must prepare a list of references for your paper and submit it to me for approval. The list is due in class on October 6. It has to be reasonable (i.e., you cannot realistically expect to read 10 books and 50 articles on the subject) but it has to be comprehensive (i.e., it includes recent scholarship without glaring omissions of important work). You should aim for 2 books (one general and the other more specialized on the origins of the war) and somewhere between 10 and 20 articles or book chapters. You

can include books that you will not read in their entirety. In these cases, list the appropriate page numbers (a chapter is roughly equivalent to a stand-alone article). These are just the references for the war you will be writing on. (You will have more references in your paper because you will need to cite theories and such.)

**PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION.** The last two meetings of this course (December 1 and 8) will be devoted to discussing preliminary drafts of your papers. These drafts need not be polished or even complete. They must, however, outline the basic possible explanations and suggest the way you intend to go with your argument based on the evidence. The drafts are due to me on November 24, either in print (in class) or in electronic form (by noon). I will make them available to the other students on Blackboard.

You will be responsible for preparing a presentation of your own draft as well as a discussion of the draft submitted by the student who is also writing about the same war. Your presentation and the discussion of your colleague's draft will be on different days. The presentation cannot exceed 10 minutes, and the discussion is limited to 15 minutes. After you present your draft and your discussant finishes the critique, there will be a 15 minute general class discussion. You are expected to take the critique and the discussions into account when you write your final version of the paper. They often result in immense improvements.

**PARTICIPATION.** You are expected to engage the material frequently and you will be graded on your contribution to class discussion. This means that you have to read carefully the assigned material. This is a seminar, so I will tend to minimize lecture and maximize discussion. It will be helpful if you came to class with a summary and a list of questions for each reading. Some common questions to ask are:

- What is the question, what is being explained? (Yes, it will most likely be something about the causes of war, but what *specifically* is the author trying to explain?)
- What is the answer? What is the causal mechanism? What are the explanatory variables? What are the assumptions?
- What are some possible alternative explanations? How does this one relate to them: does it refine, refute, or subsume them? What other hypotheses does this explanation suggest?
- What are the logical structures of the competing explanations? What is the evidence supporting them? Can we measure or represent the theoretical constructs empirically?
- What are the broader implications of the theory?

Not all readings will require that you ask all these questions and many may not even provide you with clear answers. But you should try nevertheless.

**MISSED ASSIGNMENTS.** Only a note from a real MD or a Princeton dean excuses missing your course presentation, discussion, or the exam deadline. An unexcused failure to present the material assigned or submit the exam by the deadline generates a grade of F on the

work missed. If you know you cannot present or cannot make the deadline for a legitimate reason, notify me as soon as possible so we can work out a solution. It is your responsibility to make the appropriate arrangements with me.

**GRADE APPEALS.** You can expect to be graded solely on your academic performance. This includes clarity of thought, knowledge of the material, composition, spelling, and grammar. Students who believe to have received an incorrect grade or a grade based on non-academic criteria should formally appeal it to me. The appeal will consist of a single typed page that identifies the problem and presents a reasoned argument that the grade fits the appeal criteria listed above.

**READINGS:** The course readings will be drawn from a number of books and articles. The following required books are available for purchase at the bookstore:

- Elster, Jon. 2007. *Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd Edition. New York: Longman.
- Lake, David, and Robert Powell. (Eds.) 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. 3rd Edition. New York: The Free Press.
- Rotberg, Robert, and Theodore Rabb. (Eds.) 1989. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

In addition, we shall read a number of articles. The links are on the course website.

**SCHEDULE:** Topic numbers do not correspond to week numbers although the sequence is chronological. Some topics require more than one meeting to cover. Each topic begins a new page, the schedule begins on the next page. You can find the list of weekly assignments on the course website.

## **TOPIC 1: THEORY AND EXPLANATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

### Required:

1. Elster, Jon. 2007. *Explaining Social Behavior*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 7-66, 163-256, 299-443.

### Recommended:

1. Johnson, James. 2002. "How Conceptual Problems Migrate: Rational Choice, Interpretation, and the Hazards of Pluralism." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5: 223-248.

## TOPIC 2: SYSTEMIC THEORIES OF WAR

### a) *Structural Realism*

Required:

1. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1988. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended:

1. Lake, David A. 2007. "Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics." *International Security*, 32(1): 47-79.
2. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization*, 46(2): 391-425.
3. James, Patrick. 1995. "Structural Realism and the Causes of War." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39(2): 181-208.
4. Lake, David A. 1996. "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations." *International Organization*, 50(1): 1-33.
5. MacDonald, Paul K., and David A. Lake. 2008. "The Role of Hierarchy in International Politics." *International Security*, 32(4): 171-180.
6. Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." *International Security*, 25(1): 5-41.
7. Levy, Jack S. 1998. "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 139-165.

### b) *Offensive and Defensive Realism*

Required:

1. Brooks, Stephen. 1997. "Dueling Realisms." *International Organization*, 51(3): 445-478.

Recommended:

1. Jervis, Robert. 1999. "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation." *International Security*, 24(1): 42-63.
2. Mearsheimer, John. 1990. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International Security*, 15(1): 5-56.
3. Labs, Eric J. 1997. "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims." *Security Studies*, 6(4): 1-49.
4. Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. "Realism and Domestic Politics." *International Security*, 17(1): 177-198.
5. Schweller, Randall L. 1996. "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, 5(3): 445-478.
6. Snyder, Glenn H. 2002. "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security." *International Security*, 27(1): 149-173.
7. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000. "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited" *International Security*, 25(3): 128-161.

### c) *Balance of Power*

Required:

1. Sheehan, Michael. 1996. *The Balance of Power: History & Theory*. London: Routledge, pp. 1-96, 145-169.

Recommended:

1. Haas, Ernst B. 1953. "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics*, 5(4): 442-477.
2. Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2005. "Hegemonic Threats and Great-Power Balancing in Europe." *Security Studies*, 14(1): 1-33.
3. Hager, Robert P., and David A. Lake. 2000. "Balancing Empires: Competitive Decolonization in International Politics." *Security Studies*, 9(3): 108-148.
4. Schweller, Randall L. 2004. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." *International Security*, 29(2): 159-201.

d) *Hegemony and Power Transition*

Required:

1. Gilpin, Robert. 1988. "The Theory of Hegemonic War," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Kugler, Jacek, and A. F. K. Organski. 1989. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation." In Manus Midlarsky (Ed.) *Handbook of War Studies*. London: Routledge. Pp. 171-194.

Recommended:

1. Trachtenberg, Marc. 2007. "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy." *Security Studies*, 16(1): 1-31.
2. DiCicco, Jonathan M., and Jack S. Levy. 1999. "Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43(6): 675-704.
3. Levy, Jack S. 1987. "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War." *World Politics*, 40(1): 82-107.
4. Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. 2007. "The Preventive War that Never Happened: Britain, France, and the Rise of Germany in the 1930s." *Security Studies*, 16(1): 32-67.

e) *Long Cycles and Cycle of Relative Power*

Recommended:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1985. "Theories of General War." *World Politics*, 37(3): 344-374.
2. Kohout, Franz. 2003. "Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation." *International Political Science Review*, 24(1): 51-66.
3. Doran, Charles F. "Confronting the Principles of the Power Cycle: Changing Systems Structure, Expectations, and War." In *Handbook of War Studies*, 332-368.
4. Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. "Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change." In *Handbook of War Studies*, 301-331.

### TOPIC 3: MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY

#### a) Crisis Stability

##### Required:

1. Jervis, Robert. 1978. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics*, 30(2): 167-214.
2. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. "The Dynamics of Mutual Alarm" in *Arms and Influence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 221-251.

##### Recommended:

1. Glaser, Charles L. 1997. "The Security Dilemma Revisited." *World Politics*, 50(1): 171-201.
2. Posen, Barry R. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." *Survival*, 35(1): 27-47.
3. Jervis, Robert. 1993. "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War." *Political Science Quarterly*, 108(2): 239-253.

#### b) Offense-Defense Balance

##### Required:

1. Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War." *International Security*, 22(4): 5-43.
2. Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1995. "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics." *Security Studies*, 4(4): 660-691.

##### Recommended:

1. Reiter, Dan. 1995. "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen." *International Security*, 20(2): 5-34.
2. Davis, James W., et al. 1999. "Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory." *International Security*, 23(3): 179-206.
3. Betts, Richard K. 1999. "Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay" *International Security*, 24(2): 166-198.
4. Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *International Security*, 22(4): 44-82.
5. Lieber, Keir A. 2000. "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security." *International Security*, 25(1): 71-104.
6. Adams, Karen Ruth. 2003. "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance." *International Security*, 28(3): 45-83.
7. Levy, Jack S. 1984. "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis." *International Studies Quarterly*, 28(2): 219-238.

#### c) Military Culture

##### Required:

1. Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." *International Security*, 9(1): 58-107.

##### Recommended:

1. Snyder, Jack. 1984. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984." *International Security*, 9(1): 108-146.

*d) Arms Races*

Required:

1. Glaser, Charles L. 2000. "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3: 251-276.

Recommended:

1. Glaser, Charles L. 2004. "When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming." *International Security*, 28(4): 44-84.



#### TOPIC 4: HUMAN NATURE: INSTINCT, COGNITION, PERCEPTION

##### a) *Biology*

###### Required:

1. Somit, Albert. 1990. "Humans, Chimps, and Bonobos: The Biological Bases of Aggression, War, and Peacemaking." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34(3): 553-582.

###### Recommended:

1. Keeley, Lawrence H. 1997. *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 8, and 12.
2. Parasiliti, Andrew. 2001. "The First Image Revisited." *International Security*, 26(2): 166-169.

##### b) *Personality and Leadership*

###### Required:

1. Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. "Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In." *International Security*, 25(4): 107-146.

###### Recommended:

1. George, Alexander L. 1969. "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly*, 13(2): 190-222.

##### c) *Psychology, Emotions, and Misperception*

###### Required:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1983. "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems." *World Politics*, 36(1): 76-99.
2. Crawford, Neta C. 2000. "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships." *International Security*, 24(4): 116-156.
3. Jervis, Robert. 1988. "War and Misperception." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4): 675-700. In Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

###### Recommended:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1992. "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems." *Political Psychology*, 13(2): 283-310.
2. Jervis, Robert. 1983. "Deterrence and Perception." *International Security*, 7(3): 3-30.
3. Jervis, Robert. 1968. "Hypotheses on Misperception." *World Politics*, 20(3): 454-479.
4. Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Prospect Theory and Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8: 1-21.
5. Hermann, Margaret G. 1979. "Indicators of Stress in Policymakers during Foreign Policy Crises." *Political Psychology*, 1(1): 27-46.

## TOPIC 5: INTERNAL CAUSES: ATTRIBUTES

### a) Norms and Culture

#### Required:

1. Hanson, Victor Davis. 2002. *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. New York: Anchor Books. Chapter 1 and Epilogue.

#### Recommended:

1. Dueck, Colin. 2005. "Realism, Culture and Grand Strategy: Explaining America's Peculiar Path to World Power." *Security Studies*, 14(2): 195-231.

### b) Nationalism

#### Required:

1. Van Evera, Stephen. 1994. "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War." *International Security*, 18(4): 5-39.

#### Recommended:

1. Posen, Barry R. 1993. "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power." *International Security*, 18(2): 80-124.

### c) Religion

#### Required:

1. Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster. Pp. 209-266.
2. Benjamin, Daniel, and Steven Simon. 2003. *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*. New York: Random House. Chapters 2 and 12.

#### Recommended:

1. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs*, Summer.
2. Shannon, Vaughn P., and Michael Dennis. 2007. "Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation." *Security Studies*, 16(2): 287-317.

## TOPIC 6: INTERNAL CAUSES: INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PROCESSES

### a) *Domestic Strife*

Required:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1989. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." In Manus Midlarsky, (ed.) *Handbook of War Studies*. London: Routledge.

Recommended:

1. Walt, Stephen M. 1992. "Revolution and War." *World Politics*, 44(3): 321-368.
2. Oakes, Amy. 2006. "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands." *Security Studies*, 15(3): 431-463.

### b) *Institutional Constraints and Principal-Agent Problems*

Required:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1988. "Domestic Politics and War." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4): 653-673. In Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision*. New York: Longman. Chapters 5 and 6.
3. Doyle, Michael. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(3): 205-235.
4. Doyle, Michael. 1983. "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2." *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 12(4): 323-353.

Recommended:

1. Layne, Christopher. 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." *International Security*, 19(2): 5-49.
2. Gleditsch, Nils Petter. 1992. "Democracy and Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 29(4): 369-376.
3. Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*, 42(3): 427-460.
4. Hagan, Joe D. 1994. "Domestic Political Systems and War Proneness." *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2): 183-207.
5. Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security*, 20(1): 5-38.
6. Wold, Erich Weede, and Andrew J. Enterline. 1996. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security*, 20(4): 176-207.
7. Owen, John M. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." *International Security*, 19(2): 87-125.
8. Layne, Christopher. 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." *International Security*, 19(2): 5-49.
9. Levy, Jack S. 1994. "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield." *International Organization*, 48(2): 279-312.

### c) *Partisan Politics and Socio-Economic Structure*

Required:

1. Snyder, Jack. 1993. *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1, 2, and 8.

Recommended:

1. Shellman, Stephen M. 2006. "Process Matters: Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Government-Dissident Interactions." *Security Studies*, 15(4): 563-599.
2. Levy, Jack S., and William F. Mabe, Jr. 2004. "Politically Motivated Opposition to War." *International Studies Review*, 6: 65-83.
3. Copeland, Dale C. 1996. "Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." *International Security*, 20(4): 5-41.
4. Narizny, Kevin. 2003. "Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament." *American Political Science Review*, 97(2): 203-220.

d) *Public Opinion, Elites, and Media*

Required:

1. Aldrich, John H., et al. 2006. "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9: 477-502.
2. Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B.K. Potter. 2008. "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11: 39-65.

Recommended:

1. Cramer, Jane Kellert. 2007. "Militarized Patriotism: Why the U.S. Marketplace of Ideas Failed Before the Iraq War." *Security Studies*, 16(3): 489-524.
2. Kaufmann, Chaim. 2004. "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War." *International Security*, 29(1): 5-48.
3. Krebs, Ronald R., and Chaim Kaufmann. 2005. "Selling the Market Short? The Marketplace of Ideas and the Iraq War." *International Security*, 29(4): 196-207.
4. Kydd, Andrew F., and Barbara F. Walter. 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence." *International Organization*, 56(2): 263-296.
5. Van Belle, Douglas A. 1997. "Press Freedom and the Democratic Peace." *Journal of Peace Research*, 34(4): 405-414.
6. Fibbert, Andrew. 2006. "The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War." *Security Studies*, 15(2): 310-352.
7. Benson, Brett V., and Emerson M. S. Niou. 2005. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and the Security Balance in the Taiwan Strait." *Security Studies*, 14(2): 274-289.
8. Western, Jon. 2005. "The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public." *Security Studies*, 14(1): 106-139.

e) *Military Establishment*

Recommended:

1. Dassel, Kurt. 1998. "Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression." *International Security*, 23(1): 107-140.
2. Black, Jeremy. 1998. "Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective." *Journal of Military History*, 62(4): 871-892.

f) *Organizational Routines and Bureaucratic Politics*

Required:

1. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision*. New York: Longman. Chapters 3 and 4.

Recommended:

1. Levy, Jack S. 1986. "Organizational Routines and the Causes of War." *International Studies Quarterly*, 30(2): 193-222.
2. Hagan, Joe D. 2001. "Does Decision Making Matter? Systemic Assumptions vs. Historical Reality in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Review*, 3(2): 5-46.
3. George, Alexander L. 1972. "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy." *American Political Science Review*, 66(3): 751-785.
4. Hermann, Margaret G. 2001. "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework." *International Studies Review*, 3(2): 47-81.

## TOPIC 7: STRATEGIC CHOICE

### a) General

#### Required:

1. David Lake and Robert Powell. (Eds.) 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1–4.
2. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision*. New York: Longman. Chapters 1 and 2.
3. Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” *International Organization*, 49(3): 379–414.

#### Recommended:

1. Reiter, Dan. 2003. “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War.” *Perspectives on Politics*, 1(1): 27–43.
2. Morrow, James. 2008. “Choosing War: State Decisions to Initiate and Wars and Observe the Peace Afterwards.” Manuscript prepared for *The Rational Choice Handbook of Social Research*.

### b) Uncertainty, Optimism, and Signaling

#### Required:

1. Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. New York: The Free Press. Chapters 1–11.
2. Goemans, Hein. 2000. “A Theory of War Termination,” in *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 19–52.

#### Recommended:

1. Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” *International Organization*, 53(2): 233–266.
2. Jervis, Robert. 2002. “Signaling and Perception.” In Kristen R. Monroe (ed.) *Political Psychology*. Mahwah: Erlbaum.
3. Edelstein, David M. 2002. “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers.” *Security Studies*, 12(1): 1–40.
4. Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2006. “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” *International Security*, 31(2): 151–185.
5. Tang, Shiping, and Evan Braden Montgomery. “Uncertainty and Reassurance in International Politics.” *International Security*, 32(1): 193–200.

### c) Commitment

#### Required:

1. Slantchev, Branislav L. 2005. “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium.” *Security Studies*, 14(4): 565–606.
2. Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. 2001. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” *International Security*, 26(1): 93–128.

Recommended:

1. Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization*, 51(3): 335-364.

d) *Reputation*

Required:

1. Tang, Shiping. 2005. "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict." *Security Studies*, 14(1): 34-62.

e) *Indivisibility*

Required:

1. Hassner, Ron E. 2006. "The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes." *International Security*, 31(3): 107-138.
2. Goddard, Stacie E., Jeremy Pressman, and Ron E. Hassner. 2007. "Time and the Intractability of Territorial Disputes." *International Security*, 32(3): 191-201.

Recommended:

1. Hassner, Ron E. 2003. "'To Halve and to Hold': Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility." *Security Studies*, 12(4): 1-33.
2. Toft, Monica Duffy. 2006. "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War." *Security Studies*, 15(1): 34-69.

## TOPIC 8: WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

### a) Nuclear Deterrence

#### Required:

1. Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. "The Manipulation of Risk." In *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
2. Powell, Robert. 1990. "The Nuclear Revolution and the Problem of Credibility." In *Nuclear Deterrence Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Mueller, John. 1988. "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World." *International Security*, 13(2): 55-79.
4. Jervis, Robert. 1988. "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security*, 13(2): 80-90.

#### Recommended:

1. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities." *American Political Science Review*, 84(3): 731-745.
2. Sagan, Scott D. 2000. "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks." *International Security*, 24(4): 85-115.

### b) Proliferation

#### Required:

1. Sagan, Scott D. 1997. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb." *International Security*, 21(3): 54-86.
2. Sagan, Scott D. 1994. "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons." *International Security*, 18(4): 66-107.

#### Recommended:

1. Fetter, Steve. 1991. "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" *International Security*, 16(1): 5-42.
2. Stern, Jessica. 2003. "Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons." *International Security*, 27(3): 89-123.



## TOPIC 9: THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR

### Required:

1. Williamson, Jr., Samuel R. 1989. "The Origins of World War I." In Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. Maier, Charles S. 1989. "Wargames: 1914-1919." In Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb (Eds.) *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Lieber, Keir A. 2007. "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory." *International Security*, 32(2): 155-191.
4. Snyder, Jack. 2008. "Defensive Realism and the 'New' History of World War I." *International Security*, 33(1): 174-194.
5. Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914." *International Security*, 15(3): 120-150.
6. Levy, Jack S., and Thomas J. Christensen. 1991. "Mobilization and Inadvertence in the July Crisis." *International Security*, 16(1): 189-203.
7. Papayoanou, Paul. 1996. "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I." *International Security*, 20(4): 42-76.
8. Howard, Michael. 1984. "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914." *International Security*, 9(1): 41-57.
9. Levy, Jack S. 1991. "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914." *International Security*, 15(3): 151-186.

### Recommended:

1. Rowe, David M. 2005. "The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War." *Security Studies*, 14(3): 407-447.
2. Sagan, Scott D. 1986. "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability." *International Security*, 11(2): 151-175.
3. Papayoanou, Paul. 1996. "Interdependence, Institutions, and the Balance of Power: Britain, Germany, and World War I." *International Security*, 20(4): 42-76.
4. Howard, Michael. 1984. "Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914." *International Security*, 9(1): 41-57.
5. Levy, Jack S. 1991. "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in July 1914." *International Security*, 15(3): 151-186.