CHAPTER 2

5. Consider Stigler’s equation (ibid., p. 163, no. 11), where he alters Kramer’s analysis by (1) changing the time series [1902–70], (2) using the change in the vote rather than the level of the vote and (3) using the change in the economic indices over a two-year period rather than Kramer’s yearly scores:

\[
\text{Vote} = 0.49 + 0.028 \text{ (White House Party)} - 0.0084 \text{ (Unemployment)} \] 
\[= 2.19 \] 
\[
- 0.109 \text{ (Real Income)} - 0.326 \text{ (Inflation)} \] 
\[= 0.69 \] 
\[
R = 0.38 \text{ D.W.} = 1.65 \]


16. M. Margaret Conway and Mike1 L. Wyckoff, “Vote Choice in the 1974 Senate Elections” (paper, College Park, Maryland, July 1979) and “Vote Choice in the 1974 Congressional Elections.”


Notes to Pages 10–14


34. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, p. 16.


37. The variables in table 2.1 are constructed as follows:

- Respondent’s vote
- Party Identification
- Democrat is incumbent
- Republican is incumbent
- Familiarity with Democrat
- Familiarity with Republican
- Likes something about Democrat
- Dislikes something about Democrat
- Likes something about Republican
- Dislikes something about Republican

38. Note that the effect of incumbency per se is greatly diminished in the second equation. The regression coefficients for the incumbency variables are reduced by more than half, and they no longer differ significantly from zero. The impact of familiarity with the candidates is also substantially smaller. It is also worth noting that voters evaluate candidates primarily in terms of personal characteristics, job performance, and competence, with relatively few references to general policy positions and even fewer to specific policy stands; see Parker, “Incumbent Popularity and Congressional Elections,” 1978, p. 14.


41. Some caution is advisable in using the 1978 NES/CPS Survey; the respondents seem inordinately fond of incumbents; for example, they...
no. to


CHAPTER 3

4. Thomas Kazee arrives at a similar conclusion in a study of decisions to run for Congress. See his “The Decision to Run for the U.S. Congress; Challenger Attitudes in the 1970’s,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 5 (1980): 79–100.
6. We argue in chapter 5 that the probability of attaining the collective goal of minimizing the loss of congressional seats affects the value some politicians place on the office and hence their strategic decision about running.

17. George H. Gallup, The *Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1972), 2: 1161, 1210, 1221. The Gallup question was, “If elections for Congress were being held today, which party would you like to see win this state—the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?”


23. This effect was not confined to congressional candidates. A Republican official in Tennessee lamented that his party was only contesting 65 seats in the state legislature. “Good, attractive candidates just said this was not the year to run.” Ibid., p. 2961.


25. Note that a difference remains when party is controlled, although it tends to be greater for Republicans than for Democrats.

26. State legislatures are the most frequent source of elective office experience for nonincumbent congressional candidates. National Republican leaders have recognized this explicitly and have contributed to state legislative campaigns with the acknowledged purpose of building up their pool of congressional talent.

27. Fowler, “Candidate Perceptions of Electoral Coalitions,” p. 16.

**CHAPTER 4**

1. A more elaborate and thoroughly documented presentation of these ideas can be found in Gary C. Jacobson, *Money in Congressional Elections* (New Haven: *Yale* University Press, 1980), chap. 3.

2. See, for example, William P. Welch, “The Economics of Campaign Funds,”


9. Ibid., p. 353.

10. Expenditures rather than contributions are listed because differences in regulations and methods of data collection among these elections make them more comparable figures. The pattern of expenditures depends heavily on the pattern of contributions in any case. If contributions are disaggregated by source, the same pattern appears in each.

11. The figures in table 4.1 also support, in summary fashion, several of the points made in the previous section. Incumbents obviously have an easier time raising money than do their challengers. And as we would expect, whether or not a nonincumbent candidate is facing an incumbent has an enormous effect on his ability to acquire campaign funds. Typically, the most expensive campaigns of all are for open seats.


14. The challenger is estimated to gain approximately 1 percentage point for each $10,000 (in 1972 dollars) spent on the campaign. Our discussion of contributor strategies raises the possibility that these estimates are subject to simultaneity bias: money not only generates votes, but the expectation of votes generates money. However, two-stage least-squares analysis of a simultaneous equation model of these relationships indicates that simultaneity bias is not a serious source of distortion. See Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, pp. 136–145.

16. Direct evidence for this can be found in the connection between how much a candidate spends and how familiar he is to voters in the district. In all three elections for which requisite data are available (1972, 1974, and 1978), campaign spending by challengers and other nonincumbents is strongly related to how well they are known by voters. Only in 1974 is there any significant relationship between these two variables for incumbents, and even in that year nonincumbent spending had the greater effect. See Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, pp. 145-57 and “Congressional Elections 1978: The Case of the Vanishing Challengers,” (Paper delivered during the Conference on Congressional Elections, Rice University and the University of Houston, Houston, Tex, January 10-12, 1980), pp. 8-9.

Campaign spending is important to both candidates in contests for open seats. It tends, however, to matter more to Republicans than to Democrats, which is not particularly surprising since fewer voters identify themselves as Republicans. Expenditures are evidently more important to candidates who suffer from electoral handicaps of any kind.

17. The challenger’s vote is measured as the percentage share of the two-party vote won by the challenger. The variables indicating whether or not the challenger is a Democrat or has held elective office are 1 if yes in either case, 0 if not. The strength of the challenger’s party is measured as the percentage of the vote won by the challenger’s party’s candidate in the last election for this seat. Expenditures are measured in thousands of dollars. The sources for the data in these equations are given in Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections, pp. 38-39 and 115.

18. One further observation is in order. Experience in the elective office is, on the evidence of equation 4.2, worth about 1.9 percent of the vote. But this measures only its direct effect. Much of its effect is in fact indirect: experienced candidates raise and spend substantially more money and this is where the advantage of experience is most apparent.


CHAPTER 5


3. That minority-party status may make the job less attractive can be found in the following twentieth-century retirement rates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In both party systems the minority party congressmen retired at a marginally higher rate. Frantzich similarly reports that during the 1970s Republican congressmen were more likely to have “progressive” career ambitions while Democrats most evinced “static” ambitions (“Opting Out,” pp. 112–14).


5. More generally, as members near retirement the value of the office should be discounted with each election as the return on investment in the office becomes increasingly short-term.

6. The Democratic and Republican retirement series was compiled from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research’s (ICPSR) “Biographical Characteristics of Members of the United States Congress, 1789–1977.” The data was originally collected by Carroll R. McKibbin. Neither he nor the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. Unfortunately, these data do not identify the date and reason for a congressman’s last departure from Congress. To compile overall partisan retirement rates for each Congress required that all congressmen who had interrupted careers or who subsequently served in the Senate had to be examined individually using the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 5th ed.


9. The exclusion of 1942 marginally improves most of the statistical relationships reported below.

10. The relationships are more impressive when one recognizes that the retirement rates exclude the South while the national vote totals include the South. To the degree that the congressional vote in that region was stable during the period, its inclusion in the vote totals serves to weaken the correlations but should not affect their direction.


12. For example, the Democrats’ hold on southern congressional seats has loosened much more slowly than might be expected from southern voting behavior in presidential elections or changes in party identification.

13. Following Tufte’s and Converse’s example the average or normal vote has been calculated by averaging the national congressional vote for the preceding eight elections. The difference in incumbency is the number of Republican incumbents seeking reelection minus the number of Democrats. See Phillip E. Converse, “The Concept of the Normal Vote,” in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966): 9–39.

14. This finding matches the greater importance of candidate-related variables
over party identification in explaining the individual vote choice reported in table 2.1.

CHAPTER 6

1. In analyzing variations in on- and off-year elections Kramer concludes, “that around one-third of the votes gained (or lost) because of the specific candidates and campaign tactics of the presidential race carry over to the congressional candidates of the same party” (p. 140).


5. See Tufte’s caveat cited in chapter 2.

6. In testing our theory against Tufte’s we are, of course, limited to elections for which presidential popularity ratings are available.

7. Unfortunately, the National Bureau of Economic Research’s quarterly real income series begins in 1946 rather than 1945, the date needed to obtain change scores. This requires using the annual level for 1946 in both the spring and fall income series.

8. The revised estimates are also lower because adding 1974 and 1978 reduces the fit of the equation, even for Tufte’s original specification of the real income variable. In both instances the equation overpredicts the degree of change in the vote attributable to short-run forces. Perhaps this is but one additional manifestation of the increased incumbency effect on congressional elections.

9. At least they think it does. An alternative explanation for these results is that congressional elites are convinced that economic conditions are important to voters but they are not nearly so certain about presidential popularity. Presidents’ attempts to influence elections directly have not been notably effective, regardless of their public standing. And the general effects of presidential popularity on election results have not always been obvious. A comment by a Republican politician interviewed in 1962 is instructive: “The Democrats are whistling in the dark if they think Kennedy’s popularity will affect Congressional races any more than Eisenhower’s did in 1958” (“Heating Up Mid-Term Campaigns,” Business Week, 26 May 1962, p. 467). It would be ironic if elites were influenced more strongly by their readings of economic conditions—which have little direct influence on voters—than by the president’s popularity, which evidently does influence the voter.


There are two alternative interpretations available for equation 6.3 which are less generous to economic voting theory. The first argues that the fall estimates may also reflect structural features of the electoral setting. During the fall campaign, for example, a favorable political climate may make it easier for the candidate to sustain campaign contributions and volunteer participation. Local activists respond much as voters respond to their evaluations of the president’s job performance in contributing to campaigns. The second alternative explanation is unabashedly ad hoc. (Normally, this would make it less attractive, but as our degrees of freedom approach that of a case study we should keep in mind the academic aphorism that anecdote is the singular form of data.) The main problem of the spring popularity term is the 1974 election with President Nixon’s popularity hovering around 26 percent for most of the spring. With the economy also in poor shape Nixon’s popularity grossly overpredicts the decline of the Republican vote that year. This extreme case also means that the spring popularity variable tends to underpredict the vote for the remaining eight elections. The problem, we suspect, is that elite responses are less elastic at extremes of short-term conditions. Deleting the 1974 election and rerunning equation 6.3 produces a much improved estimate for spring popularity generally, at the expense of the fall estimates.

CHAPTER 7

6. Ibid.
8. The $75,000 cutoff level is, of course, somewhat arbitrary: it could be raised or lowered substantially without affecting the point to be made.
9. The third winner in the lower right quadrant, Duncan Hunter, who upset veteran Democratic incumbent Lionel Van Deerlin, financed the early part
of his campaign by loaning it \$114,000 of his own money. This does not appear in the preliminary FEC report, so he remains, for consistency’s sake, in the “weak candidacy” category.

10. This reflects the successful Republican strategy, discussed below, of going after seats held by senior House Democrats.

12. Ibid., p. 35; *Gallup* Opinion Index 175 (February 1980):13.
13. The ratio figures for 1980 make the same point and, as usual, a much higher proportion of candidates for open seats have held elective office: 68 percent of the Democrats, 45 percent of the Republicans. Most Senate challengers of both parties were similarly experienced: 72 percent of the Democrats and 67 percent of the Republicans.

16. Ibid. Five other PACs listed in the Weekly Report distributed their money more evenly among Democrats and Republicans; not surprisingly, most of this money went to incumbents.
18. The same idea has been expressed in informal, postelection discussions by Thomas Mann and David Mayhew.

CHAPTER 8

2. The 1980 election witnessed two such cases when a neo-Nazi and a Klansman won a Republican and Democratic congressional primary, respectively. In the latter, nationally more prominent case, Tom Metzger, the California state head of the Ku Klux Klan won his nomination (Calif., 43rd) against two faint-hearted rivals who together spent under \$5000. Just their being on the ballot, however, was sufficient to so split the anti-Klan vote that Metzger won the primary with little more than one-third of the popular vote. In November he was soundly defeated, of course, by the incumbent Republican, Clare Burgener, but this did not detract from Metzger’s resounding success in generating national publicity.
3. Whether or not elite strategies were as important in structuring the congressional vote in earlier decades as they are now is an intriguing question: we cannot answer it here, since our most comprehensive evidence is limited to the 1970s; one of us (Jacobson) is currently pursuing the question under National Science Foundation Grant No. SES80-07557.

EPILOGUE

1. This equation is based on the data in Tufte, Political Control of the Economy, p. 111, with data for 1978 added; we use it rather than the modified version of the referendum equation we developed in chapter 6 because Tufte’s original equation is widely recognized as standard in the literature.
18. Ibid., p. 43.
26. A formally identical clash of interests also limits the ability of parties to maximize their gains through a partisan gerrymander; see Bruce Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming).