Democratization and Human Rights Regimes

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Abstract

The rise of international human rights regimes has sparked debate over why states enter these regimes given the costs of constraints to sovereignty – when joining these arrangements brings no material gains. We argue that entering a human rights regime can yield substantial benefits for democratizing states. Emerging democracies can use the costs from participation to lock in liberal policies and signal their intent to consolidate democratic institutions. Moreover, we argue that certain types of agreements – those codified within international organizations (IOs) rather than UN human rights treaties – are likely to generate sufficient costs to assist nascent democracies. Using an original data set of human rights IOs, we show that democratizing states are more likely than other types of regimes to enter into these arrangements, and that this relationship holds for IOs and not UN-sponsored treaties.
The number of international human rights regimes and the number of countries participating in these regimes have risen dramatically in recent decades. This development has sparked a heated debate over why states choose to enter regimes designed to establish and monitor compliance with human rights standards. Various studies refer to the costs that states bear when they surrender discretion over national policies in order to adhere to the standards set by an international regime as “sovereignty costs” (e.g., Moravscik 2000: 227). Considerable interest has been expressed in why a government would voluntarily elect to pay the sovereignty costs of participating in a human rights regime – especially the constraints on how a government treats citizens – when it seemingly obtains no material gains from membership.

In this paper, we argue that entering a human rights regime can yield substantial benefits for states in the midst of a democratic transition. Emerging democracies can use the sovereignty costs stemming from participation in such a regime to lock in liberal policies and to signal their intention to consolidate democratic institutions and practices. Moreover, nascent democracies often respond to inducements from other more established democracies to join such organizations. These states are particularly likely to seek out and accept the sovereignty costs arising from human rights regimes. In addition to democratizing countries, stable democracies may also enter these regimes in response to domestic political pressures and in support of broader foreign policy goals.

For our purposes, human rights regimes are both United Nations (UN)-sponsored human rights treaties and those international organizations (IOs) designed to govern how countries treat individuals within their borders. Very little research has focused on government ratification of specific UN human rights treaties (Cole 2005; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Vreeland 2008). Even less attention has been paid to a larger and growing set of IOs that include the promotion, advancement, or enforcement of human rights among their other aims. We contend that these organizations are central to understanding why democratizing states institutionalize commitments to
human rights. We also contend that these IOs exact greater sovereignty costs than human rights treaties and these heightened costs provide the incentive for democratizing states to accede to such organizations. Thus, we expect democratizing states to express greater interest in joining human rights organizations than in signing UN-based treaties.

Using a new data set on human rights regimes, we generate some of the first cross-national evidence on why states seek membership in these regimes. Our results reveal that, among the types of governments we analyze, states engaged in a democratic transition are most likely to join human rights IOs. Stable democracies are less likely than democratizing countries to enter human rights IOs and there is only modest evidence that democracies are more likely than other governments to enter such organizations. By contrast, there is little variation in the extent to which different types of governments join UN human rights treaties since membership imposes fewer costs on the participating countries. These results accord with our argument that human rights IOs impose greater sovereignty costs on members than treaties, creating incentives for democratizing states that want to promote human rights at home to enter such organizations.

**Human Rights Organizations and Treaties**

Various observers agree that membership in human rights regimes imposes substantial costs on states (Koh 1996-1997; Sikkink 1993; Simmons 2008). For our purposes, these regimes are comprised of treaties concluded under the auspices of the UN and both universal and regional international organizations that seek to protect human rights. IOs, however, are better than treaties at generating the sovereignty costs that are at the heart of much of the theoretical work on human rights regimes. While some UN treaties include provisions for monitoring signatories’ actions or create IOs to help enforce the treaties’ provisions, many simply involve promises by member governments to behave in a certain way. Furthermore, those organizations created by UN treaties
are quite different than the IOs that we analyze in this paper. Members do not meet regularly, they include both non-state (particularly non-governmental organizations) and state actors, and various signatories fail to recognize the authority of these organizations. Equally, UN human rights treaties do not have strong enforcement mechanisms; nor do they provide material inducements for improvements in human rights. Such treaties can sometimes create modest sovereignty costs by mobilizing human rights advocates and disseminating information to help states internalize norms of appropriate behavior, but these costs tend to be much lower than those generated by IOs, even when human rights promotion is not the only or principal mission of the organization.

International organizations that promote human rights generally require members to commit resources in order to meet the organization’s objectives and are more likely than UN treaties to include enforcement provisions. Organizations also create a permanent forum where members interact on a regular basis, especially when questions of compliance arise. These repeated interactions promote reciprocity and help to establish strong focal points for appropriate behavior (Keohane 1984). In addition, organization members help coordinate and share the costs of punishment should it become necessary to sanction a member state.

Even if formal enforcement mechanisms are not used often, the greater likelihood that IOs will enforce their rules makes the *ex ante* costs of joining organizations higher than those of signing UN treaties. Even if an IO’s enforcement mechanism is not intended to address deviations from mandated human rights standards, the frequent interaction of members within most organizations increases the odds that the issue will become an agenda item should a state violate these rights. Moreover, even in IOs where human rights are not the primary mission, the possibility of issue-linkage within the organization can prompt concerns that mistreatment of a state’s citizens could

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1 For an IO to be included in our sample, it must meet the formal definition, which we discuss below. Our core analysis of treaties is limited to UN-based treaties since this is the set of treaties on which most empirical studies of human rights focus. See Camp Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Cole 2005; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006; Ramirez and Min Wotipka 2008; and Vreeland 2008.
lead to costly sanctions in other issue areas. Thus, we argue that if a state wants to avoid the sovereignty costs associated with membership in a human rights regime, it will prefer signing a UN treaty rather than joining an international or regional organization.

Figure 1 shows a time series of the human rights IOs that comprise our sample and that we describe later. There is clear evidence of a rise in the number of such organizations from 1965 to 2000. The number of democracies in the world has steadily risen during this period as well, triggered by the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization in the early 1970s and the collapse of the Soviet bloc (Huntington 1991). Are these two trends causally related? Has the proliferation of democratic transitions spurred states to join IOs addressing human rights?

**Governance Type and Human Rights Regimes**

In this paper, we argue that states experiencing a democratic transition have particular reason to pay the sovereignty costs generated by membership in human rights IOs. For the government of a democratizing country that sincerely wants to consolidate democratic institutions, joining an international institution that insists its members safeguard the human rights of their citizens has various benefits. Respect for these rights is a keystone of democracy. Entering a human rights IO enhances the credibility of the government’s commitment to democratic reform and sends a credible signal to both domestic and foreign audiences that it is serious about such reform. By contrast, mature democracies and dictatorships have less reason to join human rights IOs because membership infringes on their sovereignty and requires them to commit resources, with few corresponding benefits.

As Moravcsik (2000) argues, governments seek binding commitments to human rights regimes when the benefits of reducing uncertainty over future human rights policy are greater than the sovereignty costs of membership. Emerging democracies gain most from an external
mechanism to guide domestic policy because they have the strongest interest in demonstrating that they intend to act democratically in the future – including an avowal to protect human rights. They have an incentive to accept the sovereignty costs associated with membership in a human rights IO because membership locks in domestic reforms and reduces the likelihood that these reforms will be rolled back at some later date. Moravcsik (2000) also contends that this process of hand-tying prompts a very different reaction from established democracies and dictatorships, which tend to oppose binding commitments. Because established democracies already respect human rights, they are generally reluctant to bear the sovereignty costs stemming from participation in human rights IOs. Pressure exerted by domestic interest groups sometimes prompts democracies to join these organizations, but they are less likely to do so than democratizing countries. Because autocratic governments do not generate benefits from such participation, they also tend to eschew membership.

As we mentioned earlier, however, not all human rights regimes impose high sovereignty costs on members. The absence of these costs weakens any commitment to a regime. Many human rights treaties are not stringently enforced and the costs of commitment vary across them (Hathaway 2002, 2003). The UN treaties are largely silent or weak on the issue of enforcement, offer no direct material inducements for improvements in human rights, and can do little to punish perpetrators of even the most egregious human rights violations (Hafner-Burton 2005). If there is a large degree of uncertainty concerning enforcement, delegation to an international agent will not tie the hands of government officials and thereby limit their ability to mistreat citizens. As such, we expect that democratizing states will be drawn to human rights IOs, but that they will not display a similar tendency to enter human rights treaties.

Credible commitments are not the only motivation for new democracies to join human rights organizations. For democratic consolidation to succeed, the public must believe that democratic
reforms are genuine (Mainwaring 1992). One way a new government can credibly signal its intention to carry through on reform is to join international organizations (Pevehouse 2005). In an emerging democracy where citizens fear human rights abuses, the government can reassure a nervous public by entering organizations that regulate and monitor the treatment of citizens. Moreover, membership in these organizations can provide information to international audiences about a new democracy’s objectives, signaling other states, multinational firms, and transnational social movements that it is committed to protecting human rights (Hawkins 1997; Vreeland 2008).

However, the clarity of a signal to support human rights is weakened if states sign UN human rights treaties rather than entering IOs. Because UN human rights treaties lack strong enforcement mechanisms, participation sends a less credible signal about a government’s intentions to treat citizens humanely than IO membership. This is not to say that human rights treaties have no inherent value. Signing a human rights treaty can be costly if a government does not intend to abide by the agreement and participation raises expectations that the government will respect human rights. This is especially true in the case of new democracies, for which being granted membership in an international regime is often a form of international recognition (Pevehouse 2005; Klebes 1999). Moreover, the public in these countries is likely to be aware of regime membership since participation in more liberal international regimes is a clear break from past authoritarian practice (Pridham 1994). As Pridham (1995: 191) notes in the case of Southern Europe, “Undoubtedly, the citizens of [Southern Europe] felt gratification over being treated as equals by international partners … We may say that external policy practice has confirmed the credibility of the democratic decision-making structures.” By reneging on international commitments, regardless of whether they are punished by other treaty members, leaders risk a domestic political backlash.

A clearer signal is sent, however, if the international agreement has a greater prospect of being enforced. Although any international commitment has the potential to create groups within
society that will monitor the government’s behavior and press it to adhere to the agreement, those commitments instantiated with organizations are more likely to be preferred by emerging democracies. As Hathaway (2002: 2005) argues, the “expressive” (i.e., signaling) benefits of joining an international regime become attenuated when the “instrumental” (i.e., legal enforcement) possibilities are low. While states gain some utility from signing UN human rights treaties, Hathaway shows that the difficulties associated with enforcing the treaties’ terms create a pooling equilibrium in which the act of signing a treaty conveys no information about the intent of the signatories.

Making commitments that have a greater likelihood of being enforced – such as commitments stemming from IO membership – sends a clearer and stronger signal for nascent democracies. Whereas scholars often treat establishing credible commitments and signaling as distinct processes, they are intimately related in the human rights realm. Less credible commitments have low signaling value. If a democratizing country wants to create higher sovereignty costs in order to increase the quality of the signal about its future intentions, then it is more likely to do so by joining human rights organizations, where the possibility of enforcement is greater, rather than by signing UN human rights treaties.

The decision to enter a human rights regime is not driven by potential members alone. There is also a supply side to this process. Established democracies often provide inducements for emerging democracies to join such regimes. These inducements include financial assistance or the promise of future membership in more exclusive international organizations, such as the European Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kelley 2004; Hawkins 2004). The EU, for example, all but requires countries to enter various human rights treaties and organizations before being granted membership. Again, organizations are far more likely to provide these
inducements than UN human rights treaties, since the treaties usually lack formal institutional structures and budgets.

Our expectations regarding the behavior of emerging democracies are clear. Although we cannot directly observe hand-tying, signaling processes, or inducements, we can observe some implications of each of these factors. The causal logic underlying each one implies that states experiencing a democratic transition have particular reason to join human rights IOs. Such states, in contrast, have less reason to sign UN human rights treaties.

It is important to recognize that we are not arguing that the UN human rights treaties hold no value or that they cannot create situations favorable for compliance. While the treaties may be helpful in generating compliance through a host of mechanisms, we are concerned with the relationship between governance type and incentives for membership. UN treaties may help empower transnational actors that pressure governments to improve human rights compliance, but this process is time consuming. So is the process of shifting norms of human rights that may arise from signing a treaty. We are agnostic about whether these long-term effects of treaty membership will actually be realized or will improve compliance. When faced with the need to commit to standards to overcome short-term uncertainty, we argue that leaders in an emerging democracy will prefer an institution that allows them to make a more credible commitment and send a clearer signal – they will prefer international organizations with human rights aims to UN human rights treaties.

Our expectations about the behavior of established democracies are less straightforward. Because there is little uncertainty about whether stable democracies will respect human rights, there is less need for them to signal future policy intentions. Thus, there is less reason for democracies to join human rights regimes of any kind. As sovereignty costs increase, established democracies are even more unlikely to join these institutions (Moravcsik 2000).
As a system of governance, however, democracy is not only consistent with respect for human rights, but it also provides opportunities for non-governmental actors to pressure the government (Hathaway 2003). In light of the premium placed on human rights in established democracies, interest groups may well press governments to join human rights regimes. Moreover, various established democracies have made promoting political liberalization and democracy abroad a foreign policy priority (Smith 1994; Carothers 2004). Certainly, both the Clinton and Bush administrations have made this goal a pillar of US foreign policy. Indeed, if some human rights regimes provide inducements for transitional states to become members, democratic participants often furnish these incentives.

As a result, we expect transitional democracies to display a pronounced tendency to join human rights IOs. Consolidated democracies may also enter these organizations, but they have fewer incentives to do so. We now analyze a newly constructed data set to evaluate these claims.

The Data

There is no existing data set that we can draw on to test these propositions. The most extensive data set on international organizations was compiled by the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). It includes many different types of IOs, including several that monitor or promote human rights. The COW data, however, exclude all emanations, which are organizations created by other organizations. By our calculations, more than seventy percent of human rights IOs are emanations. Relying solely on this data set would

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2 The justification for this exclusion is twofold. First, most theories of international relations focus on why states form or join IOs, rather than on why other organizations form IOs. Second, in many cases, the membership of emanations is identical to that of their parent organizations. In the case of human rights organizations, however, we have found this to be less the case, which makes it more important to include emanations in our analysis.
therefore risk generating results that may not be representative of the choices made by states to enter human rights IOs or treaties.

To address this problem, we identified and coded state membership in organizations that announced an intention to promote, advance, or enforce human rights during the period from 1965 to 2000. We identified these organizations by searching the 2000 Yearbook of the Union of International Associations (UIA) and examining every IO’s stated “Goals and Aims.” If the goals included a human rights program of any type, the organization was added to the sample. We then removed two types of organizations. First, we excluded organizations that were largely non-governmental rather than inter-governmental. The UIA included some organizations that consist almost entirely of individual citizens or experts who do not speak for or represent a government. Second, we excluded IOs that have rotating memberships. Some emanations from the United Nations (UN), such as the Commission on the Status of Women, maintain a limited number of seats that rotate among states. While certain states may decide not to serve, it is more likely that membership in these cases is determined by other factors, such as the institutional rules of the parent body. Our arguments do not apply to either non-governmental organizations or organizations with rotating memberships. We are interested only in human rights regimes that states actively decide to join. The sample of these regimes is listed in the Appendix. It includes 69 international organizations and six UN human rights treaties.

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3 We choose this sample period both because it overlaps with the study period of more general studies of IO membership (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006) and also because prior to 1965, data on IO membership is spottier, especially for emanations (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004).

4 Some readers may be concerned that our inclusion criteria for human rights IOs are overly broad. However, even organizations that do not have human rights as a central focus can impose significant (sometimes more significant) sovereignty costs relative to treaties. Moreover, if one believes the driving force behind membership is norms, there is no a priori reason to expect the socialization or mimesis process to be limited to IOs that focus exclusively on human rights.

5 There are seven generally recognized core UN human rights treaties, but the Treaty on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Their Families did not enter into force until 2003, after the end of the period covered in this study.
Our sample of IOs is quite heterogeneous with respect to size, region, and scope of the organization’s overall mission. For example, the sample includes the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is the world’s largest regional security organization, with 56 participating states. Its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is active in election observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, and rule of law. Also included is the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which aims to integrate human rights and development. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) works to ensure economic well-being, improve standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice, as well as peace and security for its members. The League of Arab States (LAS) attempts to strengthen political, cultural, economic, and social programs among its 22 members. It now also monitors implementation of the updated Arab Charter on Human Rights.\

There is some overlap between human rights IOs and the UN treaties. Each UN treaty creates an organization to assist with monitoring members. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, established the Human Rights Committee. In principle, this could be problematic for our analysis, since the treaties would create organizations that could, in theory, better generate credible commitments and send clear signals of intentions. In practice, however, these attendant organizations do not meet the formal definition of an IO and are not part of our IO dataset. First, these organizations include both state-sponsored representatives and private citizens. Second, some of the organizations do not convene in regular intervals or meet only after long recesses. Finally, only some treaty members recognize the competence of the monitoring body

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6 Our sample of IOs includes organizations with both a relatively high (OSCE) and a relatively low (LAS) likelihood of human rights enforcement. However, there is no agreed upon measurement for the probability of enforcing human rights measures, making it very difficult to distinguish among these organizations. Later, we do control for each state’s past track record of protecting human rights.
to consider complaints about treaty violations. Not all members of the treaty recognize the IO’s jurisdiction.

Another treaty-related organization is in the Organization of American States (OAS) system. The OAS created the American Convention on Human Rights and two organizations to enforce the treaty. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights investigates violations of individuals’ human rights, monitors members’ behavior, educates publics and governments on human rights matters, recommends policies to protect human rights, and submits cases of violations for consideration in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, the Court applies and interprets the treaty only in countries that accept its jurisdiction. Thus, for the purposes of our data, only states accepting jurisdiction are considered members. Without delegation to the Court, the treaty alone imposes few sovereignty costs on governments.

The unit of analysis in our data set is the country-year. We are interested in modeling each state’s decision about whether to enter human rights organizations and treaties in a given year. To begin, we conduct some simple tests of the relationship between domestic governance type and membership in human rights regimes. Our dependent variable is the annual change in each state’s human rights treaty and IO memberships. Focusing on this change is especially appropriate since existing theories generally seek to explain when states will attempt to join treaties and IOs, rather than, for example, the total number to which they will be a party.7

To measure each state’s governance type, we use a 21-point index drawn from an updated version of the Polity IV data set. The index ranges from 10 for the most democratic states to -10 for the most autocratic ones (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Gleditsch 2004; Marshall 2004). Previous studies have defined states as democratic if they score greater than 6 on this index in a given year, t.

7 From an econometric standpoint, this differencing also helps us avoid problems of spurious correlations between two variables that are likely trending: membership in human rights IOs or treaties and democracy. First differencing the dependent variable also removes unit level heterogeneity, obviating the need for unit (state level) fixed effects.
have defined states with a score of less than -6 as autocratic. States with scores ranging from -6 to 6 are considered anocratic. Initially, we use these thresholds to create five indicator variables measuring governance change or stability over each five-year period. *Democratization* equals 1 if, between year $t-5$ and year $t$, a state makes a fundamental change in a democratic direction: from an autocracy to either an anocracy or a democracy, or from an anocracy to a democracy (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). *Autocratization* equals 1 if a state makes a transition in an autocratic direction: from a democracy to either an anocracy or an autocracy, or from an anocracy to an autocracy. *Stable Democracy* equals 1 if a state remains democratic between years $t-5$ and $t$. *Stable Anocracy* equals 1 if a state remains anocratic during this interval, and *Stable Autocracy* equals 1 if a state remains autocratic during the interval.

Table 1 presents the mean membership change in human rights IOs and treaties for each of these five types of governance. The results indicate that democratizing countries join more human rights IOs than any other type of domestic governance analyzed here. Moreover, the difference between the mean change for democratizing countries and the mean change for every other type of country is statistically significant. This analysis therefore provides some preliminary evidence that emerging democracies join human rights IOs at a faster pace than do stable democratic countries. Stable democracies, in turn, enter these organizations at a more rapid pace than stable anocracies, stable autocracies, or autocratizing countries. Each of these differences is statistically significant.

Turning to treaty membership, there continues to be a statistically significant difference between the mean change for democratizing countries and the mean change for each of the other four domestic governance types. However, these differences are somewhat smaller and weaker than in the case of IOs. Furthermore, there are no statistically significant differences in the mean change

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8 The mean change is small in each of these cases since, in many country-years, there is no change in a state’s membership portfolio. Moreover, in some cases states leave IOs, generating negative values of the dependent variable.
in treaty membership among stable democracies, stable autocracies, stable anocracies, and autocratizing countries. On the whole, then, it appears that domestic governance type influences human rights IO membership and treaty participation in different ways, although democratization stimulates entry into both IOs and treaties.

The preceding analysis provides some initial evidence for our hypotheses. Yet, it would be premature to draw conclusions only from these simple bivariate comparisons, since they do not account for other factors that could be underlying the observed relationships between human rights institutions and state governance type. To this end, we turn to a multivariate analysis of the determinants of accession to and exit from human rights regimes.

A Statistical Model of Human Rights Regimes

To further investigate the conditions under which states enter human rights regimes, we estimate the following model:

$$\Delta \# \text{Human Rights [IOs or Treaties]} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Democratization} + \beta_2 \text{Autocratization} + \beta_3 \text{Stable Democracy} + \beta_4 \text{Stable Anocracy} + \beta_5 \text{Major Power} + \beta_6 \text{Dispute} + \beta_7 \text{Hegemony} + \beta_8 \# \text{Human Rights [IOs or Treaties]} + \beta_9 \text{Independence} + \beta_{10} \text{Year} + \beta_{11} \text{Former Communist} + \sum_{i=12}^{17} \beta_i \text{Region} + \varepsilon$$

In order to test our argument, it is important to analyze human rights organizations and treaties separately, as in the preceding analysis. To this end, we define two dependent variables. The first, $\Delta \# \text{Human Rights IOs}$, is the change in the number of human rights IOs to which each state, $i$, is a party from year $t$ to year $t+1$. The second, $\Delta \# \text{Human Rights Treaties}$, is the annual change in the number of human rights treaties in which state $i$ participates.

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9 This includes IOs in which state $i$ is an associate member. We exclude IOs where the state is an observer.
To assess the effects of domestic governance type on participation in human rights institutions, we include *Democratization, Autocratization, Stable Democracy,* and *Stable Anocracy,* the same variables used in our earlier analysis. We exclude *Stable Autocracy,* which is arbitrarily designated the reference category. Consequently, the coefficients of the first four variables reflect the impact of each type of governance relative to being a stable autocracy. We expect the coefficient of *Democratization* to be positive, since our argument is that states experiencing a democratic transition are especially likely to enter human rights regimes. We also expect this coefficient to be larger than the coefficients of *Autocratization, Stable Democracy,* and *Stable Anocracy.* Finally, we expect democratization to have a stronger effect on IO membership than on human rights treaties.

To analyze the effects of democratization on membership in human rights regimes, it is crucial that we control for other factors that may prompt states to enter or exit these regimes. Four such factors are political. First, *Major Power* is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if state $i$ is considered a great power in year $t$ by the COW Project (Singer and Small 1994). Major powers are likely to create and join human rights regimes more frequently than weaker states because major powers use these institutions to consolidate their influence (Ikenberry 2000). Second, *Independence* is the number of years state $i$ has been an independent nation-state as of year $t$, based on the date of independence furnished by the COW Project (Gleditsch and Ward 1999). At least one study of IO membership has argued that the length of time since statehood shapes a country’s propensity to enter international organizations (Shanks, Jacoboson, and Kaplan 1996). There is also evidence that the time that has elapsed since independence correlates with transitions to democracy, suggesting that the variable should be included in our model to avoid conflating the influence of political independence and democratization (Pevehouse 2005).

10 During the period covered in the analysis, the great powers were China, France, Great Britain, Russia/Soviet Union, the United States, and since 1991, Japan and Germany.
Third, *Dispute* is the number of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) involving state $i$ that are ongoing in year $t$, based on the MID 3.0 data (Ghosn and Palmer 2003). Participants in a human rights regime may be reluctant to grant membership to a state involved in interstate disputes, since its belligerence could adversely affect the regime. Moreover, if there is a perceived tradeoff between security and respect for individual liberty during times of conflict, it is unlikely that states would prioritize membership in an institution that demands respect for human rights.

Fourth, *Hegemony* measures the relative size of the largest state in the international system. It is calculated by dividing the gross domestic product (GDP) of the largest state in the system (for the entirety of this analysis, the US) by global GDP in year $t$, using data found in the Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002). Past research has linked hegemony to the formation of international organizations (Keohane 1984) as well as to patterns of international conflict and cooperation (cf. Mansfield 1994), although the strength of these links remains controversial. It is especially important to control for the influence of hegemony since the hegemon during the period covered here – the US – often emphasized the need for other countries to strengthen human rights and supported the establishment of various human rights bodies.

We also include a trend (*Year*) in the model to ensure that any observed relationship between state governance type and human rights institutions does not stem from the spread of both democracy and international institutions over time (Huntington 1991; Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). To control for possible “ceiling” or “floor” effects in human rights regime membership, we introduce variables specific to each dependent variable. As a state participates in a growing number of human rights organizations, the marginal benefit of joining another one may decline. Further, the number of possible human rights IOs that a state does not belong to declines as it joins more organizations. As such, #*Human Rights IOs* may be inversely related to the change in IO membership. Alternatively, this relationship may be direct.
States that participate in a large number of IOs may be “joiners,” predisposed to enter as many international institutions as possible, even if those IOs work in the same substantive issue area (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). Conversely, states that belong to few human rights IOs may have an aversion to joining such organizations. To analyze treaties, we replace #Human Rights IOs with #Human Rights Treaties, measuring the number of human rights treaties that state $i$ is a member of in year $t$.

Many former communist states expressed a desire to join Western organizations after the Cold War, including those focused on human rights. This tendency is not at odds with our argument about the effects of democratization, but we need to ensure that these cases are not driving any observed correlation between democratization and membership in human rights regimes. To this end, we introduce an indicator variable, Former Communist, which equals 1 for states that were communist at some point during the post-World War II era, beginning in the year after the communist government fell. In addition, because many human rights IOs are regional, patterns of membership may be similar within geographic regions (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996). We therefore add regional indicator variables to the model. Finally, $\epsilon$ is a stochastic error term.

To estimate the model of organizational memberships, we use ordinary least squares. Tests of statistical significance are based on panel-corrected standard errors, which account for heteroskedastic disturbances and contemporaneous correlation across each panel (Beck and Katz 1995). We do not adjust for autocorrelation in the data, since we found little evidence of an autoregressive data generating process. For the treaty data, because there are no instances of withdrawal from the treaties and because of the small number of treaties, we use negative binomial

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11 We use the COW Project’s definition of geographic regions with the exception of Oceania, which we combine with Asia. Because of the small number of observations in that region, this decision is necessary to achieve model convergence in several cases. See Singer and Small 1994.
count models, using standard errors clustered on the country.\textsuperscript{12}

**Results**

Table 2 presents the initial estimates of our models. As expected, the coefficient estimate of *Democratization* in the table’s first column is positive and statistically significant. Equally, this estimated coefficient is larger than that of both *Autocratization* and *Stable Anocracy*, and these differences are statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 14.11, p < 0.01$; $\chi^2 = 9.08, p < 0.05$, respectively). Emerging democracies are also more likely than stable democracies to join human rights institutions, a difference that is also statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 4.87, p < 0.05$). Not only do states that have recently undergone a democratic transition display a greater tendency to enter human rights IOs than any other type of country analyzed here, these effects are substantively large as well. Based on our results, for example, a state transitioning from stable autocracy to democracy is expected to join over twice as many human rights IOs as a state that remains autocratic.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, the estimated coefficient of *Stable Democracy* is not statistically different from the estimated coefficients of either *Stable Autocracy* or *Stable Anocracy*, although it is statistically different from that of *Autocratization* ($\chi^2 = 5.79, p < 0.05$). Thus, our multivariate analysis furnishes little evidence that stable democracies are more likely than other stable governance types to join human rights organizations.

In contrast, neither democratization nor democracy has much influence on the decision to join human rights treaties. The coefficient estimate of *Democratization* in the third column of Table 2 is marginally statistically different from the reference category (*Stable Autocracy*). But it is not

\textsuperscript{12} Clustering assumes non-independence within each panel rather than contemporaneous correlation across each panel. Re-estimating the negative binomial models using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors, however, yields very similar results.

\textsuperscript{13} For the baseline prediction, we set all continuous variables at their mean, all region variables at zero (with Africa as the reference category), and Major Power and Former Communist both equal to zero.
significantly different from any other domestic governance type, indicating that transitional
democracies are no more likely to sign such treaties than any other type of government except
stable autocracies. These findings offer preliminary evidence that democratizing states prefer
organizational membership rather than treaty membership as a mechanism to enhance the credibility
of their human rights commitments. In addition, the estimated coefficient of Stable Democracy is
positive, but it is statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient estimate of any other
governance type. As such, democracies are no more or less prone to enter human rights treaties
than other countries.

As an alternative approach to measuring a state’s governance type, we replace Stable
Democracy and Stable Anocracy with Governance Type, which is state i’s score at time t on the 21-
point index of governance type that we described earlier. This specification will allow us to
determine whether democratization influences the decision to join human rights institutions, after
accounting for each state’s governance characteristics in the year the decision is made. It is
important to recognize that in this model, the reference category is the combination of all stable
governance types over the past five years. The parameter estimates for the IO and treaty samples
are shown in the second and fourth columns of Table 2, respectively.

Again, the coefficient estimate of Democratization is positive and statistically significant
when analyzing IOs. Controlling for a state’s governance type in year t, emerging democracies are
more likely to enter human rights organizations than are either stable or autocratizing countries (\(\chi^2 = 11.62, p < 0.01\)). Democratization also continues to have a strong substantive impact on how
many human rights organizations states join: the predicted number of organizations joined is twice
as large for states that have undergone a democratic transition than for other states.\(^\text{14}\) In the case of
human rights treaties, by contrast, the coefficient estimate of Democratization is not statistically

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\(^{14}\) Again, this assumes an African state that is neither a major power nor a former communist country. All
other variables are set to their mean or (in the case of indicator variables) modal values.
different from that of either the reference category or Autocratization ($\chi^2 = 0.62, p = 0.43$).

Equally, the coefficient estimate of Governance Type is positive and statistically significant for IOs but not for treaties, indicating that states are increasingly likely to join human rights organizations as they become more democratic, whereas governance type has no systematic influence on joining human rights treaties. Even after accounting for the effects of a state’s static governance characteristics, however, democratization has a strong and sizable impact on the decision to enter human rights IOs.

Turning to the control variables, there are substantial differences across the two sets of parameter estimates. The coefficient estimates of #Human Rights IOs are not statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of #Human Rights Treaties are negative and significant. The apparent “ceiling” effect for human rights treaties is understandable. Only six such treaties were in force during the period covered in our analysis. States that joined some or all of them had few (if any) left to enter in the future.15

States in the throes of a military dispute (Dispute) are significantly less likely to enter both human rights IOs or sign treaties than are states at peace. Further, as hegemony wanes, states are more likely to join human rights IOs as well as treaties, possibly to lock in human rights standards and monitoring in the event that the hegemon (the US for this analysis) continues to falter. The coefficient estimate of Independence is positive and statistically significant for IOs, suggesting that states tend to join human rights IOs as they age, although there is no such effect for treaties. Finally, Former Communist states are especially likely to join human rights organizations, but not treaties – no doubt reflecting the fact that most Eastern European states signed the core UN human rights treaties when they had communist governments.

15 Adding a variable to the model that codes the number of organizations that could be possibly joined by state $i$ makes no difference in the estimates, and the new variable is not itself statistically significant.
Robustness Checks

Our initial results indicate that democratization is a potent impetus to membership in human rights organizations. Stable democracies join such organizations at a slower pace than democratizing countries and at roughly the same pace as other stable governance types. However, we need to ensure that these findings are not undermined by omitted variable bias. One possible source of such a bias is that a state’s desire to protect human rights (or join IOs generally) could be linked to its transition toward democracy by some variable that causes both phenomena. Past research has linked economic wealth to both IO membership rates (Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996) and transitions to democracy (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994). Consequently, we include Development, which is country i’s per capita GDP in year t, then re-estimate the models in the second and fourth columns of Table 2.

The results (which are not presented to conserve space) furnish no evidence that Development influences membership in human rights IOs. Including this variable also has little bearing on our previous results, and the estimated coefficient of Development is not statistically significant. The coefficient estimate of Democratization remains positive and statistically significant (at the $p < 0.05$ level) — indicating that democratizing states join human rights IOs at a more rapid clip than stable governance types — and it is statistically different than the coefficient estimate of Autocratization ($\chi^2 = 10.56, p < 0.05$). Likewise, Democratization continues to be substantively important: transitional democracies enter human rights IOs at double the rate of stable autocracies. In the model of human rights treaties, the estimated coefficient of Development is negative and statistically significant (at the $p < 0.05$ level), indicating that richer countries are less likely to sign UN human rights treaties than their poorer counterparts. Yet, the coefficient estimates of Democratization and Autocratization remain statistically indistinguishable from each other ($\chi^2 =$

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16 Because of missing data, the regional fixed effect for “Oceania” is omitted to achieve convergence.
0.55, \( p = 0.62 \)). The coefficient of *Governance Type* is positive, and is marginally statistically significant (at the 0.10 level).

Another possible source of omitted variable bias, highlighted by Hathaway (2003), is that a state’s existing record of human rights protection will be a good predictor of its entrance into human rights regimes. For instance, states with relatively poor human rights records may not wish to join a human rights regime, especially one that has the potential to generate high sovereignty costs. Moreover, if democratic or democratizing countries are more likely to respect human rights, this could have a confounding effect in our model. A state’s record of respect for human rights could account for the observed relationships between democratization and democracy, on the one hand, and changes in human rights regime membership, on the other.

To address this possibility, we introduce a measure of state respect for human rights into the models presented in the second and fourth columns of Table 2. This measure reflects the extent of murder, torture, forced disappearance, and political imprisonment in each country. To construct it, we rely on annual data published by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the US State Department, as well as on studies by Poe and Tate (1994)\(^\text{17}\) and Gibney\(^\text{18}\) that have analyzed these data. The variable is a five-point index that provides a yearly measure of each state’s human rights practices.\(^\text{19}\) To guard against source bias, we re-estimate these models using alternative data based on Amnesty International source documents.

Regardless of whether we rely on the State Department or the Amnesty International index, there is no case in which the coefficient estimate of this variable is statistically significant. These results (which are omitted to conserve space) indicate that a state’s rate of repression does not

\(^{17}\) For details, see Poe and Tate 1994. Data are available from: http://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.htm. Our thanks to Steven Poe and his team at the University of North Texas for sharing their data.

\(^{18}\) Data are available from: www.unca.edu/politicalscience/faculty-staff/gibney.html. Our thanks to Mark Gibney and his team at the University of North Carolina-Asheville for sharing their data.

\(^{19}\) Coding details are available from Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005. Human rights data are available on a limited sample of states, substantially reducing the sample size of our analyses.
influence changes in its portfolio of human rights organization or treaty memberships. As such, human rights practices do not seem to influence membership patterns in human rights regimes, contrary to what some studies suggest (Hathaway 2003).

More importantly, none of the governance type coefficient estimates vary in any meaningful way from the original estimates. For human rights IOs, Democratization remains statistically different from the reference category and from Autocratization. The estimated coefficient of Autocratization remains negative, but now achieves statistical significance when we rely on the State Department measure.\(^ {20} \) For human rights treaties, the effect of Democratization is not statistically different from that of either the reference category or Autocratization. The coefficient of Governance Type, however, is now positive and statistically significant when either repression measure is used.\(^ {21} \)

In addition to addressing the possibility of omitted variable bias, it is also important to analyze whether the respective processes that give rise to changes in human rights IO membership and human rights treaty involvement are related. If such a relationship exists and we model these processes as independent, then we are likely to generate biased results. To address this issue, we re-estimate the models in the second and fourth columns of Table 2 using a series of seemingly-unrelated regressions (SURs) after including: (1) the number of human rights treaties to which each state belongs in year \( t \) in the IO model, and (2) the number of human rights IOs to which each state belongs in year \( t \) in the treaty model. The SUR technique accounts for any correlation between the residuals in our IO model and our treaty model, as well as yielding efficiency gains (Pindyck and

\(^ {20} \) Further investigation suggests that this is due to the decline in sample size rather than the addition of the repression variable.

\(^ {21} \) We also examined an interaction effect between Democratization and the measure of state repression (both in year \( t \) and also from \( t-5 \) to \( t \)), but there was no statistical evidence that there is a conditional effect of democratization and repression and joining human rights IOs.

The results are shown in Table 3 and are quite similar to those from the independently estimated equations. In the IO model, the governance transition variables change very little. The estimated coefficient of *Democratization* remains statistically different from that of both the reference category and *Autocratization*, while the coefficient of *Governance Type* remains positive and statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient estimate of #*Human Rights Treaties* is not statistically significant, suggesting that the decision to join human rights IOs is not influenced by existing participation in human rights treaties. In the treaty model, however, the estimated coefficients of both #*Human Rights Treaties* and #*Human Rights IOs* are statistically significant. Consequently, the decision to join human rights treaties is at least partially driven by the extent of a state’s memberships in human rights organizations.

The SUR estimates are also useful in allowing us to directly test whether the effects of *Democratization* differ between the two equations. This test yields the strongest evidence yet that emerging democracies join IOs as a commitment strategy: the coefficient estimate of *Democratization* in the IO model is much larger than in the treaty model, and the difference is highly significant ($\chi^2 = 8.60, p < 0.01$). Moreover, this coefficient remains statistically different from that of *Autocratization* in the IO model ($\chi^2 = 12.40, p < 0.01$), but not in the treaty model ($\chi^2 = 2.14, p = 0.14$). Thus, even when accounting for the related processes of joining human rights organizations and treaties, democratization continues to be a potent impetus to entering IOs.

Next, we also re-estimated each model as a series of logit models, where the observed value of the dependent variable was 1 if state $i$ joined at least one human rights organization or treaty, respectively, between $t$ and $t+1$, and zero otherwise. The results are nearly identical to those

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22 Note that when using the SUR model, both the IO and the treaty equations are estimates using least squares regressions. Further, we do not estimate panel-corrected standard errors when using this technique.

23 A Breuch-Pagan test for the independence of the error terms marginally rejects the null hypothesis that the equations are independent ($\chi^2 = 2.83, p < 0.10$).
presented earlier, with the coefficient estimate of *Democratization* significantly different from the reference category and every other governance type in the IO model. Moreover, the coefficient estimate of *Democratization* in the treaty model remains statistically indistinguishable from every other governance type coefficient.

Finally, we expand our sample of human rights treaties by including a set of regional pacts. Thus far, we have compared states’ membership in a range of international and regional IOs with their membership in the six core UN human rights treaties that are the subject of most analyses. Now, we also include membership data on the three core regional treaties – the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the European Convention on Human Rights – into our treaty sample, and remove the related human rights IOs – the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Council of Europe – from our IO sample. The findings based on this new sample are quite similar to our initial results. For the reduced sample of human rights IOs, the coefficient estimate of *Democratization* remains positive and statistically different from the coefficients of the reference category and *Autocratization* ($\chi^2 = 15.13, p < 0.01$). The estimated coefficient of *Autocratization* is negative and statistically significant. For the expanded sample of human rights treaties, the estimated coefficient of *Democratization* is positive and marginally significant ($p < 0.10$), but it does not differ significantly from that of *Autocratization* ($\chi^2 = 1.32, p = 0.25$). These results suggest that democratizing states prefer to enter human rights IOs rather than treaties, regardless of whether the treaties originate in the UN or in the state’s region.

In sum, our results show that democratizing states join human rights organizations more rapidly than other countries, even stable democracies. Furthermore, the quantitative effect of democratization exceeds that of any other governance type. The evidence concerning stable democracies is less clear cut. In many cases, democracies do not join significantly more IOs or
treaties than their stable anocratic or autocratic counterparts. In contrast, there is little evidence that domestic governance type affects whether or when states sign UN human rights treaties.

Conclusions

The rise of international human rights regimes has spawned a vigorous debate in the field of international relations. Some observers contend that these institutions create strong legal and normative structures that heavily shape state behavior. Others hold that these regimes are inconsequential. They argue instead that states enter these arrangements regardless of domestic governance type or past human rights behavior. Until now, no systematic empirical study has attempted to sort out what types of states join human rights regimes, whether they choose IOs or treaties, and why they elect to join. By developing a new data set of human rights organizations to compliment existing data on UN human rights treaties, we tested several propositions concerning what provides the impetus for state membership in human rights IOs and treaties.

The logic of credible commitments leads us to expect that transitions to democracy will spur states to join human rights IOs, but not necessarily the core UN human rights treaties. Other scholars have suggested that when an emerging democracy commits to observing international human rights standards it reduces uncertainty about how that government will treat its citizens. That uncertainty remains, however, if human rights regimes do not enforce their standards. While existing human rights treaties impose fewer sovereignty costs on signatories, IOs are better suited to the task of solving credibility problems because they impose greater sovereignty costs on members. Yet we also outlined two other causal mechanisms that could motivate transitional states to join both human rights IOs over the UN human rights treaties. While both may serve as important signals of intent to domestic and international audiences, the signals are likely to be clearer in cases where the expected probability of enforcement is higher. In addition, organizations are more likely to wield resources that may be used as incentives by mature democracies to lure new democracies...
to membership in both. Our evidence is preliminary and cannot differentiate between the causal processes at work, but it suggests that transitional democracies are more often choosing those institutions with higher sovereignty costs to lock in policy reforms at home than are other states.

Our expectations concerning the propensity for stable democracies to enter these organizations are less clear cut. Democracies may forgo paying the sovereignty costs stemming from membership in human rights IOs since they generally already comply with the accompanying standards. Conversely, due to domestic pressure from interest groups and a desire to promote standards consistent with their own behavior, stable democracies may choose to join these regimes regardless of the sovereignty costs.

Our statistical results provide strong evidence that emerging democracies join human rights IOs at a higher rate than any other domestic governance type, but that there is little variation across governance types in the propensity to sign the UN human rights treaties. The evidence regarding stable democracies is more ambiguous. While such countries do appear to join more human rights institutions than do stable anocracies or autocracies, these differences only achieve statistical significance when a state’s respect for human rights is considered. Thus, while the effects of democratization are quite strong and consistent, the effects of stable democracy are less clear.

Our statistical analysis does not allow us to conclusively determine whether signaling, commitment, or inducement provided the impetus for membership in these organizations for democratizing countries. Yet we have provided the first systematic empirical examination of the question. Future work will no doubt attempt to trace causal patterns, focusing on the observable implications of those causal theories. Moreover, while we cannot speak to the emerging debate over whether these institutions are enforced, by knowing what types of states join these organizations, we can begin to understand the motivations behind the ever-expanding number of human rights regimes in the world.
Figure 1. Human Rights Organizations in the World, 1965-2000.
Table 1. Mean Change in Human Rights Organizations and Treaties by Governance Type, 1965-2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Type</th>
<th>Mean Change</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ORGANIZATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stable Autocracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocratization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stable Anocracy</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TREATIES</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.140</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stable Autocracy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocratization</td>
<td>0.130</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Governance Type</th>
<th>IOs Stable Indicators</th>
<th>IOs Governance Score</th>
<th>Treaties Stable Indicators</th>
<th>Treaties Governance Score</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
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<td>0.174**</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.171</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autocratization</td>
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<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
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<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Democracy</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.137)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Anocracy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.155)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>--.--</td>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
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<td>(0.045)</td>
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<td>--.--</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
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<td>-0.344***</td>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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(Table 2 continued)
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<td></td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Governance</td>
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<td>Indicators</td>
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<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Score</td>
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<td>0.361**</td>
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<td>0.029</td>
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<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
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<td>South America</td>
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<td>-0.039</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.039</td>
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<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
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<td>-0.074</td>
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<td>-0.297*</td>
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<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>0.236**</td>
<td>0.305*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>88.881***</td>
<td>89.141***</td>
<td>-74.803</td>
<td>-72.514</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization vs. Autocratization</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 14.11***)</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 11.62***)</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 1.18)</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 0.62)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratization vs. Stable Democracy</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 4.87**)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(\chi^2 = 0.55)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For the IO model, entries are ordinary least squares estimates with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. For the Treaties models, entries are negative binomial regression estimates with standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For all models, N = 4821. Africa is omitted because it is the regional reference category. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** \(p \leq .01\); ** \(p \leq .05\); * \(p \leq .10\). Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for all estimated coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>IOs</th>
<th>Treaties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>0.201***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
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<td>Autocratization</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.028)</td>
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<td>Stable Democracy</td>
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<td>(0.021)</td>
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<td>(0.006)</td>
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<td>-1.666***</td>
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<td>(1.046)</td>
<td>(0.581)</td>
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<td>0.005***</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independence</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>-0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0003)</td>
<td>(0.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Communist</td>
<td>0.364***</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>90.975***</td>
<td>-10.886***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.055)</td>
<td>(3.362)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democratization vs. $\chi^2 = 21.40^{***}$ $\chi^2 = 2.38$

Autocratization

Democratization [IOs] vs. $\chi^2 = 11.02^{***}$

Democratization [Treaty]

Note: Coefficient estimates are generated using seemingly-unrelated regression. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. For each model, N = 4821. Region fixed-effects are omitted to conserve space. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** $p \leq .01$; ** $p \leq .05$; * $p \leq .10$. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for all estimated coefficients.
References


Marshall, Monty. 2004. Regime Type 4 Data Set Codebook. Online: 


