Political Science 12: IR -- Fourth Lecture
Domestic Politics and War
Domestic Politics and War

1. War Model Review
2. Domestic Groups and War
3. Institutions and War
Domestic Politics and War

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Can internal characteristics of states explain why states go to war?
Domestic Politics and War

Figure 4.1: The Price of Oil, 1957–2012

- Iranian revolution/onset of Iran-Iraq War
- Yom Kippur War/Arab oil embargo
- Iraq invasion of Kuwait/Persian Gulf War
- Arab Spring uprisings
- Onset of Iraq War
War Model Review

It is usually more rational to bargain than to go to war.
War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain

Figure 3.2: The Costs of War and the Bargaining Range

(i) State A's share of territory from a deal at $x$
(ii) State B's share of territory from a deal at $x$
State B's ideal point

(iii) Amount of territory that State A expects from a war
(iv) Amount of territory that State B expects from a war
State B's ideal point

State B's ideal point

State A's ideal point

State A's ideal point

Bargaining range: Deals that both states prefer to war

Deals that State A prefers to war

Deals that State B prefers to war

Value of war to State A once costs, $a$, are subtracted

Value of war to State B once costs, $b$, are subtracted

$p - a$

$p$

$p + b$

State B's ideal point

State A's ideal point
War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain: A Model of War
A Model

Fertile farmland

Castle A

Castle B
A Model of War

The object of contention (the green line) can be anything that states are in conflict over.
A Model of War

Current Border

Probable new border if A and B fight
A Model of War

Costs of fighting to A

Costs of fighting to B

Probable new border if A and B fight
A Model of War

Net value of fighting to A

Net value of fighting to B
A Model of War

Current Border

Range of possible border settlements that both A and B prefer to fighting
A Model of War

B's proposal for a new border

Current Border
For any A and B, if
• war is costly, and
• the object of contention is divisible,
then there is always at least one negotiated settlement that A and B will both prefer to war.
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Domestic Groups and War

• War may serve the interests of some domestic groups
• Groups may have selfish interests contrary to national interests
• Types of groups
Domestic Groups and War

Collective action

- Smaller groups tend to be better organized.
- Larger groups suffer from free riding.

Groups may shape policy to support their narrow interests.
Leaders and War

Figure 4.2: Rally Effects and Popularity of President George W. Bush, 2001–2004
Leaders and War

Figure 4.3: Rally Effects and the Bargaining Range

(i)

Size of the bargaining range: \( a + b \)

State B’s ideal point \( p - a \) \( p \) \( p + b \) State A’s ideal point

(ii)

State A’s benefit from a rally, \( r \)

Size of the bargaining range: \( a + b - r \)

State B’s ideal point \( p - a \) \( p \) \( p - a + r \) \( p + b \) State A’s ideal point
Leaders and War

- Deals that A prefers to war
- Deals that B prefers to war
- Red line = bargaining range
Leaders and War

- Bargaining range when Rally effect added to A’s payoffs
Leaders and War
Leaders and War

Figure 4.4: U.S. Battle Deaths and Public Support for War
Leaders and War

Figure 4.A: War Outcomes and the Fate of Leaders
Leaders and War

Figure 4.B: Democracy and the Fate of Wartime Leaders
Groups and War

• War to satisfy the military or interest groups
• Costs fall on society as a whole; benefits may accrue to a specific group
Groups and War
Hawks and Doves

• Hawks favor war
• Doves oppose war
Hawks and Doves

Bargaining with hawkish interests in State A
Hawks and Doves

Bargaining with dovish interests in State A
Hawks and Doves

Figure 4.5: Domestic Interests and International Bargaining

(i) Bargaining with dovish interests in State A

- Status quo that State A will challenge
- Status quo that neither will challenge
- Status quo that State B will challenge

(ii) Bargaining with hawkish interests in State A

- Status quo that State A will challenge
- Status quo that neither will challenge
- Status quo that State B will challenge
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Institutions and War

• Are democracies less prone to go to war?
• Features of democracies
Institutions and War
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Map 4.1: Democracy and Freedom
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Figure 4.6: The Spread of Democracy, 1800–2010
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Political Science 12: International Relations