This paper provides the first model of legislative behavior in nondemocratic settings. Many authoritarian regimes have sought to maintain a façade of democracy by creating “puppet” legislatures. These legislatures should always support the regime since uncooperative behavior risks career-ending punishments. But in spite of potentially high costs, legislators do sometimes rebel against military executives. I show how legislative rebellion can be a rational strategy—even under authoritarian rule. When applied to data from Brazil, the model reveals the durable power of the electoral connection and patronage politics. The methods and model could be easily applied to other cases of legislative rebellion against nondemocratic executives.

Introduction

This paper provides the first model of legislative behavior in nondemocratic regimes. Many authoritarian executives have sought to maintain a façade of democracy by creating “puppet” legislatures. These legislatures should have every reason to support the regime since uncooperative behavior risks career-ending punishments. In spite of this, they sometimes rebel against the authoritarian executive. Why should politicians risk their careers to oppose a powerful regime?

This paper models legislators’ choices to support or oppose an authoritarian executive as functions of political survival. When evaluating unpopular policies, legislators must consider the costs of anti-executive or anti-constituent roll-call votes. I argue that deputies weigh these potential costs with reference to their relative career risks.

I test the model by examining Brazil’s authoritarian regime (1964–85). During most of this period, deputies continued to hold legislative sessions, vote on policy proposals, and face regular elections. But at the same time, the military occupied the presidency and used broad executive powers to control legislative behavior.
Cooperative deputies received pork for their constituents, but rebellious deputies could lose all access to government resources, be removed from office, and have their political rights cancelled for up to 10 years.

As popular opposition to the regime grew, legislators balked. On a series of visible and controversial roll-call votes, the chamber split its votes. Some deputies voted with the military, risking voters’ wrath. Others rebelled against the generals, risking career-ending punishments.

A statistical test using roll-call votes validates the model of political survival and shows significant change—and continuity—in patterns of Brazilian representation during the military regime. More broadly, this analysis shows the durability of the electoral connection, even under an authoritarian regime, the powerful impact of institutional changes on voters’ and legislators’ behavior, and the persistence of clientelism.

I proceed in three steps. First, I develop a model of legislative behavior, showing how Brazilian legislators balanced competing demands from constituents and from the military. Second, I discuss variable measurement. Third, I test the model and present results.

I. A Political Survival Model of Legislative Behavior

During Brazil’s most recent authoritarian period (1964–85), decisions to support or oppose the military’s agenda could determine politicians’ futures. Supporting the military’s program in the face of constituent opposition could cost legislators popular support needed for elections. But voting against the military’s agenda could end deputies’ access to government patronage, or even result in their removal from office. During the military regime, almost 200 federal deputies were purged by the president (Alves 1985, 98).

Under strategic and career-maximizing assumptions, deputies had to assess the relative career risk of voting for or against the military’s program. Was voter or military wrath more likely to end their careers? I model their voting decisions as functions of (a) their evaluations of constituents’ and the military’s likely reactions and (b) their political security at the time. The basic form of the model is:

$$ U_{ij} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_j + \alpha_2 M_j + \alpha_3 S_i + \epsilon_{ij}, $$

(1)

where $U_{ij}$ is legislator $i$’s relative career utility of voting against the military on issue $j$; $C_j$ is the expected gain or loss in constituent support associated with the vote on issue $j$; $M_j$ is the expected military reprisal or reward associated with the vote on issue $j$; $S_i$ is the political security of legislator $i$ (explained below); and $\epsilon_{ij}$ is a random error for legislator $i$ on vote $j$. (See Appendix A for more details on the model.)
The model offers an explanation for legislators’ behavior. A deputy’s vote is a function of his or her career utility \(U_{ij}\). On each controversial issue, there is a potential gain or loss of constituent support \(C_{ij}\). Similarly, there are potential military reprisals or rewards associated with each vote \(M_{ij}\). The decision of whether or not to defect varies with each legislator’s political security \(S_{i}\).

Career utility \(U\) refers to a deputy’s future career prospects. The basic assumption of this model is not that politicians are reelection seeking, but that they are career seeking. The literature shows that the percentage of Brazilian deputies that stand for reelection is often relatively low. Nevertheless, this issue does not affect the validity of the model for two reasons. First, during the military regime, over 75% of deputies did run for reelection (Samuels 1998b, 5). Second, the few legislators who did not seek reelection had incentives to behave exactly the same way as those that ran again.

Brazilian politicians who leave the legislature are not leaving politics—they are going to other political offices such as mayor, governor, senator, or appointed political positions. To reach these positions, they have to behave the same way as deputies seeking reelection: they have to mobilize votes, deliver patronage to their supporters, attend to constituents’ requests, and build personal machines. So although there are some deputies who leave Congress after one or two terms, their career goals require that they behave as if they were seeking reelection.

Political security \(S\) captures each politician’s supply of career-building resources. One dimension of this variable is directly electoral: a large and faithful popular following provides security to legislators. A second dimension of security is indirect: a politician’s ability to mobilize and deliver patronage, jobs, contracts, and campaign finance is essential for creating and maintaining a personal network and political career.

Secure deputies have adequate resources to make career advancement likely. These deputies can weather an unpopular roll-call vote and still seek reelection or run for a higher office. For these MCs, when deciding how to vote on controversial issues, the greater career risk is that of military reprisal. A popular following or extensive machine is of no value if the military cancels one’s mandate and all political rights; hence, secure deputies are less likely to vote against a military proposal.

Conversely, deputies lacking security need to increase their popular support or machines. Without such resources, their future career opportunities are limited. Moreover, threats from the military of
removal from office or withholding patronage seem less important when a politician already has little chance of political advancement. Hence, less-secure deputies should vote against the military on controversial votes when doing so could increase their popular support or personal machines.

**Qualifications and Complications**

The model (1) presented above requires some comment and qualification. First, the expected costs of voting against the military’s position ($M_j$) varied significantly from one vote to another. Especially in the first half of the regime, a cycle of rebellion and reaction emerged. Deputies would gradually begin to speak critically and act independently. Eventually, the military’s patience would be exhausted, and they would crack down on the Congress with purges and closures. After a period of meek acquiescence, the Congress would begin to assert itself again.

Before the crackdowns, deputies had slightly more room to maneuver. Rebellious behavior was risky but might not provoke a purge or other punishment. When the military did respond, however, the costs to deputies were very high. For example, in 1966, combat troops closed Congress for a month, and the president purged 6 deputies and cancelled the rights of an additional 18 state and municipal politicians. In another case, after growing tension in late 1968, the president closed Congress and purged over 90 deputies (Kinzo 1988, 108).

At other times, the president was more likely to use patronage to influence legislative behavior. Soon after the coup, all economic planning was centralized in the executive branch and almost all fiscal power taken from the legislature. As a result, the president could tightly control patronage and influence legislators with promises to deliver, or threats to withhold, resources for their municipalities. Several retired deputies confirmed this use of patronage. One told me how, before some votes, legislators went to see then-President Figueiredo, arriving with a list of pork-barrel projects for their constituencies.\(^5\)

The second qualification concerns constituents’ influence: Did constituents matter? Which constituents were influential? For Brazilian deputies, we must distinguish between two constituencies: voters and local political elites. Normally, Brazilian voters seem to have limited influence on legislators’ behavior, but institutional changes during the military regime greatly increased some voters’ influence. On the other hand, the influence of political elites is well documented. Important organizers of elections and campaigns, political elites are informed
about legislators’ behavior, and their continued support requires reliable and attentive service.

Brazilian voters’ policy influence is usually taken for granted as being very low; voters are generally ignorant about representatives’ behavior and usually cast votes for candidates based on personal benefits (Ames 1995; Geddes and Zaller 1989; Rabinovich 1990; Von Mettenheim 1990). Voter ignorance is often exacerbated by the weak Brazilian party system—voters cannot use party as a proxy for policy positions because most parties do not have well-defined, consistent platforms. But during the military regime, changes in the party system and declining support for the military combined to greatly increase voters’ influence and pressure on deputies.

Most important were changes in the number of parties. After 1965, the government imposed a two-party system, creating a government and an opposition party. The military planners intended to create two cohesive, single-minded coalitions: The National Renovation Alliance (ARENA) would always support the government and always control Congress; the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) would oppose everything the government did but never take power. After 1979, the restrictions on party formation were relaxed and a multi-party system restored. But after two years and additional changes in party legislation, the two-party system was largely preserved. By 1981, over 90% of deputies were either in the renamed ARENA (now the Democratic Social Party or PDS) or in the renamed MDB (now the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party or PMDB).

The authoritarian regime also imposed several other important changes, including 1) prohibitions on cross-party election alliances, 2) restrictions on party switching, and 3) new party discipline rules. Prohibiting cross-party electoral alliances reduced voter confusion and increased the value of party labels. Restrictions on party switching meant that candidates could not switch parties according to the tides of public opinion but had to campaign under their party’s label and popularity (or unpopularity). Finally, during the 1970s, party leadership had the option to force party fidelity on legislative votes. Any deputy who did not vote with the party leadership could have his or her electoral mandate revoked and be removed from office.

The result of these changes was that parties were more “institutionalized,” albeit artificially, than during any other period in Brazilian history. For nearly the entire period of military rule, government and opposition parties were clearly situated in a way they never had been before nor have been since. While these parties might not have represented the most complete and efficient aggregation of interests,
their clear definition as pro-military or the opposition made even uneducated voters’ choices much easier.

How did institutionalized parties make individual deputies much more accountable for their actions? Strong parties create political brand names that help voters correctly and quickly label candidates’ policy platforms (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993). In Brazil, ARENA deputies were labeled “pro-military” and suffered from the declining support for the military regime. MDB deputies were labeled “anti-military” and benefited as opposition to the regime grew.

Campaigning deputies seeking to escape their party labels had to do so aggressively. Without any additional information, voters could assume that ARENA deputies were pro-military. Consequently, ARENA deputies had to be proactive in advertising their distance from the regime. One way to distinguish oneself credibly from the regime’s policies was to show an anti-military voting record. Likewise, voters could assume that MDB deputies opposed the regime, and these deputies had to be equally aggressive if they wished to escape that label. Note that this argument does not require that voters themselves become fully informed, attentive citizens or even that they remember who they voted for in the last election. They need only briefly pay attention once every four years before casting their votes.

Data from the period confirm these effects. Schneider writes that “. . . ARENA candidates found strong indications of discontent with government politics; they responded by stressing their independence and playing down their ties to the national regime. . .” (Schneider 1971). He goes on to note that ARENA candidates were most cheered when they criticized the regime and that many tried to hide their party affiliation (Schneider 1971, 186). Both Strand and Schneider find that these strategies worked—candidates who distanced themselves from the regime were the top vote-getters (Schneider 1971; Strand 1977).

McDonough analyzed a survey of politicians taken during the military regime and showed that most politicians believed their constituents were watching their behavior. He found that a majority of respondents believed that Brazilians in general, and their individual constituents in particular, were interested in politics.9 Their beliefs seem validated by voting behavior: elections became plebiscites on the regime, with approval measured in ARENA votes, disapproval in MDB votes (Cardoso and Lamounier 1975; Lamounier 1989).

The impact of these changes, however, must be qualified. The entire Brazilian electorate did not become partisan, informed, and ideological. Low-income, less-educated, and rural voters were still likely to cast votes based on personal benefits rather than policy positions.
These voters were much less likely to care about deputies’ policy positions and were more concerned with their ability to deliver patronage. Deputies with these kinds of constituencies had significantly less pressure to vote against the military’s proposals. In contrast, more-informed urban voters were more likely to judge legislators and the regime’s performance critically (Geddes and Zaller 1989). Thus, deputies with such constituencies faced more pressure to defect and vote against the military.

The second important constituency for Brazilian legislators is composed of local political elites, i.e., mayors, local party members, and political bosses. These constituents provide essential contacts between voters and legislators; they are part of a hierarchy of patronage that organizes Brazilian politics. Specifically, they organize and mobilize voters in support of candidates for legislative and other offices.

The system works through a hierarchy of patronage. Local elites trade goods for votes. They organize concerts and barbecues or distribute goods or small cash payments to followers, who in turn vote for the leader’s candidate for office. Elites provide these services for legislators in exchange for pork and patronage: construction contracts, funding for local social services, federal jobs, and other favors.

These elite constituencies are well informed, important for electoral success, and nearly uniform in their clear preference for increasing access to government pork. As a result, this cohesive, attentive, and important group wields substantial influence over legislators’ behavior.

Whether voters or political elites are more influential varies for each deputy. Patronage politics and political bosses dominate in poor areas, especially small rural towns, where there is less media information and fewer educational opportunities and where poverty makes small personal benefits valuable to voters. But voters should matter more in urban areas, where constituents are more informed and better-off—middle- and upper-class voters do not trade their votes for a beer or basket of foodstuffs.

The type of constituency each deputy had determined the kinds of pressures that each faced. Voters and political bosses generally had different interests. Controversial issues that mobilized voters were as diverse as the voters themselves and included democratization, human rights, and the voters’ standard of living. Elites had a much narrower and more uniform set of interests—pork from the federal government.

Table 1 summarizes the effect of different constituency interests. Each cell summarizes the likely pressure felt by deputies with different constituency types on different issue types. In the first cell (Voters
TABLE 1
Level of Pressure on Deputies by Constituency and Issue Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>Voters Politicized</th>
<th>Voters Controlled by Elites’ Machines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>1. Some popular pressure to defect, though elites oppose risking access to pork through defections.</td>
<td>2. No popular pressure to defect. Elites will oppose risking access to pork.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>3. High pressure to defect from elites; voters are ambivalent or support defection.</td>
<td>4. High pressure to defect from elites; voters are ambivalent or support defection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Politically, deputies are lobbied by constituents to defect on controversial issues. Elites may oppose rebellion, as it may risk access to pork, but their effectiveness will be limited. In the second cell (Machine Politics/Popular Issue), there are no incentives to vote against military proposals. Elite constituents will not want rebellion that may risk access to patronage; voters will be uninformed about the issues. In cells 3 and 4, there is high pressure to rebel on all pork-related issues (cells 3 and 4). Voters will either be ambivalent or supportive of local transfers; powerful elites will strongly support increases in pork.

Political party should also be included in the model. A legislator’s choice of party reflects his or her political alliances and ideological preferences, both of which affect roll-call vote decisions. In addition, given the stronger parties during this period, disloyal legislators could have faced disciplinary action from leadership.

But this factor brings up another issue. Does this model even apply to opposition deputies? After all, the military created the MDB specifically to oppose the government unsuccessfully and maintain only a facade of democracy (Kinzo 1988, 3). Further, voters supporting the MDB were opposed to the regime. So if both the military and the voters expected opposition deputies to oppose the regime, then why would opposition deputies ever do otherwise? Why would these deputies ever vote for the military? As a matter of fact, opposition deputies rarely did: on controversial votes, less than 1% of MDB deputies ever voted for the military’s position.

On the other hand, there is significant evidence that opposition deputies felt some of the same pressures that government deputies felt. For example, after controversial votes and debates, opposition
Legislative Politics in Authoritarian Brazil
depuities were purged by the military, just like government deputies. Also, retired legislators assert that many opposition deputies negotiated with the president for patronage and were virtually indistinguishable from government deputies. Finally, while the opposition may have never voted for the military, they avoided voting against it. On key votes, many opposition deputies were notably absent. Interviews confirmed that these absences were not random but were a form of position taking. On the basis of this evidence, I decided to include opposition deputies in the model.13

Governors’ political influence should also be included in the model. Governors are important actors in deputies’ political lives. They control key electoral resources, wield strong coattail effects on legislative elections, and, consequently, strongly influence their states’ legislative delegations (Samuels 2000). In states with ARENA governors, deputies should have had additional incentives to vote for military proposals. Where opposition governors were elected, deputies should have had more reason to defect.

Summarizing and Revising the Model

We can now make some adjustments to our original model (1) to incorporate the qualifications.

\[
U_{ij}(\text{defect}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_{ij} + \alpha_2 M_j * I_{\text{ARENA}_i} + \alpha_3 M_j * I_{\text{MDB}_i} + \alpha_4 S_i + \alpha_5 \text{PID}_i + \alpha_7 \text{GovPID}_i + \epsilon_{ij},
\]

where, for the \(i\)th legislator choosing a position on the \(j\)th issue, \(M_j\), \(S_i\), and \(\epsilon_{ij}\) are as per (1). \(C_{ij}\) varies for each legislator and roll-call vote, \(\text{PID}_i\) captures the party of the deputy (0=government, 1=opposition), and \(\text{GovPID}_i\) captures the party of the deputy’s governor (0=government, 1=opposition). \(I_{\text{ARENA}_i}\) and \(I_{\text{MDB}_i}\) are dummy variables allowing legislators from these parties to have different military costs associated with rebellious roll-call votes.

The essential hypotheses of this model can be summarized as follows:

1. \(\alpha_4 < 0\): More-secure deputies are less likely to vote against military positions.
2. \(\alpha_1 > 0\): Higher constituent pressure, especially from local political elites, increases the utility of rebellion.
3. \(\alpha_5 > 0, \alpha_2 < \alpha_3\): Opposition deputies have lower rebellion costs and are more likely to vote against the military.
4. \(\alpha_2 < 0, \alpha_3 < 0\): Military pressure on deputies makes rebellion less likely.
II. Data and Measurement

Legislative rebellion against the military is measured using roll-call votes on controversial bills. I talked with deputies past and present about the high rate of abstention on some votes. All confirmed that, on key legislation, abstentions and absences were forms of position taking. For example, a deputy might not want to vote for or against a military proposal in public. In either case, an absence falls somewhere between a “yes” or “no” vote, neither as loyal as a pro-military vote, nor as rebellious as an anti-military vote. I code votes “1” for pro-military votes, “2” for abstentions, and “3” for anti-military votes. Additional discussion of variable coding is provided in Appendix B.

For each vote I also measured military pressure. As already mentioned, military techniques for influencing legislators varied significantly over the course of the regime, oscillating from providing pork-barrel projects for legislators’ constituents to removing rebellious legislators from office; however, we cannot say much more. How much pork was withheld or delivered to deputies contingent on their roll-call votes? In the deputies’ eyes, how likely was the military to respond to rebellion with purges? We simply do not know.

I use the best, if rough, alternative measure: a dummy variable (MilPressure) that distinguishes between high and low pressure from the military. If, when the vote took place, the military was regularly removing rebellious legislators, I code MilPressure “1” for high pressure. If there were no cancelled mandates, and if my interviews and secondary sources noted that deputies and the president were trading pork and votes, I coded MilPressure “0” for lower pressure. I based my codings on secondary sources, deputy’s debates on the Chamber floor, and interviews with retired deputies.

A third variable captures the issue type. “Elite Interest” is a dummy variable that classifies votes as elite or popular issues. For bills related to pork and patronage, those especially watched by local elites, the variable is coded “1.” Popular issues, such as democratization, labor, and human rights, are coded “0.” To create this variable, I first considered the substance of the bill, examining the original text of the proposal. Second, I reviewed secondary literature to identify the interested constituency (elite or popular). Finally, I looked at deputies’ appeals during the debate on the Chamber floor. Discussion of labor rights, democratization, or amnesty for students indicated that the proposal was a popular issue and voters were the key constituency. Discussions of “municipalism,” of defending municipal finance, or similar subjects indicated that the issue was one of patronage, of interest to local elites.
I used roll-call votes from the period during which the military president and a significant civilian constituency disagreed strongly about the content of the legislation. I searched for such bills in the academic literature on the authoritarian regime and in other news sources. I then examined the pre-vote debates recorded in the *Diário do Congresso Nacional* and the *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados*.

Using this methodology, I was able to identify seven votes that fit my criteria and two that partially fit my criteria. Four of the votes took place in the 1960s, and five in the 1980s. Although a larger sample would be desirable, the data simply do not exist. There were few roll-call votes during this period and even fewer controversial votes. I found a handful of roll-calls by skimming the *Anais* and *Diário*, but they were either routine administrative matters, unimportant for the military, or unknown among constituents.

From the 1960s, two controversial votes were Decree Law 335 of 1967 and an amendment to Bill 1346-B of 1968. The first was a presidential decree law that reduced municipalities’ share of petroleum-related circulation tax revenues. This decree directly reduced states’ and cities’ revenues and hence threatened local elites’ resources. Deputies’ discussion on the floor of the Chamber was tied to the bill’s negative impact on municipalities, particularly local political leaders. One deputy noted:

> As Your Excellency knows, we, Federal Deputies, were elected by the Mayors and City Council members that have effective political power in our States. And it would be unjust that we . . . allow the voting of this project that . . . eliminates the possibility that Brazilian municipalities receive the 20% of the ICM allocated specifically to them by number 7, Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic.  

I coded this proposal as an elite-interest item.

The second bill from the 1960s was an amnesty to forgive political crimes, designed especially for students and workers involved in protests at the University of Sao Paulo in August of 1968. This bill came in the wake of months of growing social tension that spread across social classes (Alves 1985, 99). Student protests and workers’ strikes were held in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Belo Horizonte. After several hundred students were arrested, “sympathy” demonstrations spread to other cities (Schneider 1971). Given the evidence of broad unrest, I coded this legislation as a popular-interest bill. Since purges and threats of purges were common when the 1967 Tax Decree and 1968 Amnesty votes took place, I coded Military Pressure as high (“1”) for each.
Two other votes from the 1960s are worth examining: the approval of the 1967 Constitution and the Electoral College vote for President Medici in 1969. Both were examples of legislative behavior under high military pressure. The Constitution vote took place in December of 1966, shortly after Congress had been closed for one month by combat troops. The 1969 election of President Medici came after Congress had been closed and 92 deputies removed from office. On both of these votes, rebellion almost certainly would have resulted in loss of office.

These last two bills are not entirely appropriate for the full model because I found no evidence of constituent interest or lobbying on these votes. Nonetheless, the votes still provide insight on the impact of military pressure on deputies. There simply were no other votes during periods of extremely high military pressure, when the risk of purges was almost certain. I examine these bills briefly for comparative purposes but do not include them in the formal multivariate tests.

This analysis also uses five bills from the 1980s. Prior to some of these, there was significant tension and military pressure. On several occasions, the military cracked down against its opposition: union members and leaders were arrested and beaten, a state of emergency was declared in Brasilia, and soldiers were stationed in the streets (Alves 1985, 239–51). But in spite of the tension, there is no evidence that deputies’ careers were threatened by defection—no deputies were purged in the 1980s. Further, there is evidence that the military was using pork, not force, to deal with the legislature. For example, after failing to pass DL2024 and DL2036 (discussed below), the military traded high-level government jobs in exchange for legislators’ votes.18 Because deputies were apparently never at risk of being purged, I coded Military Pressure as low, or “0,” on all votes in the 1980s.

Decree Laws 2024 and 2036 were a series of controversial labor laws voted on in 1983. During this period, the Brazilian government was under IMF pressure to implement an austerity program that included wage reductions. Decree Law 2024 set limits for salary inflation adjustments. Decree Law 2036 affected public employees and employees of state-owned companies. Further, the vote on DL2036 was closely tied to a broader wage vote.19 Together, these votes affected nearly all employed Brazilians. Deputies faced considerable pressure from constituents on these bills. The decrees were accompanied by strikes and protests nationwide. Labor movements lobbied heavily against these measures, taking large delegations to Brasilia to sit in the galleries during key votes. I coded both as popular-interest votes.

Another important vote involved a series of constitutional amendments that weakened the military’s centralized control of government
spending. Most important was Senator Passos Porto’s substitute bill, which made adjustments in Proposed Amendments 22, 23, 38, 39, and 40 and resulted in a large increase in states’ and municipalities’ share of federal revenues. The military lobbied heavily against the proposed amendment, but on the final discussion of the measure, no deputy would even argue the military’s position. The most senior PDS deputy just “stated” the government’s position. In fact, deputies’ comments on the floor of the Chamber were really just to claim credit for the measures and establish their credentials as “municipalists.” Further, the proposal was heavily supported by local governments. Consequently, I classified this vote as an elite-interest issue.

The “Direitas Ja” vote was perhaps the most famous of the military period. The measure was the culmination of Brazil’s “largest and most successful political mobilization in history” (Soares 1986). The Direitas movement sought adoption of an amendment granting direct presidential elections. Popular support for this measure reached 90%, including 65–75% among PDS sympathizers (Soares 1986, 284). The government fought approval of the amendment with a series of measures: 1) a state of emergency was declared in Brasilia, 2) Planning Minister Neto applied economic (i.e., pork) pressure on deputies, and 3) leaders were not allowed to travel to Brasilia to lobby. The final vote on this amendment was televised live. The broad-based knowledge of and support for this bill make it a case of popular pressure on deputies.

Finally, the January 1985 Electoral College vote gave delegates a choice between two candidates: Tancredo Neves from the opposition and Paulo Maluf, the government’s candidate. The selection of Brazil’s first civilian president since the 1960s was well publicized, coming in the wake of the Direitas Ja campaign and at the end of the military regime. I categorized it as an issue of popular interest. Basic information on all the votes and the environment in which each took place is summarized in Table 2.

Other Variables

“Percent Rural” is a proxy for the activation and attentiveness of a deputy’s constituents. As discussed above, rural constituents are less likely to care about roll-call votes, while urban voters are more likely to be informed and critically judge legislators’ behavior.

The difficulty is in measurement. In Brazil, states act as large multimember districts, and deputies can seek votes anywhere in the state. Ideally, one would create a variable using detailed electoral and
### TABLE 2
Details of Controversial Roll-Call Votes, 1966–85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Military Pressure</th>
<th>Constituency Type</th>
<th>Result for Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PL1346-B as amended</td>
<td>10/1968</td>
<td>Amnesty</td>
<td>Amnesty for political crimes, especially for students and workers involved in riots and violence at the University of Sao Paulo.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral College</td>
<td>1/1969</td>
<td>1969 Presidential Election</td>
<td>Electoral College vote in 1969 to accept or reject General Medici as President.</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL2024/83</td>
<td>10/1983</td>
<td>Wage Bill 2024</td>
<td>Restricted workers’ salary inflation adjustments, part of IMF program.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposal</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Substance</td>
<td>Military Pressure</td>
<td>Constituency and Issue Type</td>
<td>Result for Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL2036/83</td>
<td>10/1983</td>
<td>Wage Bill 2036</td>
<td>Controlled salaries and benefits for bureaucrats and employees of state-owned companies. This bill was tied to DL2045, which had a broader impact and provoked substantial popular outcry. See Appendix A for more details.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub for PECs 22, 23, 38, 39, and 40 of 1983</td>
<td>11/1983</td>
<td>Passos Porto Amendment</td>
<td>Porto’s adjustment to these proposed amendments (PECs) resulted in a huge mandated transfer of federal revenue to state and local governments.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Elite / Pork</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direitas Ja</td>
<td>4/1984</td>
<td>Direitas Ja (Direct Elections)</td>
<td>Ended indirect elections for President. Known popularly as “Direitas Ja!” for “Direct (Elections) Now!”</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral College</td>
<td>1/1985</td>
<td>Presidential Election, 1985</td>
<td>Electoral College (Senate, Chamber, and state delegates) vote to elect new President. Government candidate Paulo Maluf or opposition candidate Tancredo Neves.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
census data to estimate the size of deputies’ rural constituencies. Unfortunately, municipal-level electoral data from this period is not digitized, and its collection is too huge a task for this project.\textsuperscript{24} 

As an alternative, for each deputy, I recorded the percent of residents living in rural areas in the deputy’s hometown. This variable takes advantage of a pattern in Brazilian politics: the great majority of legislators, especially before the 1990s, earned most of their votes in and around their hometowns. While they \textit{could} compete statewide, most limited their campaigns to their hometowns and neighboring cities.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, this measure provides a rough but reasonable estimate of a deputy’s constituency type.

As discussed above, Political Security can be divided into electoral and institutional dimensions. To measure the electoral dimension, I created “Electoral Quotient.” On this variable, deputies receiving more votes than the electoral quotient are coded “1,” and those receiving fewer are coded “0.” This variable distinguishes between deputies with electoral security (Quotient=1) and those that face significant electoral uncertainty (Quotient=0).

Understanding this variable requires a brief review of Brazil’s electoral system, open-list proportional representation. In Brazil, states act as multimember districts, with district magnitude set roughly proportional to state population. Seats are divided among parties according to the number of votes received by all the parties’ candidates. These seats are then distributed within the parties to the top vote-getters. So if a party in the state of Piauí earns three seats in an election, the top three candidates of the party will receive the seats.

The electoral quotient in this system is equal to the total number of valid votes, divided by the number of seats in the state: (Total valid votes cast)/(Number of seats). In other words, the electoral quotient is the number of votes a party has to earn to receive one seat.\textsuperscript{26}

The electoral quotient defines a natural boundary for deputies’ electoral security. Deputies receiving more votes than the quotient are guaranteed election. Their election is independent of the performance of the rest of their party—they would be elected even if there were no other candidates in their party. Further, they would have been elected in any party—not just in their own. Deputies receiving fewer votes than the quotient do not have the same security. Their election depends not just on their votes but also on (a) how many seats their party earns and (b) how well they do against the members of their own party. This and alternative measures of electoral security are discussed in Appendix B.

The second dimension of political security, “Institutional security,” reflects deputies’ nonelectoral assets. These include their
access to pork from the federal government, their control of legislative resources, like committee leadership, and their personal machines. These assets are difficult to measure, but one proxy is to distinguish between freshmen and more-senior legislators. In this case, I created a variable counting each deputy’s number of terms.

This method makes sense since more-senior deputies have significantly higher reelection rates than do freshmen. Incumbents often have better committee assignments, more publicity, and should have more connections by virtue of their longer careers. Freshmen may or may not have ties to local elites and are less likely to have connections at the national level. They should have the fewest powerful committee seats and the least access to patronage resources.

For Party Identification and Governor, I created two dummy variables. The first, PID, is coded “0” for the government party and “1” for any one of the opposition parties. The second is coded “0” if the governor was a member of the government’s party and “1” if the governor was a member of one of the opposition parties.

I added several other variables to account for the peculiarities of state-level politics and particular roll-call votes. “PTB” is a dummy variable that accounts for the Brazilian Labor Party negotiations with the military government. The PTB supported the military government on some votes in exchange for control over executive jobs. On other bills, the PTB voted strictly as an opposition party. “Minas” is a dummy variable that identifies deputies from Minas Gerais during the 1985 presidential vote in the Chamber. The opposition candidate (Tancredo Neves) was from Minas Gerais and had negotiated for the support of Mineiro politicians before agreeing to be the opposition’s candidate.

I also included “Sao Paulo Labor” and “Sao Paulo Amnesty” dummy variables to distinguish deputies from that state during the 1968 Amnesty Bill and the 1983 Wage Bill (DL2024 and DL2036). Additional details are provided in Appendix B.

III. Data Analysis

Table 3 shows government deputies’ votes on the nine controversial bills discussed above. Trends in the table correspond to those predicted by the model and suggest two main points. First, military pressure greatly reduced deputies’ incentives to defect. Second, elite constituents had substantially more influence than did voters.

The 1967 Tax Decree and 1968 Amnesty votes both occurred during periods of tension between the military and legislature. Purges for rebellion were possible on these votes but not certain. In contrast,
the 1967 Constitution and 1969 Electoral College votes came after severe military crackdowns on the Congress. The deputies’ behavior reflects these differences. On the amnesty and tax bills, deputies averaged an 18% defection rate and 28% abstention rate. But after the military crackdowns, only 3% voted against the military on the 1967 Constitution, and none defected on the 1969 election of General Medici as president. Survival-oriented deputies did defect during the 1960s, in spite of risks of punishment. But when severe punishment was almost certain, defection rates fell to nearly zero.29 We can also compare votes from the 1960s and 1980s to see how legislators reacted when the military relaxed pressure on deputies. Overall, many more deputies abstained or voted against the military once the threat of purges ended.

True, there were other significant changes from 1967 to 1983 that could explain the increase in defections in the latter period. Public opposition to the regime increased substantially, as was reflected in electoral returns. Clearly, these comparisons across time periods capture constituent changes as well as changes in military strategy. Defections on the elite-interest issues, however, allow a more robust comparison of the influence of pork and of punishments. Pork has been a constant in Brazilian politics—local leaders and elites wanted pork in 1967, and they still sought it in 1983. Comparing government deputies’ 88% defection rates in 1983 (Passos Porto Amendments) with a 22% defection rate in 1967 (Tax Decree) allows us to hold constituent preference constant and shows how threats of purges were more effective than control of patronage in deterring defections.

### TABLE 3
**Government Party’s Roll-Call Votes, 1966–85**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Pressure</th>
<th>Key Constituency</th>
<th>Pro-Military</th>
<th>Abstain</th>
<th>Anti-Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967 Constitution</td>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 DL335</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>ELITE</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 Amnesty</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>POPULAR</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 Electoral College</td>
<td>VERY HIGH</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 IMF/Wage Bill: DL2024</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>POPULAR</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 IMF/Wage Bill: DL2036</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>POPULAR</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Passos Porto</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>ELITE</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Direitas Ja</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>POPULAR</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Electoral College</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>POPULAR</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3 also offers some insight on key constituencies. Defection rates on popular-interest votes are substantially lower than defections on elite-interest legislation. In the 1960s, rebellious votes and abstentions were significantly more frequent on the Tax Decree than the Amnesty vote. (On the Tax Decree, 22% of government deputies voted against the military and 34% abstained; on the Amnesty vote, only 14% voted against the military and only 19% abstained.) In the waning years of the regime, government defection rates on the Passos Porto bill were almost 90%. Even on the highly publicized and popular “Direitas Ja” vote near the end of the military regime, deputies were not so rebellious—only 40% voted against the military. The dramatic differences show how local clientelistic elites preserved their participation and power in politics, in spite of Brazil’s centralized authoritarian regime.

Table 4 shows opposition deputies’ voting on the same bills. As expected, opposition deputies consistently cast anti-military votes or abstained from voting. Only a few ever actually voted in favor of the military’s position. Nevertheless, the opposition apparently did respond to military pressure. After military crackdowns and purges, few deputies voted against the 1967 Constitution or 1969 election of General Medici—nearly all abstained instead. In contrast, a large majority of deputies opposed the military on the other votes.

Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of Tables 3 and 4. The lines show ARENA and MDB’s “mean rebellion” on each roll-call vote. Specifically, I computed the differences between percent rebellious and percent loyal, counting absences as “0”s.
The figure shows more clearly the three patterns discussed above. First, during the 1960s, defection rates were lower for both parties. Neither party offered resistance on the very high-pressure Constitution (1966) and presidential (1969) votes. Second, in the 1980s, both parties were more rebellious. The MDB and other opposition parties consistently and overwhelmingly voted against the military. ARENA’s votes were less consistent but never provided solid pro-military support as they had in the 1960s. Third, considering the two periods separately, ARENA deputies were more rebellious when pressured by elites on pork-related issues than on any other legislation. During the 1960s, ARENA defections were highest on the 1967 Tax Decree. During the 1980s, defections were highest on the 1983 Passos Porto Amendments.

For a multivariate test, I pooled all the votes and estimated an ordered logit model (see Appendix C for more details on all statistical tests). The results, presented in Table 5, strongly support all primary hypotheses. All key variables are significant with appropriate signs.

The coefficient for military pressure is negative and significant at the .001 level. The threat of purges was more effective than the distribution of pork when the military wanted to control legislators’ behavior. Further, the coefficient for Military Pressure on ARENA
deputies is significantly greater than that on the opposition. While legislators in both parties voted more cautiously when purges were a risk, government deputies were more responsive to military threats.

The estimates also confirm predictions about elites’ influence. The coefficient on elite interest is positive and significant at the .001 level. In other words, deputies were much more likely to defect in response to pressure from local elites than in response to pressure from constituents. Again, these findings reveal the powerful influence of local elites, even during a centralized military regime. This finding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordered Logit Model of Controversial Votes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Huber SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constituents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Pressure</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>−0.47</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil*Govt Party</td>
<td>−2.34</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil*Opp Party</td>
<td>−1.26</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. Terms</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quotient</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor PID</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo Labor</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo Amnesty</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTB</td>
<td>−0.61</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minas Deal</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>−1.98</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n: 3336
Log Likelihood: −2348.23

*Note:* Dependent variable: 1 = Pro-military vote
2 = Abstention
3 = Anti-military vote

One-sided significance levels: *.05; **.01.
concur with Hagopian’s work (1996), which showed how clientelism survived the military’s presence and reemerged to dominate the political arena during the return to democracy.

Among popular constituencies, informed and attentive urban voters were more influential than those voters in the rural sectors. The coefficient for the rural variable is negative and significant. Deputies with more informed and attentive urban constituencies were more likely to defect than those with rural constituencies. More-informed constituents critically evaluated the regime’s performance, while voters without access to political information continued trading pork for electoral support.

The data also confirm the political security hypotheses. A deputy’s number of terms follows the predicted pattern: its coefficient is negative and significant at the .001 level. In addition, the electoral security variable (Quotient) follows the expected trend: its coefficient is also negative and significant. Deputies new to the legislature, that is, those without essential contacts in the federal government, were politically at-risk, as were legislators with little popular support. These politicians had no guarantees of reelection or advancement and used anti-military votes to build their careers. Deputies with stable constituencies and machines were well established and voted conservatively to protect their careers.

The control variables offer some additional insights. “Minas,” positive and significant, confirms the influence of state-level politics in the 1985 presidential election. “PTB” is negative but not significant, suggesting that these deputies were somewhat, though not dramatically, different from other opposition legislators, at least on these votes. Neither of the Sao Paulo variables was significant—an unexpected result given that state’s student and labor activity during the military regime. Finally, the coefficient for Governors was not significant, contrary to my expectation. I had predicted that Governor’s PID would be positive and significant, i.e., deputies with opposition governors should be more likely to rebel. Instead, the variable for opposition governors’ impact was consistently negative. Deputies with opposition governors were significantly less likely to defect.

To test for consistency across votes, I also ran separate ordered logistic regressions for each vote, the results of which are presented in Table 6. Overall, the separate models agree with Table 5. Although many coefficients are not statistically significant, they do follow the model’s predictions. Party is positive and significant in nearly all the models. Rural, Number of Terms, and Quotient have mostly negative coefficients, dovetailing with previous results. The primary problem
## TABLE 6
Ordered Logistic Regressions for Controversial Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DL335</th>
<th>Amnesty</th>
<th>DL2024</th>
<th>DL2036</th>
<th>Passos Porto</th>
<th>Direitas Ja</th>
<th>Electoral College</th>
<th>Sign Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>2.22**</td>
<td>3.96**</td>
<td>5.42**</td>
<td>3.71**</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>3.20**</td>
<td>2.35**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-1.10**</td>
<td>-1.46*</td>
<td>-0.91*</td>
<td>-0.98*</td>
<td>-1.00**</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Num. Terms</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.20**</td>
<td>-0.30**</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.69*</td>
<td>-0.68*</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor PID</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.50*</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo Labor</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
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<td>0.36</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
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<td>PTB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.85</td>
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<td>Minas Deal</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cut point 2</td>
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<td>506</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>516</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-Likelihood</td>
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<td>-278.73</td>
<td>-130.59</td>
<td>-216.91</td>
<td>-176.52</td>
<td>-386.49</td>
<td>-386.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Note:_ Dependent variable: 1 = Pro-military vote; 2 = Abstention; 3 = Anti-military vote. One-sided significance levels: *.05; **.01.
occurs in the Passos Porto vote where coefficient for Party changes sign. This wrinkle could be an estimation problem, however, since no deputies actually voted against this bill and very few were absent. The final column of the table tests for each variable’s significance across all models. If a variable had no impact on deputies’ decisions, we would expect its sign to be positive or negative with equal frequency. The key variables of the model confirm the patterns observed above: Party, Rural, Quotient, and Number of Terms are significant in most cases at .05 or better. Governor’s Party is negative, as above.

Conclusion

Why risk one’s career to vote against the military’s legislative agenda? Many government and opposition deputies did just that during Brazil’s authoritarian regime. I modeled their decisions to rebel or cooperate with the military as rational, career-maximizing strategies. This approach could be applied to any legislature in a nondemocratic setting. When tested on the Brazilian case, four main findings emerge.

First, this paper validates a model of political survival. Deputies made career-oriented decisions to vote for or against the executive’s proposals by considering both military and constituent pressures. The weight of each pressure was determined by a legislator’s political security. Deputies with established machines and electoral bases were hesitant to jeopardize their careers by voting against the military. Deputies with low security had little or nothing to lose—and thus were more likely to rebel.

Second, aggressive military pressure did reduce rebellion among government party deputies but had a lesser impact on opposition legislators. When military purges were a possible response to defection, some deputies took their chances and voted against the president’s proposals. But when purges were certain, as was the case after combat troops occupied Congress, after Congress was closed for one-and-a-half years (1969–70), and after widespread purges, legislators did not try the president’s patience. Finally, when purges were no longer a threat and the military was using only pork to lobby Congress (1980s), government deputies’ defection rates rose significantly. The opposition deputies were less susceptible, but not immune, to the same pressures. The data showed that military pressure also affected these deputies’ behavior.

Third, the paper shows the durability of the electoral connection. Even under an authoritarian regime, facing threats of purges and loss of patronage resources, deputies of both parties voted against the
military’s proposals. The strength of the electoral connection did vary—urban, attentive, and informed constituents were more likely to evoke responsiveness than were uninformed rural dwellers—but its persistence is impressive. In spite of the executive’s best designs, constituents remained an important part of deputies’ decisions.

Finally, constituents may have mattered, but some constituents mattered much more than others. Local elites evoked much more responsiveness than the general electorate. This was true in the 1960s, even though deputies risked purges when defecting. Elites’ influence was even more impressive in the 1980s, when the president’s extraordinary powers had expired and he had to rely mostly on pork to encourage loyalty in the Chamber. The much higher level of defections reveals the importance of local elites. In the face of aggressive lobbying by municipal leaders, ARENA deputies defected en masse on the Passos Porto bill. Deputies’ ties to constituents may have been preserved, even under an authoritarian regime, but so were the traditional clientelism and patronage-politics of the Brazilian political system.

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APPENDIX A
Details of Model

The model is derived using standard random utility functions. Let legislator \( i \) have the following utility functions associated with her roll-call choice on vote \( j \):

\[
U_{\text{rebel}}(i)_j = \delta_0 + \delta_1 C_j + \delta_2 M_j + \delta_3 S_i + \lambda_{ij},
\]

and

\[
U_{\text{concede}}(i)_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 C_j + \beta_2 M_j + \beta_3 S_i + \nu_{ij},
\]

Legislator \( i \) will vote against the military when \( U_{\text{rebel}}(i)_j > U_{\text{concede}}(i)_j \), and will support the military’s position when \( U_{\text{rebel}}(i)_j < U_{\text{concede}}(i)_j \). We can then write:

\[
U_{\text{rebel}}(i)_j - U_{\text{concede}}(i)_j = (\delta_0 - \beta_0) + (\delta_1 - \beta_1) C_j + (\delta_2 - \beta_2) M_j + (\delta_3 - \beta_3) S_i + (\lambda_{ij} - \nu_{ij})
\]

or:

\[
U_{\text{rebel}}(i)_j - U_{\text{concede}}(i)_j = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_j + \alpha_2 M_j + \alpha_3 S_i + \varepsilon_{ij},
\]  

(1)
Consequently, legislator $i$ rebels if
\[ \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_j + \alpha_2 M_j + \alpha_3 S_i < \varepsilon_y, \]
and concedes if
\[ \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 C_j + \alpha_2 M_j + \alpha_3 S_i > \varepsilon_y. \]
When $\varepsilon_y$ follows an iid logistic distribution, this naturally leads to a logistic regression model.

**APPENDIX B**

**Details on Variable Measurement**

This appendix provides additional information on the source and construction of variables.

**Roll-Call Votes**

All votes were recorded directly from the *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados* or the *Diário do Congresso Nacional*. I coded votes into three categories: pro-military votes ("1"), anti-military votes ("3"), and abstentions or absences ("2").

The record for votes that took place in joint Senate-Chamber sessions does not list absences. To identify absences on these votes, I compared the attendance lists from congressional sessions with the complete lists of deputies from near-contemporaneous Chamber sessions. Deputies listed in the Chamber membership, but not in the National Congress session record, I considered “absent.” The incongruity between National Congress and Chamber of Deputies sessions, unidentifiable errors in congressional documents, and institutional changes all combine to explain the variance in number of deputies included in the models in Table 6.

**Rural**

This variable records the percent of residents in each deputy’s hometown who live in a rural area. I identified deputies’ hometowns using various volumes of *Deputados Brasileiros* and the *Dicionário Biográfico de Minas Gerais*. Demographic figures came from the Brazilian census.

A few deputies do not represent their native states, that is, they were born in one state and elected in another. For these deputies, I set the Rural variable equal to the percent rural in the entire state. Unlike native-born politicians who have primarily concentrated vote shares, non-native politicians are more likely to have statewide constituencies.

**Electoral Security**

Brazil’s complicated electoral system makes any measure of electoral security difficult. States have greatly varying district magnitudes and electoral quotients, so cross-state inference is difficult. The first measure of electoral security used here, “Electoral Quotient,” is intended to reduce electoral security to an easily comparable measure.

I validated the measure by trying other measures of political security and by controlling for state size. The other electoral security measures produced the same basic results. Controlling for state size actually strengthened my results.
APPENDIX C
Statistical Tests

For both Tables 5 and 6, I estimated the models using Stata’s ordered logit command. In Table 5, I used the Huber adjustment to account for the repeated measure of legislators who voted on more than one of the bills. Specifically, this adjustment allows each legislator to have a different error variance. The adjustment proved statistically conservative—the results would be stronger without it.

Since the votes took place over an 18-year period (1967–85), there were certainly other changes that may have affected deputies’ decisions. I tested another model (not shown), in which I included a dummy variable for each vote to account for any such changes over time. None of the substantive conclusions changed under these alternative specifications.

NOTES

This paper benefited from the comments and criticisms of Monica Barczak, Larry Bartels, Ben Bishin, David Brown, Michael Coppedge, David Fleischer, Barbara Geddes, David Karol, Kevin Quinn, George Tsebelis, and four anonymous reviewers. The archive staff of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies provided invaluable research assistance. Financial support for data collection was provided by the UCLA Latin American Center.

1. The Congress was forcibly recessed during the elections of 1966, again from 1969 to 1970, and briefly in April of 1977.
2. It may be that more deputies stood for reelection during the authoritarian regime because the military controlled the distribution of these other political jobs. See Samuels 1998b, 11.
3. Samuels (1998a) shows that deputies running for mayor may change the way they distribute pork but not their basic need to distribute it. Other deputies I interviewed talked of the importance of a strong electoral showing in order to be competitive for appointed positions.
4. Research on legislative behavior in other countries supports this hypothesis. Carey (1996) examined Costa Rica, where legislators cannot serve consecutive terms. He showed that although most deputies serve only one term, they behave as if they were seeking reelection.
6. Some left-wing parties, however, present a coherent and programmatic policy platform.
7. The party-system change was instituted by Institutional Act Number 2 (IA-2).
8. Party-fidelity voting was not always imposed, even on controversial bills.
9. Of the ARENA politicians interviewed, 74% thought Brazilians in general were interested in politics; 64% of MDB politicians had the same opinion. Further, 78% of ARENA respondents thought their constituents were interested in politics, as did 67% of MDB respondents. See McDonough 1982, 79.
10. There is an extensive literature on the relationships between local political elites and federal deputies. For some examples, see Banck 1974, 1994; Graham 1990; Hagopian 1996; Leal 1949; and Pang 1973.
11. As is consistent with this pattern, ARENA’s most reliable support came from rural areas, but urban areas were more likely to support the opposition.


13. Thanks to an anonymous reader for suggesting that I include the opposition parties in this analysis.

14. One of the president’s powers was the ability to legislate by decree. Presidential decrees became law after 45 days if they were not rejected by the Congress. Some controversial bills were never voted on because the ARENA party leadership kept the items out of the normal legislative process. This fact makes DL335 even more extraordinary—ARENA’s leadership only had to prevent this bill from appearing on the floor for a vote and it would have become law.


17. ARENA deputies who defected on the amnesty vote were among the first to be purged in a crackdown a few months later. See Schneider 1971, 265.

18. In fact, the government convinced the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PTB) to support the government’s position in exchange for control of high-level appointed government jobs. Even so, there was significant opposition within the PDS and PTB—DL2065 only passed with the imposition of party-fidelity rules. Any deputies not voting with their parties would have had their mandates cancelled. See the *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, November 9, 1983, 2327–2378.

19. A few minutes after voting on DL2036, the Chamber also rejected DL2045, which would have affected all workers and had generated substantial popular opposition. However, once the DL2036 had been defeated by a roll-call vote, the Chamber allowed 2045 and several other bills to be defeated on a symbolic party vote. In effect, once the opposition had shown it had a majority coalition on DL2036, the government conceded the rest of the day’s agenda. So, while controversial in its own right, DL2036 also represented the broader conflicts and pressures associated with DL2045. See *Diário do Congresso Nacional*, October 20, 1983, 2114.


23. In contrast, I did not categorize the 1969 presidential election as a “popular interest” vote. The 1969 vote was not as closely watched. There was no real opposition candidate, so the vote was just the approval or disapproval of the military-selected candidate.

24. Compiling the data would require recording each candidate’s vote share in each of several thousand municipalities—a dataset of approximately 20,000 observations.

25. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this measure. For evidence of concentrated vote shares, see Fleischer 1986.

26. The rules have changed slightly in recent years. Since the return to democracy in 1985, parties can again form electoral coalitions. As a result, small parties that cannot reach the electoral quotient alone can still earn a seat in Congress using the votes of their allies.
27. I ran a simple linear regression of percent reelected against number of terms to test this assertion. Data came from Samuels 1998b.


29. Neither the 1967 Constitution vote nor the 1969 Electoral College vote captures the same constituencies or publicity that the amnesty and tax decree votes did. But when military coercion was applied, there were very few roll-call votes at all. These votes are the only look at legislative behavior under very high pressure. Ninety-two deputies were purged prior to the 1969 presidential vote, including thirty ARENA deputies. Congress was forcibly closed by troops and deputies were purged prior to the 1967 Constitution vote (the vote took place in December of 1966). I include them for some simple comparisons but exclude them from the statistical tests and multivariate models (Tables 5 and 6).

30. The PTB did vote with the government on DL2065 in exchange for control of some political jobs. Party leaders imposed fidelity rules, so the final vote cannot be added to the analysis.

REFERENCES


Anais da Câmara dos Deputados, various volumes. 1967–85.


Diário do Congresso Nacional, various volumes. 1967–85.


