Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis

Laura Briggs
Gladys McCormick
J. T. Way

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Transnationalism: A Category of Analysis

Laura Briggs, Gladys McCormick, and J. T. Way

Transnationalism is a much abused word. Is it the same thing as globalization? As internationalism? Is neoliberalism a particular period in the history of the political economy of transnationalism, or something else? Was the colonial period transnational or prenational? Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, in her brilliant ethnography of environmental movements, *Friction*, writes that “the concept of ‘globalization,’ at its simplest, encourages dreams of a world in which everything has become part of a single imperial system,” which she calls a theory “of suffocation and death.” Transnationalism, in contrast, she identifies as the work she is doing, centering difference, coalition, misunderstanding, the alternating voraciousness and stuttering and failure of multinational capitalism. So can we follow Tsing, and agree that transnationalism is the name of longings on the left, and globalization the imperial universalism of the right? Alas. A participant in a recent conference on “transnational history” said she almost did not come, because for her as a Latin American, “transnational” could not mean anything except (primarily U.S.-based) rapacious corporate dominance and its associated knowledge systems. If only the proliferating meanings could be sufficiently contained that we could all agree on a single naming system—if only, in fact, processes within and across nations were so easily divided into good and bad, left and right.

Clearly, one key distinction in the deployment of these terms is political valence—Immanuel Wallerstein and Coca-Cola may both be working in transnational frames, but with very different consequences; one is a critique of more than five centuries of capitalist transformation, the other, its realization. Within academe, there is also the question of discipline. Diverse fields are talking about transnationalism, but those working in these fields are not even necessarily mutually conversant; terms such as *glocal*, so crucial to geography’s working out of what is meant by transnationalism in that field, is only occasionally even intelligible to historians. Influential formulations, such as Arjun Appadurai’s notion of fluid cultural flows, ideoscapes, and ethnoscapes, may be in their particulars fundamentally opposed to the kinds of transnationalism proposed by, say, a sociologist of migration such as Yen...
Le Espiritu, who is interested in the hard-edged and violent legal exclusions and differential inclusions produced by U.S. migration policy. This lends debates about transnationalism as theory a certain boxing-with-shadows quality; one can say a great many contradictory things about what is wrong with transnationalism and they will all be true about someone’s transnationalism, and those of us who think the paradigm productive feel compelled to defend ourselves against charges of complicity with work with which we disagree. Hence, the precise things that some find inadequate about transnationalism as a paradigm—its inability to think about the force of nationalism, say, or imperialist aggression—others see as precisely its strength—nationalism and imperialism as above all transnational processes, for example.

There are, of course, concrete material reasons for this conceptual confusion. As Bruce Cumings, Aihwa Ong, and Andrew Ross have all mapped in different ways, in the aftermath of the cold war, increasingly cash-strapped academics, universities, and fields (conspicuously area studies) were all invited to map the transnational. Cumings points to two specific incidents in the United States: the National Security Education Act (NSEA) in the first half of the 1990s, providing funding for graduate and undergraduate students (and hence, indirectly, to departments) for post–cold war area studies research, organized through the Defense Intelligence Agency (“an outfit that makes the CIA look liberal and enlightened,” says Cumings) with a requirement that those students serve an intelligence agency after receiving a grant; and, at the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a restructuring plan for academic funding that includes “a desire to move away from fixed regional identities given that globalization has made the ‘areas’ more porous, less bounded, less fixed.” Cumings’ point is that in many ways academic transnationalism has had to serve the goals of the U.S. government or business. Those of us who early hoped that we could ride the transnationalism funding horse to a different destination were largely disappointed. “Us and IBM! We’ll all be transnational!” one of our colleagues said as she dashed off grant proposals—only to find that the Ford Foundation, for example, was not interested in funding a “transnationalism” conference in Mexico—especially not if the goal of the funding was to fly in Latin American scholars. Transnationalism, apparently, was something done in the United States by U.S. American scholars. The irony apparently escaped Ford.

This article is the product of that conference, in fact of four years of conversations at the Tepoztlán Institute for the Transnational History of the Americas, a tremendously productive annual week-long scholarly gathering. Although even in that context the concept of transnationalism has been regu-
larly and vigorously abused (as an ahistorical term implying that there were always nations to transverse, as never more than a celebration of neoliberal or corporate globalization, as just another Yankee imperialist assault on productive Third World nationalisms . . . ), we want to keep the notion in play as a crucial corrective to academic ways of doing history. Even scholarship on centuries prior to the eighteenth that might seem to pose an alternative to the nation by historicizing it are regularly transformed into prehistories of the nation—“colonial Guatemala,” for example, or “colonial U.S.”—as if these colonies were always nations in fetal form. If the intellectual work in history, literature, and area studies (like American studies) has been more than a handmaiden to the ideological work of producing the imagined communities of nations, then at a minimum these fields and the nation have a common root. As is clear in U.S. policy debates about national history standards for public schools, conservative ideologues have been winning the fight over whether history has a role beyond inspiring young citizens in their nationalist faith. In this article, we argue against writing histories or analyses that take national boundaries as fixed, implicitly timeless, or even always meaningful, and for a quite different role for history-writing and criticism—one that directly challenges the nation by revealing nationalism as ideology.

We want to suggest that, even if we stipulate that transnationalism is a notion underpinned by the goals of the U.S. state or multinational corporations, its possibilities are multiple, and so are its histories. Rather than argue for what seems in this context an elusive linguistic clarity about the relationship of transnationalism, globalization, neoliberalism, colonialism, and internationalism, we will argue here, first, for a genealogy that centers some meanings of transnational and displaces others and, second, for a way of thinking the conceptual work of the “transnational,” leaning on an analogy with the intellectual work of feminists in thinking gender. We want to suggest that “transnationalism” can do to the nation what gender did for sexed bodies: provide the conceptual acid that denaturalizes all their deployments, compelling us to acknowledge that the nation, like sex, is a thing contested, interrupted, and always shot through with contradiction.

As American studies scholars know well, none of the imputed attributes of the nation—the people, the language, the literature, the history, the culture, the environment—is the “pure” object that nationalisms take them to be. The notion of the transnational enables us to center certain kinds of historical events as the emphatically non-national but indisputably important processes that they are, including colonialism; the travels of the Enlighten-
ment, science, liberalism, socialism, major religions, such as Christianity and Islam; an international (sexed) division of labor; the production of migrants, slaves, and other strangers and unfree peoples as racialized minorities; resource extraction and environmental degradation, as well as the more contemporary productions of non-governmental organizations, human rights discourses, free trade agreements, refugee and migrant "crises," and the production of national security states in a global "war on terror." As much as it belongs to the worlds of free trade agreements and export processing zones, transnationalism belongs to genealogies of anti-imperial and decolonizing thought, ranging from anticolonial Marxism to subaltern studies to Third World feminism and feminisms of color. Transnationalism has been a diverse, contested, cross-disciplinary intellectual movement that in some of its manifestations has been bound together by a particular insight: in place of a long and deeply embedded modernist tradition of taking the nation as the framework within which one can study literatures, histories, and so forth, the nation itself has to be a question—not untrue and therefore trivial, but an ideology that changes over time, and whose precise elaboration at any point has profound effects on wars, economies, cultures, the movements of people, and relations of domination.

As historians, we do here what historians always do when confronted with tangled, unclear ways of conceiving the world: we tell a story. Edward Said observed that the first task of any intervention is to create a beginning. In what follows, we begin by naming or inventing an anti-imperial, politically left intellectual tradition within which we understand the work of transnational paradigms. As historians of the United States, Mexico, and Guatemala, respectively, we draw primarily from work in and on the Americas. There are at least three different conversational strands. The first is rooted in anticolonial thinkers, from Fanon and Wallerstein to peasant and subaltern studies. The second is work that draws on those traditions but is explicitly concerned with struggles over gender, race, and ethnicity. The third, not always entirely separable from either of the other two, is labor history and migration. We then turn to an exploration of what transnationalism can do, conceptually and theoretically. Finally, we turn to a discussion of the kinds of work transnationalist paradigms have enabled for us.
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agenda that resonated with decolonization movements from Latin America and the Caribbean to Africa to Asia, particularly Vietnam and Algeria. One of their innovations was to decenter previously territorialized and localized subjects—antifascism, Marxism, literature, the exploration of psychic distress, and modern economies. Not only did they call attention to the vibrant existence of such phenomena in the Third World (not just Europe and the United States), but they also implicitly and explicitly reconceptualized them as rooted in transnational processes—colonialism and the resistance to it. Intellectuals such as C. L. R. James, Frantz Fanon, and Alejo Carpentier wrote powerful texts that centered transnational processes and retooled familiar narratives: antifascism, but from the perspective of Ethiopia; Marxism, but from the point of view of black nationalism; psychiatry, but mapping the effects of racism, imperialism, and anti-imperialist activism; the radical avant-garde and the liberatory potential of the imaginary and the marvelous, but from the perspective of Haiti. Historians of Latin America began examining the effects of imperialism and forms of migration through such themes as the evolution of economic relations and power struggles within colonial institutions, most prominently the slave trade, mining, and other forms of mercantile investment. Immanuel Wallerstein, looking to bring closure to the debate over feudalism and capitalism in explaining the supposed “lag” in economic development the “Third World,” proposed his world systems model in the mid-1970s. In it, he extended the center/periphery proposition of Ernesto Laclau, Raúl Prebisch, and André Gunder Frank, and forced into the “development” debates the possibility that impoverished economies were not isolated islands awaiting the coming of modernity, but part of a continuous, interconnected, historical process that enriched some at the expense of others.

One presupposition of these antifascist and cold war texts was that if imperialism and capitalism were the problem, then some form of socialism might well be the answer. After 1989, though, we saw the emergence of a radical formation that was openly critical of postcolonial socialist regimes, although still Marxist, via Gramsci: subaltern studies, a powerful South Asian critique, rooted in peasant studies. Subaltern studies disrupted the fundamental underpinning of the decolonial nation-building process by insisting that postcolonial nations were still fundamentally shaped by historical colonial processes, epistemologically, institutionally, and in their processes of citizen subject-formation. In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty intervened in India’s national-history writing project, arguing compellingly that history writing itself is a European enterprise, founded in epistemologies and
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cosmologies foreign to other places before colonization and, to some extent, after. Ranajit Guha and other members of the subaltern studies group argue that a recovery of the agency of Indian peasants requires a rejection of both a historiography that focuses on elite actors and a too-simplified account that insists that the people always really want socialism, disrupting the apparent natural-ness (and vertical integration) of the evolution of India’s state-socialist project. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak brilliantly theorizes the problem as one not only of socialisms, but also of Foucauldian, Deleuzian, and U.S. ethnic studies and women’s studies in which the subjectivity of the subaltern (especially the subaltern woman) is homogeneous and transparent, showing how the nationalist project of defending sati in the name of history and the authentic desires of the good wife is a ventriloquist trick that can equally justify imperialist intervention as well as nationalism, while “white men are fighting with Brown men over Brown women’s bodies.”

South Asian subaltern studies had a great effect on Latin American scholarship, particularly as the end of the cold war and the violent defeat of communism in Central America occasioned a requestioning of the paradigms of the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars studied the ways in which subaltern groups organized around alternative interpretations of dominant political and economic paradigms, including their noninclusion or partial inclusion in specifically national projects like citizenship, socialism, and liberalism. A Latin American subaltern studies group formed, born of the desire to “recover voices” without homogenizing or oversimplifying the experiences of those living at the margins or assuming that their longings were coterminous with the nation. This group wrote about the triumphalist, capitalism-is-all post-Sandinista moment of 1991 as productively directing critical attention away from national projects, recentering questions of the unrepresentability and ungovernability of the Latin American popular classes (interestingly prefiguring Zapatismo). In his 1992 ethnography, Life Is Hard, Roger Lancaster studies the intimacy of power in a poor urban neighborhood during the Sandinista revolution, and finds that even in that period of crisis, the nation could not contain or even describe the forms of life and power he found there. Sexuality, gender, and class emerge as lines of fracture, with machismo constructed as much by U.S. American popular culture (like Rambo) as by any national culture. Another Latin Americanist response to the challenge of subaltern studies and the disappointments of the postrevolutionary period is Diane Nelson’s Finger in the Wound, which transforms what she calls the “transvestite trick” of the U.S.-based solidarity movement, which, she points out, relied on
the premise of a homogeneous “people” in Guatemala (and Nicaragua and El Salvador), oppressed by U.S. foreign policy and military campaigns, who longed for the realization of the authentic form of their nations (some form of socialism, undistorted by U.S. interventionism) and could be protected, championed, and defended by U.S. solidarity activists (including prominently, for Nelson, feminists). With the defeat of the revolutionary Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (UNRG) in Guatemala and the emergence of a self-consciously Mayan movement in contradistinction to the guerrillas, Nelson suggests, this position shattered. Hence, she suggests “fluidarity,” a practice of alliance with identities-in-formation. Nelson proposes a transnational politics that uses innovative ways of getting at what Raymond Williams called “structures of feeling,” by looking at jokes, for example, and ties together global discourses and the world of specific subjects by using the body, and “body politics,” as a central metaphor. Works such as these suggest the productivity of Foucauldian approaches that underscore the messy (often gendered), on-the-ground articulations of power with a nation-based analysis that would highlight economic systems, points of production, and class, armies, nations, states and institutions.

As Nelson’s work underscores, an internacionalista feminism on the left has long been a crucial piece of the transnational anti-imperialist critique we are characterizing here. The “Third Wave” periodization, which imagines that feminists discovered racism, political economy, and imperialism only in the nineties, is wrong. On the contrary, there was a fight; where some feminists (in North America, Latin America, Asia, and Africa) prioritized questions of gender to the exclusion of race, class, and imperialism—from the 1970s to the present—others struggled for an analysis that understood these things as mutually imbricated and simultaneous. These struggles, in academic scholarship and international conferences, came to a head in the seventies and eighties over issues such as development, genital cutting, missionaries, and the colonial studies field. In 1984, Robin Morgan proposed that there was a “global feminism,” and Pratibha Parmar and Valerie Amos rejoined that its proper name was “imperial feminism.” While the existence of an “imperial feminist” formation for some seemed to limit the utility of feminism, nevertheless, feminism has been crucial to understanding the transnational deployments of women’s labor, woman-as-symbol-of-the-nation, and women who take up revolutionary roles. For a time in the 1960s and ‘70s, it was a romance of (female/feminist) insurrectionism, and photographic images of women as gun-toting guerilleras circulated widely, influencing both revolutionary move-
ments and feminist scholarship. Frantz Fanon’s essay “Algeria Unveiled” was especially influential in this regard, positing as it did women taking up radical, revolutionary roles. In the 1980s, we saw texts like Margaret Randall’s *Sandino’s Daughters*, which constructed the revolutionary Nicaraguan woman in the context of the Sandinista struggle. Other efforts theorized the role of women in neocolonial development and Reagan-era imperialism, such as Cynthia Enloe’s influential *Bananas, Beaches, and Bases*, about women and the military, from sex workers to file clerks. This is also the moment when texts like Yamila Azize-Vargas’s *La Mujer en la Lucha* emerged, focusing on recovering a strong anti-imperial tradition among Latin American women in a context of an imperial history. In the 1990s, another current in this revolutionary-inspired historiography traced social movements. For example, Emma Pérez’s *The Decolonial Imaginary* conceptualizes Mexican and Chicana/o feminism in the United States as a descendent of the Mexican Revolution; Jennifer Nelson, in *Women of Color and the Reproductive Rights Movement* wrote about the Young Lords Party—a Puerto Rican nationalist party on the mainland, styled after the Black Panthers—as the site of a fight in which feminists won, transforming the party’s platform to one that contained demands for an end to *machismo*, coerced sterilization, and an affirmative right to abortion. Other works, such as Diana Taylor’s *Disappearing Acts*, on Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, have looked to transnational solidarity networks among women’s movements in the late twentieth century, especially those formed in response to human rights crises.17

Much work by Chicana feminist theorists has centered the simultaneity of the *transfrontera/trans*national together with the hard-edged and sometimes violent ways that gender collides with and is refigured by race, class, and the *trans/nation*. One of the most influential Chicana/Latina feminist formulations was Gloria Anzaldúa’s *Borderlands/La Frontera*, from 1987, which imagined neither a “here” nor a “there,” a Mexico nor a United States, but an in-between, formulated on the one hand as an actual place, a geography of *mestizaje* in the context of the U.S. Southwest, and on the other as a metaphor for locations and imaginaries of impurity, hybridity, and queerness.18 Anzaldúa’s generative formation suggested to scholars of the Caribbean ways of thinking the restless migration of individuals, here one day, there the next, as Alberto Sandoval-Sanchez’s “guagua aérea” (air bus) would have it, or, as Orlando Patterson posited, the existence of the Third World within the First. In the eighties and nineties, these scholars challenged us to think of the unfolding of Latin American and Caribbean history within the United States and vice
versa. They underscored the “back and forth” movements of people and ideas within spaces that challenged our notions of discrete domains.¹⁹

Other theorists like Mary Pat Brady, Norma Alarcón, and Sonia Saldívar-Hull have suggested that a transnational sensibility lets scholars see the movement of goods, individuals, and ideas happening in a context in which gender, class, and race operate simultaneously.²⁰ In this context, the process of empire building in Latin America and the Caribbean took place inside a world economy that placed individuals into discrete categories that could easily migrate into different settings, albeit often with significant changes. In this way, we can see how policies such as social engineering and eugenics were not exclusively about either race or class, but were also mobile gender ideologies (and discourses of reproduction) aimed at creating a more modern citizenry. We also see the gendered, class, and racial dimensions behind populist politics and social reform projects geared at civilizing the popular masses pressuring for inclusion via reform or revolution.

A Few Recent Interventions: Mapping Neoliberalism, Feminism, War

Influenced by the wars in Central America, Latin American, and the Caribbean, leftist activists developed a critique of neoliberalism that irrupted into international headlines in 1994, when the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was met with the Zapatista revolt in Chiapas, the impoverished and significantly indigenous southern state of Mexico. The Zapatista movement’s critique of neoliberalism spread rapidly—through newspapers, the Internet, and European and U.S. American activist circles—in significant part because its vision and aspirations were transnational. Although on the one hand it offered itself as a fulfillment of the national project of the Mexican Revolution, of Zapata’s dream of land and full cultural citizenship for impoverished, peasant Mexico, it simultaneously directed itself outward, “a revolution that makes revolution possible,” in one of its memorable aphorisms. International solidarity activists were welcomed, but also transformed into students of forms of privatization, neoliberal governance, and alternative, deep forms of democracy. Naomi Klein writes about the kinds of hopefulness Zapatismo inspired in international activist circles, calling it “a global call to revolution that tells you not to wait for the revolution, only to stand where you stand, to fight with your own weapon . . . It’s a revolution in miniature that says, ‘Yes, you can try this at home.’”²¹ It emerged in anarchists’ squats in Italy, in the WTO protests against globalization in Seattle in 1999, and, increasingly, in a critical scholarship on neoliberalism.
Some of the most innovative new scholarship linking transnationalism, neoliberalism, and war has also come from, or derived from work about, Africa and Asia. James Ferguson’s recent work on Africa leaves the concept of the nation in tatters—neither the state, the economy, territory, nor publics are national, as he understands them. Following Achille Mbembe’s arguments about the ongoing brutalization of Africa and African subjects, and the ever deepening of the processes initiated under colonialism, Ferguson offers a map of neoliberalism’s transformations of these postcolonies. In the aftermath of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment in the 1980s, states were stripped of many development-era functions (health care or education, for example), and these functions were taken over by institutions that exercised a form of transnational sovereignty, NGOs. As state workers followed their jobs and salaries to NGOs, many states essentially shifted their function, gathering income and power from forms of criminalization. While international capital refused to invest in nations governed by weak states, poor infrastructure, and little security apparatus, it did not disappear from the continent—appearing instead in enclaves like Angola’s, where oil companies claim territories governed by corporations and private armies. Populations, far from longing for national renewal, channel their desires for improved standards of living and an end to sharply declining life spans in transnational directions, migration on the one hand and modernity and development for “Africa” on the other (that concept so rejected by academics, in favor of national specificity, but which Ferguson compellingly argues is alive and well on the continent).  

From the post–cold war perspective of the “Asian Tiger” markets, Aihwa Ong expands on two of the most influential accounts of recent forms of transnationalism—Giorgio Agamben’s (particularly in *Homo Sacer*) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s (in *Empire* and *Multitude*)—in her brilliant *Neo-liberalism as Exception*. She suggests that Agamben, charting a Europe awash in refugees and other migrants, offers too simple an account in producing only two categories—the “citizen” and the exception. In contrast, she argues that there are (of course) multiple kinds and qualities of dispossession, and that even those who are not citizens are not necessarily reduced to the status of “bare life,” as Agamben suggests, but rather have many kinds of claims on states. Ong maps the ways that NGOs, human rights groups, and Islamic religious groups advocate for those who are dispossessed through a specifically moral language. Ong also complicates and expands on the work of postcolonial critics like Ferguson and Mbembe in charting the limits of state sovereignty. Not all such limitations, she argues, are historically derived from colonialism; some
of them are new, such as China’s “Special Economic Zones,” where the state’s economic regulation does not apply. Finally, she suggests that the conditions of labor (and labor’s forms of resistance) are vastly more differentiated than Hardt and Negri’s account of a global multitude allows for. If you theorize too far away from empirical work, she suggests, you wander into a fantasy that is logical but wrong. What emerges in Neoliberal as Exception is an image of how neoliberalism is producing sovereignty, citizenship, public cultures, and forms of labor that are striated across multiple “zones” that are not nations, but which articulate with nations and with other, transnational forces.

There is, too, a restaging of the global feminism/imperial feminism debates here, but with ever increasing urgency as a form of “imperial feminism” provides one of the rationales for the U.S. war in Afghanistan (ventriloquized memorably by Laura Bush, not a public figure otherwise known for her feminism). So, where Ong is interested in the ways those advocating human rights form unlikely alliances with Islamic feminists, Inderpal Grewal is far less sanguine about the work of human rights discourses, especially with respect to women. Akin to Spivak’s postcolonial critique, Grewal’s concern is with the ways human rights discourse constructs a female object of imperial intervention, as in the U.S. project of “rescuing” Afghan women from the Taliban (by bombing them). Lisa Yoneyama productively reframes the question as “national feminism” versus “critical feminism,” a formulation that reiterates our concern here with the reified frame of the nation as the problem. Yoneyama notes that there is nothing new in the deployment of “national feminism” by otherwise antifeminist policymakers—she points to MacArthur. Noting that U.S. policymakers claim to have modeled the occupation of Iraq on the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, she recalls that that occupation, too, found legitimacy in a claim to be liberating women from (Japanese) oppression. In a weird reversal, one that could scarcely have been conceived in the 1970s and ’80s struggles over global feminism, now, in the context of the war in the Middle East, neoconservative ideologues have constructed themselves as the arbiters of what is good for women, and actual feminists have become the problem—in October 2007, David Horowitz announced “Islamo-Fascist Awareness Week” on U.S. university campuses, in which he urged students to organize “sit-ins in Women’s Studies Departments and campus Women’s Centers to protest their silence about the oppression of women in Islam.”

Another intriguing and provocative recent intervention in thinking the fever-dream of the nation has been a feminist- and queer-inflected account of the ways publics and desiring subjects are produced in relationship to nation-
alisms and transnationalism, which extends Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities” in new and unexpected ways to diagnose the neoliberal moment. Inderpal Grewal’s *Transnational America* renders “America” as a consumer culture, bought and produced in many places (India and the United States interest her in this work), through a particularly female instantiation of the consumer. Lisa Rofel’s *Desiring China* notes the ways that for China and its citizens the production of desiring subjects—longing for consumer objects on the one hand and kinds of sex or partners that might include gay and lesbian desires on the other—are mobilized in specifically national ways, on behalf of China’s neoliberal experiments. That these are forms of desire and kinds of public cultures produced in relation to forces outside the nation goes without saying for Rofel. Neferti Tadiar incisively and helpfully describes the project of understanding desiring publics as they interact with the nation, joining the national economy—a thing so foundationally naturalized in neoliberalism—to the nationalist political project, and calling them both fantasy productions, “part of the dream-work of an international order of production founded upon the conjoined, if sometimes contradictory, logics of nationalism and multinational capitalism.” Jasbir Puar’s *Terrorists Assemblages* asks, against what others are LGBTQ subjects being recognized and incorporated into the U.S. nation? Could it be the perversely sexualized (although deficient with respect to gay rights) Muslims and Arabs, who engage in practices such as honor killings and female veiling?

Despite the ways “transnationalism” or “globalization” has declared itself as a new theoretical, economic, or political project, then, we are suggesting a continuous and productive tradition of analyzing against the naturalized frame of the nation. As Stuart Hall writes,

> when we are talking about globalization in the present context we are talking about some of the new forms, some of the new rhythms, some of the new impetuses in the globalizing process . . . located within a much longer history. We suffer increasingly from a process of historical amnesia in which we think that just because we are thinking about an idea it has only just started.

A considerable amount of work in anti-imperialist and decolonial traditions, in feminist, antiracist, and ethnic studies scholarship, and in economic and labor history has prefigured and provided a foundation for the project of transnationalism. What remains, if transnationalism is to be a coherent category of analysis, is to chart its theoretical direction.
Writing Transnational History

We see feminist theory as providing a useful analogy for ways of theorizing the transnational. Two decades ago, Joan Scott made the argument that gender is a crucial category of analysis for any study of politics, society, and culture. Scott suggested that we understand gender as having significance far beyond sexed bodies (read: women), shifting instead to a framework that understands gender as “a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes, and . . . a primary way of signifying relationships of power.” In so doing, Scott denaturalized male and female, masculinity and femininity, suggesting instead that they are always cultural ideologies applied to bodies. As such, these ideologies not only underpin interpersonal relationships, but also extend outward in all directions to condition far more wide-ranging and abstract social structures and events, such as economies, political paradigms, and even wars. Similarly, the nation is an ideology applied to a territory, its people, and its economic and social institutions that extends far beyond the naming of a piece of land. It is, in short, another “primary way of signifying relationships of power.” Scott’s simultaneous abstraction of the meanings of gender and materializing of gender holds great promise for how we might think about the nation.

Scott identified four elements of gender: (1) culturally available symbols; (2) normative concepts that set forth interpretations of the meaning of the symbols; (3) social institutions and organizations thus conditioned (ranging from kinship, the household, and the family to more formal institutions); and, finally, (4) subjective identity. With just a few changes in wording, Scott’s formulation of gender as a category can also apply to the nation. The work of the “nation concept” far exceeds the bounds of problems of the state or diplomacy. It produces endlessly proliferating related terms, such as homeland, security, traitors, minorities, family, culture, home, immigrants, and so on. Are nations and nationalities composed through something that is actually fairly unified and coherent, an identity etched on states, individuals, and communities by geography and history? Or are they rather much more contingent and fragile, sometimes in play and other times not, and sometimes a cover story, a patriotism that persuades people to act against their own interests? Here we make the case for “transnationalism” as a strategy for identifying the ideological work of the nation by offering a series of provocations derived from our own work about what might be seen as the self-evidently “national.”

Take, for example, the case of the Guatemalan national economy. In this moment of free market fundamentalism, nothing could be more foundation-
ally real, more naturalized than the national economy—especially in critiques of its backwardness in places like Central America, where the vast majority of economic activity takes place in the informal sector, which is held to be a symptom of its fundamental weakness. But what if, as J. T. Way argues in his forthcoming book, the predominant “real” economy in Guatemala is precisely the so-called informal economy—produced through small-scale capitalism within Guatemala and outside it? Further, perhaps this “backward” and “antimodern” nation is hypermodern, a laboratory of the future of neoliberal privatization and militarization in the name of crime, gangs, and security, with the involvement of familiar entities such as Texaco and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. Guatemala’s putative underdevelopment, one could argue, is part and parcel of the transnational process of corporate capitalist development. In this sense, the economy is simultaneously bigger (extending beyond national boundaries) and more local (the informal economy) than the nation; in this sense, the “national economy” emerges as an ideological invention that constructs national “underdevelopment.”

The nation’s identity as a land of premodern, indigenous farmers (who serve collectively as a “culturally available symbol” buttressing the “normative concept” of national backwardness and informing hosts of “social institutions and organizations,” to use Scott’s terms) is in no way incompatible with globalization writ large. The notion of an “informal economy” does a particular kind of ideological work, rendering some people’s—primarily women’s—economic activity illegal or unreal, in need of capture by transnational economic entities. Popular articulations such as oficios de su sexo, a commonly used phrase for women’s labor that elides its centrality to the economy, evidence a widespread fetishism that also lies behind the feminized naming of the economy that supports nearly 80 percent of the population as “informal,” and therefore backward and in need of change. The unquestioned gender ideology lurking behind oficios de su sexo also bolsters the near-hegemonic myth of a stable, nuclear family—a now apparently “disintegrating” family that historical evidence indicates was never a social norm to begin with. It conditions everyday politics in markets and neighborhood associations and lies behind the evolution of contemporary moral outrage over young male mareros (gang members). The word development itself is a product of the transnational, capitalist culture industry—a word that straddles a paradoxical mix of unquestioned acceptance and fierce contestation in Guatemala, where neoliberalism was imposed by genocide, torture, and war on a country only allowed to return to “democracy” when the left wing of the body politic had been effectively clipped by
The precise structures that are deployed to characterize Guatemala as a nation—the interlocked characteristics of its economic “backwardness,” its gender ideologies, families, and development—are transformed when we see them as transnational.

The story of modern Mexico told through cooperatives in the 1940s and 1950s suggests that the process of naturalizing the nation was much more contentious, violent, and negotiated than previously assumed. History remembers these decades as Mexico’s heyday of economic growth and cultural production, bookended by the earlier revolutionary moment and the ensuing post-1960s economic and political upheavals. Gladys McCormick explores the uneven and contested production of the “subjective identities” of peasants as fully subjects of the Mexican Revolution’s progressive tradition. In her work on the development of state-sponsored sugar production cooperatives throughout Mexico, McCormick argues that these years were anything but peaceful. She delves into the struggles and negotiations between rural peoples determined to preserve some autonomy and state officials intent on laying down the contours of what became arguably the most successful instance of authoritarian modernization in twentieth century Latin America. Cooperatives (as an example of Scott’s culturally available symbols) conveyed an image of national collaboration and brought together thousands of peasants and industrial and white-collar workers in a project to industrialize the countryside and connect each group to the state’s corporatist structure. Through cooperatives, the state purported to give the means of production to previously disenfranchised groups and thereby invest them in the nation’s modernization. In practice, however, the state adopted a top-down approach that included divisive strategies to ensure its control over cooperative members. While the state afforded workers effective means of representation and met their demands as a class, in essence domesticating them, it chose to disregard and marginalize peasant claims. Peasant leaders thus opted for innovative strategies to make their voices heard: they reached out to other popular groups, including teachers and railroad workers, and formed their own organizations to compete with ineffective state-sponsored unions.

Increasingly frustrated, some peasant leaders chose radical paths to stymie the state’s deliberate neglect and to recover the revolutionary legacy underpinning modern Mexico. The fact that several of these leaders fought in the peasant army of Emiliano Zapata during the 1910–1919 Revolution made their call to arms all the more threatening to a social order supposedly founded on the memory of national heroes such as Zapata. In response, the ruling regime
unleashed unprecedented repressive tactics on peasant movements that it later employed against worker and student activists in urban centers, most shockingly in the 1968 student massacre at the Tlatelolco Plaza in Mexico City. As far back as 1947, with the support of the U.S. government, the Mexican state set up a new intelligence agency, the Dirección Federal de Seguridad, to act as a form of secret police to bring in line popular opposition. To do so, the agency complemented its surveillance activities with more aggressive strategies to co-opt, subvert, and eliminate dissent against the regime. The authoritarian social order easily identified and distinguished between “enemies” and “friends,” even as Mexico kept up its progressive image in the international arena and conveyed a sense of social peace. Taking then what appears to be a perfect case of national integration and nation formation, the vertical class integration and enfranchisement of the rural poor in Mexico through a vision of progressive collectivism, in the heyday of Mexico state-sponsored economic and cultural development, McCormick shows that these rural workers were anything but integrated into either state projects or a united imaginary of Mexican-ness. Even the Mexican state, it turns out, is not bounded by the nation, but is rather shot through by efforts of the U.S. intelligence agencies to produce bureaucratic efficiency in the production of an anticommunist security state.

Using the family as a starting point, Laura Briggs has argued that, far from being private or national affairs, reproduction and sexuality are key ways that relations between nations are negotiated, both symbolically and materially; there is no “domestic” that is not extensively transected by the transnational. Although we think of the family and the household as the opposite of the transnational, as that which above all is domestic (a word we not incidentally use to describe both the inside of the nation and the inside of the home, suggesting something of their symbolic importance to each other), the boundaries of the “domestic” are illusory and ideological. From the colonial to metropolitan household, it is not difficult to think of ways that domestic and sexual labor are transnationalized (indeed, in the wake of scandals involving various Clinton and Bush cabinet-level appointees that have gone awry because of “problems” involving undocumented household workers, it is tempting to say, counter-intuitively, that the family is not “domestic” at all, but the most explicitly transnational of spaces).\textsuperscript{33} Turning to the newspapers, one finds that sexuality and reproduction are frequently topics of importance to transnational publics, in part because reproductive and sexual labor are stratified by nation. That is, questions regarding, for example, military sexual politics are periodically
but explosively transnational subjects of interest (think, for example, of the
movement on Okinawa to get rid of U.S. military bases when three service-
men raped a twelve-year old girl in 1996, or how the market in sex outside
the Subic Bay Naval Base spurred the movement in the Philippines to close
it). Although these might at first glance appear to be isolated examples, other
questions of sex, household, and kinship are equally transnational: au pairs,
nannies, and other domestic laborers are almost by definition transnational
migrants, coming to households in Europe, the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, and Canada, but also to places like Costa Rica and Puerto Rico. These
forms of (“domestic”) labor migration are not random, but extend along the
lines of colonialism, capitalism, and trade; differences in labor’s value are not
a function of separation or isolation but of familiarity, so to speak—there is
a relationship between the domestic relations of the colonial household and
domestic work in London or Los Angeles. Contemporary sites of transna-
tional adoption, likewise, have historic and contemporary relationships to the
displacements of this century’s hot wars—think Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador,
Guatemala—and cold ones—for instance, China, Russia, or Romania.

These “domestic” international relations are more than the passive fallout
of (implicitly more real) transnational relations; they are a constitutive part
of them. As Christina Klein argues in Cold War Orientalism, caring for “their”
orphans from China in the 1950s shored (and shores) up a U.S. American
sense of benevolence and responsibility toward Asia. Remittances from
transmigrants doing domestic labor of various sorts have a significant impact
on local and national-level economies in places like Nicaragua, El Salvador,
and the Dominican Republic. As Briggs argued in Reproducing Empire, the
demographic production of “overpopulation” was ideologically key to erasing
the history of Western colonialism during the cold war, and the production of a
“new” policy of help for the “Third World” called development (a combination
of industrialization and reforming reproduction through birth control)—as
if it were not a continuation of older, colonial policies.

Military, colonial, and public policies are constantly called upon to develop
ways of policing transnational intimacies, regulating institutions such as the
brothel, the orphanage, the lock hospital. As Ann Stoler has argued, laws
structuring the nationality and mobility of mixed race children, war orphans,
and other unclaimed (adoptable?) children are crucial colonial and postcolonial
institutions. Transnational domestic spheres also require laws governing who
can make whom a citizen in the context of heterosexual marriage, as well as
medical tests and policies regulating the mobility, labor, and social interac-
...ation of those suffering from TB, syphilis, or AIDS. Furthermore, not only do censuses and demographers try to determine where children belong, but they also, since the 1930s, simply quantify them, giving rise to the social science of “overpopulation,” spurring the science of birth control research, and engaging in the taxonomies of quality associated with eugenics—which are also transnational discourses. Notwithstanding all the ways that the family as a social institution is asked to stand for the nation and so underpins subjective identity (“as American as mom and apple pie,” “soccer moms,” “security moms,” the “American family,” “family values,” even “working families”—and non-U.S. examples could serve equally well), the family is as flexibly transnational a space as any other.

The examples we have given from our own work suggest that economics, politics, subjectification, and the family all exceed the nation, and offer points of entry into transnational analysis. Race is another example. Conceived within a U.S.-based formation of “minorities,” race seems above all national (one is minoritarian or majoritarian only with reference to a certain population or demographic reference point—a statistic, a number kept by the state). But other evidence points differently if, for example, we looked to the wealth of scholarship on the ways Asian Americans are constructed as permanently foreign to the United States. Nor is this paradoxical state of affairs unique to U.S. Americans. Mexican national subjects may be paradigmatically mestizo, and Brazilians engaged in a process of whitening, while Central Americans may understand indigenous people only as those who wear traditional dress, and most everyone else might be acknowledged to be mixed. But each of these examples simultaneously points to racial difference as constitutively inside the nation and also indicates that certain racial formations exceed the nation. Indigenous people in Mexico, Guatemala, or Bolivia are construed as signs of a colonial moment before the nation, or, if acknowledged to exist in the present, an unruly and ungovernable people who cannot be fully incorporated in the citizenry or the national economy. Indigenous people point beyond official state nationalisms.

This contradictory nature of racialized subjectivities in the United States (as both within and outside the nation or, better, of nationalism as a strategy for containing the “excesses” of racial justice claims) was played out in one of the more ingenious efforts of liberal newspapers to minimize the nature of racial protest in the aftermath of the April 2006 marches for immigrant rights. It seemed in general like a moment of naked ideological containment. To take only one example of a move that was repeated in the national press...
for weeks, the New York Times described the federal legislative district that includes Tucson, home to the largest march in southern Arizona’s history, as “majority Latino.” Tucson is represented by a politically left Mexican American congressman, Raúl Grijalva, and the Times used the designation “majority Latino” to explain both the march and Grijalva’s election when in fact the largest single group in the district is composed of Anglos, with Latinos and indigenous people making up somewhat less than a third each. But the possibility that justice for immigrants was a politics, rather than a racial identity, was being rapidly shut down at that moment. Not only did various commentators try to foreclose the possibility of a multiracial alliance in the pro-immigrant movement on the left, but in Republican circles, the hard right tried to discredit the Bush administration’s proposal for guest workers by construing the desire for an end to restrictive immigration laws as essentially foreign, as inimical to U.S. national interest and hence brought to us by foreigners. In the immediate aftermath of the protests, newspapers began asking whether these marchers, recast as all “Mexicans” or Mexican Americans (and probably “illegals”) were actually inheritors of the civil rights tradition they claimed. African Americans were duly found to speak on behalf of an uneasy, potentially economically displaced national subject. Latinos were thus construed as the foreign, diasporic racialized group and contrasted with African Americans, who were represented as a U.S. minority.

These brief examples are meant to suggest some of the possibilities of thinking the nation as a category of analysis, to understand some of the ideological effects of the nation, well beyond what we obviously and instantly think of as the work of nationalism, constructing the national population, or simply as a frame for other kinds of stories. The nation does all sorts of ideological work, and when we take it for granted as the frame of U.S., Guatemalan, or Mexican history, for example, that work becomes invisible. Those who work on social movements or the welfare state sometimes claim that concepts such as “national liberation” or the redistributive state are not necessarily bad. That may be true. But that does not mean that we are better off when we take the nation for granted.

Transnational scholarship opens possibilities and raises new questions, but is also fraught with potential problems. One important avenue that transnational intellectual work can open up is the possibility of collaboration among academics and intellectuals located in publishing’s First World (the United States and Europe, with access to international publics) and Third World (where knowledge, however erudite, seems to be of strictly “local”
This piece is itself the product of a transnational collaboration in one sense—we met each other in Mexico, McCormick is Costa Rican by birth, Way lives in Guatemala, Briggs is a U.S.-based academic—and it has crossed many national borders in its travels among us, and is based on research that, for each of us, has been done in more than one country. Yet in another sense, our collaboration is not transnational at all, built as it is on the fact that each of us has sturdy ties to U.S. universities, and more importantly, the funding structures that flow from that. And therein lies the rub. Transnational scholarship, to the extent that it requires jetting around to multiple nations (with all that implies about easy access to visas), is potentially just another imperial vantage point.

There is also the risk of being U.S.-centric in our studies of empire or hegemonic power and failing to recognize the influences of non-U.S. groups. Thinking of the Americas, Mexico, for instance, has long played a pivotal role in the historical record of Central America. European powers, such as Spain (of course), but also France and Germany, have also long wielded political, cultural, and economic pressures in the region. But if we pull back the lens to look at nations in this way, how do we account for larger, global forces without being reductive about the local and regional specificities? Or, alternatively and contradictorily, where do we put an analysis of how the nation signifies in people’s lives that is not deterministic? In their provocative article “Unfinished Migrations: Reflections on the African Diaspora and the Making of the Modern World,” Tiffany Ruby Patterson and Robin D. G. Kelley argued that “the African diaspora itself exists within the context of global race and gender hierarchies which are formulated and reconstituted across national boundaries” and other kinds of borders—which is to say, the nation is only one among several forms of power, meaning, and containment, and not always the dominant one at that. We need to keep in tension a focus on the power of the heroic narratives of nationalism without, as it were, taking them too seriously and thus participating in renaturalizing the nation.

Finally, though, it seems crucial to reiterate the importance of making the nation and nationalism an explicit question, and how the nation’s ideologies and institutions are in play in countless obvious and not obvious ways in diverse struggles, symbols, institutions, and identities. To do otherwise is to risk engaging in scholarship that unwittingly does the work of nationalism, whether it is in the form of American exceptionalism, naturalizing the national economy, or any in a host of related moves. History, in particular, we would argue, needs to be more than just another way to teach young people to love
their country. Literary study likewise ought not reify the national culture by making it singularly wonderful, stunningly racist, or even just unique; rather, scholars might be about the business of noting how literary traditions in fact are constructing the fiction of the national community. This is more than a claim that nationalism is perhaps bad for human communities—we are perfectly willing to agree that it is sometimes good. Rather, it simply asks our scholarship to make us sensible of when nationalism and ideologies of the nation are in play, rather than being complicit with them.

Notes
5. It has, for example, produced the Fall 2007 transnationalism issue of *Social Text*, as well provided the context for sustained and thoughtful discussion of the work of literally dozens of forthcoming books.
6. For example, C. L. R. James’s *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* is one key work marking these discussions over imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); others include Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965); Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism* (New York: Grove Press, 1967); and Alejo Carpentier, *El reino de este mundo* ([Santiago de] Chile: Editorial ORBE, 1972).


29. Ibid., 1067.

30. Ibid., 1067–69.


37. For a magnificent study of the regulation of brothels and lock hospitals, see Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race, and Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (London: Routledge, 2003).


42. Ibid.

44. For a forceful and compelling argument along these lines, see Suresh Canagarajah, *A Geopolitics of Academic Writing* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2002).