1. INTRODUCTORY LECTURE: OVERVIEW OF THE COURSE

26 SEPTEMBER 2006

2. POWER AND ARMED FORCES

I. BASIC CONCEPTS: POWER AND FORCE
   A. A COMMON DEFINITION: POWER AS THE ABILITY TO GET OTHERS TO ACT THE WAY YOU WANT THEM TO, BUT THEY WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE ACTED
   B. WAYS TO USE FORCE
      1. BRUTE FORCE
      2. ARMED INFLUENCE
         [1] THREAT OF STRATEGIC DENIAL
         [2] THREAT OF COSTLY RETALIATION
         [3] DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE TO DENY
         [4] INCREMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION OF RETALIATION

II. MEANS AND ENDS
   A. BRUTE FORCE VS. ARMED INFLUENCE
      1. KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (1780-1831)
         —ON WAR (1832)
         [A] DESTRUCTION AS A MEANS, BUT NOT NECESSARILY THE END OF WARFARE
         [B] DESTRUCTION TO INFLUENCE THE BEHAVIOR OF OUR ENEMY
      2. AMERICAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT—POLITICAL VS. MILITARY USES
         [A] MEANS: POLITICAL VERSUS MILITARY USES
            [1] DESERT SHIELD / STORM (1990-91)
            [3] WORLD WAR III (?)
         [B] ENDS
            1. MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO
               —DEFENSE / DETERRENCE
            2. CHANGE THE STATUS QUO
               —OFFENSE/COMPELLENCE

   MEANS
   | BRUTE FORCE | ARMED INFLUENCE |
  -------------------------|
   | OFFENSIVE | COMPELLENT |
   | DEFENSIVE  | DETERRENT  |
II. MILITARY REVOLUTIONS AND STATE OPTIONS

A. THREE MILITARY REVOLUTIONS

1. RATIONALIZATION
   —PRUSSIA (FREDERICK-WILLIAM, FREDERICK THE GREAT)
      [A] CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES BY CENTRALIZED STATE
      [B] METHODS OF CALCULATING USE OF FORCE

2. POPULARIZATION
   —AMERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS
   —NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
      [A] POPULATION AS INSTRUMENTS OF WARMAKING
      [B] ERA OF “TOTAL WAR”
         —MARSHAL FOCH / CLAUSEWITZ
      [C] SOCIETIES AS OBJECTS OF WARFARE

3. MODERNIZATION
   —INDUSTRIAL AND SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
      [A] THREE-DIMENSIONAL WARFARE
      [B] TECHNOLOGY OF MASS DESTRUCTION
      [C] INFORMATION ERA

4. THREE ERAS OF WARFARE
   [A] ANCIEN REGIME
   [B] POST-NAPOLEONIC
   [C] CONTEMPORARY

B. EXPANDING MENU OF STATE OPTIONS

1. THREE-DIMENSIONAL WARFARE AND TARGETING HOMELANDS
2. MASS DESTRUCTION AND INFlicting SUFFERING
3. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND PRECISE TARGETING
4. POPULARIZATION AND UTILITY OF SUFFERING
5. RATIONALIZATION AND MEASURED APPLICATION
3. FROM “OLD LOOK” TO NEW LOOK, 1945-1960

I. GRAND STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINES
A. IDENTIFY THREATS TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND OPPORTUNITIES TO SECURE THIS
B. GUIDANCE TO SPECIFIC DOCTRINES OR STRATEGIES
   —MILITARY DOCTRINE OR “PURE STRATEGY”

II. THE GRAND STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT
A. ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT
   —GEORGE KENNAN [MR. X], “THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT” FOREIGN AFFAIRS (JULY 1947).
   1. IDENTIFIED AMERICA’S CHIEF ADVERSARIES
   2. DEFINED A STRATEGIC RESPONSE (COUNTERFORCE)
   3. PROVIDED COORDINATION TO INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER
   4. PROVIDED GUIDANCE TO MILITARY DOCTRINES
B. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING CONTAINMENT
   1. THE ISOLATIONIST ALTERNATIVE (OLD RIGHT)
   2. THE CONCILIATION ALTERNATIVE (PROGRESSIVES)
   3. LIBERATION / ROLL BACK
      —DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER
      —JOHN FOSTER DULLES

III. TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION’S MILITARY DOCTRINE: “SWORD AND SHIELD”
A. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, 1945-1952
   1. IMBALANCE OF FORCES
   2. THREAT OF SOVIET/COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN EUROPE
B. “SWORD AND SHIELD”
   —NATO MC 14/1
   1. CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF EUROPE: THE MODEL OF WORLD WAR II
      [A] OCCUPATION OF WESTERN EUROPE BY ENEMY
      [B] RAPID COMMITMENT OF EXISTING TROOPS
      [C] LONGER-TERM MOBILIZATION OF TROOPS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
      [D] LIBERATION BY CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
   2. DETERRENCE=DEFENSE: DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
   3. THE CONVENTIONAL ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
      —WHY WAS THERE NO NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IN DOCTRINE?
      [A] LIMITED NUMBER AND DESTRUCTIVE POWER
      [B] AMERICA’S NUCLEAR MONOPOLY
      [C] NO NATIONAL SECURITY COMMUNITY
   4. CRISES CONFRONT “SWORD AND SHIELD”
      [A] 1949. SOVIET ATOMIC BOBM
         —PAUL NITZE AND NSC-68
            [1] DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
            [2] ABILITY TO STOP CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION
            [3] VULNERABILITY OF USA STRATEGIC FORCES
      [B] 1950. KOREAN WAR
IV. EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND THE “NEW LOOK”

A. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE: MASSIVE RETALIATION
   1. CENTRALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRIKES
   2. CENTRALITY OF ARMED INFLUENCE
      —DETERRENCE SEPARATED FROM DEFENSE

B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE “NEW LOOK” FOR USA FORCE POSTURE

C. WHY WAS THERE A NUCLEAR REVOLUTION IN DOCTRINE IN THE 1950S?
   1. MR CONSISTENT WITH GRAND STRATEGY OF CONTAINMENT
   2. MR MADE POSSIBLE BY NEW TECHNOLOGY
   3. “NEW LOOK” WAS ECONOMICAL
   4. “NEW LOOK” WOULD AVOID SMALL WARS
   5. MR WAS EMPIRICALLY SOUND
   6. MR WAS SUPPORTED BY AMERICAN STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY
4. FROM NEW LOOK TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE, 1961-1969

I. BACKGROUND: DEBATE OVER NEW LOOK, 1954-1960
A. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
   —SPUTNIK AND THE “MISSILE GAP”
B. CRITICISM FROM THE NEW “STRATEGIC COMMUNITY”
   1. MASSIVE RETALIATION WAS NOT A CREDIBLE THREAT
      [A]. CHECKED BY SOVIET RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
      [B]. INCONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER
         —REPUTATION
         —WM. KAUFMANN. MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY.
   2. NEW LOOK LEFT OUR STRATEGIC FORCES VULNERABLE
      [A]. IMPORTANCE OF VULNERABILITY / SURVIVABILITY
      [B]. FIRST STRIKES AND SURVIVABLE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY
   3. ABSENCE OF FLEXIBILITY
      [A]. FLEXIBILITY PROVIDES OPTIONS SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL
      [B]. FLEXIBILITY IS THE BEST DETERRENT
C. EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION RESPONDS TO CRITICS
   1. REJECTION OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
   2. GRADUATED DETERRENCE, 1957
D. THE POLITICS OF THE STRATEGIC DEBATE
   1. PRESSURES FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
   2. GAITHER COMMISSION, 1957
   3. THE “MISSILE GAP” SCARE AND THE 1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

II. KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS: FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
A. THE LOGIC OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
   1. ROBERT McNAMARA
   2. TWO-AND-A-HALF-WAR DOCTRINE
   3. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND FORCE POSTURE
B. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
   1. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: ASSURED DESTRUCTION
   2. SURVIVABILITY OF RETALIATORY CAPABILITY
   3. CONSEQUENCES FOR FORCES
      —STRATEGIC TRIAD
C. UNCONVENTIONAL WARS
   1. THE CHALLENGE OF “WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION”
   2. INGREDIENTS IN THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE
      [A]. UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES
      [B]. UNCONVENTIONAL TACTICS
      [C]. THE CLOSE LINK WITH A PROGRAM OF POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION
         —“CIVIC ACTION”
D. EXPERIMENTS WITH FLEXIBILITY ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF VIOLENCE
   1. CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WAR CAPABILITY
      —HENRY KISSINGER. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY.
      —COUNTERFORCE TARGETTING
      —(VS. COUNTERVALUE TARGETTING)
   2. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
      [A]. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)
      [B]. CIVIL DEFENSE (CD)
5 OCTOBER 2006

5. THE TRANSITION TO FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS, 1969-1980

I. WHY DID THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATIONS NOT CARRY FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION?

THEY CONCLUDED:
A. THIS WOULD UNDERMINE DETERRENCE
B. THIS WAS TECHNOLOGICALLY UNWORKABLE
C. THIS PLACED UNREASONABLE DEMANDS ON HUMANS
D. THIS WOULD FUEL THE ARMS RACES
E. THIS WOULD PRODUCE UNACCEPTABLE PUBLIC REACTIONS


A. 1968 CAMPAIGN: THE SLOGAN OF “SUPERIORITY”
   1. FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
   2. FIGHT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARS TO WIN
   3. REASONS NIXON ADMINISTRATION ABANDONED “SUPERIORITY”

B. STRATEGY OF “SUFFICIENCY”
   1. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
      [A] DAMAGE REQUIREMENTS: RELATIVE ADVANTAGE AFTER WAR
      [B] DONALD RUMSFELD: “ASSURED RETALIATION”
         [1] COUNTERVALUE = ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASSETS
         [2] RELATIVE RECOVERY RATES
   2. FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
      [A] STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE
      [B] “CRISIS STABILITY” AND CONTROLLING / LIMITING CONFLICTS
      [C] SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE
   3. ARMS RACES AND NUMERICAL BALANCE
      [A] REPUTATION AND CREDIBILITY
      [B] SIGNALING WILL AND RESOLVE
      [C] SHAPING OUR ADVERSARY’S EXPECTATIONS
   4. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AGAINST PROLIFERATION

C. WHY THE CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS?
   1. EXPANSION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS
      —MIRV: MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY-TARGETED REENTRY VEHICLES
   2. MODERN COMPUTERS
      —COMMAND DATA-BUFFER SYSTEM
   3. IMPROVED ACCURACIES
      —CEP: CIRCULAR ERROR PROBABLE

I. BACKGROUND: VIETNAM AND THE SOVIET BUILD-UP
   A. LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR, LATE 1970S
      1. REJECTION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
      2. NEGLECT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES
      3. POLARIZATION OF OPINION
   B. THE SOVIET BUILD-UP
      1. STRATEGIC FORCES
      2. CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE
      3. POWER-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES FOR THIRD WORLD

II. CRITICS FROM THE “RIGHT”, MID- TO LATE-1970’S
   A. “WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY”
      —SCENARIO: CRIPPLING SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
      —THE THREAT OF SOVIET BLACKMAIL
   B. EUROSTRATEGIC MISSILES (SS-20)
      —IMPLICATIONS FOR USA COMMITMENT TO EUROPE
   C. IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE
   D. FALLING BEHIND IN POWER-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES

III. REAGAN DOCTRINES
   A. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CAPABILITY
      1. CONVENTIONAL WARS
      2. LOW-INTENSITY WARS
      3. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
      4. RETURN OF THE “2-1/2 WARS DOCTRINE”
   B. “PREVAILING” IN NUCLEAR WAR
      1. “WINNING” VS. “PREVAILING”
      2. RECONCILIATION OF CONTRADICTIONS
         BETWEEN “FLEXIBLE RESPONSE” AND “ASSURED DESTRUCTION”
      3. CARTER’S PD-59: “COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY”
         [A] FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS AGAIN
         [B] TARGETING: REDEFINING “COUNTERVALUE”
         [C] FIGHTING A PROTRACTED WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
   C. TARGETING PRIORITIES: AFFIRMING REDEFINITION OF “COUNTERVALUE”
      1. COUNTERFORCE AS COUNTERVALUE
      2. DECAPITATION AS COUNTERVALUE
   D. FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
      1. LIMITED OR LOCAL NUCLEAR WARS
      2. PROTRACTED SUPERPOWER WAR
         —WITH COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
   E. THE OPTION OF ESCALATION
      —VERTICAL ESCALATION (INTENSITY)
      —HORIZONTAL ESCALATION (GEOGRAPHIC)
   F. DEFENSIVE TRANSITION
      —STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI), “PEACE SHIELD,” “STAR WARS”
      1. VISION #1: REPLACING MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD)
         WITH MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY / SURVIVAL (MAS)
      2. VISION #2: REINFORCED MAD
3. VISION #3: PREPARING TO FIGHT AND WIN WORLD WAR III

IV. THE REAGAN BUILD-UP
7. AFTER THE COLD WAR—THE SEARCH FOR A NEW GRAND STRATEGY

I. BUSH-1 ADMINISTRATION AND THE END OF COLD WAR, 1989-1993

II. THE FACT OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY
   A. AMERICAN MILITARY PREDOMINANCE
   B. A KERNEL OF A GRAND STRATEGY? DEFENDING HEGEMONY
      1. PAUL WOLFOWITZ
      2. THREATS TO AMERICAN HEGEMONY

III. GRAND STRATEGY: TWO VISIONS
      —"A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY" (2000)
      —"THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"
         (2002 AND 2006)
   A. DEFENDING HEGEMONY
   B. PROMOTING DEMOCRATIZATION

IV. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION: DEFINITION OF THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES
   A. VITAL INTERESTS AND THE “FIRST TIER”
   B. IMPORTANT INTERESTS
   C. HUMANITARIAN INTERESTS AND THE “SECOND TIER”

V. BUSH-2 ADMINISTRATION: PRIORITY TO COUNTERTERRORISM
   A. CONTINUITY: MULTIPLE CONTINGENCIES FOR USING ARMED FORCES
   B. CONFRONTING THE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF MILITARY DOCTRINES
   A. FULL-SPECTRUM DOMINANCE
   B. OPTION OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL ESCALATION
      —PREEMPTION
   C. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND WAR FIGHTING
      1. FIGHT AND WIN PROTRACTED WARS?
      2. STRATEGIC DEFENSE?
   D. LARGE-SCALE (CONTINENTAL) CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
   E. REGIONAL CONVENTIONAL WARS AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
   F. COUNTERINSURGENCY
   G. COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE “DISTRIBUTED BATTLEFIELD”
   H. NON-COMBAT MISSIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES
8. **BARGAINING WITH VIOLENCE AND THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE**

I. **GAME THEORY AND BARGAINING**
   A. **GAMES: INTERDEPENDENT CHOICE**
   B. **BARGAINING AS A TYPE OF GAME**
      —INFLUENCING THE CHOICES OF THE OTHER SIDE
   C. **AN ILLUSTRATIVE GAME TREE**

II. **STRATEGIC BARGAINING—ASSUMPTIONS**
   A. **RATIONAL SELF-INTERESTED PARTIES**
      —CAVEAT: WHAT ARE THOSE INTERESTS?
   B. **STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR: GAUGING REACTIONS**
      —“LOOKING DOWN THE DECISION TREE”
   C. **LIMITED INFORMATION**
      —INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER’S CAPABILITIES AND RESOLVE

III. **IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY**
   A. **INFLUENCING ADVERSARY’S COST-BENEFIT CALCULUS**
   B. **INFLUENCING ADVERSARY’S EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OUR FUTURE ACTIONS**
      —CONTINGENT ON THEIR BEHAVIOR
      —THREATS AND PROMISES
   C. **IDIOM OF ACTIONS AND WORDS**
      —TO INFLUENCE BELIEFS ABOUT CAPABILITIES AND RESOLVE
   D. **PROBLEM OF “CHEAP TALK”**
   E. **MAKING CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS**
      1. **CONSISTENCY WITH THE PAST**
         —WITH ONE’S PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS
         —WITH ONE’S PREVIOUS BEHAVIOR
      2. **LINKING TO THE FUTURE**
         —INVOKING A LARGER PRINCIPLE
         —BINDING ONE’S REPUTATION IN FUTURE CRISES
      3. **ELIMINATING OPTIONS OF NON-FULFILLMENT**
         [A] ACTUALLY ELIMINATING OPTIONS
         [B] DELEGATING RESPONSIBILITY OF FULFILLMENT
      4. **DECOMPOSING THREATS AND IMPLEMENTING INCREMENTALLY**
         [A] SIGNALING RESOLVE
         [B] GENERATING RISK OF MUTUAL DISASTER
   F. **MUTUAL INFLUENCE AND COMPOUNDING EXPECTATIONS**
19 OCTOBER 2006

9. BEGINNINGS: HOW TO WIN WORLD WAR II IN THE PACIFIC?

[FILM: “X-DAY: THE INVASION OF JAPAN”]

24 OCTOBER 2006

10. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY, I

I. USA NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE STRATEGIC TRIAD

II. MAJOR DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 2001
   A. MASSIVE RETALIATION (1953)
   B. GRADUATED DETERRENCE (1957)
   C. ASSURED DESTRUCTION (1963)
   D. SCHLESINGER DOCTRINE: FLEXIBLE STRATEGIC OPTIONS (1973)
   E. RUMSFELD DOCTRINE: “ASSURED RETALIATION” (1975)
   G. “PREVAILING” (1981)
   H. REJECTION OF PREVAILING (1997)

III. THE LOGIC OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
   A. A DECISION TREE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
   B. FIVE THORNY ISSUES IN THIS LOGIC

IV. DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT V. DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
   A. MAD VS. NUTS
   B. CASE FOR DETERRENCE BY DENIAL
      1. DEFENSE IS THE BEST DETERRENT
         [A] PREFERENCES OF AGGRESSOR
         [B] HEAT OF WAR
      2. CONTINGENCIES SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL
      3. DENIAL IS MORE MORAL
   C. CASE FOR DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT
      1. PUNISHMENT IS MORE REALISTIC
         [A] TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
         [B] PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
      2. PUNISHMENT LEADS TO GREATER STABILITY
      3. PUNISHMENT LIMITS THE ARMS RACES
11. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY, II

V. DAMAGE REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE BY PUNISHMENT
A. WHAT TYPE AND HOW MUCH PUNISHMENT WOULD OUR ENEMY CONSIDER “UNACCEPTABLE”?
B. MASSIVE RETALIATION
   1. THE CREDIBILITY OF A SIMPLE, ELEGANT THREAT
   2. THE COSTS OF IMPRECISION
      [A] CREDIBILITY OF THE THREAT AFTER SOVIET BUILD-UP
      [B] COMMITMENT TO UNLIMITED USA BUILD-UP
C. ASSURED DESTRUCTION
   1. IMPLICATIONS FOR DAMAGE REQUIREMENTS
   2. PRECISION AND CREDIBILITY
   3. CRITICISMS
      [A] THE VALUES OF OUR ADVERSARY
      [B] WHERE DID AD COME FROM?
D. RUMSFELD DOCTRINE: ASSURED RETALIATION
   —PRIORITIES OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP: MILITARY AND HEAVY INDUSTRY
E. CARTER'S COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY (PD-59)
   —MILITARY AND POLITICAL-CONTROL STRUCTURE PLUS ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL BASE

VI. CAPABILITIES AND NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
A. DEMONSTRATED CAPACITY TO FULFILL THREATS
   1. DESIGNING A FORCE POSTURE: THE STRATEGIC TRIAD
   2. SCALING OUR THREATS TO OUR CAPABILITIES
B. PROBLEMS FOR NUCLEAR DOCTRINES
   1. SURVIVABILITY AND DETERRENCE
      [A] THE STRATEGIC TRIAD
      [B] STRATEGIC DEFENSE / BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)
   2. PENETRABILITY AND DETERRENCE
   3. RELIABILITY AND DETERRENCE
C. ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGY
   1. DISARMAMENT VS. ARMS CONTROL
   2. WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC STABILITY
      [A] LIMITING DESTABILIZING WEAPONS SYSTEMS
      [B] ENCOURAGING STABILIZING DEPLOYMENTS

VII. CREDIBILITY OF NUCLEAR THREATS
A. MAKE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS THREATS
B. HAVE INCENTIVE TO CARRY OUT THREAT (IF IT FAILS)
   —DELEGATE IMPLEMENTATION
C. MATCH THREATS TO REPUTATION
   —SIGNAL BY BEHAVIOR IN ANALOGOUS SITUATIONS
D. ELIMINATE THE OPTION OF NON-FULFILLMENT
E. DECOMPOSE THREAT INTO ESCALATORY STEPS AND IMPLEMENT INCREMENTALLY
VIII. ARE THERE LIMITS TO DETERRENCE?
A. WHAT RATIONALITY MEANS: MATCHING MEANS TO ENDS
B. WHEN IS AN ADVERSARY NON RATIONAL?
   1. CRAZY ADVERSARIES
   2. EMOTIONAL ADVERSARIES
C. RATIONAL ADVERSARIES WHO MAY SEEM BIZARRE
   1. ADVERSARIES WITH EXTREME OBJECTIVES
   2. ADVERSARIES WHO HIGHLY VALUE THEIR OBJECTIVE
   3. ADVERSARIES WITH DIFFERENT VALUATION OF COSTS

IX. THE BUSH-2 ADMINISTRATION’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
A. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW (JANUARY 2002)
B. PROPOSITIONS FOR A NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
   1. THE CHANGED NATURE OF THE THREAT
   2. THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED FORCES
   3. DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
      —PRECISION LOW-YIELD WEAPONS DESIGN (PLYWD)
   4. NEW URGENCY TO BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
   5. DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE (NON-NUCLEAR) WEAPONS
12. CRISIS BARGAINING AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, I

I. ILLUSTRATION: THE KOSOVO CRISIS
   OCTOBER 1998. USA THREATENS AIR STRIKES
   JANUARY 1999. USA REPOSITIONS USS ENTERPRISE
                  NATO AUTHORIZES ARMED FORCES
   FEBRUARY 1999. DEADLOCK OVER PEACEKEEPERS
   MARCH 24, 1999. NATO BEGINS BOMBING
   JUNE 3, 1999. SERBIA ACCEPTS NATO TERMS

II. THE ESCALATION PROCESS
   —HERMAN KAHN: AN ESCALATION LADDER
   A. TWO PARALLEL BARGAINING PROCESSES
      1. PRIMARY ARENA: NEGOTIATIONS OVER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
         WITH DEMANDS AND CONCESSIONS
      2. PARALLEL ARENA: BARGAINING OVER THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
         WITH ACTIONS
      —BARGAINING OVER THE MEANS USED IN THE CRISIS
   B. ESCALATION AS A PROBLEM AND AN OPPORTUNITY
   C. TYPES OF ESCALATION
      1. HORIZONTAL (GEOGRAPHICAL)
      2. VERTICAL (TECHNOLOGICAL)
      3. COMPOUND
   D. THE ESCALATION LADDER IS ONLY A HEURISTIC DEVICE
### AN ESCALATION LADDER

#### AFTERMATHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>44. Spasm or Insensate War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>43. Some Other Kinds of Controlled General War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars</td>
<td>42. Civilian Devestation Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41. Augmented Disarming Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40. Countervalue Salvo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39. Slow-Motion Countercity War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CITY TARGETING THRESHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>38. Unmodified Counterforce Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>37. Counterforce-with-Avoidance Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wars</td>
<td>36. Constrained Disarming Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35. Constrained Force-Reduction Salvo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34. Slow-Motion Counterforce War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33. Slow-Motion Counter-&quot;Property&quot; War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32. Formal Declaration of &quot;General&quot; War</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CENTRAL WAR THRESHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exemplary</th>
<th>31. Reciprocal Reprisals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>30. Complete Evacuation (Approximately 95 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>29. Exemplary Attacks on Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28. Exemplary Attacks Against Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27. Exemplary Attack on Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. Demonstration Attack on Zone of Interior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### CENTRAL SANCTUARY THRESHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bizarre</th>
<th>25. Evacuation (Approximately 70 per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crises</td>
<td>24. Unusual, Provocative, and Significant Countermeasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Local Nuclear War—Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Declaration of Limited Nuclear War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Local Nuclear War—Exemplary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NO NUCLEAR USE THRESHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intense</th>
<th>20. &quot;Peaceful&quot; World-Wide Embargo or Blockade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crises</td>
<td>19. &quot;Justifiable&quot; Counterforce Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. Spectacular Show or Demonstration of Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. Limited Evacuation (Approximately 20 per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. Nuclear &quot;Ultimatums&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Barely Nuclear War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Declaration of Limited Conventional War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Large Compound Escalation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Large Conventional War (or Actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Super-Ready Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Provocative Breaking Off of Diplomatic Relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NUCLEAR WAR IS UNTINKABLE THRESHOLD

| Traditional | 9. Dramatic Military Confrontation |
| Crises      | 8. Harassing Acts of Violence |
|            | 7. "Legal" Harassment—Retortions |
|            | 6. Significant Mobilization |
|            | 5. Show of Force |
|            | 4. Hardening of Positions—Confrontation of Wills |

#### DON'T ROCK THE BOAT THRESHOLD

| Subcrisis | 3. Solemn and Formal Declarations |
| Maneuvering | 2. Political, Economic, and Diplomatic Gestures |
|           | 1. Ostensible Crisis |

#### DISAGREEMENT—COLD WAR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIOLENCE</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highest Levels of Violence</td>
<td>Coercive Diplomacy within Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[See Escalation Ladder]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercive Bombing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Levels of Violence</td>
<td>Armed Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Punitive Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Shelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THRESHOLD OF VIOLENCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Probability of Violence</td>
<td>Non-violent Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blockade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Military Presence</td>
<td>Combat Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Redeployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowest Probability of Violence</td>
<td>Symbolic Military Actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Showing the Flag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. CRISIS BARGAINING AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, II

III. ESCALATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY

A. ESCALATION AS A STRATEGIC MOVE
   1. FOR BATTLEFIELD ADVANTAGE
   2. TO MAKE GOOD THE THREAT OF DENIAL
   3. TO INCREASE THE ADVERSARY’S COSTS
   4. TO MAKE CREDIBLE A THREAT OF FUTURE ESCALATION
   5. TO SIGNAL ONE’S OWN RESOLVE
   6. TO RAISE THE RISK OF UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION
      —“THE COMPETITION IN RISK TAKING”

B. RISKS AND UNCERTAINTY
   1. THE GAME OF CHICKEN
      [A] VERBAL THREATS
      [B] PHYSICAL ACTS TO DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE
   2. THE “ENHANCED GAME OF CHICKEN”
      [A] UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF YOUR ACTIONS
      [B] IMPERFECT COMMUNICATION
      [C] AUDIENCE COSTS
   3. STRATEGY TO MANIPULATE RISK OF MUTUAL DISASTER
      [A] STRATEGICALLY CUTTING OFF COMMUNICATIONS
      [B] ELIMINATING THE OPTION OF SWERVING
      [C] MAKING DISASTER INEVITABLE IF OTHER DOESN’T SWERVE

C. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE MODELS FOR STRATEGY
   1. FOCUSES ATTENTION ON MEANS
   2. CONVINCE ADVERSARY COSTS EXCEED BENEFITS
   3. CONVINCE ADVERSARY YOU DOMINATE EVERY LEVEL
   4. CONVINCE ADVERSARY YOU WILL ACCEPT COSTS
      —“RATIONALITY OF IRRATIONALITY”
   5. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF FLEXIBILITY

D. PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS FOR CRISES
   1. MAKE CLEAR DEMANDS THAT ADVERSARY CAN ACCEPT
   2. THREATS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH PAST BEHAVIOR
   3. STRONGER DEMONSTRATIONS OF RESOLVE ARE MORE CONVINCING
   4. MORE DIRECT AND ACTIVE USES OF ARMED FORCES ARE TOO
   5. DETERRENCE IS MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN COMPELLENCE
   6. THREATS OF DENIAL ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN
      THREATS OF PUNISHMENT
   7. THERE MUST BE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

IV. ESCALATION AS A PROBLEM: LIMITING ESCALATION
   —THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
   OR “CONTROLLED WARFARE”

A. FINDING LIMITS IN WARFARE
   —T.C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
   1. TACIT BARGAINING
      —COORDINATION OF MUTUAL EXPECTATIONS
   2. FOCAL POINTS
   3. “CONSPICUOUS” OR “PROMINENT” SOLUTIONS
4. SUBMITTING TO THE LOGIC OF THE SITUATION

B. STRATEGY FOR CONTROLLED WARFARE
   —WM. KAUFMAN. “LIMITED WARFARE”
   1. LIMITED OBJECTIVES
   2. TARGET AND WEAPON SELECTION TO SIGNAL LIMITS
   3. DETERRENCE OF OTHER’S ESCALATION AT EVERY LEVEL
   4. MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE
7 NOVEMBER 2006

14. CASE STUDY—CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

OCTOBER 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUN</th>
<th>MON</th>
<th>TUES</th>
<th>WED</th>
<th>THURS</th>
<th>FRI</th>
<th>SAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAJOR EVENTS IN THE CRISIS

OCT 16.   PRESIDENT RECEIVES PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOVIET MISSILES
OCT 22 (7 PM).  PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION ADDRESS ANNOUNCES BLOCKADE
OCT 26.   INITIAL SOVIET RESPONSES
OCT 28 (9 AM).  SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AMERICAN TERMS

FILM:  AT THE BRINK  (PART 5 IN WAR AND PEACE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE)
15. CRISIS BARGAINING AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, III

V. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AS AN EXAMPLE
A. DEFINING “THE PROBLEM”
   1. WHAT AMERICAN INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE?
   2. MILITARY AND POLITICAL INTERESTS
B. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIONS
   1. FULL-SCALE INVASION
   2. SURGICAL AIR-STRIKE AGAINST MISSILE SITES
   3. BLOCKADE
   4. DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE
   5. DO NOTHING
C. SOPHISTICATED STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE OPTIONS
   1. LOOKING DOWN THE DECISION TREE
   2. EXAMPLE: “GAMING” THE AIR-STRIKE OPTION
   3. EXAMPLE: “GAMING” THE BLOCKADE
D. CONSCIOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND POLITICAL USES OF USA ARMED FORCES
E. BLOCKADE AS A CONSCIOUS ESCALATORY STEP
   1. SIGNALLING INTENTIONS AND RESOLVE
   2. GENERATING RISK OF MUTUAL DISASTER
F. A CONSTRAINT ON DECISIONMAKERS: LIMITED INFORMATION
   1. SOVIET OBJECTIVES
   2. TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP
   3. WHO IS MAKING DECISIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE?
G. A CONSTRAINT ON DECISIONMAKERS
   1. AUDIENCE COSTS FOR USA LEADER
   2. AUDIENCE COSTS FOR USSR LEADER
H. MUTUAL AGREEMENT THROUGH NEGOTIATION
   —A SOLUTION THAT OUR ADVERSARIES COULD ACCEPT

VI. CRITICISMS OF THE STRATEGY OF CRISIS BARGAINING
A. LIMITS AND INCREMENTALISM ERODE INFLUENCE
   1. SELF-IMPOSED LIMITS SIGNAL LIMITED RESOLVE
   2. LIMITS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVERSARIES TO EXPLOIT
B. UNREALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LEADERS
   1. THE LIMITS OF HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
   2. THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY AUDIENCES
   3. THE LIMITS MUST BE OBSERVED BY OUR ADVERSARIES
C. CRISIS BARGAINING ERODES NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
   1. ILLUSION THAT COSTS OF WAR CAN BE LIMITED AND CONTROLLED
   2. EROSION OF THRESHOLD IN SMALL INCREMENTAL STEPS
D. THE STRATEGY HAS NOTHING ABOUT ENDING CRISSES OR WARS
   1. HOW TO END A CRISIS OR WAR THAT WE ARE NOT WINNING?
E. EROSION OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS
F. THE TECHNOLOGIES FOR CONTROL ARE LIMITED
   1. VULNERABILITY OF COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS
   2. OUR ADVERSARIES (SMALL STATES) OFTEN LACK THESE CAPABILITIES
G. CAN NUCLEAR WAR EVER BE “LIMITED”?
1. CLIMATIC EFFECTS FROM SMALL NUCLEAR CONFLICT
   —THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WINTER (TTAPS REPORT)
2. COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND FALLOUT FROM COUNTERFORCE STRIKES
3. DESTRUCTION FROM LIMITED COUNTERVALUE STRIKES
14 NOVEMBER 2006

14. STRATEGIES OF REVOLUTION AND INSURGENCY

I. REVOLUTIONARY WAR SINCE 1945
   A. SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONARY WARS
   B. INTENSE INSURGENCIES IN THE 1990’S

II. LENINIST STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION
   —VLADIMIR LENIN. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? (1902)
   —CENTRAL ROLE OF ORGANIZATION
   A. PROFESSIONAL REVOLUTIONARIES
   B. TIGHTLY DISCIPLINED ORGANIZATION
      1. SECRET, CONSPIRATORIAL CELLS
      2. THE “RULE OF THREE”
   C. VANGUARD PARTY AND THE MOVEMENT
      1. BRINGING REVOLUTIONARY CONSCIOUSNESS TO SOCIETY
         —AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA BY WORDS
      2. ORGANIZING THE PROLETARIAT
         —AUXILIARY (FRONT) ORGANIZATIONS
   D. “MISSING” ELEMENTS FROM LENINIST STRATEGY
      1. NO ARMED FORCES OR PROTRACTED ARMED STRUGGLE
      2. NO SPECIAL ROLE FOR TERROR
      3. LIMITED ROLE FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE AND PEASANTS

III. MAOIST STRATEGY OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
   A. MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
   B. FOCUS ON THE PEASANTRY AND COUNTRYSIDE
      1. ADDRESSING LOCAL PEASANT GRIEVANCES
      2. DEVELOPING RURAL BASE AREAS
         —A STATE WITHIN THE STATE
      3. MOBILIZING BASE AREAS FOR THE STRUGGLE
   C. PROTRACTED ARMED STRUGGLE WITH UNCONVENTIONAL METHODS
      1. GUERRILLA WARFARE AND UNCONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
      2. A STRATEGY FOR PROTRACTED AND FLEXIBLE OPERATIONS
      3. FINAL VICTORY THROUGH CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
   D. MODEL OF THE 3-PHASE ARMED STRUGGLE
      1. PHASE I. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
         (“ORGANIZATION, CONSOLIDATION, PRESERVATION”)
      2. PHASE II. PREPARATION FOR OFFENSIVE
         (“PROGRESSIVE EXPANSION”)
      3. PHASE III. STRATEGIC OFFENSE
         (“DECISION”)

IV. THE CUBAN VARIANT
   A. FIDEL CASTRO AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
   B. SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM POLITICAL ORGANIZING TO GUERRILLA WAR
      —AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA BY HEROIC DEEDS
   C. MILITARY AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ARE SYNONYMOUS
   D. MOBILITY RATHER THAN FIXED BASE AREAS

V. A FOOTNOTE ABOUT INSURGENCIES
16 NOVEMBER 2006

15. COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE, I

I. DEVELOPMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY (CI) DOCTRINE
   —1962. NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDA 124 AND 182
   A. NEW ARMED FORCES
      —MODEL OSS GUERRILLA UNITS
      —SPECIAL FORCES, AIR COMMANDOS, SEALS
   B. UNCONVENTIONAL MILITARY TECHNIQUES AND OBJECTIVES
      1. DISRUPT INSURGENTS’ POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
      2. DESTROY INSURGENTS’ MORALE AND WILL TO FIGHT
      3. LIMIT MOBILITY OF INSURGENTS
      4. DISRUPT AND DESTROY INSURGENTS’ BASE AREAS
      5. DESTROY POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE REVOLUTION
   C. "CIVIC ACTION"
      1. CREATING A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
      2. BUILDING A LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE
         [A]. STABILITY OPERATIONS
         [B]. PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN VIETNAM
         [C]. CIVIL OPERATIONS RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT (CORDS)

II. THE VIETNAM WAR
   A. PERIOD 1. 1945-1954. FRANCE VS. VIET MINH
      1. HO CHI MINH AND THE CREATION OF THE VIET MINH
      2. AUGUST REVOLUTION, 1945
         —DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
      3. FRENCH RETURN IN 1945
         —CREATION OF THE BAO DAI REGIME
      4. FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIEN BIEN PHU (MAY 1954)
      5. GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954
   B. PERIOD 2. 1954-1965. SOUTH VIETNAM AND AMERICAN ADVISORS
      1. NGO DINH DIEM AND REPUBLIC OF (SOUTH) VIETNAM
         —INITIAL SUCCESSES
         —AGROVILLES
         —HANDICAP: THE DIEM ELITE
      2. 1959. THE VIET MINH CAMPAIGN RENEWED
         —1961 CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
      3. DIEM RESPONSE
         —THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VIETMINH
         —"STRATEGIC HAMLETS"
      4. 1961. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION EXPANDS AMERICAN COMMITMENT
         —EXPANDING THE ADVISORY MISSION AND ROLES
         —PREPARING FOR ARMED INTERVENTION
         —EXPANDING AID TO THE REFORM PROGRAM
      5. 1963-64. CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
         —THE GENERALS’ COUP (NOVEMBER 1963)
         —GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY
      1. AUGUST 1964. GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION
      2. JULY 1965. LYNDON JOHNSON’S ESCALATION
      3. DISRUPTION OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY
      4. ERODING AMERICAN POPULAR SUPPORT
5. FEBRUARY 1968. TET OFFENSIVE
   —OPENING OF PARIS PEACE TALKS
D. PERIOD 4. 1968-1973. AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL
   1. VIETNAMIZATION OF WAR
   2. JANUARY 1973. PARIS PEACE SETTLEMENT
   3. APRIL 30, 1975. SURRENDER OF SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT
III. “LESSONS OF VIETNAM” FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINES

A. NECESSITY OF LEGITIMACY OF INDIGENOUS FORCES
   1. GVN FAILED TO BUILD LEGITIMACY
   2. USA COULD NOT CREATE LEGITIMACY
   3. MILITARY METHODS COULD NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGITIMACY

B. USA MILITARY OPERATIONS
   1. CIVILIAN STRATEGIES VS. MILITARY DOCTRINES
   2. CONVENTIONAL UNITS PERFORM UNCONVENTIONAL TASKS POORLY
   3. FIGHTING A DIFFERENT WAR THAN OUR ENEMIES
   4. MILITARY VICTORIES VS. POLITICAL DEFEAT

C. CONTEST OF NATIONAL RESOLVE
   1. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE STAKES
   2. EROSION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT OVER TIME
      —HARRY SUMMERS. ON STRATEGY.
      —WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE

D. AVERSION TO CI AFTER VIETNAM
   1. LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (LIC)
   2. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID)
   3. MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)

IV. LESSONS FROM PEACEKEEPING?

A. TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING
   —BARRY BLECHMAN
   1. TRADITIONAL PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION (PKO)
   2. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
   3. PEACE ENFORCEMENT (PE)

B. DEMANDS OF PEACE KEEPING PLACE ON ARMED FORCES
   1. PRIMACY GIVEN TO UNITS THAT ARE NOT CENTRAL TO CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS
   2. UNCONVENTIONAL TASKS
   3. COORDINATION WITH CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS

C. A DOCTRINE FOR PEACE OPERATIONS (1994)
   1. PEACE KEEPING VS. PEACE ENFORCEMENT
   2. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONTEXT
17. TERRORISM

I. THE PROBLEM
   A. DEFINITION
      TERRORISM IS THE USE OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST PERSONS OR
      PROPERTY WITH SOME ULTIMATE POLITICAL OR SOCIAL OBJECTIVES, BUT WITH
      THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF INTIMIDATING OR COERCING A GOVERNMENT,
      GROUP, OR INDIVIDUALS SO AS TO INDUCE THEM TO MODIFY THEIR CURRENT
      BEHAVIOR OR POLICIES.
   B. PATTERNS OF TERRORISM

II. TERROR AS A POLITICAL USE OF FORCE
   A. BRUTE FORCE
   B. ARMED INFLUENCE
      1. BOMBING AS A PREFERRED TECHNIQUE
         —ALTERNATIVES: ARMED ATTACKS, HIJACKINGS, ASSASSINATIONS,
         AND KIDNAPPINGS (HOSTAGE-TAKING)
      2. THE IMPACT OF SUICIDE BOMBING

III. THE CONTEXT OF A LARGER POLITICAL STRUGGLE
   A. CATHARTIC OR EXPRESSIVE VIOLENCE
   B. POLITICAL PURPOSES

IV. TWO TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS
   A. POST-MAOIST MODEL
   B. THE DECENTRALIZED NETWORK

V. PHYSICAL VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGETS
   A. THE TERRORISTS’ ENEMY AS PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGET
      —TO ERODE THE ENEMY’S WILL
   B. THE PEOPLE AS PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGET
      —TO BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT
   C. THE PEOPLE INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE ENEMY:
      —TO PROVOKE ENEMY RETRIBUTION AGAINST THE PEOPLE
   D. THE MOVEMENT AS PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGET
      —TO MAINTAIN DISCIPLINE AND MORALE
17. COUNTERTERRORISM

I. USA STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
   A. “NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM” (FEBRUARY 2003)
      —DEFEAT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
      —DENY TERRORISTS SPONSORSHIP AND SANCTUARY
      —DIMINISH THE UNDERLYING SOCIAL CONDITIONS
      —DEFEND THE UNITED STATES
   B. “NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ” (NOVEMBER 2005)

II. ELEMENTS OF POLICY (COUNTER-TERRORIST POLICY OPTIONS)
   A. “TARGETS” FOR COUNTER-TERRORIST ACTION
      1. TERRORIST FIGHTING FORCES
      2. SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
      3. STATE SPONSORS AND SANCTUARIES
      4. SUPPORTING POPULATION
         —FOOTNOTE:
            —IF ALL ARE NECESSARY TO TERRORISTS, WE COULD TARGET
            ANY ONE AND SHORT-CIRCUIT TERRORIST OPERATIONS
            —IF NONE IS NECESSARY OR NONE CAN BE COMPLETELY ELIMINATED,
            WE MUST TARGET ALL OF THEM
   B. MEANS
      1. BRUTE FORCE
         [A]. CONTEST OF ARMS ON THE BATTLEFIELD
         [B] UNCONVENTIONAL “BRUTE FORCE”
            [1]. EXECUTIVE ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST LEADERSHIP
            [2]. PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST FORCES
            [3]. VIGILANTE ACTIVITIES AGAINST TERRORIST SUPPORTERS
         [C] UNCONVENTIONAL “COUNTER-FORCE” OPERATIONS
            [1] DESTROY FUNDING OPERATIONS
            [2] REDUCE MOBILITY
            [3] ISOLATE TERRORISTS
      2. ARMED INFLUENCE
         [A]. HARSH PUNISHMENT OF TERRORISTS
         [B]. SEVERE REPRISALS AGAINST MOVEMENT AND SUPPORTERS
      3. MELIORATION
         [A]. “POLITICAL TRACK” IN IRAQ
         [B]. “ECONOMIC TRACK” IN IRAQ