President George Bush has just read Richard Haass’ op-ed piece (“Is There a Doctrine in the House?” New York Times 8 November 2005, see attached) criticizing his Administration for its failure to advance a grand strategy (or what Haass labels a “doctrine”).

The President has asked you, “Send me a memorandum outlining the options available to us if we were to articulate such a grand strategy. Our grand strategy should explain to the American public how there really is coherence among the primary military doctrines and policies that we have already announced. It should give guidance to strategists for further development of specific military policies. And it may even point up some new initiatives that we need to take in some areas. Do not hesitate to include any recommendations that might help me select among these options for a new grand strategy.”

You should enumerate the options, evaluate them, and explain how your recommendations would better serve American national interests and give direction to the specific military policies of the Administration.

Your Research and Analysis

Your memorandum should be five to seven double-spaced pages. When preparing this you should keep in mind the guidelines included with the first memorandum assignment, except for the following:

Your primary “research” source should be the the readings and lectures from this course. I strongly recommend that you treat these as all known facts about the world for the purpose of writing this memorandum. Your memorandum will be evaluated in large part on the success with which it integrates the different elements of military strategy developed in the course.

You do not need to use footnotes or include a bibliography in this assignment. You may simply refer to materials in the readings by the author’s last name. Assume that the material in lectures is common knowledge that does not need to be cited.

Your policy memorandum is due at the final examination on Tuesday, December 6, 2005 (3:00 pm) (This is later than the due date indicated in the syllabus.)
IS THERE A DOCTRINE IN THE HOUSE?

By Richard N. Haass, the director of policy planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, is the president of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course."

WHAT policy should the United States adopt toward China's rise? How should we greet India's emergence, Japan's new assertiveness, Europe's drift or the possible decline of Russia? How can the United States reduce terrorism, promote trade, stop nuclear proliferation and increase freedom?

These are among the toughest questions on the foreign policy agenda, and right now Washington is trying to answer them without a compass. Containment, the doctrine of resisting Soviet and communist expansion, survived some four decades of challenge, but could not survive its own success. What we need is a foreign policy for both the post-cold-war and the post-9/11 world.

That a guiding principle is needed cannot be doubted. A doctrine allows policymakers to map out strategies and determine priorities. Those strategies and priorities in turn guide decisions of long-term importance, like where to invest the country's intelligence and diplomatic assets, as well as how to deploy its military forces and channel its assistance programs. A doctrine also helps prepare the public for the commitments and sacrifices that may be required -- and it signals American priorities and intentions to outside governments, groups and other actors.

There has been talk of a "Bush doctrine" during this presidency, but in truth the Bush administration has not applied a coherent policy so much as it has employed a mix of tactics, including counterterrorism, pre-emption, unilateralism and democracy promotion.

Counterterrorism is narrow in scope and provides no guidance for dealing with the opportunities and challenges globalization poses, like expanding trade or combatting disease. Pre-emption (or prevention, to be more precise) is relevant to an even narrower set of circumstances and cannot be a regular feature of policy given the uncertainty and controversy it entails. Unilateralism is not viable because most of today's pressing problems are global ones that cannot be met by the United States alone, given the limits of its power.

Democracy promotion is a more serious proposition, but to make it a doctrine would be neither desirable nor practical. Too many problems, including some that threaten the lives of millions, will not be solved by the emergence of new democracies. Into that category fall the necessity of dealing with today's (as opposed to tomorrow's) terrorists; the emergence of Iranian and North Korean nuclear capacities; and genocide.

Promoting democracy is one American foreign policy goal, and rightly so, but when it comes to relations with China, Egypt, Russia or Saudi Arabia, other national security interests must bear equal or greater weight. Moreover, promoting democracy is too difficult to be a truly viable doctrine. In Iraq, where the United States used military force to oust a regime and occupy a country, the costs have been too high and the results too uneven to furnish any kind of model for future operations.

What, then, is the appropriate foreign policy doctrine for the United States? I would suggest "integration." Based on a shared approach to common challenges, it means that we cooperate with other world powers to build effective international arrangements and to take collective actions. And those relationships would be expanded to include other countries, organizations and peoples, so that they too can come to enjoy the benefits of physical security, economic opportunity and political freedom. Finally, we should offer rogue states the advantages of integration into the global economy in exchange for fundamentally changing their ways.

Containment was the right doctrine for the cold war. But for the current era, we must find a way to bring others in, not keep them out. Integration meets that criterion, along with all the others required of a new
doctrine. It reflects existing international realities, addresses American national security challenges, sets forth ambitious but achievable objectives and provides "first order" guidance that policymakers can consistently apply. It is also domestically supportable.

By adopting integration as United States doctrine, policymakers would acknowledge and adapt to a new reality -- namely, the fact that the principal threat to American security and prosperity does not come from a great-power rival, because the gap in abilities is too large and the chance of conflict too remote. Rather, our greatest menace stems from what can best be described as the dark dimension of globalization, which includes terrorism, nuclear proliferation, infectious disease, protectionism and global climate change.

What would a foreign policy guided by integration look like? The United States would forge partnerships with China and Russia, accept India's nuclear status, welcome a more assertive Japan, and encourage a more capable and active Europe. We would jettison hopes for rapid changes of regime in Iran and North Korea. Instead we'd offer those countries security guarantees and substantial political and economic incentives (along with access to nuclear power but not control of nuclear fuel) in exchange for abandoning their nuclear weapons programs.

We would propose to extend the World Trade Organization to cover virtually all aspects of manufacturing and services, and we'd reduce or eliminate tariffs, quotas and subsidies. The United States would sponsor worldwide efforts to counter AIDS and avian flu, as well as to bring about a post-Kyoto arrangement to slow global climate change. We would spearhead a diplomatic offensive in support of the principle that governments conducting or supporting either genocide or terrorism forfeit their sovereign rights.

If much of this looks familiar, that's because it is. The Bush administration is clearly moving in this direction. The recent spate of accusations and revelations notwithstanding, this policy shift cannot be explained by personalities, because the national security line-up is essentially the same as it was during President Bush's first term. Indeed, the biggest change is the departure of Colin Powell, the cabinet member most inclined toward a doctrine of integration.

No, what accounts for the changed approach to the world is reality. Iraq has stretched the United States military to the breaking point, cost hundreds of billions of dollars, alienated would-be partners around the world (as evidenced in Argentina last week), and curtailed the enthusiasm of the American people for a missionary foreign policy.

It is hard to escape the paradox: Iraq, a classic war of choice, has constrained the administration's choices in its second term. Choices are further constrained by tax cuts, extravagant spending and the absence of a policy to reduce American dependency on imported oil. The result is that the United States is moving -- haltingly and reluctantly, but inexorably -- toward a more pragmatic and multilateral foreign policy appropriate to the era in which we live.