Origins of World War I

I. Puzzle: Why Did a Century of Peace Come to An End?

II. Events Leading to World War I
   —10 Steps  [See Supplement available on-line, return to PS 12 homepage]

III. Answers #1 and #2: The “War Guilt” Debate
   A. The “First Shots” from the Archives
   B. The War Guilt Commission
   C. The Revisionist View
      —Harry Elmer Barnes

IV. Answer #3: Domestic and International Constraints on Choice
   A. Immediate Causes: Four Decisions
      1. Austria’s Response to Serbia
      2. Germany’s “Blank Check”
      3. Russia’s Full Mobilization
      4. Germany’s Two-Front War
   B. Constraints on Choices
      —Sidney Fay
      1. Nationalism
      2. Militarization of Policy
      3. Alliance System
         —Triple Alliance [Germany-Austria-Italy]
         —Triple Entente [France-Russia-England]
Origins of World War II

I. Background: Europe After World War I
   A. Collapse of Monarchies
   B. New Nation-states in Eastern Europe
   C. Limits on German Power
      1. Loss of Territory
      2. Limits on Military
      3. Reparations Payments

II. Answer #1: Deterrence Failure
    —Appeasement
   A. Nine German Assaults on the “Versailles” Order
      1. Withdrawal from the League of Nations
      2. Intimidation in the Saar Plebiscite
      3. Repudiation of the Versailles Disarmament Clause
      4. Remilitarization of the Rhineland
      5. Intervention in Spanish Civil War
      6. Anschluss: Annexation of Austria
      7. Demands for Sudetenland: the Munich Conference
      8. Invasion of Bohemia and Moravia
      9. Invasion of Poland
   B. The Other Axis Powers
      1. Japan in Manchuria and China
      2. Italy in Ethiopia (Abyssinia)

III. Answer #2: Sources of Aggression
    A. Dissatisfaction with the “Versailles” Order
    B. Hyper-nationalism
    C. Failure of Domestic Economies

IV. Two Models of War Origin: Spiral vs. Deterrence Models
    A. Crisis Spiraling Out of Control
    B. Failure of Balancing / Failure of Deterrence
Origins of the Cold War

I. Background: Major Changes at the End of World War II
   A. Defeat and Occupation of the Axis Powers and their Allies
   B. Decline of Britain and France as Great Powers
   C. Growing Involvement of USA and USSR in European and Asian Affairs

II. From Collaboration to Confrontation:
   A. Disagreement Over the Shape of the Peace, 1945
      —Yalta and Potsdam Conferences
   B. Communization of Eastern Europe, 1945-1948
   C. Growing Western Solidarity, 1947-1949
   D. Division of Asia, 1945-1949
   E. Direct East-West Confrontations, 1948 and 1950

III. The Orthodox Answer
   A. Soviet Expansionism
      1. Three Orthodox Explanations
         a. The Soviet Leader—Joseph Stalin
         b. The Soviet Ideology—Marxism-Leninism
         c. The Needs of the Soviet System—Totalitarianism
      2. The Pattern of Soviet Expansion
   B. The American Response—Containment
      —George Kennan [Mr. X]. Foreign Affairs, March 1947.

IV. The Revisionist Answer
   A. Soviet Security Interests in Eastern Europe
   B. Explaining American Expansionism
      1. The American Leader—Harry Truman
      2. American Political Culture—Paranoia about Communism
      3. The Needs of the American System—Capitalism

V. The Systemic Answer: The Power Transition from Multipolarity to Bipolarity
   A. The Rise of Two Superpowers
   B. The Power Vacuum Left by Decline of Other Powers
Was 9/11 the End of a Long Peace?

I. Debate #1: Was the Cold War a Long Peace?
   —John Lewis Gaddis
   A. Conventional View: The Cold War as Protracted Conflict
      1. Central System—Two Blocs
         a. Superpower Crises
            —Berlin 1948, 1959, 1961
            —Cuba 1962
         b. Military Standoff in the Central System
            —NATO vs. Warsaw Pact
      2. Superpower Expansion in the Peripheral System
         a. Superpower Fight over Decolonization
         b. Use of Political Instability in New States
         c. Harnessing Third World Inter-state Conflicts
            —Arab-Israel Wars
            —India-Pakistan Wars
      3. The Nature of Conflict in the Cold War
         a. Central Wars by Substitute Means
            —Arms Races and Crises
         b. Displacement of Warfare to the Periphery
            —J. David Singer
            —Warfare through Proxies
   B. Challengers’ Case: No wars among the major powers in the central system
      1. John Mueller: No wars among 48 wealthiest 1945-88
      2. Jeffrey Record: Europe 1600-1945 (29 wars or one new war every 12 years)
         vs. Europe 1945- (0 wars among great powers)

II. Debate #2: Why the Long Peace?
   A. Bipolarity
      —Kenneth Waltz
      1. Consequences: Negotiating Peace and Caution
      2. Rules of Engagement: Avoiding Direct Conflict
   B. Nuclear Weapons
      —Costs of Warfare and Great-Power Restraint
   C. American Economic Hegemony
      —Rules of Conduct in a Liberal Economic Order
   D. Obsolescence of War
      —John Mueller: A cognitive shift so that war is unimaginable
III. Debate #3: Will the End of the Cold War Bring More Conflict?

*N.B.: Even political scientists cannot study the future. So we ask: Have comparable shifts in the international system in the past produced more or less conflict?*

A. If Polarity is most important:
   1. Shift to Multipolarity from bipolarity will produce more conflict
   2. Shift to Unipolarity will produce less conflict

B. If Nuclear Technology is most important:
   1. End of Cold War is insignificant
   2. Proliferation will generalize the restraining effect of nuclear weapons

C. If Economic Hegemony is most important:
   —American hegemonic decline will lead to more conflicts

D. If Ideas are most important:
   1. The Rejection of War will deepen
   2. Or a new Clash of Civilizations will produce new and more intense conflicts

E. Changes in the Fundamentals of the International System
   1. New Actors
   2. New Issues
Theories of Foreign Policies, I

I. Images and Levels of Analysis
   A. Level = Cases that are Compared
      1. State-actor: Comparing states
      2. Systemic: Comparing International Systems
      3. The level of analysis affects both
         a. How you ask your question and
         b. How you frame your answers
   B. Three Intellectual Traditions
      1. Political Realism
      2. Political Economy
      3. Political Sociology

II. Political Realist Approach
   A. Classical Realism
      1. Three Assumptions about All States
         a. Unitary Actor
         b. Rational Decisionmaking
         c. Pursuit of National Interest Defined as Power
            (These cannot explain why some states pursue different foreign policies.)
      2. Three Differences among States that Explain Why They Behave Differently
         a. Power Capabilities
         b. Threats to their Power Interest
         c. Opportunities to Defend or Expand Power
      3. Application: Foreign Policies at the End of the Cold War
         —USA and its Allies: Changed Power Positions, Threats, and Opportunities
   B. Domestic Power Constraints on Leaders
      1. Civil-military Relations and Cult of the Offensive
         —Jack Snyder: Civil-Military Relations → Doctrine → For Pol Behavior
      2. The Theory of Totalitarianism
         —Survival of totalitarian regimes necessitates expansion
      3. Democratic Politics
         —Democracies are less likely to pursue aggressive foreign policies due to
           domestic power constraints on leaders of democracies
           a. Electoral Connection
           b. Institutional Checks in Decision Making
Realism: Power and Strategy

I. Power: Influence and Force
   A. Power: A political actor has power over another to the extent that the first can get the second to do something that the second would not otherwise have done.
   B. Power=Influence and Force
      1. Simple Influence
      2. Brute Force
      3. Threat of Force as Influence
      4. Use of force as influence

II. States; Instruments of Power
   A. Economic Rewards and Sanctions
   B. Diplomacy and Propaganda
   C. Armed Forces
      1. Brute force
      2. Armed influence
         a. Deterrence: Do not change your current behavior
         b. Compellence: Do change your current behavior

III. Strategy: The Prudent Use of Power
   A. Three Essential Elements of Influence
      1. Influencing Other’s Choice by Influencing Other’s Expectation of your Reaction
         —Threats and Promises
      2. The Problem of “Cheap Talk”
         —Costless Commitments vs. Costly Fulfillment
      3. The Credible-Commitments Problem
   B. Tactics for Making Credible Commitments
      1. Inflating the Apparent Importance to You
         —Invoking a Principle
         —Staking your Reputation for Future Action
      2. Tying your Hands
         —Physically Eliminating Option of Non-fulfillment
         —Delegating Fulfillment to Third Party with Incentive to Fulfill
      3. Incremental Implementation of Threat or Promise
Theories of Foreign Policy, II

III. Political-Economic Tradition
A. Origins and Premises
   1. Adam Smith: Individuals as Consumers
   2. Karl Marx: Individuals as Producers
   3. Economic Foundations of Conflict and Cooperation
B. Marxian Tradition
   —Vladimir Lenin. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism
   1. Monopoly Capitalism as a Stage of Capitalism
   2. Division of the Third World (Colonialism)
   3. War among Imperialist Powers
C. Positive Political Economy
   —Joseph Schumpeter. The Sociology of Imperialisms
   1. Capitalists’ Interests Harmed by War
   2. Mercantilism and Empires prior to Capitalism
   3. Non-capitalist States and Modern Empires

IV. Political-Sociological Tradition
A. Origins and Premises
   1. Emile Durkheim
   2. Max Weber
   3. Conflict and Cooperation due to Diverging or Shared Identities, Beliefs, Values
B. Idiosyncrasies of Leaders
   —Truman’s Learning: Trauma of Munich
C. Regime or Leadership Ideologies
D. Political Culture
   —Louis Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in America
   1. Lockean Liberalism (John Locke)
   2. Liberal Absolutism
   3. Pragmatism at Home, Crusades Abroad

V. A Footnote About Theory
A. Structure of Theories [Premises → Theoretical Development → Hypotheses]
B. Counterfactual Claims
   Given the importance of a particular causal factor ($x_1$),
   the outcome ($y$) would have been different in this case,
   if the value of $x_1$ had been different.
   This is *not* the same as saying that another causal factor ($x_2$) was more important.
C. Why Theory?
   —Theory as a Road Map (“a little white lie about reality”,
     “a useful simplification”)
   1. Theories Spotlight the Most Important Causes
   2. Theories Permit Generalization across many Cases
   3. Theories Permit us to Predict the likely Consequences of our Actions
The International System of States

I. The Levels of Analysis Distinction: One Last Time

II. The Modern International State System
   A. The Medieval Order
      1. Diversity of Types of Actors
      2. No Supreme Rulers
   B. Rise of the Sovereign State, circa 1500-
      1. Centralizing Monarchies
      2. Jean Bodin: The Sovereign
   C. International Recognition of the Sovereign State
      —1648. Peace of Westphalia

III. Six International Systems since 1648
    1667-1713 Wars of Louis XIV
    1713-1792 The Ancien Régime
    1792-1814 Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars
    1815-1914 The Century of Peace
    1914-1945 Wars of German Ascendancy
       (or -1991) and Cold War
    1945 (or 1992)-? The Contemporary Long Peace

IV. The Ancien Régime, 1713 to 1792
   1. Flexible Alliances
   2. (Example) War of the Spanish Succession

V. The “Century of Peace,” 1815-1914
   A. The Concert of Europe, 1815-?
      —1815. Congress of Vienna
      1. Routine Summit Conferences
      2. Countering Domestic as well as International Threats to the Peace
   B. The Pax Britannica
      1. Military and Economic Hegemony
      2. Imposing and Enforcing an Order
   C. Challenges to the Peace in Nineteenth-Century Europe
      1. Nationalism
      2. Imperialism
Security Dilemma

I. Analytic Perspectives in the Third Image (See chart on next page)
   A. Realists
   B. Idealists
   C. Neo-Liberals
   D. Constructivists

II. Realists and the Security Dilemma
   Anarchy → Security Dilemma → Conflict
   A. Background: Prisoners’ Dilemma

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1. A Game = A situation involving interdependent choices
2. A Competitive Game = Choices to benefit one side, harm the other(s)
3. A Perverse Outcome = When all select their better options, all are worse off

B. Security Dilemma

III. Structural Sources of the Security Dilemma
   A. Sovereignty
      1. Peace of Westphalia (1648)
      2. Background: Rise of Modern State
      3. Thirty Years’ War
      4. Fundamental Principle in International Diplomacy
         —in 1648: “pro rege, pro religio” (as the ruler, so the religion)
         —Sovereignty = exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the state
   B. Anarchy
      —Not chaos, but the absence of government (legislative or executive authority)
   C. Self-Help
      —Each state is the ultimate guarantor of its own survival
   D. The Security Dilemma
      —In a world of self-help every attempt by a state to increase its power to defend its
      security diminishes the power and security of others.
### Analytic Approach

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<th>Level of Analysis</th>
<th>Political Realism</th>
<th>Political Economy</th>
<th>Political Sociology</th>
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<td>Classical Realism</td>
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<td><strong>International System</strong></td>
<td>Structural Realism</td>
<td>Idealism</td>
<td>Neo-Liberalism</td>
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- **Traditionalists**
- **Modernists**
Unipolarity—Hegemonic Stability?

I. Realists and International Power
   A. Polarity
      —Unipolar, Bipolar, Multipolar
      —Kenneth Waltz. *Theory of International Politics*
   B. Technology of Warfare

II. Hegemonic Stability—The Theory
   A. Mechanisms of Stability
      1. Hegemon as Enforcer of Order
      2. Rules of Order Created by the Hegemon
      3. Willing Compliance by most Subordinate Powers
         —Security for Small Powers
         —Framework for Cooperation for Mutual Benefit
      4. Self-interest of Hegemon to Provide Order
   B. Why War?
      1. Hegemonic Decline and Transition
      2. Alternating Periods of War and Long Peace
         —George Modelski. *The Long-Cycles Theory*
      3. Engines of Change
         —A. F. K. Organski. *Power-Transition Theory*
         —Timing and Extent of Industrialization (France → Britain → USA)

III. Is This a Model for the New World Order?
   A. Case for Pax Americana
      1. American Military Predominance
      2. The Liberal International Order
   B. Critics of Pax Americana
      1. The Transitory Nature of Unipolarity
         —Christopher Layne. *Unipolar Illusion*
      2. America’s Economic Decline
         —Paul Kennedy. *Hegemonic Decline*
      3. A Democracy will not Pay the Costs of Hegemony
      4. There are No Longer any Benefits to Being #1
         —Robert Jervis
Multipolarity—The Classic Balance of Power

I. The Case For the Balance of Power
Definition: The balance of power is an international order that emerges almost automatically in a multipolar world, that maintains the status quo through a flexible alliance mechanism, and that has important spillover consequences, including security and peace for all states.
A. Multipolarity
B. Automaticity
C. Equilibrium
D. Flexible Alliance Mechanism
E. Consequences—Peace and Security

II. The Case Against the Balance of Power
A. Missing Preconditions—Irrelevant
   1. Multipolarity
   2. “Dynastic” Politics
      a. Momentary Allies and Enemies
      b. Balancing by Shuffling Territories
      c. Versus the Rise of Nationalism
B. Implications of Polarity for Deterrence and Cooperation
   1. Deterrence of Aggression under Multipolarity
      a. Difficulty of Forming Coalition in order to Defend Status Quo
      b. Uncertainty Whether any Great Powers will Balance: Free-Riding
      —Thus, in multipolar world it remains uncertain whether an invincible coalition in defense of the status quo will form and this leads potential aggressors to conclude that aggression has a chance of success.
   2. Peaceful Settlements of Disputes under Multipolarity
      —More parties must become involved and this increases delay or failure
C. Undesirable Means to Maintain the Balance
   1. Intervention in Small States
   2. Reciprocal Compensation
   3. Warfare

III. The Concert of Great Powers
A. The Concert of Europe, 1815-1914, as a Model
   1. Proactive Responses to International and Domestic Threats
   2. Routine Summit Diplomacy
B. Critics’ Case: Sustained Great Power Unity Unlikely
   —Breakdown in Unanimity after 7 years (1822)
   1. British Reluctance to Cooperate in Crushing Constitutionalism
   2. Growth in Nationalism in Mid-century
**Balance of Terror**

I. Strategic Nuclear Weapons
II. The Mutual Hostage Relationship
   —Definition: The balance of terror is a relationship of mutual deterrence in which each side has a second-strike or retaliatory capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy.
   A. Mutual Deterrence
   B. Second-Strike (Retaliatory) Capability
   C. Unacceptable Damage
   D. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)

III. Differences with Balance of Power
A. The Role of Armed Forces
   1. BOP: Armed forces Balancing Armed Forces
   2. BOT: Retaliation with Unacceptable Damage
B. The Role of Alliances
   1. BOP: Strengthening the Defenders of the Status Quo
   2. BOT: Extending Nuclear Commitments to Non-nuclear States

IV. Responses from the Critics
A. Nuclear Weapons are Largely Irrelevant
   —No taming effect beyond the nuclear stalemate
B. Technology Will Undermine Stability
   1. First-Strike Technologies
      —Accuracies + Yields
   2. Defensive Capabilities
C. Proliferation Undermines Stability
D. Nuclear Weapons Do No Inject Restraint
   1. Overextending Nuclear Commitments
   2. Nuclear Utilization Targeting Strategy
      —NUTS vs. MAD
   3. Nuclear Brinkmanship
**International Institutions**

I. Idealist Response to Realists: Replacing Anarchy by Building International Institutions

II. International Adjudication
   A. Proponents’ Case
      1. Adjudication = The settlement of disputes by judicial bodies
      2. The Argument: Parallel With Domestic Order
      3. The Evidence: The World Court
         —Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-45
         —International Court of Justice (ICJ), 1945-
      4. Examples of Other Courts
         —Regional: European Courts of Justice (ECJ)
         —Specialized: International Criminal Court (ICC)
   B. Skeptics’ Rebuttal—Absence of 3 out of 4 necessary conditions:
      1. Compulsory Jurisdiction (but states decide what in national jurisdiction)
      2. Impartial Judges (but judges tend to vote with national interests)
      3. Fair Procedure
      4. Binding Judgments (but no enforcement mechanism)

III. Collective Security
   A. CS = A commitment by all member states to preserve the peace among themselves
      —Not an alliance against a common enemy
      1. Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations
      2. United Nations, 1945-
         —Security Council
   B. The Proponents’ Case: Record of Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO)
   C. The Skeptics’ Rebuttal—Unworkable
      1. Great Powers Disagree over Aggression
         a. Disagreements over Definition of the Concept “Aggression”
         b. Disagreements over Applying the Concept in Specific Cases
      2. Great Powers are Seldom Willing to Pay the Price of Enforcement

III. Supranational Governance
   A. Proponents’ Case
      1. The Necessary Steps
         a. Common Law-making Institutions and Delegation of Power by States
         b. Common Executive-Administrative Agencies and Delegation of Power
      2. Paths to Supranational Governance
         a. Functional Integration
         b. Federalism
   B. Skeptics’ Rebuttal
      1. Impractical: States Unwilling to Give up Sovereignty
         a. Europe is Far from Supranational Governance
         b. The European Model does not “Travel”
      2. Undesirable
         a. Supranationalism makes Government more Remote from the Governed
         b. World Government is Unlikely to be Democratic or even Stable
**Transformation of Global Culture**

I. Political-Sociological (Constructivist) Approach

II. Stable vs. Revolutionary Systems
   —Stanley Hoffmann
   A. Consensus over Fundamental Rules
      1. Who Should be the Primary Actors?
      2. What Rules of Conduct Should They Observe?
   B. Normative Consensus vs. Dissension
      —Classification of Different International Systems

III. Contemporary International Society
   A. Growth of International Society
      1. Rooted in Shared Norms not Enforcement
      2. Bases of Compliance with Norms by States
         a. Extended Sense of Self-interest
         b. Internalization of Rules as Appropriate Behavior
   B. Growth of International Regimes
      1. Shared Norms that Coordinate Behavior within Individual Areas
         a. Example: International Diplomatic Practice
         b. Example: Geneva Accords
      2. Formalization in International Law (Multilateral treaties/Conventions)
   C. Optimist’s View of Changes in Global Culture
      1. Kantian Internationalism and the Democratic Peace
         —Michael Doyle
      2. Revulsion Against War
         —John Mueller
      3. Postmaterialism
         —Ronald Inglehart

IV. Criticisms from Pessimistic Constructivists
   A. Persistence of the Norm of Sovereignty
   B. Resurgence of Nationalism
   C. Clash of Civilizations
      —Samuel P. Huntington

V. Criticisms from Realists and Political Economists: The Limited Role of Ideas
   A. No Enforcement Mechanisms
   B. No Regimes in the Security Realm
   C. No Security Spillover from Socio-Economic Regimes
Transformation of Global Relations

I. The Neo-Liberals’ Challenge
   —Robert Keohane

II. New Actors in Global Relations
   —IGO: Inter-Governmental Organization
   —INGO: International Non-Governmental Organization
   —MNC: Multi-National Corporation

III. New Relations Among Societies
   A. Transnational Relations
      —(vs. Inter-State Relations)
   B. Complex Interdependence: Mutual Sensitivity/Vulnerability of Societies
      1. Trade
      2. Labor Movement
      3. Financial Transactions

IV. Transformation of Societies
   A. Breakdown of Inequalities
   B. Internationalization of Societies
      1. Elites
      2. Interest Groups
      3. Political Cultures

V. New Agenda of Politics
   —Growing Irrelevance of the State as Decisionmaker

VI. Cooperation and Conflict
Why Would Rational Economic Actors Ever Go to War?

I. The Positive Political Economy of Cooperation
   A. Political Actors as Consumers
      —Utility Maximizers
   B. Joint Gains through Political Cooperation
      —(Example) Villagers Creating Government
   C. Prisoner’s Dilemma
      1. Free Riders and Suckers
      2. Collective Action Problem
   D. Cooperation Even Under Anarchy
      1. Mutual Monitoring
      2. Mutual Sanctioning
         —In repeat play (iterated games): It may be a simple threat not to cooperate in the future if the other side defects now

II. Mutual Gains in International Economics
   A. Free Trade, Joint Gains, and Free Riders
   B. Bretton Woods System
      1. GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
         a. Most-Favored Nation Principle
         b. WTO (World Trade Organization)
      2. IMF (International Monetary Fund)
         a. Freely Convertible Currencies
         b. Stable Exchange Rates

III. Neo-Liberals: Why War?
   A. War and a Shrinking Pie
      1. War is Costly
      2. A Contract to Avoid War that Leaves Both Better Off
   B. Bargaining Failure
      1. Incomplete Information
         —Incentive to misrepresent resolve and capabilities
      2. Credible Commitment
         —Inability to credibly commit to abide by contracts

IV. Comparison
   A. Political Sociology
      —Culture as base, Economics as superstructure
   B. Political Realism
      —Politics as base, Culture and economics as superstructure
Are International Relations Really Changing? The Traditionalists Strike Back

I. Relative Power
   A. Unequal Power: State vs. New Actors
   B. New Actors as Tools of States
      1. Extending Great Power Policies to Other Countries
      2. Directing Economic Development of Other Countries
      3. Influencing the Domestic Politics of Other Countries

II. How Interdependent Are We?
   A. Limits of Interdependence
      —No more than 10 per cent of our lives
   B. Decline of Interdependence Over Time
      —Stephen Krasner

III. Persistence/Deepening of Inequalities
     —North-South Gap

IV. Nationalist Backlash in Politics
   A. Winners vs. Victims of Interdependence
      1. Producers with Mobile vs. Immobile Assets
      2. Migration, Jobs, and Worker Salaries
   B. New Agenda of National Protection

V. Conflicts Among the Interdependent
   A. Interdependence and Conflict
   B. New Competitive Economic Relations
      —Lester Thurow: Niche vs. Head-to-Head Competition
   C. Defensive State Policies Produce New Inter-state Conflicts
   D. Security Threats Spawned by Interdependence

VI. Continued Primacy of the State as Decisionmaker
   A. The Failure of International Organizations
      1. IMF
      2. GATT / WTO
   B. Preeminence of States as Decisionmakers
      1. Unilateral and Bilateral Responses to Economic Problems
      2. Response to New Security Challenges