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   1667-1713 WARS OF LOUIS XIV
       1713-1792 THE CLASSIC BALANCE OF POWER
   1792-1814 WARS OF FRENCH REVOLUTION / NAPOLEONIC WARS
       1815-1914 THE CENTURY OF PEACE
   1914-1945 WARS OF GERMAN ASCENDANCY
       1945 (OR 1992) THE NEW EUROPEAN PEACE

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   A. THE MEDIEVAL ORDER
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      [2] NO SOVEREIGNTY
   B. RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE, C. 1500-
      ► CENTRALIZING MONARCHIES
      ► 1517. PROTESTANT REFORMATION BEGINS
   C. MODERN STATE SYSTEM
      ► 1648 PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

III. THE CLASSIC BALANCE OF POWER PEACE (1713 TO 1789)
    ► (EG) 1713. PEACE OF Utrecht (WAR OF SPANISH SUCCESSION)

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   A. THE CONCERT OF EUROPE, 1815-?
      ► 1815 CONGRESS OF VIENNA
   B. THE PAX BRITANNICA
   C. CHALLENGES TO PEACE IN EUROPE
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      2. IMPERIALISM
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I. PUZZLE: WHY DID THE CENTURY OF PEACE COME TO AN END?

II. EVENTS LEADING TO WORLD WAR I
   ► 10 STEPS  [SEE APPENDED]

III. ANSWERS #1 AND #2: THE “WAR GUILT” DEBATE
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   B. REVISIONIST VIEW
      ► HARRY ELMER BARNES

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      2. GERMANY’S BLANK CHECK
      3. RUSSIA’S FULL MOBILIZATION
      4. GERMANY’S TWO-FRONT WAR
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      ► SIDNEY FAY
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      2. MILITARIZATION OF POLICY
      3. ALLIANCE SYSTEM
         ► TRIPLE ALLIANCE [GERMANY-AUSTRIA-ITALY]
         ► TRIPLE ENTENTE [FRANCE-RUSSIA-GREAT BRITAIN]

—SECOND IMAGE VERSUS THIRD IMAGE
EVENTS LEADING TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

June
28 Assassination of Franz Ferdinand [1]
29
30

July
1
2
3
4
5 Blank Check [2]
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 AUSTRIA Issues Ultimatum to Serbia [3]
24
25 SERBIA Responds to Ultimatum [4]
26
27
28 AUSTRIA Declares War Against Serbia [5]
29 AUSTRIA Begins Bombardment of Belgrade (Serbia) / RUSSIA Mobilizes [6]
30
31

August
1 GERMANY Mobilizes and Declares War Against Russia [7] / FRANCE Mobilizes [8]
2
3
4 GERMANY Invades Belgium [9]
5 ENGLAND Declares War Against Germany [10]
3. ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II

I. THESIS: IMMEDIATE, SYSTEMIC CAUSES
   AND DEEPER, DOMESTIC CAUSES

II. BACKGROUND: EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR I

III. SYSTEMIC CAUSES: DETERRENCE FAILURE
   —APPEASEMENT
   A. 9 GERMAN ASSAULTS ON “VERSAILLES”
      1. WITHDRAW LEAGUE OF NATIONS
      2. SAAR PLEBISCITE
      3. REPUDIATE DISARMAMENT CLAUSE
      4. REMILITARIZE RHINELAND
      5. INTERVENTION IN SPANISH CIVIL WAR
      6. ANSCHLUSS WITH AUSTRIA
      7. SUDETNELAND AND “MUNICH”
      8. INVASION OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA
      9. INVASION OF POLAND
   B. THE OTHER AXIS POWERS

IV. DOMESTIC CAUSES: SOURCES OF AGGRESSION
   A. DISSATISFACTION WITH “VERSAILLES”
   B. HYPER-NATIONALISM
   C. FAILURE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIES

V. TWO MODELS OF ORIGINS OF WAR
   A. CRISIS SPIRALLING OUT OF CONTROL
   B. FAILURE OF BALANCING / DETERRENCE
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Nov 11. Germany defeated</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Jun 28. Versailles Treaty concluded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 20. League of Nations opens</td>
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<td>1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 30. Mussolini assumes power in Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Jan 11. Ruhr Crisis [inflation begins]</td>
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<td>1924</td>
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<td>1928</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 29. Great Depression begins</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sep 18. Japan-Manchurian Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb 28. Manchukuo established by Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Jan. Plebiscite in the Saar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct 2. Italo-Ethiopian Crisis</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Mar 10. Germany renounce disarm clause</td>
<td>May 7. Germany re-militarizes Rhineland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Mar 11. Germany annexes Austria</td>
<td>Sep 30. Munich Agreement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Mar. Germany invades Bohemia-Moravia</td>
<td>Sep 1. Germany invades Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Jun 22. Germany invades Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec 7. Japan attacks USA</td>
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</table>
4. **ORIGINS OF COLD WAR IN EUROPE**

I. HOW DID EUROPE BECOME DIVIDED BETWEEN EAST AND WEST?
   A. DISAGREEMENT OVER SHAPE OF PEACE
   B. COMMUNIZATION OF EASTERN EUROPE
   C. GROWING WESTERN SOLIDARITY
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   E. DIRECT EAST-WEST CONFRONTATIONS

II. ORTHODOX ANSWER
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      1. THREE ORTHODOX EXPLANATIONS
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         B. MARXISM-LENINISM
         C. TOTALITARIANISM
      2. PATTERNS OF SOVIET EXPANSION
   B. USA RESPONSE—“CONTAINMENT”

III. REVISIONIST ANSWER
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   B. AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM
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      2. AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE
      3. CAPITALISM

IV. SYSTEMIC ANSWER
   A. BIPOLARIZATION
   B. POWER VACUUM

N.B. "COUNTERFACTUAL CLAIM"
## ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

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<th>Outside Europe</th>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>Feb Yalta Conference</td>
<td>May Germany surrenders</td>
<td>Jun U.N. Charter signed</td>
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<td>Aug Potsdam Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sep Japan surrenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Nov Yugoslavia communist govt</td>
<td>Jan Albania communist governmt</td>
<td>Mar Iron Curtain speech</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Jan COMECON established</td>
<td>Oct Bulgaria communist governmt</td>
<td>Dec Vietminh open hostilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb Poland communist governmt</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Mar Truman Doctrine</td>
<td>Jun Marshall Plan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug Hungary communist govt</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct Cominform established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec Rumania communist govt</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb Czechoslovakia Comm coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Mar Brussels Treaty</td>
<td></td>
<td>May North Korea established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun Berlin Blockade (to Oct 1949)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jul South Korea established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Apr NATO established</td>
<td>May FR Germany established</td>
<td>Sep PR China established</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct DR Germany established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun Korean War begins</td>
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</table>
5. **THE NEW EUROPEAN COOPERATION**

I. **EUROPEAN UNION**
   A. **THREE PILLARS OF THE EU**
   B. **STEP-BY-STEP INTEGRATION**
      —1951. **TREATY OF PARIS**
      —EURO COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
      —1957. **TREATY OF ROME**
      —EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
      —1965. **EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)**
      —1986. **SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT**
   C. **INTERNATIONAL V. SUPRA-NATIONAL ORGANS**
      1. **COUNCIL OF THE UNION**
         [A]. **EUROPEAN COUNCIL**
         [B]. **COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN UNION**
      2. **EUROPEAN COMMISSION**
      3. **EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**
      4. **COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES**
   D. **EUROPEAN POLICIES**
      1. **THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY (CAP)**

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         —MILITARY COMMITTEE
         —INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
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         —PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
         —NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL
   B. **DOES NATO HAVE A FUTURE? —FOUR PERSPECTIVES**
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I. WAS THE COLD WAR A LONG PEACE?
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      2. CENTRAL SYSTEM STANDOFF
         —ARMED CAMPS AND ARMS RACES
      3. COMPETITION IN PERIPHERAL SYSTEM
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         —SUPERPOWERS PROJECT POWER INTO THIRD WORLD
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         —JOHN MUELLER

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   B. DISPLACEMENT OF WARFARE TO PERIPHERY
      —J. DAVID SINGER

III. HAS THE POST-9/11 WORLD CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY?
   A. IS THE WAR WITH TERRORISM THE OVERARCHING ISSUE?
   B. IS THE WAR WITH TERRORISM FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT?
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II. DEBATES—REALISTS V. IDEALISTS (BOTH TRADITIONALISTS)
   TRADITIONALISTS VS. MODERNISTS

III. REALISTS AND SECURITY DILEMMA
   A. PRISONERS’ DILEMMA

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B. SECURITY DILEMMA

V. STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF SECURITY DILEMMA
   A. SOVEREIGNTY
      1. INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
         —WESTPHALIA (1648)
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   B. ANARCHY
   C. SELF-HELP
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      2. RULES OF ORDER
      3. INTERESTS OF SUBORDINATES
      4. SELF-INTEREST OF HEGEMON
   B. WHY WAR?—HEGEMONIC DECLINE
      —ALTERNATING PERIODS—PEACE / WAR
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   C. ENGINES OF CHANGE
      —A. F. K. ORGANSKI. POWER TRANSITION

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   B. CRITICS OF PAX AMERICANA
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      4. NO BENEFITS TO HEGEMON
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   A. AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
   B. 4 ELEMENTS OF BALANCE OF POWER
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      2. STABLE EQUILIBRIUM
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      2. HOMOGENEITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF GREAT POWERS
      3. BALANCER
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      2. RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION
      3. WARFARE
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         —CONSEQUENCE OF MULTIPOLARITY

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       2. UNACCEPTABLE
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II. MUTUAL HOSTAGE RELATIONSHIP
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   B. SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY
   C. UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE
   D. MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION

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   B. ROLE OF FORCES IN EQUILIBRIUM
   C. QUANTITATIVE ARMS RACES
   D. SUBJECTIVITY OF EQUILIBRIUM
   E. ALLIANCES

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   B. UNSTABLE UNDER ASSAULT OF TECHNOLOGY
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      2. DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
   C. CAN PROLIFERATION BE MANAGED?
   D. DANGEROUS
      1. EXTENDING NUCLEAR UMBRELLAS
      2. NUCLEAR UTILIZATION DOCTRINES
      3. NUCLEAR BRINKSMANSHIP
### The Nuclear Club, January 1, 1999
*(according to the Federation of American Scientists)*

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<th>Land-Based Missiles*</th>
<th>SLBMs</th>
<th>Bombers†</th>
<th>Strategic (Theater)</th>
<th>Warheads on Bombers</th>
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<td>ICBMs (on I/MRBMs)</td>
<td>Warheads on SLBMs</td>
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<td>444 (&gt;500)</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>64</td>
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11. INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL POWER

I. TRADITIONAL IDEALIST RESPONSE

II. INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
   A. PROPONENTS’ CASE—WORLD AND EUROPEAN COURTS
      —PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-45
      —INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 1945-
      —COURT OF JUSTICE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
      —EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
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      1. COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
      2. IMPARTIAL JUDGES
      3. FAIR PROCEDURE
      4. BINDING DECISIONS

III. COLLECTIVE SECURITY
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      2. UNITED NATIONS, 1945-
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         —RECORD OF PEACE-KEEPING
      3. TRANSFORMING NATO
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      2. PAYING PRICE OF ENFORCEMENT

IV. SUPRANATIONAL GOVERNANCE
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   B. CRITICS’ CASE—IMPRactical AND UNDESIRABLE
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II. **STABLE V. REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS**

---STANLEY HOFFMANN

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B. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

C. FORMALIZATION OF REGIMES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW
   1. SOURCES: CUSTOM AND TREATY
   2. ORIGINS OF STATE OBLIGATION
      ---RATIFICATION / ACCESSION

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B. REVULSION AGAINST WAR
   ---JOHN MUELLER

C. POSTMATERIALISM
   ---RONALD INGLEHART

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A. LIMITED ROLE OF IDEAS AS CONSTRAINT ON CONFLICT
   1. NORM OF SOVEREIGNTY
   2. NO ENFORCEMENT
   3. NO SECURITY REGIMES
   4. NO SECURITY SPILLOVER OF REGIMES

B. DIRECTION OF CHANGE
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   2. CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
13. NEW ACTORS TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN RELATIONS

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   1. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS
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      —LABOR MOVEMENT
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   A. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
      —DAVID RICARDO
   B. FREE TRADE
      1. TARIFFS
      2. IMPORT QUOTAS
   C. BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM
      1. GATT
         —MOST FAVORED NATION PRINCIPLE
         —URUGUAY ROUND (1986-1993)
         —WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
      2. IMF

III. **INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION**
   A. TRAGEDY OF GLOBAL COMMONS
   B. COOPERATION TO SAVE ENVIRONMENT
      1. EARTH SUMMIT (1992)
      2. CLIMATE TREATY
      3. BIODIVERSITY TREATY
## Comparative Advantage

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Porsches</th>
<th>Tons of Asphalt</th>
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<td><strong>No Specialization / No Trade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>AND 5</td>
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<td>Country B</td>
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<td>AND 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Output</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>AND 15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Specialization / No Trade</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Specialization and Trade</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Output</td>
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15. **ARE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REALLY CHANGING?**

I. RELATIVE POWER: STATE / NEW ACTORS
   A. NEW ACTORS AS TOOLS OF STATES
   B. THREE EXAMPLES

II. HOW INTERDEPENDENT ARE WE?
   A. LIMITS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
   B. TRENDS OVER TIME
      —STEPHEN KRASNER

III. PERSISTENCE OF INEQUALITIES
      —NORTH-SOUTH GAP

IV. NATIONALIZATION OF POLITICS
   A. WINNERS AND LOSERS
   B. NEW AGENDA OF PROTECTION

V. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
   A. IMF: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
   B. GATT / WTO: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
   C. CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF STATE

VI. CONFLICTS AMONG THE INTERDEPENDENT
   A. INTERDEPENDENCE AND CONFLICT
   B. NEW AGENDA AS SOURCE OF CONFLICT
   C. TRENDS OVER TIME
      —LESTER THUROW: NICHE / HEAD-TO-HEAD
   D. DEFENSIVE STATE POLICIES