The Hispanic Vote in the 2004 Presidential Election: Insecurity and Moral Concerns

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This paper examines Hispanic voting behavior in the 2004 Presidential election. Our research makes a significant contribution to the literature on Hispanic politics, as this is the first study to apply theories of issue and economic voting to a nationwide sample of Hispanic voters. We demonstrate that, similar to Anglos, issues and ideology were highly influential in the vote choice of Hispanics in the 2004 election. However, using the best available data on Hispanic voting behavior for this election, a statewide aggregation of the National Election Pool (NEP), we demonstrate that in this election Hispanic voters placed more emphasis on moral values issues and national security than on traditional domestic issues such as the economy and education. This accounted for Republican gains beyond the overall increase in Bush's vote share from 2000 to 2004. We also show that moral values and national security had roughly equal importance in Bush's victory.

For more than 30 years, the Hispanic electorate's estimated support of the Democratic presidential candidate has never dropped below 60% (Schmal 2004).[1] However, in the 2004 presidential election, according to most exit polls, Bush's share of the Hispanic vote increased to 40% or more.[2] There are two main theories that can explain Bush's relatively strong performance among Hispanics in 2004. First, the set of issues collectively referred to as "moral values" in 2004 may have been a major factor. This includes the issue of gay marriage, which gained unusual currency in 2004 with the Vermont decision to allow same-sex marriages and the issue's presence on the ballot in a number of states. This also includes abortion: since most Hispanics in the United States are Catholic, and are more religious than their Anglo counterparts, Republicans hoped that this issue could attract Hispanic voters to Republican candidates. Second, the issue of national security could explain this shift in Hispanic support for Bush in 2004. It was

the first presidential election following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and it was held while the United States continued to suffer casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq. In all available polling data Bush held a large lead over Kerry in his perceived ability to deal with national security issues. These two explanations obviously have very different political implications. If moral values swayed Hispanic voters, then we argue that, if this is a Republican-owned issue, they may be able to consolidate their gains among Hispanic voters beyond 2004. However, if Bush's success in 2004 was based on his perceived strength over Kerry on national security, then Republican success with Hispanic voters might be restricted to the 2004 election for two reasons: first, Bush himself will not be running for office again; second, national security, as the issue was constructed in 2004, may not continue to be a salient issue.

In this paper we demonstrate that national security issues and "moral values" together dominated Hispanic

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[1] Throughout this paper we will use the term "Hispanic," though we could just as easily have used the term "Latino" to describe voters of Hispanic or Latino identity. We use the term "Anglo" to describe non-Hispanic Whites.

[2] According to the national sample of the National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, 44% of the Hispanic electorate supported George W. Bush. An independent national exit poll conducted by *The Los Angeles Times* found that 45% of the Hispanic electorate voted for Bush. The National Annenberg Election Survey estimated that 41% of the Hispanic electorate supported Bush in 2004, an increase of about 6 percentage points over the 2000 Annenberg estimate. The William C. Velasquez Institute's 2004 exit poll gave Bush a lower share of the Latino vote, only 35.1%.

voter choice in this election relative to more typical domestic issues featured in past presidential elections such as education or health care. We also show that they contributed roughly equally to Bush's victory. We see as well that one domestic issue, the state of the economy, played an important role in this election. However, on the issues of terrorism, national security, and Iraq, the candidates were clearly *not* waltzing in front of a blind audience (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989). After estimating a multivariate model of voter choice, we demonstrate the impact of different issues at the level of the individual voter, and we present estimates of the effect of voters' views on national security, the economy, and moral values on the aggregate election results. Additionally, while the focus of our paper is on Hispanic presidential vote choice, we provide comparative results for Anglo voters.

Hispanic Partisanship and Issue Preferences

There has been a dramatic increase in the amount of research on Hispanic politics in the United States in the past 20 years. The continuing growth of the Hispanic population has made them an attractive segment of the electorate for politicians, and their concentration in battleground locations such as the Southwest and Florida has magnified their importance in presidential races. However, much of the research to date has focused on determining which Hispanics are likely to turnout, how they can be mobilized to vote, and what their partisan preferences are. But rather surprisingly, little research has examined another critical factor—what influences the way Hispanics cast their ballots in Presidential elections? No study, to date, has applied the major theories of voting behavior (for example, the spatial model of voting, any of the variations of economic models of voting, or models of issue salience) to the presidential voting behavior of Hispanics.[3] Instead, the research on Hispanic vote choice has mainly focused on local and state elections (Abrajano, Nagler, and Alvarez 2005; Cain and Kiewiet 1984; Falcon 1989; Graves and Lee 2000; Hajnal, Gerber, and Louch 2002; Hero and Beatty 1989; Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001). Several edited volumes have looked at the Hispanic vote (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1996,

2000, 2005), but again, these are state-by-state analyses primarily regarding turnout and mobilization. Even the *Annual Review of Political Science* on Hispanic politics and ethnic politics (de la Garza 2004; Segura and Rodrigues 2006) only discusses voting behavior with respect to a Hispanic's willingness to support a candidate based on shared ethnic identity, and these findings are limited to statewide samples. In conducting a comprehensive literature search on Hispanic or Hispanic voting using the Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (1972–2006), we found only eight refereed articles focusing on Hispanic voting behavior: presidential elections (1); senate (1); congressional (1); mayoral (3); and statewide (2).[4]

The one article that examines Hispanic voting behavior at the presidential level (Welch and Sigelman 1993) does not account for respondents' issue opinions or ideologies in explaining Hispanic vote choice. Moreover the research bibliography *Hispanics and Politics* (Garcia et al. 1991) includes no references pertaining to Hispanic voting behavior. So despite over 30 years of research in Hispanic politics, we know little about the factors that guide the way Hispanics cast their ballots in presidential elections and little as to whether they adhere to the dominant theories of voting behavior. The aim of our research is to fill this gap in the Hispanic politics literature and establish the basis for additional work in this area.

Even with this gap in the literature, the research on Hispanic *partisanship* provides us with some foundation for understanding which issues may influence Hispanic political behavior. In every presidential election for the past 30 years, the Democratic Party has won a solid majority of the votes of Hispanics and other racial minorities (Schmal 2004). This could be because the Democrats have traditionally been more sympathetic to minority groups and minority interests (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991). From 1960 to 2000, black support for Democratic presidential candidates consistently ranged from 75% to 80%, and Hispanic support of Democratic presidential nominees has always exceeded 60% (Schmal 2004). So why have Hispanics' partisan alliances remained so strong and stable over the past 30 years? While Hispanic voters have generally supported the Democratic Party (DeSipio 1996; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992; Garcia and de

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[3]Welch and Sigelman (1993) examine the presidential exit polls from 1980 to 1988, but they do not control for respondent's issue preferences. Leal et al. (2005) examine the Hispanic vote in the 2004 election, but issue preferences are also omitted from the analysis.

[4]We searched for the terms ''Latino'' or ''Hispanic'' and Voting and found 160 matches. Of these, eight focus on Latino voting behavior. There are three additional nonrefereed articles: on the 2004 presidential election (Leal et al. 2005), the 2004 L.A. mayoral election (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2005), and the 2003 gubernatorial recall election in California (Barreto and Ramirez 2004).

la Garza 1977), partisan differences exist in the Hispanic electorate, based largely on their country of origin. The historical experiences of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in the United States aligned them with the Democratic Party (Pycior 1997), while the experiences of Cubans led to support for the Republicans (Garcia 1996; Moreno 1997).

Beyond these historical and sociological explanations for Hispanic partisanship, efforts by Cain et al. (1991) and Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) explore other factors that could explain Hispanic party identification. Cain et al. (1991) test several hypotheses regarding the acquisition of partisanship by U.S. immigrants and find that Hispanic partisanship is best explained by the "minority group status hypothesis," which suggests that perceived economic discrimination experienced by Hispanics makes them more inclined to support the Democratic Party, since Democrats have traditionally advocated the interests of minority groups. They do not find support for the "economic advancement" hypothesis, which contends that as their economic status increases, second– and third–generation Hispanics are more likely to become Republicans than are first–generation Hispanics.

Others have looked to political issues and ideology as possible determinants of Hispanic partisanship. Popular discussions note that many Republicans, especially those in the Southwest (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003), believe that Hispanics' social conservatism may realign them with the Republican Party if they emphasize issues that they believe will appeal to these voters. This appears to be a compelling strategy, given that issues play an important role in voters' assessments of presidential candidates and their vote decisions (Carmines and Stimson 1980; Jackson 1975; Key 1966; Page and Brody 1972; Page and Jones 1979; Pomper 1972). One issue that many expected to work in the Republicans' favor was abortion. Using data from the 2000 presidential election, Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) found little support for the hypothesis that Hispanic Democrats would "convert" to the Republican Party based on their prolife position on abortion. But this does not mean that abortion, combined with other social issues, may not play joint roles in the vote decisions of Hispanics.

The theme of "moral values" received much attention in the 2004 presidential election. This term could have encompassed abortion, the debate over gay marriage, and Bush and Kerry's positions on these contentious issues. The Republican Party's strategy to emphasize moral values in their campaign fits squarely with Leege et al.'s (2002) argument that cultural politics are an important component of American campaigns and elections in the post-New Deal era. Leege et al. (2002) define cultural or moral values issues as one's beliefs about how individuals should live, thereby evoking one's fundamental and social values. They find voters to be highly responsive to these appeals, as cultural and moral values can be characterized as an "easy issue" (Carmines and Stimson 1980)—symbolic and normative in nature as well as easy to communicate to voters. As the Republican presidential campaign in 2004 capitalized on cultural themes (e.g., moral order) to mobilize and turnout their base, this particular platform was perceived to advantage Bush in his appeals to the Hispanic electorate as Hispanics are socially conservative.[5]

But concerns about terrorism and the war in Iraq also took center stage in the 2004 presidential election. Hispanic surveys conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center in 2004 indicated that Hispanics felt that while terrorism was important, Bush should also concentrate on the economy.[6] So for Hispanics, along with the other salient issues of 2004, the economy and jobs were also on their list of issue priorities.

In addition to the specific issues that rose to prominence in the 2004 presidential election, voters' ideologies, partisanship, and perceptions of the economy play an important role in their vote decisions (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 2002; Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Page and Brody 1972). Hispanics are no exception to this rule, particularly with regards to their perceptions about the economy and jobs. In fact, according to a poll taken by Democracy Corps in July 2004, 40% of Hispanics reported that "the economy and jobs" were the most important issue to them. Voters whose decisions are influenced by the economy evaluate the previous performance of the macro economy or their own personal finances under the incumbent party and tend to select the party possessing the best economic record (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Markus 1988; Rosenstone 1984; Tufte 1978).

Several strains of research in political science document the effects of issues on vote choice. The spatial proximity model suggests that voters will choose the candidate closest to their own position on the issues (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1985). And the directional model suggests that voters will prefer candidates on the same side of the issue that they are (Rabinowitz and

[5]A Democracy Corps survey (July 2004) reports that 29% of Hispanics "would not support a candidate who is open to gay marriage." http://democracycorps.com/reports/analyses/Bush_Faltering_Among_Hispanics.pdf.

[6]For more information on these polls, go to http://www.pewHispanic.org/reports.

Macdonald 1989). In addition, the salience of issues is believed to affect vote choice (Bernstein 1995; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968; Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby 1982; RePass 1971). To clearly distinguish between these theories of issue voting, we need much richer data than what we have available to us: we need to know both the positions of voters and candidates on the issues and the salience voters attach to each of the issues. In our case, we only know the issue that the voter feels is most salient; the data we use here does not include information on voter or candidate issue positions. Thus we can determine whether or not issues matter, but we cannot explicate the specific mechanism by which they matter.

We contend that the combined concern for moral values and national security weighed more heavily in Hispanics' vote decisions than did domestic policy issues such as health care and education. Below we demonstrate that moral issues and national security played nearly equal roles in explaining Bush's showing among Hispanic voters in 2004 and that each of these issues had a larger substantive effect on Hispanic voters than the traditionally important domestic issues like education and health care. And again, while not the main focus of this paper, we also show that moral values had a substantively larger impact on Hispanics than on Anglos.

Survey Methodology and Research Design

Our analysis uses survey data from the 2004 National Election Pool (NEP) state exit polls.[7] We include states whose Hispanic population comprises at least 6% of the total state population. Also, given our research question, we only examine states where voters were asked what they believe is the "most important issue" for the election. Our sample thus consists of voters from eight states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and New Jersey.[8] This sample represents approxi-

mately 57% of Hispanics in the United States and provides us with 1,807 Hispanic voters.[9]

Exit polls are not often used for scholarly research. However, the only surveys from the 2004 election with sufficient Hispanic voters to test competing theories of voter behavior are the NEP samples. Using the pooled state exit polls provides us with a sample of Hispanic voters large enough to draw reliable inferences from, which would not be possible with smaller-sample surveys such as the National Election Studies. We use the aggregation of the statewide NEP samples because they provide estimates that are somewhere near the midpoint of the range of exit poll or postelection survey estimates of the Hispanic vote in this election. The NEP also includes questions sufficient to test our hypotheses.

Given the debate about the extent of Hispanic support for Bush in the aftermath of the 2004 election, we are aware that these statewide exit polls may not produce point estimates of each candidate's vote shares among Hispanic voters that are necessarily unbiased.[10] Since the various exit polls taken of Hispanic voters in the 2004 presidential election disagree, we cannot adjudicate which is producing unbiased estimates of the degree to which Hispanic voters supported Kerry or Bush. Rather we test competing theories that may account for *why* Hispanic voters cast ballots for the two candidates. Our analysis focuses less on inferences drawn from the aggregated point estimates of candidate vote shares; instead, we focus on multivariate analysis of the voting decision and the counterfactual *differences* in vote shares based on alternative hypothetical scenarios of voter preferences. To produce consistent estimates of a multivariate analysis of vote choice we do not necessarily need a sample of voters that is representative of the population.[11] As long as there is sufficient variation in the characteristics of the voters sampled, we can obtain consistent estimates of the model based on the data at hand and thus evaluate

[7]The state exit polls are distinct from the *national* NEP exit poll. For more information on the design of these exit polls, go to: http://www.exit-poll.net/election-night/MethodsStatementStateGeneric.pdf.

[8]Although the state populations in Texas, Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts contain more than 6% of Hispanics, the statewide exit polls taken in Texas and Connecticut did not include the "most important issue" question. Illinois and Massachusetts were excluded from the sample due to multicollinearity. There was not enough variation in the responses provided by the Hispanic voters living in these two states to estimate our model.

[9]Had Texas, Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts been included in the sample, this percentage jumps to 82%. These percentages were calculated using Census data on the Hispanic population from 2003.

[10]For a summary of this debate, see Suro, Fry, and Passel (2005).

[11]Selecting on the dependent variables—vote choice—would give us a sample that would produce inconsistent estimates. But all hypotheses about potential sources of error in the exit poll estimates are based on problems of sampling on voter characteristics that are for us explanatory variables. For example, it would not cause any problem in estimating our multivariate model of vote choice if our sample had "too many" rich voters, though the likely impact would be for the sample to have a higher Bush vote than the population.

competing causal theories of voter behavior. In this goal we are successful, as the NEP statewide samples provide considerable leverage for testing competing hypotheses of Hispanic voter choice in this election.

The survey questions used in our analysis pertain to voters' demographics, opinions on the war in Iraq, their evaluation of their personal finances, and their opinion as to the "ONE issue that mattered most" in deciding how they voted for president. It would be desirable if we had a cardinal, as opposed to ordinal, measure of salience. A voter could rank two issues as being very close in salience, but the available question wording permits only one response. As such, we proceed knowing that we have a potential problem of measurement error, one that may very well attenuate our estimates of the impact of issues on voter choice.

In addition to these questions, voters were also asked their party identification and ideology. Since we are interested in determining what issues influenced Hispanic voters in their vote decision, we specify a vote choice model where the dependent variable is dichotomous, with a "1" indicating a vote for Kerry and "0" indicating a vote for Bush.[12] As our dependent variable is a binary choice between Kerry or Bush, we use logit analysis. To determine the relative importance of the explanatory variables regarding vote choice, we compute predicted probabilities and first–difference estimates for different values of the explanatory variables. We use these predicted probabilities and first–difference estimates to test a number of interesting counterfactuals. If Hispanics had strongly approved of the war rather than disapproving of it, would this have substantially decreased Kerry's share of the vote among Hispanics? Counterfactuals such as these allow us to determine which mattered more for the election outcome: moral values, national security, the economy, or other issues?

Findings

We begin by presenting, in Table 1, summary statistics on the political preferences of voters in the NEP exit poll samples, by their racial and ethnic identity as well as for all respondents. In the states included in our sample, Bush received 47.1% of the overall two-candidate vote; the exit poll estimate for

the Bush vote from these states—which we report in the last column—is 49.8%.[13] We present information from these statewide samples on presidential preferences, most important issue opinions, assessments of their personal finances, and opinions on the war in Iraq. First, note that our sample of voters from the statewide NEP surveys give Bush 41.5% of support from Hispanics and Kerry 58.5% of support from Hispanics. These percentages differ from the estimates of the nationwide NEP, but are in line with the preelection polling cited in the introduction to our paper.

Hispanic respondents were more likely to choose the economy (22.7%) than any other issue as the most important issue in determining their vote choice, followed by terrorism (21%), moral values (18.2%) and Iraq (18%). But for Anglos the most important issue ordering differed, with terrorism (25%), Iraq (23.3%), and moral values (22.3%) being the three most important issues that influenced their vote decision; the economy ranked much lower for Anglos than Hispanics.[14] Also, while all three non-Anglo groups had a largely shared set of issue concerns, Blacks were more concerned about the economy and jobs than Hispanics (by over 10%), but Asians were somewhat more concerned than Hispanics about both the war in Iraq and terrorism. This suggests that moral values may not necessarily be a major factor driving Hispanics to vote Republican; Hispanics were significantly *less* likely to name "moral values" as the most important issue than were Anglos (18.2% vs. 22.3%).[15]

Table 1 also presents the opinions of the various racial and ethnic groups towards their own pocketbook finances. Anglos were more likely to say their finances were better than worse (34.9% vs. 23.7%).

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[12]Too few respondents offered a candidate choice other than Kerry and Bush for reliable analysis, thus we restricted our analysis to those respondents who reported voting for either of the two major party candidates.

[13]In an appendix we provide a table with data from the eight states included in our analysis. Here we compare the overall unweighted exit poll estimates of the two-candidate vote, the weighted exit poll estimate, and the actual two-candidate vote as compiled from David Leip's "Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections"(http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/data.php?year=2004&datatype=national&def=1&f=0).

[14]The proportion of Hispanic voters naming each issue other than taxes and health care as the most important issue differed from the similar Anglo voter proportions, and these differences are statistically significant at the 95% level.

[15]Of course "moral values" could mean different things to Hispanics than it does to Anglos, but based on the campaign messages produced by Bush and Kerry in their English and Spanish-language ads, they emphasized similar moral issues—the Laci Peterson law, partial birth abortion, parental notification for teenage abortions, allowing schools to hand out morning after pills without parental notification (Segal 2004). Thus, voters may have been primed to think of moral values issues in this manner.

TABLE 1   Vote and Issues by Race

Variable	Race or Ethnicity of Voter					All Voters
	Anglo	Black	Hispanic	Asian	Other	
Presidential Vote						
Bush	55.8	15.7	41.5	41.2	39.4	49.8
Kerry	44.2	84.3	58.5	58.8	60.6	50.2
Most Important Issue						
Taxes	5.0	5.8	4.8	7.9	6.3	5.1
Education	3.3	7.1	8.4	4.0	8.8	4.5
Iraq	23.3	20.6	18.0	23.7	19.8	22.2
Terrorism	25.0	10.5	21.0	21.5	16.9	23.1
Economy	15.2	33.5	22.7	25.7	23.2	18.0
Moral values	22.3	11.7	18.2	9.7	18.0	20.5
Health care	6.1	10.9	6.8	7.5	7.0	6.7
Financial Situation						
Better	34.9	19.0	30.1	30.7	26.1	32.6
About the same	41.5	40.9	38.5	42.7	40.6	41.0
Worse	23.7	40.1	31.4	26.6	33.3	26.4
Iraq War						
Strongly approve	32.4	8.1	25.5	24.3	20.4	29.0
Somewhat approve	24.4	14.5	22.0	16.8	17.6	23.0
Somewhat disapprove	13.1	21.4	17.8	21.6	18.5	14.7
Strongly disapprove	30.1	56.1	34.7	37.3	43.5	33.3
Number of Respondents	11,867	1224	2645	386	562	16,853

Entries in columns 2-6 are column percentages, computed from the statewide NEP surveys used in our analysis. These estimates have been weighted using the sample weights provided by the NEP.

But Hispanics were mixed in their assessment of their pocketbook finances, with 38.5% seeing them as about the same, 31.4% viewing them as worse, and 30.1% seeing them as better. Blacks were the most negative about their personal financial situation, with 40.1% saying that it had grown worse. While a majority of Anglo voters (56.8%) approved of the war in Iraq, a majority of Hispanic voters opposed the war (52.5%). Both Asian and black voters were even more likely to be opposed to the war, with 58.9% of Asians opposing the war and 77.5% of blacks also in opposition to the war.

In Table 2 we show how vote choice was a function of both the voter's views on the war and their view of their personal financial situation. First, in parentheses, we give the percentages of Hispanic voters in our sample who had the various combinations of opinions. For example, 2.3% of Hispanic voters felt that their personal financial situation had become worse *and* strongly approved of the Iraq war. The entries next to those in parentheses give the percentage of Hispanic voters in each cell who voted for Kerry; thus the first cell of data in Table 2 shows that of the 2.3% of Hispanic voters with this

combination of opinions, 42.4% of them supported Kerry.

What we see in Table 2 is the dramatic effect of these two issues on Hispanic vote choice in 2004. While few Hispanic voters are in the first row of this table (25.6%), note that no matter what their perception of their personal finances, Hispanic voters who strongly approved of the war were also supporters of President Bush. Yet in the next row, those who only somewhat approved of the war in Iraq are likely to be Kerry supporters, if they saw their own personal finances as having worsened (72.7% of Hispanic voters in that cell of the table supported Kerry). But if they felt their personal finances had improved they were likely to be Bush supporters (20.2% of Hispanic voters in that cell supported Kerry), yielding more than a 50-percentage point difference across the columns of this row. But when we look at Hispanic voters who strongly disapproved of the war in Iraq, they strongly supported Kerry (over 89%), no matter how they evaluated their own financial situation. Table 2 also includes Anglo voters, for comparison. While at the time of the survey Anglos were not as likely to be opposed to the war as were Hispanics, the

TABLE 2   Support for Kerry, by Opinions on War and Financial Perceptions

	Hispanics Financial Situation			Anglos Financial Situation		
Opinion on Iraqi War	Worse	Same	Better	Worse	Same	Better
Strongly Approve	(2.3%) 42.4%	(8.1%) 7.5%	(15.2%) 3.6%	(2.0%) 17.2%	(11.5%) 2.4%	(19.5%) 1.4%
Somewhat Approve	(3.8%) 72.7%	(9.8%) 36.0%	(8.5%) 20.2%	(3.8%) 46.5%	(10.7%) 18.8%	(10.3%) 9.0%
Somewhat Disapprove	(7.5%) 89.5%	(7.4%) 84.0%	(2.8%) 72.5%	(4.4%) 81.5%	(6.0%) 75.6%	(2.6%) 55.3%
Strongly Disapprove	(17.9%) 99.5%	(13.1%) 92.5%	(3.7%) 89.6%	(13.4%) 97.7%	(12.6%) 95.5%	(3.3%) 89.7%

Entries in parentheses are the % of voters in the given category.
Entries not in parentheses are the % of voters in the given category who voted for Kerry. These estimates have been weighted using the sample weights provided by the NEP.

pattern of support for Kerry increasing dramatically with opposition to the war is the same.

Multivariate Analysis of Hispanic Voter Choice

To gauge the relative importance of issues, economic perceptions, and reactions to the Iraq war on Hispanic voting in the 2004 presidential election, we provide estimates of our logit model in Table 3. Our explanatory variables control for voters' partisanship, ideology, demographics, evaluation of their personal finances, their view of the most important issue, and their perception of the war in Iraq. The demographic variables included the voter's education and income level, as well as their gender, age, which state they live in, and their religious affiliation. For one's religion, we created two dummy variables for whether the voter was a Protestant or Catholic.[16] We included dummy variables for voters with no high school degree, a high school degree, some college, and a college degree. The excluded category is voters with postgraduate education. For income we created dummy variables for middle- and high-income voters, with low-income voters serving as the omitted category. Voters were asked to choose the most important issue from a list that included taxes, education, Iraq, terrorism, the economy, moral values, and health care. Dummy variables were created for each issue, and each dummy except for "taxes" was included in the right-hand side of the model. Thus each of these dummy variables for an issue should be interpreted as the marginal impact of the voter listing that issue as most important, *relative* to

whether the voter has listed "taxes" as the most important issue. We also use a direct measure of voter disapproval of the Iraq war, captured as a four–category response ranging from strongly approve (1) to strongly disapprove (4).[17] Finally, we control for voters' assessments of their personal financial situation.[18]

As expected, the coefficients of partisanship and ideology are statistically significant and correctly signed. Controlling for other factors in the model, Protestants are significantly less likely to vote for Kerry than are other non-Catholics. Also, older voters, ceteris paribus, were less likely to vote for Kerry. None of the coefficients for education, nor any of the coefficients for income, were individually statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising given that partisanship, ideology, and several issue measures are included in the model. More importantly, the estimates in Table 3 also demonstrate that issues played an important role in the way Hispanics voted in the 2004 presidential elections. The coefficients for voters' positions on the war and their evaluations of their financial situation were statistically significant. Ceteris paribus, voters with positive evaluations of their personal finances were more likely to vote for the incumbent. And the more negative a voter felt about the war in Iraq, the more likely they were to support Kerry. Here we also estimate an identical model for Anglo voters and the same pattern of coefficients emerge; Anglo voters who felt their personal finances had improved were less likely to vote for Kerry than were those who did not, and

[16]The omitted category here includes all non-Christians as well as nonresponses. We also estimated the model with an additional dummy variable for non-Christians; the results remain unchanged.

[17]We are thus treating the variable as cardinal rather than simply ordinal. We also estimated the model with three separate dummies, thus dropping the cardinality assumption. Since the three estimated coefficients were almost perfectly linear, we report the more parsimonious model with the cardinality assumption.

[18]Additional information on the coding of the variables is available in the appendix.

TABLE 3 Logit Estimates: Probability of Voting for Kerry

Variable	Hispanics		Anglos	
	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Constant	−1.69*	(0.72)	−3.07**	(0.36)
Democrat	1.25**	(0.25)	1.24**	(0.12)
Republican	−1.46**	(0.30)	−1.67**	(0.12)
Liberal	0.54*	(0.27)	0.79**	(0.14)
Conservative	−1.07**	(0.26)	−0.76**	(0.13)
Demographics				
Woman	−0.13	(0.21)	−0.35**	(0.10)
Protestant	−1.04*	(0.43)	−0.43**	(0.13)
Catholic	0.25	(0.23)	−0.34**	(0.12)
Age	−0.12*	(0.05)	−0.09**	(0.02)
No HS Degree	−0.03	(0.50)	−0.30	(0.33)
HS Degree	−0.07	(0.40)	−0.63**	(0.17)
Some College	−0.23	(0.38)	−0.26	(0.15)
College Degree	0.12	(0.40)	−0.20	(0.15)
Middle-Income	0.30	(0.26)	−0.14	(0.14)
High-Income	−0.09	(0.32)	−0.16	(0.14)
Most Important Issue[a]				
Health Care	2.10**	(0.57)	1.97**	(0.28)
Economy	1.85**	(0.43)	1.80**	(0.23)
Iraq	1.15**	(0.43)	1.65**	(0.22)
Education	1.08*	(0.47)	1.15**	(0.29)
Moral Values	−0.96*	(0.42)	−0.00	(0.22)
Terrorism	−0.74†	(0.41)	−0.63**	(0.23)
Other Issues				
Personal Finances Better	−2.15**	(0.30)	−1.29**	(0.14)
Personal Finances Same	−1.36**	(0.28)	−0.58**	(0.12)
Disapproval of Iraq War	1.59**	(0.12)	1.75**	(0.06)
State Dummies				
Arizona	−0.72†	(0.43)	−0.01	(0.20)
Colorado	−0.11	(0.43)	−0.34	(0.18)
Florida	−0.61	(0.40)	−0.07	(0.19)
Nevada	0.29	(0.43)	0.14	(0.19)
New Mexico	−0.73*	(0.34)	−0.33	(0.23)
New York	0.31	(0.55)	0.08	(0.22)
New Jersey	−0.89†	(0.52)	.07	(0.22)
N	1807		8540	
Log-likelihood	−334.653		−1469.27	

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
[a]Taxes is the omitted issue.

those who strongly disapproved of the war were more likely to vote for Kerry.

In addition, all of the coefficients on the "most important issue" variables are statistically significant for Hispanics, suggesting that the salience of specific issues to individual voters framed their vote choice. The issues that advantaged Kerry were health care, the economy, Iraq, and education. Voters who listed any of these as their most important issue were, ceteris paribus, more likely to vote for Kerry. But Hispanic voters who ranked moral values or terror-ism as their most important issue, rather than taxes, were more likely to vote for Bush, controlling for other factors in the model.[19] This would seem to bode well for Kerry as the issues that favored him among Hispanic voters were listed as the most important issue by 22.7% (the economy), 18% (Iraq),

[19]We do not know if voters who ranked moral values as most salient necessarily preferred Bush to Kerry on this issue. But the logical inference, given our results, is that most did. Bernstein (1995) has shown that salience and issue preferences are correlated.

TABLE 4 Predicted Probabilities and First Differences

	Hispanics			Anglos		
Scenario	*Pr* of Voting for Kerry	Marginal Impact	Std Error	*Pr* of Voting for Kerry	Marginal Impact	Std Error
Baseline	.66	–	–	.46	–	–
Most Important Issue						
Education	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	(–)
Health Care	.83	.17	(.10)	.65	.20	(.06)
Economy	.80	.14	(.08)	.62	.16	(.06)
Iraq War	.68	.02	(.09)	.58	.12	(.06)
Taxes	.42	−.24	(.11)	.21	−.24	(.06)
Terrorism	.26	−.40	(.08)	.13	−.33	(.06)
Moral Values	.22	−.44	(.09)	.21	−.24	(.06)
Personal Finances						
Personal Finances are Better	.49	−.18	(.06)	.29	−.16	(.03)
Personal Finances are the Same	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	(–)
Personal Finances are Worse	.87	.21	(.07)	.60	.14	(.03)
Perceptions of the Iraq War						
Strongly Approve	.31	−.35	(.04)	.13	−.33	(.04)
Somewhat Approve	.66	–	(–)	.46	–	–
Somewhat Disapprove	.90	.23	(.07)	.82	.37	(.03)
Strongly Disapprove	.98	.31	(.11)	.96	.51	(.06)

Entries in the second and third columns are probability estimates. They are calculated using CLARIFY for a hypothetical voter described in the text.

8.4% (education), and 6.8% (health care) of Hispanic voters. When we compare these results to what we obtain for Anglo voters, the most striking difference pertains to the issue of moral values. The estimated coefficient on moral values (relative to taxes) as being the most important issue for Anglos was zero—thus, consistent with conventional wisdom, Hispanic voters were more susceptible to the Republican appeal on moral values issues than were Anglos.[20]

To determine the impact of each explanatory variable on vote choice, we compute the probability that a hypothetical voter supports Kerry under two circumstances: first when we define all values for our hypothetical voter at fixed positions; and second after we adjust the value of only one variable for our hypothetical voter. The difference between these two estimated probabilities reveals the impact of changing the single variable, with all other explanatory variables held constant.[21] We constructed our hypothetical voter by setting all variables other than the most important issue variables to their mean or mode. Thus our hypothetical voter is female, identifies as a Democrat, and is ideologically moderate. She is also Catholic, between the ages of 30 and 39, possesses some college education, an income between $50,000 and $74,999, and perceives education as the most important issue in determining her vote.[22]

In the first seven rows of Table 4 we give the probability that our hypothetical voter supported Kerry for each of the possible most important issue responses. The first column gives the predicted probability of our hypothetical voter supporting Kerry if she lists the row variable as the most important issue. The second column gives the increase in the probability of voting for Kerry if the hypothetical voter gives the row variable as the most important issue rather than education (i.e., relative to

[20]This coefficient estimate is relative to the impact of the omitted category, which is taxes. Thus the coefficient on moral values suggests not that moral values had no impact on the vote decision of Anglos, but that, ceteris paribus, Anglos who felt that moral values was the most important issue were no more likely to vote for Kerry than were Anglos who felt that taxes was the most important issue. Or, that, ceteris paribus, Anglos who felt that moral values was the most important issue were less likely to vote for Kerry than were Anglos who listed health care, the economy, Iraq, or education as the most important issue. However, Anglos who listed moral values were more likely to vote for Kerry than were those who listed terrorism as the most important issue, all other things being equal.

[21]The calculations are performed with the CLARIFY package in STATA (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2001).

[22]We performed similar calculations for Anglos. Our hypothetical Anglo voter is an independent, moderate, male, religion other than Protestant or Catholic, between the ages of 50 and 59, with some college education, income between $50,000 and $74,999, and felt that education was the most important issue in determining his vote.

TABLE 5   Aggregate Predicted Vote Share for Different Counterfactuals Respondents are Moved Out of the Row-Variable Category

	Hispanic Voters		Anglo Voters	
Variable of Interest	Predicted Kerry Share of Vote[a]	Predicted Increase in Kerry Share of Vote[b]	Predicted Kerry Share of Vote[a]	Predicted Increase in Kerry Share of Vote[b]
Baseline	60.0	–	45.0	–
Taxes Most Important Issue	60.2 (0.6)	0.2 (0.2)	45.2 (0.2)	0.2 (0.1)
Economy Most Important Issue	57.6 (0.7)	−2.4 (0.3)	43.3 (0.3)	−1.7 (0.2)
Education Most Important Issue	59.5 (0.6)	−0.5 (0.2)	44.8 (0.2)	−0.1 (0.1)
Iraq Most Important Issue	58.9 (0.7)	−1.1 (0.3)	43.1 (0.3)	−1.8 (0.2)
Terrorism Most Important Issue	62.7 (0.7)	2.7 (0.4)	47.3 (0.3)	2.3 (0.2)
Moral Values Most Important Issue	62.2 (0.7)	2.2 (0.3)	46.1 (0.3)	1.1 (0.1)
Health Care Most Important Issue	59.4 (0.6)	−0.6 (0.1)	44.4 (0.2)	−0.6 (0.1)

[a]Entries not in parenthesis in the second and fourth columns are the estimated share of the two-party vote for Kerry under the counterfactual condition listed for the row: that all voters who actually chose the row variable as the most important issue were randomly assigned to other issues. Standard errors in parentheses.
[b]Entries not in parenthesis in the third and fifth columns are the predicted increase (or decrease) in Kerry's share of the two-party vote under the counterfactual scenario listed for the row. Standard errors in parentheses.
All entries computed based on 1,000 draws of parameters from the model in Table 3.

the baseline probability). The third column gives the standard error of the difference. We see that a Hispanic voter who felt terrorism was the most important issue was .40 less likely to vote for Kerry than was an otherwise identical voter who felt that education was the most important issue. The corresponding difference for a voter who felt moral values was the most important issue was slightly larger (.44). However, our hypothetical voter was .14 *more* likely to vote for Kerry if she thought the economy, rather than education, was the most important issue. Note that the largest possible swing based on evaluations of issue salience is .61; if our hypothetical voter had ranked moral values as the most important issue, then she would have been .61 less likely to vote for Kerry than an otherwise identical voter ranking health care as the most important issue. Finally, consistent with our results thus far, moral values were substantially less important for Anglos vote than for Hispanics; the estimated first difference for Anglos is barely half of what it is for Hispanics.

These calculations demonstrate the impact of specific issues on individual voters. Voters' views on Iraq, perceptions of personal finances, and views of the most important issues were all strong predictors of their vote choice. However, the more important questions concern aggregate vote shares: how would the relative vote shares of Kerry and Bush change if the relative salience of these issue differed for voters? In order to test our central hypothesis, which con-

tends that the effect of moral values and terrorism on Hispanic vote choice is greater than the effect of education and health care on Hispanic vote choice, we calculate aggregate estimated vote-shares based on counterfactuals about voters' issue opinions. We examine a scenario where no voters considered moral concerns as the most important issue, and additional scenarios where no voters ranked each successive issue as the most important issue. Such counterfactuals are in the spirit of what campaigns are perhaps best able to do: campaigns are more better able to prime voters into considering certain issues more than others in their voting calculus than actually swaying voters' opinions on issues.

To estimate the aggregate impact of moral values, we take every voter who said that moral values was the most important issue and reset their most important issue response to one of the other six issues listed. We randomly distribute these voters among the six other issues in proportion to the distribution across the six issues given by all other voters in the sample. Using the estimated logit parameters in Table 3, we compute the predicted probability of these voters voting for Bush and Kerry. These predicted probabilities are then aggregated over all the voters in our sample, providing us with an aggregated predicted vote share for Kerry under the counterfactual condition. This value is reported in the first column of Table 5, in the seventh row. We also compute the predicted probability for each voter

TABLE 6 Aggregate Predicted Vote Share for Different Counterfactuals

Scenario for all voters	Hispanic Voters		Anglo Voters	
	Predicted Kerry Vote Share[a]	Predicted Increase in Kerry Vote Share[b]	Predicted Kerry Vote Share[a]	Predicted Increase in Kerry Vote Share[b]
Baseline	60.0	–	45.0	–
Most Important Issue is...				
The Economy	69.5 (1.6)	9.5 (1.5)	53.7 (7.8)	6.6 (0.7)
Education	65.3 (2.2)	5.3 (2.0)	51.3 (1.2)	4.2 (1.3)
Iraq	64.9 (1.8)	4.9 (1.7)	52.7 (0.7)	5.6 (0.6)
Terrorism	51.3 (1.7)	−8.7 (1.5)	38.0 (0.8)	−9.0 (0.8)
Moral Values	49.6 (1.9)	−10.4 (1.8)	42.2 (0.7)	−4.9 (0.6)
Health Care	71.6 (2.9)	11.6 (2.8)	60.0 (1.1)	9.4 (1.1)

[a]Entries not in parenthesis in the second and fourth columns are the estimated share of the two-party vote for Kerry under the counterfactual condition listed for the row: that all voters list the row variable as the most important issue.
[b]Entries not in parenthesis in the third and fifth columns are the predicted increase (or decrease) in Kerry's share of the two-party vote under the counterfactual scenario listed for the row.
Entries in parentheses are standard errors.
All entries computed based on 1,000 draws of parameters from the model in Table 3.

supporting Kerry given their actual responses to the most important issue question. We aggregate each of these to generate the baseline expected vote-share for Kerry, which we report as the first row in entry in Table 5. The difference between the counterfactual prediction and the baseline prediction is the estimated total impact of the change.[23] The first column of Table 5 gives the predicted vote share for Kerry under the counterfactual condition, and the second column gives the estimated increase in Kerry's vote share (along with its standard error in parenthesis). So, looking at the second to the last row of the table, we see that if all Hispanic voters who said that moral values was the most important issue had believed some other issue was the most important issue, Kerry's vote

share would have increased by 2.2 percentage points (from 60.0% to 62.2%). The equivalent number for terrorism is 2.7 percentage points.

The economy had an effect similar in magnitude to the effect of terrorism and moral values on Kerry's vote share; if all Hispanic voters who responded that the economy was the most important issue had instead ranked another issue as more important, Kerry's vote share would have dropped by 2.4 percentage points. However, education provided Kerry with very little traction; had all Hispanic voters citing education as the most important issue selected another issue, Kerry's share of the Hispanic vote would have dropped by only 0.5 percentage points. This is surprising as education is an issue that is traditionally associated with and "owned" by the Democrats (Petrocik 1996); it is also an issue that Hispanics had consistently listed as their most important issue in past elections. For instance, in the Pew 2004 survey of Latinos education was named as extremely important or very important by more respondents than any other issue. Yet on Election Day it ranked fifth among the issues offered to voters in these exit polls. And finally, while health care influenced a Hispanic voter's likelihood of supporting Kerry (the individual impact was .17), its impact on Kerry's vote share was minimal. If each Hispanic voter who claimed that health care was their most important issue had preferred a different issue, Kerry's vote share would have decreased by less than one percentage point (0.6). Thus, despite the importance of health care on a voter's decision-making

[23]To determine standard errors, we start with the logit estimates of the vote choice model, and we take 1,000 draws of the parameter values from the estimated distribution. We then use these 1,000 draws, and the original dataset of voters from which the parameters were estimated, to compute probabilities of Bush and Kerry support for each voter, for each of the 1,000 draws. Aggregating these individual vote probabilities within each draw of the parameters gives an estimate (and standard error) for the vote share of Bush and Kerry. We then assume that the entire Hispanic electorate had a different distribution of opinions about a particular issue, and using the same 1,000 draws of the parameter estimates, we recomputed the probabilities that each voter in the sample would support Bush or Kerry in this counterfactual scenario. Again, within each draw we aggregate the individual probabilities into candidate vote shares. This allows us to determine how changes in Hispanics' issue preferences or views would have affected the overall vote shares of Kerry and Bush, and to compute confidence intervals about those estimates.

process at the individual level, its aggregate impact on Hispanics was minimal.

From a comparative standpoint, differences do exist in the impact of issue salience on Anglo and Hispanic vote choice. For instance, if no Anglo voters thought education was the most important issue, Kerry's vote share amongst them would have dropped by a statistically insignificant 0.1 percentage point, but for Hispanic voters, this drop in vote share is larger (0.5) and statistically significant. And where less concern about moral values by Hispanic voters could have increased Kerry's vote share among Hispanic voters by 2.2 percentage points, our estimates suggest that if all Anglos who said moral values was the most important issue had instead ranked another issue as more important, then Kerry's vote share amongst Anglos would have only increased by 1.1%.[24] More than any other calculation we perform, the estimates from Table 5 confirm the conventional wisdom that ''owning'' the issue of moral values provided Republicans with a considerable advantage amongst Hispanic voters, to a much greater extent than for Anglo voters. All in all, by estimating the impact of these issues across many voters, we gain a better understanding of the dynamics of this election. Had the issue of terrorism not been so important to voters, Kerry would have picked up 2.7 percentage points among Hispanic voters. And because of Bush's advantage among Hispanics on moral values, Kerry lost 2.2 percentage points among Hispanic voters. The one issue that the Democratic Party is traditionally advantaged on, education, was apparently neutralized by the Bush campaign; Kerry's ''advantage'' on this issue contributed to less than half a percentage point of his total share of the Hispanic vote.

Because the two campaigns appeared to have emphasized different issues, we should also study the *potential* affect of the various issues on Kerry and Bush's vote share. For that, we perform similar counterfactual calculations to those presented in Table 5. However, for each issue, rather than resetting the voter's opinion so that the issue was *not* the most important issue, we reset every voter's opinion to make the row variable the most important issue. This means that the counterfactual estimates presented in first row of Table 6 indicate that had *all* Hispanic voters felt that the economy was the most important issue, Kerry's vote share among Hispanics would have been 9.5 percentage points higher. But if voters felt

that education was the most important issue, Kerry's corresponding increase would have been 5.3 percentage points.

Health care was the one issue that had the greatest potential to increase Kerry's vote share; *if* all Hispanic voters ranked health care as their most important issue, his share of the Hispanic vote could have increased by 11.6 percentage points. However, the reality is that only 6.8% of Hispanics considered health care to be the most important issue in this election. And consistent with our previous estimates, the two issues where Kerry suffered the most were terrorism and moral values; had all Hispanic voters felt that terrorism was the most important issue, his share of the Hispanic vote would have dropped by 8.7 percentage points. If moral values ranked as the number one issue for Hispanics, his vote share from them would have fallen by 10.4 percentage points. But for Anglos a completely different picture emerges—even if they ranked moral values as the most important issue, Kerry's vote share amongst Anglos would have only decreased by 4.9 percentage points. Once again, these findings lend support to our claim that moral values had a greater influence on Hispanic than on Anglo voters.

Conclusion

As we have documented, the key to understanding the Hispanic vote in 2004 is to acknowledge that while economic concerns, education, and health care loomed large for Hispanics, the combined concern that many Hispanic voters had for moral values and national security trumped traditional domestic issues. Our analysis demonstrates that the issues that traditionally advantage Democrats, such as health care and education, played a small role in this election. This is especially surprising given that Hispanics typically care the most about these ''bread and butter'' issues and are generally less concerned about foreign policy matters.[25] But for this particular election, how the candidates defined the issues that rose to the forefront of the debate significantly influenced the decisions made by Hispanic voters. Thus, instead of health care and education determining the vote decision of Hispanics, the issues of moral values and terrorism dominated how Hispanic voters cast their ballots.

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[24]While 1.1% of Anglo voters constitutes more raw votes than does 2.2% of Hispanic voters, the point of the comparison is to show the relative effects of issues *within* each community.

[25]See the ''Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2004 National Survey Of Hispanics: Politics and Civic Participation,'' (http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=33).

We again point out that our analysis enables us to distinguish between two competing explanations of the 2004 election with different implications for understanding Hispanic voting. While national security is likely to be a short-term issue, and not one on which the Hispanic electorate is generally identified as being distinct from the overall electorate, moral values is an issue area which may well be a factor in U.S. national politics for the foreseeable future. And it is an issue area that Republicans had hoped to use to appeal to the Hispanic electorate. Our research demonstrates that each of these views is half right. Bush *did* pick up a substantial number of votes among Hispanics based on moral values. We also demonstrated that moral values was a particularly effective issue with Hispanic voters relative to Anglo voters. But some of Bush's performance was due to the unique national security context of the election, a context future Republican nominees cannot count on inheriting. We therefore leave it to each political party to determine whether their glass is half-full or half-empty.

These insights also place the explanation for Hispanic voting in 2004 squarely within the dominant paradigms in the political behavior literature for understanding electoral choice; issues matter, economic concerns matter, and elections revolve around how candidates prioritize issues and which positions candidates take on issues. Hispanic voters obviously perceived that they had choices, not echoes; the issues emphasized by the candidates influenced Hispanic vote choice. But these insights also raise new questions. That foreign policy issues loomed large in the voting decisions of Hispanics in the 2004 presidential election we find of particular interest, given that foreign policy issues rarely feature prominently in studies of voting behavior, especially Hispanic voting behavior. While we obviously lack the detailed data used by Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989), given our results, it may be that the 2004 presidential election is like other past presidential elections (1972, 1980, or 1984) where foreign policy issues were highly salient and accessible to Hispanic voters, and where there were clear differences between the two major parties on certain foreign policy issues. If so, this may imply that the Hispanic electorate can respond to appeals made to them on more complex and abstract issues (e.g., foreign policy), if they are given the necessary campaign information to make an appropriate decision. However, an analysis of the actual campaign content targeted at Hispanics in the 2004 election would be necessary to test this hypothesis.

Without more finely grained survey data, we cannot say precisely what Hispanic voters see as the moral values that concern them: is it abortion, gay marriage, school prayer, religiosity, or some combination of these and other social or value-laden issues? What were the messages that both Kerry and Bush tried to send to Hispanic voters about moral values, and what precise issues or values were they targeting? What role did other social institutions, especially churches, have in spreading moral value messages to Hispanic voters in the 2004 election? While it is clear that moral values and cultural values have long played a role in presidential election voting (Abramowitz 1995, Layman 2001, Layman and Carmines 1997, Layman and Green 2005, Leege et al. 2002), how these issues influence Hispanic voters, especially in light of their changing religious preferences (Pew 2006), remain to be seen.

Finally, our research implies that the fight for the Hispanic vote will continue in future elections, as this electorate is projected to increase in numerical terms and because Hispanics have issue concerns to which both Democrats and Republicans can appeal. Both parties obviously should pay attention to moral values if they want to win large numbers of Hispanic votes. However, if moral values has become an issue "owned" by the Republican Party, then Democrats' best strategy may be to restructure their campaign strategies so that voters make choices based on other issues, such as health care and education. And while public opinion polls indicate that Hispanics care the most about "bread and butter" issues such as education, the economy, and health care, this election demonstrates how candidates can successfully emphasize other concerns in order to minimize the effect of these more traditional issues on voter decision making.

Acknowledgments

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