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Fall Quarter 2009  
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# COMPARATIVE PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES

## Objectives

This course will focus on three aspects of legislative politics in parliamentary democracies: (1) parliamentary constitutions and their consequences, (2) parliamentary institutions, behaviors, and strategies, and (3) cabinet coalition bargaining and governance. On all of the topics covered in this course, we shall draw on recent and ongoing research projects. The seminar is designed for graduate students in political science but is, with the consent of the instructor, open to well-qualified students from other programs. Because this is an interactive seminar, full participation in seminar discussions is both expected and required.

## Responsibilities and Grades

The seminar will involve a core of required readings. **All** students, including auditors, should complete these readings before seminar meetings and be prepared to discuss them. You will also post a weekly memo to the class message board by the evening of the day before the seminar (Monday 8:00pm). Your memo should be one paragraph to a page and contain either (i) a critique of some of the readings, (ii) possible discussion questions for the class meeting *and* your (tentative) answers, or, (iii) interesting ways to compare and contrast readings. The memo should not be a summary of readings. During the week you make a formal presentation, you do not need to turn in a memo (see below).

The main written assignment will be a seminar paper (at least 15-20 pp.) on parliamentary politics, due on **December 11**. Topics should be chosen by **October 20**, in consultation with the instructor. There will also be a take-home essay assignment (with a page limit). Tentatively, this assignment will be due on **November 17**. You will also be expected to make two seminar presentations: one on a topic related to the course readings (see the list of study questions below) and one on your seminar paper project. The paper will account for 40% of your grade, the take-home exam also 40%, and seminar participation (including memos and seminar presentations) 20%. You have to complete all assignments to get credit for the course.

## Books and Materials

The following required books have been ordered by the UCSD Bookstore:

Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 0-521-54244-8.

Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 0-521-43836-5.

Alastair Smith, *Election Timing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 978-0-19-829786-4.

Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Paperback edition 2006. 0-19-929160-8.

George Tsebelis, *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 978-0691099897.

Other readings may be assigned and made available. Details will be discussed during the first class meeting. All readings listed below are required.

## COURSE OUTLINE AND READINGS

### **Week 1 (September 29):                   What is Parliamentary Democracy?**

#### **Readings:**

Arend Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Introduction (pp. 1-27).  
 Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, ch. 7.  
 Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), chs. 1 and 3.  
 Cheibub (2007), ch. 2.

### **Week 2 (October 6):                   Parliamentary Structure and Process**

#### **Readings:**

Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch. 6.  
 Herbert Döring, ed., *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, chs. 7, 10, and 14-15.  
 John D. Huber, *Rationalizing Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 2, 4-5.  
 George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money. *Bicameralism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 6, and 8-9 (except appendices).  
 Lanny W. Martin and Georg Vanberg, "Coalition Policymaking and Legislative Review." *American Political Science Review* 99, 1 (February 2005), 93-106.

#### **Study Questions:**

1. What purposes do restrictive procedures serve in parliamentary democracies?
2. How do parliamentarians seek to overcome their lack of policy information relative to the executive branch?
3. Who rules parliament: Presiding officers, party leaders, the prime minister, or the citizens?

### **Week 3 (October 13):               Parliamentary Recruitment and Roles**

#### **Readings:**

Döring, ch. 5 (Andeweg and Nijzink).  
 Peter Esaiasson and Knut Heidar, eds., *Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience*. Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000, chs. 3 (Esaiasson) and 4 (Narud and Valen).  
 Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991, chs. 1 and 9.  
 Donald Searing, *Westminster's World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, chs. 1-2, 6-10.  
 Kaare Strøm, "Rules, Reasons, and Routines: Legislative Roles in Parliamentary Democracies." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3, 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 155-74.

#### **Study Questions:**

1. Which matters most to the quality of parliamentarians: the demands of selectors or the supply of candidates?
2. To what extent and how does the pursuit of office shape parliamentary behaviors?
3. Do parliamentarians choose their roles?

### **Week 4 (October 20):               Parliamentary Elections**

#### **Readings:**

Kathleen Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* 37, 4 (November 1993), 965-89.  
 Mark Hallerberg, "Electoral Laws, Government, and Parliament." In Herbert Döring and Mark Hallerbert, eds., *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, ch. 1.  
 Alastair Smith, *Election Timing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, chs. 1-4.  
 Kaare Strøm and Stephen M. Swindle, "Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution." *American Political Science Review* 96, 3 (September 2002), pp. 575-91.

#### **Study Questions:**

1. Is the parliamentary dissolution power the reason that parliamentary democracies are so stable?
2. Can incumbent parties in parliamentary systems fool the voters all of the time, some of the time, or none of the time?
3. Are PR elections the cause of multiparty systems, or are multiparty systems the cause of PR?

**Paper Topics Due****Week 5 (October 27): Political Parties****Readings:**

Shaun Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, eds., *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1999, ch. 1.

Cheibub (2007), ch. 5.

Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, ch. 12.

Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization: The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1, 1 (January 1995), 1-28.

Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartellization: Political Representation and State Failure in Postindustrial Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37, 2 (March 2000), 149-179.

Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., *Policy, Office, or Votes?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. 1.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), ch. 22.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), ch. 11.

**Study Questions:**

1. The cartel party: a European peculiarity, a wave of the future, or a figment of the imagination?
2. Does the policy influence differential between government and opposition matter, and if so, how?
3. Why do citizens distrust political parties?

**Week 6 (November 3): Coalition Bargaining: Formation and Membership****Readings:**

David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82, 2 (June 1988), 405-422.

Bowler, Farrell, and Katz (1999), ch. 11 (Mershon).

Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson, "Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 45, 1 (January 2001), 33-50.

Kaare Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, ch. 3.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), chs. 1-2, 4, and 6.

Tsebelis (2002), ch. 1 and 4.

**Study Questions:**

1. Was Riker right after all: Is the desire to avoid unnecessary "passengers" the most important force in coalition bargaining?
2. Are pre-electoral agreements the key to coalition bargaining?
3. To what extent does cabinet structure dictate coalition membership, and to what extent does coalition membership dictate cabinet structure?

**Week 7 (November 10): Coalition Bargaining: Governance and Portfolio Allocation****Readings:**

Octavio Amorim Neto and Kaare Strøm, "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (2006), 619-43.

Bowler, Farrell, and Katz (1999), ch. 12 (Mitchell).

Royce Carroll and Gary W. Cox, "The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre-election Coalitions and Portfolio Allocations." *American Journal of Political Science* 51, 2 (April 2007), 251-65.

John D. Huber and Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, "Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 102, 2 (May 2008), 169-80.

Laver and Shepsle (1996), chs. 1-5, 8-9, and 13.

Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), chs. 5, 7-8.

**Study Questions:**

1. What powers do cabinet members have, and how does it matter?
2. Which is the greater threat in executive appointments: adverse selection or moral hazard?
3. Does the parity norm disprove rational choice theories of coalition bargaining?

**Week 8 (November 17): Coalition Bargaining: Stability and Duration****Readings:**

- Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson, "Coalition Terminations and Critical Events." *American Political Science Review* 94, 3 (September 2000), 627-40.
- James N. Druckman, "Party Factionalism and Cabinet Durability." *Party Politics* 2, 3 (July 1996), 397-407.
- Arthur W. Lupia and Kaare Strøm, "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89, 3 (September 1995), 648-65.
- Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2008), chs. 9-10.
- Paul V. Warwick, "Ministerial Autonomy or Ministerial Accommodation? Contested Bases of Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (1999): 369-394.

**Study Questions:**

1. Does cabinet stability matter?
2. The suspicious deaths of parliamentary cabinets: Do they jump or are they pushed?
3. What makes critical events in coalition politics critical, and how critical are they?

**Take-Home Essays Due****Week 9 (November 24): Policy Performance****Readings:**

- Kathleen Bawn and Frances Rosenbluth, "Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector." *American Journal of Political Science* 50, 2 (April 2006), 251-65.
- Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In Mathew D. McCubbins and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005, chs. 1-2, 6-7, and 9.
- Strøm, Müller and Bergman (2003), ch. 23.

**Study Questions:**

1. Does parliamentary democracy enhance the production of public goods, the creation of rents, neither, or both?
2. What matters most to policy performance: regime type, cabinet type, or electoral system?
3. Have the parliamentary mechanisms of citizen control lost their edge?

**Week 10 (December 1): Parliamentarism, Presidentialism, and Democratic Stability****Readings:**

- Cheibub (2007), ch. 6.
- Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz) and 3 (Sartori).
- Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1 and 3.
- Tsebelis (2002), ch. 3.

**Study Questions:**

1. Is the relationship between regime type and democratic stability spurious?
2. Is the semi-presidential regime type the happy medium?
3. Is the failure of presidential democracy a failure of Latin American politics, a failure of military intervention, a failure of presidential leadership selection, or none of the above?

**December 11: Seminar Papers Due**