Lecture 7: **Attribution and Behavior**



Cogs 102A * Distributed Cognition

The Problem of Attribution

The Photophilic Fly

- Flies will fly toward light
 - A "trophism"
 - It "likes" light,
 it "wants to go" to light
- Should we attribute "desires", "goals" to flies?
 - To mammals?
 - To primates?
 - To humans?
 - To robots?




Braitenberg's Vehicle

Mechanism:

Activation of <u>left</u> light <u>sensor</u> drives <u>right</u> wheel
 (& vice versa)


>> Vehicle turns toward light





>> Vehicle turns **from** light

Rewired, activation of <u>right</u> sensor <u>inhibits</u> <u>left</u> wheel (& vice versa) driven by internal battery
 >> Vehicle turns <u>from</u> light

 SO, different mechanisms can produce same behavior










Braitenberg's Vehicle

Some implications:

- 1) <u>Behavior cannot tell</u> you unequivocally what <u>internal mechanism</u> is involved!
- 2) An attributional term ("want", "like") is a convenient summary of regularities of behavior
 - e.g. In both cases shown here, vehicles acts as if it "dislikes", "wants to avoid" light.
 - In that case, these terms could just as well apply to vehicle, and fly, and human
 - After all, isn't the brain just another kind of wiring...?







Traditionally researchers DO attribute internal ("cognitive") m

researchers DO attribute internal ("cognitive") mechanisms based on performance

e.g. Children *have* a "Theory of Mind module" that "turns on" between 2 & 3 years of age

Let us examine the presumptions at work here...

(ToM)

I have a theory that you (and I) have a mind...



(ToM)

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
False Belief Task

(AKA "Sally-Ann Task")

Considered the definitive test for ToM


Sally/Ann Task

 Subject sees Sally & Ann (Bert & Ernie, etc)







- Subject sees Sally & Ann (Bert & Ernie, etc)
- Sally hides object at A




- Subject sees Sally & Ann (Bert & Ernie, etc)
- Sally hides object at A
- Sally leaves, Ann stays



- Subject sees Sally & Ann (Bert & Ernie, etc)
- Sally hides object at A
- Sally leaves, Ann stays
- Ann moves object to B, then leaves




- Subject sees Sally & Ann (Bert & Ernie, etc)
- Sally hides object at A
- Sally leaves, Ann stays
- Ann moves object to B, then leaves
- Experimenter asks subject:
- "Where will Sally look for object when she returns?"



Attributing False Beliefs?

RESULTS

- 2 yr olds "fail"
 - Pick B (where object is)
 - Interpreted: "They believe others believe"
 the same as they believe"



• 3 yr olds "succeed"



- Pick A (where object was when Sally was last present)
- Interpreted: "They believe other has 'false belief' diff from their own"

i.e. Results explained by the presence/absence of a "mental ability" to represent the beliefs of others

Another Perspective...

We would say . . .

. . . child has learned behavioral contingencies of many complex interactions involving. . .

multi-party coordination of looking, not looking, seeking, finding, not finding, etc.

- Plus 3 year olds have also developed relevant <u>linguistic competencies</u>
 - e.g. For use of terms like "will", "where", "look for" etc.




Tissot "Hide & Seek" 1877

Whatever ToM is, it is not monotlithic

- Emerges in stages, typically characterized as...
- 6 month olds act as if attribute <u>Animacy</u>

Behavior: Treat an object differently if initiates own movement vs. if it is only moved by other



Whatever ToM is, it is not monotlithic

- 1 year olds act as if it attributes "Intentions", "Goals"
 - e.g. If adult reaches for object, infant will get it and give it
 - Familiar enough with common sequences of interaction, infant can "complete" task for another



Some say "representing" intentions required for Imitation




BUT see deBarbaro, Johnson & Deak 2013!

Whatever ToM is, it is not monotlithic


- 2 yr olds distinguish that diff people respond differently to same stimulus
 - You say "Yum!", I say "Yuck!"
 - i.e. Come to attribute <u>Preferences</u>





Whatever ToM is, it is not monotlithic

- 3 year olds act as if they attribute <u>beliefs</u>
 - Per classic False Belief Task
 - Traditionally say child has developed the capacity to "represent the beliefs" of others and compare them to their own
 - i.e. "...<u>have</u> a full-blown Theory of Mind"
 - "Mindreading"



Nominal Fallacy

 Confusing <u>naming</u> a phenomenon with <u>explaining</u> that phenomenon

 e.g. Saying that kids have a "ToM ability" as an explanation for their passing the False Belief task

- We would say, instead...
- Child had sufficient, scaffolded experience
 with situations in which players had
 <u>differential access</u> to an object's shifting location,
 and thereafter predictably engaged in
 different search routines

Nominal Fallacy

- Confusing <u>naming</u> a phenomenon with <u>explaining</u> that phenomenon
 - e.g. Saying monkeys have "ability to deceive" used to explain why subordinates have sex in the bushes





- We would say, instead...
- Sufficient experience with, and observation of, conditions under which
 dominant male does/does not show aggression toward subordinates
 (e.g. not when his back is to them) leads subordinates to recognize &
 manipulate affordances (e.g. move to place of no line of sight)

Nominal Fallacy

- Confusing <u>naming</u> a phenomenon with <u>explaining</u> that phenomenon
- So, <u>learned regularities in social & material conditions</u> promote <u>predictable behavior</u>







- Naming the achievement of such behavioral regularity as "having an ability" explains nothing
- Can be misleading, actually obscure cognitive processes involved

"Mindreading" is behavior reading...

Just what behaviors do we read?

To attribute "Motivation" -- Read Affect & To/From

AFFECT

- Esp in mammals, "emotional displays" correspond to satisfaction, fear, aggression, etc
- These play a role in negotiating alliances, power struggles, collaboration, parenting, etc.





To attribute "Motivation" -- Read Affect & To/From

AFFECT.

- Aspects of facial expressions mimicked at birth
- Smiles shared early in mother-infant interactions
- Usually associated with own evaluation of situation, but potentially "deceptive" for impact on other

















To attribute "Motivation" -- Read Affect & To/From

TO/FROM

- Animals <u>approach</u> some stimuli (food, mates, friends),
- Avoid others (predators, enemies)







- Ethology (Study of Animal Behavior) long recognized <u>T</u>O/FROM as basic propensities of animate engagement
- Psychology calls stimuli that provoke TO/FROM "positive" vs. "negative" "reinforcers"

&WILL PRESS 差

LEVER

Food

To attribute "Motivation" – Read Affect & To/From

TO/FROM

- Practices "carve up" co-inhabited space,
 establish "boundaries" in inter-animal distance, etc
 - "Personal space"

"Approach/avoidance conflict"



To attribute "Motivation" — Also read Long-Term Patterns

W/repeated experience, can also use long-term behavioral patterns

- Predict will tend to act, in context, as have in the past
- This can become very complex in humans...
 - Who tends to attend, turn to/from whom?
 - Who displays what affect toward whom?
 - How effected are these by who else present/absent?
 - Who sides with whom in conflicts?
 - Who prioritizes gaining which rewards?
 - Who tends to adopt which cultural conventions?
 - Etc...!

To attribute "Motivation" — Also read Long-Term Patterns

- Biases in social inference "Fundamental Attribution Error"
 - 3 Parameters interact: Distinctiveness, Consistency, Consensus
 - **Distinctiveness** Action/event (by anyone) <u>familiar or novel</u> to B?
 - Consistency Has <u>A tended to do this to B</u> in the past?
 - Consensus Does A tend to do this to others?
 - If high distinctiveness, high consistency, high consensus
 - e.g. B is hurt, A has hurt B in past, A seen hurting others
 - Attribution: A is at fault, A is a "hurter"
 - If high distinctiveness, low consistency, low consensus
 - e.g. B is hurt, A never hurt B before, A never seen to hurt others
 - Attribution: No one at fault, circumstances/accident responsible
 - If high distinctiveness, high consistency, low consensus
 - e.g. B is hurt, A hurt B in past, A never seen to hurt others
 - Attribution: A at fault, deliberately targeted B

To attribute "Motivation" — Also read Long-Term Patterns

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 - 3 Parameters interact: Distinctiveness, Consistency, Consensus
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NOTE!

- Above reminiscent of "Population, Evaporation, Dispersion" in ANTS
 - That is, emergent attribution depends on relations across multi-dimensions
- Above require tracking...
 - Historical "long-term" patterns
 - A+B (you & me) relations as well as A+Others (you & them) relations
 - i.e. Access to full ecology is required, typical of attributors

To Attribute "Knowledge"...

- Each participant in an interaction can have a different
 Epistemic Status = who knows what
- e.g. One knows more about X
 than the other does







On what basis do we make such attributions?

To Attribute "Knowledge"...

Epistemic Status:

Consider Lab on Expert vs. Novice



- Expert acts more "knowledgeable", Novice acts less
 - Expert: Smooth, contingently narrated demonstration
 - Novice: Hesitant, back-tracking, asking questions, assisted

To Attribute "Knowledge"...

Epistemic Status:

e.g. If see another searching, we attribute epistemic status:



Attribution: "He does not know where it is"


To attribute "Knowledge"...

Epistemic Status

SURPRISE!

Open mouth (gasp!) & wide-eyed fixed gaze





- As when dishabituate to unexpected stimuli
- Surprise >> Attribute that subject does NOT know

To attribute "Knowledge" -- Read Attentional Behavior

Attentional Behavior

- Sensors directed to a target, especially effortful change
 - e.g. Turn head, fixate, reach to touch, reposition for better access,
 co-ordinate atten/action with others, etc.





To attribute "Knowledge" -- Read Social Attention

SOCIAL Attention

- Target of attention is, or is influenced by, a social other
 - e.g. Solicit attention, Gaze follow, Direct attention of other,
 Synchronize, Imitate, etc







Social Attention

Monitor Attention

- Tracking others' attention, including their attention to the attention of others
- e.g. In False Belief task, above, Subject sees that Sally did not see that object was moved







Competition for Attention

- Social attention, itself, is often a valued (worked for) resource
 - Effort to attain attention interpreted as "interest"








Change in Salience

Salience = increase in likelihood of noticing

- Recall that Affordances are necessarily "in the eye of the beholder"
 - i.e. Affordance is not inherent to object, but based on object+user
- Since affordances change with learning, can use changes in salience to detect (observe!) learning
- e.g. Ask: How quick to discriminate? ...to adapt to opportunities?





Directing Other's Attention

Use <u>indexical gestures</u> to point out, show others objects, events



- "Show-er" is knowledgeable
- "Show-ee" is less so

Directing Other's Attention

- One critical function of Language is to attract & direct attention
 - e.g. Name object, place, topic, etc. ("wastebasket") directs attention



If attention so directed, <u>attribute shared knowledge</u> of focus

Attributing Knowledge

Hearsay

- Hearsay = info to which you have no direct (perceptual) access
 - Have only "the word" of (presumably knowledgeable) speaker

• e.g. If I say "I ride bikes", you now attribute knowledge of bike-riding

to me, w/o even seeing me ride





Likelihood of access, confidence, institutional status, etc. all contribute to credibility, likelihood of attribution

Attributing Knowledge Based on subject's own claims...

Epistemic Stance

Any behavior that displays one's epistemic status



e.g. Conventional displays of familiarity vs. uncertainty

Adopting an **Epistemic Stance**

- Heritage 2012: In human conversation, information differential is an "Epistemic Engine"
 - Ignorant <u>asks</u>
 - Informed replies
 - Stabilizes when both informed





- Requesting Information
 - All languages provide grammatical ways to pose a question
 - Who? What? With whom? Where? When? Why?

Deception

- Acting "as if" know/don't know, do not notice, etc.
 - e.g. Gaze Aversion






Photo by F.B.M. de Waal

In competitive situations, primates may look away from what most interests them

Attentional Behavior in Deception



Connie "tricks" Lori out of her branch

- Deception
 - Acting "as if" know/don't know, do not notice, etc.
 - e.g. Mis-direction



Competitive



Teen uses "alibi" to deter mom from interfering with her gaining access to infant

- Deception
 - Acting "as if" know/don't know, do not notice, etc.
 - e.g. "Alibi"
- Teen shows attention to infant, which attracts concerned mom
- All are likely to produce behavior (e.g. approach other, engage) contingent w/their focus of fixation
- When infant's mom approaches, teen fixates on a distant target – her ALIBI
- Since teen acts in a way that does not easily afford engaging w/infant, mom's attention subsides



LAB 5: TWILIGHT GAZE

You will examine the BEHAVIOR that underlies Social Attributions