Evidential mastery

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Master speakers
In Zinacantán, a Tzotzil [Mayan] speaking community in highland Chiapas, Mexico, there are various kinds of specialists in talk, many of whose roles are lexically labeled. Consider, for example the j’ilol, ‘curer, lit., seer’ who cures (and occasionally gives) illness by means of ritual offerings and prayer; the jmeltzanej-k’op, ‘dispute settler, lit., maker of words’ who helps people resolve conflict by ordering their words, either in the household or at the courthouse; the jk’opojel, ‘talker (for one)’, a person whose skill in speech makes him an appropriate “mouthpiece” in dealing with authorities both within the community and in the wider world; or the totil-me’il ‘ritual adviser, lit., father-mother’ who guides ritual officeholders through the procedures of their years in office, most notably instructing them in how to speak appropriately with both human and superhuman interlocutors. In this paper I try to characterize one aspect of “speech skill” in Zinacantán, in the context of a wider study of Zinacantec linguistic virtuosity. In particular, I concentrate on the spectacular communicative prowess of my compadre Mariano, an octogenarian now almost deaf and blind. To focus the discussion, I introduce a series of Tzotzil evidential devices and locate part of mol (‘elder’) Mariano’s masterful speech in his deployment of them for different interactional ends.

“Honey, I shrunk the linguistic competence”
When we teach linguistics to novices, we typically inflict a variety of idealizing and simplifying abstractions on the phenomena of language, only afterwards, in a kind of Austinian revelation, having to try to undo the damage by restoring a good part of what has been abstracted away. Thus, in trying to isolate for analysis a notion of “knowledge of language” we perform a series of “subtractions”—removing from the scope of our inquiry into language a set of considerations or phenomena, leaving behind a hopefully more tractable linguistic residuum. Following some of our most distinguished ancestors we subtract history, and we remove society, leaving behind a disconnected putatively autonomous synchronic shell. In a further move, we typically abstract away behavior altogether—
rejecting as impure mere “speech” or real “discourse” for example. We eliminate by fiat variation in the resulting knowledge (or “intuition”) in order to focus our empirical attention on “ideal” speaker-hearers, with perfect knowledge, infinite memory, etc., a fiction rendered more palatable by resorting to abstract, algebraic models of “well-formedness.”

How poor (and how remote from the empirical realm that I, for example, work with in my interactions with Tzotzil speakers) is the resulting linguistic datum! Instead of, for example, a situated language aesthetic, the sort of appreciation for good or proper talk that the best speakers—those to whom, if we are lucky, we apprentice ourselves—quite enthusiastically try to teach us, we are instead reduced to rarified (and often painfully elicited or carefully massaged) “well-formedness judgments”. Instead of an explicit and frequently well-articulated metatheory of practice (for example, about speech efficacy, or “persuasiveness”)—what one can or must do largely or exclusively through talk—one concentrates on what one “can” (or cannot) “say” (and now not in an even remotely Austinian sense).

There are, of course, alternative, richer views of the linguistic datum, which I myself prefer. One typically compact expression is that of %Silverstein (1985):

“The total linguistic fact, the datum for a science of language, is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an unstable mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested human use, mediated by the fact of cultural ideology” (1985:220).

Here each linguistic datum implies three interlocking perspectives. First there is a structural perspective (roughly, a grammar of form); second there is a pragmatic perspective on the “appropriate” and “effective” uses of linguistic forms; and third, an ideological perspective about “language use as a means to an end in interaction” (Silverstein 1985:222).

Given such a wider perspective on the minimal linguistic fact, it becomes necessary to relate linguistic competence not just to an elaborate filter on formal combinatorial possibilities and their mappings onto alternate algebraic representations, a kind of structural lowest common denominator for all speakers of a linguistic variety, but to the virtuoso, skillful, effective, and beautiful performances of the best—i.e., the most competent—speakers.

My compadre, the “Master Speaker”

Let me introduce my compadre and teacher mol Mariano. I first met him, in 1966, as a ritual officeholder in Zinacantán, occupying a high-ranking position in the third level (out of four) in the hierarchy of j-pas-`abtel ‘lit., doers of work’ who perform essential religious functions in the community during year-long terms in office, and to which system all male Zinacantecs are supposed to aspire (Cancian 1965). As a j-pas-`abtel and later as a totil-me’il ‘lit., father-mother’ or ritual adviser to other cargoholders once he had finished his own distinguished career in the hierarchy, mol Mariano was a recognized expert in the ritual
procedures of Zinacantec religious performance—largely devoted to the care of saints in the elaborated calendar of yearly fiestas in the community. A central part of his expertise lay in his ability to marshal words: the parallel constructions of religious prayer, and the elaborate courtesy of ritual visits between cargoholders and other specialists such as musicians, cooks, cannoneers, helpers, and other totil-me’iletik. Still later, when he became a ch’ul-mol ‘holy elder’—one of six men chosen to serve for life as the most senor performers in the ritual hierarchy—their primary responsibility is to nail the figure of Christ to the Cross during holy week, and in Nabenchauk, his home village, to make final, authoritative decisions about everything having to do with cargo ritual—his position at the pinnacle of Zinacantec ritual life became even clearer.

I later came to know Mariano’s speaking abilities in a much wider range of contexts, as he became one of my principal teachers and mentors over several decades. In panels of Zinacantec men that George Collier and I assembled in a study of shared knowledge among fellow Zinacantecs (Haviland 1977), Mariano proved to be an accomplished, well-informed, and eloquent gossip. He was a skilled raconteur, knowledgeable about events of the past, about myth and lore, and centrally—being also a lifelong dedicated cornfarmer, a well-endowed landowner, and an inquisitive neighbor—about land, its histories of ownership, its use, care, and cultivation. His position as an elder in his family, son of an important political leader and ritual specialist, eldest brother in a prominent sibling set, father-in-law to a municipal president, much sought-after godfather and compadre frequently put him in a position to advise other kinsmen on their affairs or to help settle disputes. Finally, I came to know him as a dreamer, or rather a reteller of dreams, a theme to which I will return at the end of this paper. In all of these capacities, mol Mariano’s abilities as a “master speaker” are central. My focus in this paper will be his expert, expressive, and delicate manipulation of evidence to a variety of purposes.

Social anchors in grammar
Let me first present the basic facts of the Tzotzil evidential system, some of which are treated in Haviland (1987; 1995). In terms of syntax, evidential notions—on Jakobson’s standard formulation (1957) following Whorf (1956), signaling an indexical relationship with a “narrated speech event” En,s distinct from the current speech event which provides “evidence” or, in the standard case, epistemological grounding for aspects of the narrated “events” in the current speech event, and extended to what Jakobson calls “status,” in particular an epistemic commitment on the part of the speaker (or other participants) to aspects of this narrated material—have three sorts of realization in Tzotzil. At the least grammaticalized level are a variety of lexicalized expressions and particles with sentential scope, often occurring at the edges of utterances. There is further a series of semi-grammaticalized verbs of speaking, which explicitly frame “quote” utterances and lend them evidential flavor. Finally, there are “second position” clitics, fully integrated into clausal syntax, subgroups of which provide the most systematic
and abstract expression of evidential categories. These devices, especially the latter less lexically transparent types, have resisted systematic analysis in previous work on Tzotzil and its sister languages, partly because native exegesis of such forms is largely unavailable (see Silverstein 1981), and partly because the use of evidential devices is inextricably linked not just to straightforward and easily characterized semantico-referential or pragmatic values but to highly contextualized interactive facts. My warrant for detailing these structural matters is found in recent comparative treatments of evidential systems (Chafe and Nichols 1986; Hill and Irvine 1992), who urge that “[i]mportant …for future study . . . is the ethnography of the use . . . of grammaticalized evidential systems” (Hill and Irvine :22). In previous work I link evidentials in Tzotzil to “other interpersonal elements in language (honorifics and similar conventional implicatures, diminutives and augmentatives, or other linguistic devices …[which indicate] without really saying, how a speaker feels, or where he stands with his fellows) . . .[I]t is precisely when speakers get down to such ordinary business that the properties of language as a tool begin to appear--that it stops, in Wittgenstein's phrase, ‘idling.’” (Haviland 1987)

The Tzotzil system is semi-grammaticalized, with epistemically loaded particles and clitics in 3 structural positions: clause initial and final, and “2nd” position. Here is a single utterance from mol Mariano’s conversation with his nephew that illustrates all three positions.

(1) An yu`un me chopol un a`a
WHY because INTENS bad then AGREE
“(Responding to what you just said) the fact is that (I myself really think) it is bad, then, (agreeing with you, and I knew it all along).”

Here an ‘why…!’ is a phrasal proclitic, me ‘speaker as principal’ is a “second position” evidential clitic, and a`a ‘agreement’ a phrasal enclitic. However, the relative uselessness of both these brief glosses (and even of the free gloss of (1)) and the minimal structural characterization of these elements is clear proof that a more systematic analysis is required.

Without trying to give a full account of the Tzotzil clause (see Aissen 1987, and especially 1992) we can still characterize with some precision the positions involved for these evidential elements. Both the phrasal proclitics and enclitics are essentially extra clausal, coming either before or after other elements with structurally defined positions. For example, the phrasal evidential proclitics precede the interrogative particle, as well as topicalized preposed WH-words, which otherwise come clause initially.

(2) an mi chi` yilel unen-e
WHY ☐ be_frightened it_seems child-CL
Why, has the child become frightened?

Similarly the evidential enclitics follow other elements which occupy clause final positions, such as the phrasal right-edge marker un in (1). Iconically appropriate
to this essentially extra-clausal positioning is the pragmatic force associated with these evidentials: they relate the utterance in question (or the epistemic move it represents) to the ongoing flow of talk, and the interplay of presuppositions in discourse. They are, in this sense, discourse sequencers or what Schegloff (1996) calls “links”; for example, an relates the current utterance to some immediately preceding talk, evincing surprise; a’ a similarly points backwards toward a preceding turn, indicating knowing agreement.

To suggest the flavor of the inventory of evidential notions expressed by these extra-clausal elements, I have included rough glosses for some of them in tables (1) and (2).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>an</td>
<td>why</td>
<td>orients to previous turn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ku</td>
<td>so it’s that way</td>
<td>responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ya</td>
<td>why not?</td>
<td>vaguely critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tzal</td>
<td>why?</td>
<td>but critical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yu’van (=yu’ + van)</td>
<td>Can you really think that..?</td>
<td>‘(i.e., obviously not…)’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yu‘nan</td>
<td>Perhaps it is the case that..</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yu‘un</td>
<td>because</td>
<td>following on what has just been said</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Spanish loans)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pero</td>
<td>but…</td>
<td>contrary to expectation or suggestion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>solel</td>
<td>only, it is surprisingly the case that…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pwes ke (pues que)</td>
<td>it is the case that…</td>
<td>considering the discursive moment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Phrasal proclitics (partial)

On the other hand, “second position” clitics are integral to clausal syntax. To characterize an element as accruing to “second position” implies a syntactically precise characterization of what can occupy “first” position. In Tzotzil, the incumbent of “first” position can be a word or a phrase—for example, either the first lexical word of a complex noun phrase, or the entire noun phrase—allowing for considerable flexibility in where “second position” clitics show up in an utterance, although again the precise details will not concern us here. Being more thoroughly integrated into the clause, 2nd position clitics are more closely linked to the grammatical system of the language than the phrasal clitics; unlike the latter, they form a small, closed set. Moreover, their contribution to utterance meaning is intimately linked to perspectives in the clause, notably its illocutionary and aspectual frames.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bi</td>
<td>indeed!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kik</td>
<td>perhaps</td>
<td>with a note of positive encouragement?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Phrasal enclitics (partial)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>che’e</th>
<th>pues, then, as a consequence, obviously, as expected…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>un</td>
<td>pues, period (.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yu’van</td>
<td>clearly, obviously, how could you think otherwise?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-a’a</td>
<td>indeed, I agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>(D1)</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>(D2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>xa</td>
<td>onox</td>
<td>nan</td>
<td>ox</td>
<td>la</td>
<td>ox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘already’</td>
<td>‘anyway, all the same, always’</td>
<td>‘perhaps’</td>
<td>‘other time’</td>
<td>‘they say’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>van</td>
<td>me</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘still’</td>
<td>‘just’</td>
<td>‘perhaps (+ interrog.)’</td>
<td>‘I say’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ma =me + interrog.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘indeed, as I suspected’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Tzotzil “second position” clitics

The “second position” in the Tzotzil clause is not, however, a single slot. Instead, structural tests (linking those elements that are in nearly complementary distribution, and comparing fixed pairwise ordering of different clitics in normal speech) show that there are several distinct positions, occupied by even smaller paradigmatic contrast sets—a typical repertoire of Whorfian “cryptotypes” with distributional “reactances” much like those that help distinguish semantic adjective classes in English. (Thus, for example, xa ‘already’ contrasts with to ‘still’, and both always occur before either la ‘principal other than speaker’ or me ‘speaker same as principal’—the latter two also contrasting with each other.) Without presenting all of the relevant arguments, let me summarize the layering within Tzotzil “second position” as in Table 3, which includes the most frequent second position clitics in modern Zinacantec speech.

Here, columns A and D (ox alternates between two possible positions in the clitic stack) present aspectual perspectives on the events portrayed in the clause, and are of no further interest in this paper. Slots B and C allow expression of different sorts of epistemic status. Thus, in slot C appear nan and van, both of
which mean ‘perhaps’—that is, they signal some sort of uncertainty, with van further co-indexing interrogative syntax. In slot B occur no ‘just [i.e., less than might be expected]’ and ono ‘exactly, still [i.e., what would be expected].’ Both clitics often co-occur with ox to form no‘ox and onox. Thus, clitics in positions B and C relate the state of affairs enunciated to speaker’s expectations and estimations of likelihood or certainty.

For present purposes I should like to focus on slot E whose incumbents express evidential categories of a classical Jakobsonean sort. The two clitics which occur with overwhelming frequency in this position are la—sometimes characterized as a “hearsay” clitic, and glossed by Laughlin (1975) as ‘they say’—and me, which Laughlin glosses as ‘please /desiderative particle/.’ There is, in addition, the form ma which replaces me in the interrogative contexts. I have also included the relatively infrequent ka ‘so, as I suspected, I now realize; I suspected, and now confirm [or perhaps am surprised to find disconfirmed]’ (probably derived from an inflected form k-a’i ‘I hear, I think’) since it appears to pattern in the same position.

Laughlin’s glosses reflect characteristic uses of these particles—la is particularly appropriate to narratives (he writes that la is “used primarily in narrative speech--e.g., gossip, folk tales, dreams--indicating object or action not directly perceived, or information for whose veracity the speaker assumes no responsibility” [1975:201]), and me is frequently heard with polite imperatives—but they miss the essential paradigmatic contrast encoded in this evidential slot. In effect, the opposition between a and me is one of illocutionary source; in Goffman’s familiar terms (1979) la asserts that the “animator” or current speakers is distinct from the “principal,” or authority behind the words: “these are other’s words.” In a narrative context, the effect is to distance current speaker from the authority behind the declarative proposition. By contrast, me asserts that animator and principal are one and the same; the effect is emphatic: “these words are my words.” In the context of an imperative, the effect is thus one of emphasizing the speaker’s desire that the command be carried out; hence, the gloss ‘please.’ The contrast is systematic, as the following constructed examples show, with declaratives (3-4), imperatives (5-6), and interrogatives (7-9).

(3) Chbat la “He’s going (so someone says).”
(4) Chbat me “He’s going (I assert it!).”
(5) Batan la “You are to go.”
(6) Batan me “Please go!”
(7) Mi chabat la? “Will you go (someone asks)?”
(8) Mi chabat me? “Will you go (for goodness sake, go already)!?”
(9) K’u ma ora chabat? “When (the hell) will you go?”

In terms of the standard Jakobsonian definition, la is a clear “evidential” in that it indexes a displaced (non-current) speech event, whether real or fictionally projected, what Irvine (1996) calls a “shadow conversation” in which
someone other than the speaker animates an utterance—an assertion, a question, a command—to which the current utterance is indebted. *Me* on the other hand involves a marked reflexive reference to the current act of speaking (by contrast with a similar but unmarked utterance with no evidential ornamentation): using *me* emphasizes that I am animating my own thoughts, intentions, desires, etc. (*Ma* further compounds the contextualization by indexing the co-presence in the utterance of an interrogative element.) *Ka*, though infrequent, apparently indexes a prior expectation that is somehow confirmed, perhaps suprisingly.

(10) Ta ka xabat. So, you’re going (after all, I had heard that you might).

**Framing verbs and epithets**

Before turning to my compadre’s use of evidential elements in ordinary conversation, let me flesh out the picture of a few further, related Tzotzil resources. I have claimed that the ‘hearsay’ clitic *la* indexes a virtual “narrated speech situation” that is distinct from the current moment of speech, but without specifying details of the implicated interlocutors or their actual talk. Indeed, as we shall see, part of the interactive virtue of *la* is its anonymity, its noncommittal invocation of quite unspecific others. By contrast, *me* focuses attention on the current act of speaking, investing it with an emphatic relationship to the speaker herself, her intentions, state of knowledge, desires, etc. In addition to these semi-grammaticalized evidentials, Tzotzil speech is liberally sprinkled with explicit verbs of speaking which, in various degrees, frame talk and knowledge of events directly in terms of different kinds of participant structures and perceptive modalities. Without going into details, I list some of the relevant framing verbs in Table 4. Each verb provides a miniature scenario to characterize the relative states of knowledge, expectation, and talk among interlocutors. Each verb is also at least partially grammaticalized in Zinacantec Tzotzil, in the sense that the verbal paradigms are somewhat reduced both morphologically and phonologically, and that each verb gives rise to a series of frozen and conventionalized expressions that begin to exhibit particle like syntactic autonomy.

For example, the three explicit verbs of speaking have slightly different properties. *Chi* ‘say’ is formally intransitive, although it is always accompanied by a “quoted” utterance (which may be articulated speech, a sound, a gesture, or even a movement); it is aspectually defective, occurring only with the unmarked aspectual prefix *x*--; and it is phonologically reduced in the 3rd person form, *xi*, which also means ‘thus, this way.’ The transitive *ut* ‘tell’ also involves a “quoted” utterance, but its two formal arguments are speaker and addressee; the verb also occurs only in unmarked aspect. The transitive *al* ‘say’ has as its syntactic object whatever is said; an addressee can be formally incorporated via an applicative suffix; and although this verb has a complete aspectual paradigm, a number of its forms are frozen: the perfective forms, for example, mean not that...
someone has said X, but that one has intended (unsuccessfully) to do X or thought (wrongly) that X.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>chi</th>
<th>‘say’ [intr.]</th>
<th>xi ‘he says/he goes’, x-i-chi ‘I say/I go’, x-a-chi ‘you say/you go’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ut</td>
<td>‘tell’ [tr.]</td>
<td>x-k-ut ‘I said to him’, x-ut ‘he told him’, …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al</td>
<td>‘say’ [tr.]</td>
<td>ch-k-al ‘I say [it]’, ti k-al-oje ‘I would have said [it], I should have thought’; x-k-al-tik ‘(as) we say’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>il</td>
<td>‘see’</td>
<td>yilel ‘apparently’; y-av-il ‘now that you see it; since it is the case that…’; k’el-av-il ‘look here’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a`i</td>
<td>‘hear, understand’</td>
<td>v-a<code>i ‘so, listen’; k-a</code>-tik ‘as we know..’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>na`</td>
<td>‘know’</td>
<td>x-a-na<code> ‘as you know’; a-na</code>-oj ‘do you think [wrongly]?’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: evidentially tinged framing verbs

The verbs of perception on Table 4 have, in addition to their literal perceptual meanings, a series of semi-grammaticalized particle-like forms which provide evidential commentary on utterances, as we shall in some of the examples to follow.

Zinacantec Tzotzil also has a large collection of exclamations and assessments—syntactically unconstrained epithets, added appositionally or extra-clausally—which seem on the face of things to express a variety of speaker “attitudes,” including their epistemic expectations and stances. Many of these expressions are borrowed from Spanish, and they are characteristic of certain genres and styles of speech.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kere</th>
<th>‘[boy] damn!’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jkobel</td>
<td>‘[fucker] damn!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>juta</td>
<td>‘[whore] damn!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chin</td>
<td>‘[fuck] damn!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pentejo</td>
<td>‘[pubic hair] damn! How incredibly stupid!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kavron</td>
<td>‘[goat, cuckold] damn!’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: A few male epithets

They are also gender linked, since some forms only men use, while others are reserved for women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kajival</th>
<th>‘[my lord] my goodness!’</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>jlo<code>-tzo</code></td>
<td>‘[shit eater] how terrible!’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>porkiriya</td>
<td>‘[disgusting thing] how disgusting!’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Some female epithets
“Thieves”: Zinacantec “Small talk”

In order to connect my compadre’s masterful speech with these Tzotzil evidential devices, I draw exemplary material largely from a videotaped conversation between mol Mariano and one of his nephews, in forest lands not far from the village of Nabenchauk. The nephew has been hauling newly hewn pine boards from a wooded plot up to the path, in order eventually to transport them by truck back to the village. Talk has turned to thieves who steal firewood, pine needles (which are important in ritual), and tools. Mol Mariano recounts the loss of a hoe and of two hand pumps used for applying herbicides from property both nearby and in lowland fields. Both men tell of similar cases involving others, complete with narrated dialogues and laments. Evidential elements of various sorts are prominent throughout the conversation, as subsequent fragments will show.

The pump was sitting in the house la, and was lost la.

It is worth noting that such a conversation—growing out of a casual encounter between acquaintances who are nonetheless not closely enough related to share more than the most superficial of intimacies—is in the native calculus of ways of speaking quintessentially “polite” Tzotzil. The conventional etiquette of such talk is patent in a number of discursive features: massive repetition, conventionalized expressions, and a certain enforced vacuity about topics: the weather, the cornfield, the costs of things. Interactively, Zinacantec “small talk” also requires a mutual “drawing out” between interlocutors, who frame agreement in conventional ways, and engineer epistemic alignment largely through the use of evidential elements of the kind we have seen. Moreover, evidentials implicate “shadow conversations” and thus “shadow participants,” about whom face-to-face interlocutors can also negotiate moral and affective stances.

“[T]he grammar of evidence picks out, presupposes, or implicates voices or faces (on both the speaker's end and that of his interlocutors): those who do and don't, can and can't, [should or shouldn’t] know” (Haviland 1987).

In mol Mariano’s conversation with his nephew, for example, he describes the theft of an important and costly farming tool—the herbicide spraying pump that men nowadays use to weed their fields. (In Tzotzil transcripts, Mariano is M, his nephew N; line numbers from the original transcript are preserved; glossing conventions are described in Appendix 1.)
No third party narrators are cited here, but M’s use of the clitic la shows that this must be someone else’s story. In line 110, M agrees with N’s sentiment (“In the name of God” suggests surprise and dismay here), but even his “yes” is given evidential distancing via la.

In describing another theft—a hoe that his son’s worker had left hidden in a cornfield alongside a pickaxe—Mariano explicitly (if non-specifically) voices his protagonists, with the framing verb xi ‘he said.’ In line 46, moreover, it is clear that the reported speaker (subject of the framing verb xi) is his son, whereas it is the worker (the 3rd person subject of the verb –javan ‘lay_face_up’) who left the hoe where the thief could find it.

Although with human principals, careful conversationalists like mol Mariano will assiduously use la to distance themselves from non-verified sources, the frozen and phonologically reduced expression lojryox, derived from y-il-oj ryox ‘lit., God has seen it’ attests to the epistemic certainty of a supernatural witness.
A recurring theme in recent studies of evidential systems is the relationship between evidence, moral positioning by interlocutors, and responsibility (Hill and Irvine 1992).

“Evidentials offer a delicate resource for manipulating a constantly shifting common ground between speaker (in his or her various faces) and interlocutors, a universe of discourse that has not only epistemological but also moral character. Evidentials encode not only what a speaker knows or how he knows it; but also what [interlocutors] can be taken to know, or should know, or apparently (perhaps culpably) fail to know” (Haviland 1987).

Mol Mariano tells his nephew that he has had considerable trouble with thieves in the nearby fields, and his nephew, who has already complained about the same problem, uses the Tzotzil formula for “I told you so” (literally, ‘hear what I am saying, i.e., that’s just what I’m telling you’, using both the verbs a’i ‘hear’ and al ‘say’) to suggest that he already knew all about the problem.

(14) I told you so

7 M; batz’i ep s- pas -oj -b- -on palta
real much 3E- do, make -PF -BEN- -1A fault
li’ ta j- na -e
here/this PREP 1E- house -CL

They have caused me lots of problems here at my house.

8 N; av a’i ch- k- al -e (> va’i chkale)
2E- hear ICP- 1E- say -CL

You see what I told you?

Because evidentials have to do with belief, they also involve disbelief, doubt, absolute certainty and agreement, as well as absolute disagreement. They are thus appropriate vehicles for “assessments” (Goodwin 1986) with which interlocutors react to and evaluate each other’s pronouncements. Moreover, since Tzotzil evidential elements often implicate “shadow conversations,” in the mouth of a master speaker they are powerful tools for representing shadow personalities: the assessments of narrated protagonists give subtle clues to their attitudes, feelings, and character, via gestures of their narrated voices (which may be, in a complex lamination, also narrating voices), their epistemic and affective positioning, and so on. They are also resources well-designed to express politeness and its black sheep cousins (rudeness, mocking, scorn, indifference, and so on).
Mariano describes a good hoe and a valuable axe lost to a thief. His
nephew responds with a sympathetic and somewhat disbelieving Spanish epithet,
complete with little shake of the head.

\[(15)\] Chin!
18 M; lek mol asaluna
   good large hoe
   \textit{It was a nice large hoe.}
19 jun ek’el i- bat
   one axe CP- go
   \textit{And a single axe was stolen.}
20 N; chin
   \textit{Damn!}

Mariano does not merely describe but demonstrates his chagrin at the
thefts, by putting emotional words, framed by a verb of speaking, in an emotional
mouth—in this case, his own mouth.

\[(16)\] “Damned thief,” I say.
58 M; jee
   \textit{Hmph!}
59 puta j’elek’ -e kere x- -i- chi
   whore robber -CL boy ASP- -1A- say
   \textit{“The damned thief!” I said to myself.}

Certainty and uncertainty, the supposed substrate of evidentiality, are also
manipulable for interpersonal ends. Consider the following exchange, in which
the nephew uses the conventional expression \textit{jna’tik} ‘who knows? lit., we know.’
One assumes that N does know when the truck is scheduled to come, and his non-
committal, hedged reply is consistent with a conventional politeness strategy in
Indian Chiapas (Haviland 1988, Brown and Levinson 1978:175 passim.).

\[(17)\] uncertainty (feigned) as politeness
198 M; jayib to ora ch- tal li karo
   how many still hour ICP- come ART truck
   un -e
   PT -CL
   \textit{At what time will the truck come?}
199 N; j- na` -tik mi ch- tal ta chib ora
   1E- know -PLINC Q ICP- come PREP two hour
   Who knows if it will come at 2 o’clock.

Similarly polite is what one might call vacuous agreement, accomplished through
the manipulation of “indeed”-style evidentials as well as via massive
conversational repetition (see lines 223-228 in the following fragment).

\[(18)\] Peaches
220 M; li` nox k- ak’ to j- bwelta
Mariano and his nephew consider the theft of herbicide pumps, mentioned in the first illustrative fragment above, and together they construct a disastrous hypothetical scenario in which, had the thieves encountered not just the tools but their owners as well, things could have turned out much worse. Again, evidential framing combines with repetitive agreement to align the rhetorical positions of the interlocutors.

(19) Could have been worse

119 M; ja` mu j- na` ti tey -uk ! NEG 1E- know CONJ there -IRREAL
And I don’t know if (the owner) had been there...

120 y- ajval
3E- lord
(the owner)

121 mu j- na` mi mu x- milvan komel(DIR) NEG 1E- know Q NEG ASP- murder staying
ch- k- al -e ICP- 1E- say -CL
I don’t know if (the thieves) might not have just killed him and left him, I say.

122 N; yu`n ja` ch- milvan
because ! ICP- murder
Well, they would have killed him.

Those bastards.

They would have killed him, indeed.

Indeed, they would have killed him, what else?

The world of the soul and the face of the earth

There is another context in which a skilled raconteur like my compadre displays his mastery of evidentials: in dream narratives. In Zinacantán, dreams are powerful and prophetic: they are the source of often obscure but important premonitions and the site in which supernatural gifts (the ability to cure, or to play music, for example) are bestowed by the ancestral deities. Unlike the waking world, known as ta sba balamil ‘on the face of the earth’, dreams are the realm of the soul, which can detach itself from the sleeping body, and travel far and wide, having its adventures. Although, ones soul is recognizable, it constitutes an authority of its own distinct from oneself: its experiences are normally qualified with the evidentially distancing clitic la.

"This is his house," he said la.

Thus, for example, when mol Mariano tells his dreams, he is normally careful to distinguish what he himself sees or experiences, from what his soul sees and experiences in dreaming.

(20) What my soul sees

What my soul sees

Thus, for example, when mol Mariano tells his dreams, he is normally careful to distinguish what he himself sees or experiences, from what his soul sees and experiences in dreaming.
It appeared that there were women gathered there, LA.

It seemed there was a very low cave there, LA.

Similarly, even what my soul hears and says in dream requires evidential qualification.

"Ah," I said, supposedly.

"Look what there is in there," he said.

"Ah," I told him, LA.

Finally, at the end of this troubling dream, in which Mariano was offered suspicious food, shown where a witch prayed to sell people’s souls, and was finally shown a prone man, said to be Christ, comes the punchline. Mariano’s soul recognizes that it was being deceived. Still, the moment of revelation itself also receives the evidential la.

But what would you find?

It was a dead person, LA.

(Socio)linguistic spaces in modern Chiapas and new “Master speakers”?

The Tzotzil region and, indeed, all of indigenous Chiapas is experiencing dramatic language shift, as Indian communities along with the languages they speak are being rapidly displaced. War, religious and political fragmentation, as well as profound changes in the social organization of work have all contributed to the rise of new, mixed, sometimes wildly multilingual communities—in both sparsely settled areas of the state and on the fringes of urban centers. Although there have been cyclic rises and falls over two centuries in the percentage of speakers of Indian languages bilingual in Spanish, the past two decades have seen a rapidly increasing reliance on Spanish on the part of Indians, as “traditional” forms of control over indigenous populations and their labor that, in the second half of the last century, permitted Zinacantecs, for example, the apparent luxury of living in a largely Tzotzil world have lost their purchase.

Increased competence in Spanish by Zinacantecs has had differential impact on the Tzotzil evidential system. We saw in the inventory of initial and final particles a large number of Spanish loans, and the vast majority of male
epithets are also transparently borrowed. If one compares Colonial Tzotzil (Laughlin 1988) with its modern Zinacantec variety, one discovers a virtually unchanged inventory of 2nd position clitics: the same repertoire, syntax, and evident function. In both initial and final phrasal clitics, some Colonial elements have been displaced or disappeared entirely. One phrase-final clitic with an evidential flavor which does not, to my knowledge, survive in modern Zinacantec speech, is shown by the early friars as *jey ‘God grant, if it only were so…’ Moreover, the lack of phrasal clitics in the Colonial sources may reflect either lack of attention on the part of the friar/lexicographers to these troublesome elements that come at the edges of utterances, or a large influx of (gender indexed) Spanish loans to fill or displace discursive functions. Comparing the two epochs of the language on the basis of Colonial documents, on the one hand, and patterns of public oratory in modern (male) speech, one also observes a massive influx of Spanish connectives into the language.

George Collier (1994) has argued that new forms of capital intensive agriculture and employment have created new sorts of economic power in communities like Zinacantán without corresponding social ties that heretofore bound even wealthy Indians to their communities and to cohorts of supporters. In modern Zinacantán there are political leaders totally emancipated from the hierarchy of community-oriented religious service (and the Tzotzil discursive mastery that underpins it). Even within the religious and curing hierarchies—under threat in all neighboring Tzotzil municipalities—there is a shifting balance between formerly exclusive orality and growing literacy, mostly in Spanish. There are also shifts in curing practices (increasing reliance on clinics, aleopathic medicines, as well as patent remedies of all kinds), and in procedures of formal dispute settlement (new courthouses of Paz y Reconciliación ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ supposedly designed to preserve “customary” Indian law in the aftermath of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion have been installed throughout Indian Chiapas). Health and law were formerly areas of central importance for specialists in Tzotzil to put their expertise with words into action. There is little place, in this new linguistic order, for “master speakers” in the mold of my compadre Mariano. It remains to be seen what new sorts of linguistic mastery will emerge in the current constellation of languages and speech situations in modern Chiapas. The empirical work to capture emerging, perhaps hybrid, evidential systems also remains to be done.

Allow me to conclude this excursion into a perhaps doomed and anachronistic sort of Tzotzil linguistic competence, with a polite—because evidentially hedged—leave taking between mol Mariano and his nephew.

(23) Saying goodbye.

213 M; tey kuch -o kik che’e
there carry -IMP perhaps then

So, carry (more wood), perhaps, then.

214 N; an y- u’un te ta j- kuch kik
Why, I will perhaps keep carrying.

We'll talk together.

Later.

Why, let it be then, indeed.

Yes.

Yes.

Here the forward-looking and encouraging tone of kik ‘perhaps’ captures the optimistic spirit I would like to be able to adopt towards my compadre’s linguistic skills and their chances for survival in a Tzotzil future. The promise of taking ones leave by agreeing to “talk together” again in the future is one I hope can apply to the endangered languages of the region.

Appendix

Abbreviations used in the glosses include the following:

! emphatic nominal predicate
1A 1st person absolutive affix
1E 1st person ergative prefix
2E 2nd person ergative prefix
3E 3rd person ergative prefix
ART article
ASP neutral aspect
BEN benefactive (applicative) suffix
CL clitic
CONJ conjunction
CP completive aspect
DIR directional
ICP incompletive aspect
IMP imperative
IRREAL irrealis suffix
LA la 2nd position clitic (also glossed as QUOT[ative])
NEG negative particle
PF perfective suffix
PL nominal plural suffix
PLINC 1st person plural inclusive suffix
PREP preposition
PT particle
Q yes/no question particle
QUOT Quotative clitic la

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