The Limits of Awareness

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In the course of field work, linguists, just like other anthropologists, spend a great deal of their time listening to people talk about what they are doing. The resulting data form a corpus of speech about speech, a "meta-corpus" as it were, that consists of speech at the same time that it seems to talk about, or characterize, speech as a meaningful social action. In reply to our queries or spontaneously, people will utter descriptive statements about who has said or can say what to whom, when, why, and where, just like statements about who can give presents of certain kinds to whom, when, why, and where. But talking about "saying" is, for better or worse, also an example of "saying"; and such metalanguage, for the analyst of culture, is as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. As is readily apparent, all our efforts to differentiate "conscious native models" from "anthropologist's models," or "ethno-theories" and "ideologies" from "objective social reality," are attempts to come to grips with the metalanguage vs. language relationship, or its more general form, (meta-)language vs. action. So I hope that what I discuss here will be seen not as a crabbled and technical treatment whose relevance is bounded by linguistic and semiotic debate, but as a contribution to general anthropological theory and methodology, using the data of speech. And further, I hope that my title in terms of "limits" is not taken as purely negative, but rather as characterizing relative ease and relative difficulty. For the point I wish to make is that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a native speaker take account of those readily-discernible facts of speech as action that (s)he has no ability to describe for us in his or her own language. And I want to demonstrate by examples what dimensions of speech usage play a role in this relationship.

Let me now introduce the word "pragmatic" for how speech forms are used as effective action in specifiable cultural contexts. One dimension of the "meaning" of every speech form is pragmatic, exactly like any social action. From a semiotic point of view, all such meanings can be described as rules linking certain culturally-constituted features of the speech situation with certain forms of speech. To give those rules, or talk about them, is to engage in "meta-pragmatic" discourse, we should say. So the statement, "In our society, when a proper religious or judiciary functionary so empowered sincerely utters to a man and woman, 'I pronounce you husband and wife,' the latter are married," is a metapragmatic utterance describing the effective use of this formula. Whether or not it is a correct statement is, of course, not at issue; it is in any case intended as a description of some pragmatic meaning relation.

I can now formulate my hypothesis as follows. For the native speaker, the ease or difficulty of accurate meta-pragmatic characterization of the use of the forms of his or her own language seems to depend on certain general semiotic properties of the use in question. That is, the basic evidence we have for awareness of the pragmatic dimension of language use, susceptibility to conscious native testimony, is universally bounded by certain characteristics of the form and contextually-dependent function of the pragmatic markers in speech. I intend here to illustrate the dimensions I have so far isolated in field-based data, drawn from my own and from others' field work, and then to try to explain them. In each case, we will be interested in seeing why native speakers are able or unable to characterize the contextual appropriateness of speech, and to manipulate it for the investigator.

Let me start with a success story, reported in a number of publications about the Djirbal language of North Queensland, Australia, by R. M. W. Dixon. Djirbal has two disjoint (non-overlapping) sets of vocabulary items, one that Dixon calls the "everyday" set of words, and the other, of contextually-specific usage, that he calls the "mother-in-law" set. As is widespread in Australia, when a person speaks within earshot of a classificatory "mother-in-law" - the details of the kin-reckoning need not concern us here - he must use all and only the vocabulary items of the special "mother-in-law" set, and none of those in the "everyday" set of items. Utterances in either style have exactly the same overt grammatical patterns, however. Now we should understand that a speaker is not necessarily talking about, or referring to, the mother-in-law, when using the special mother-in-law vocabulary; it is just that the use of this set of vocabulary items is obligatory in the context where speaker and audience are in a specified kin relationship, regardless of the topic of discourse. We would say that, in any given appropriate instance of speaking, the vocabulary items used have two independent kinds of meaning relations: (a) a context-independent word-"sense," in terms of how the Djirbalan refer to persons, things, events, and build statements using these words in grammatical arrangements; and (b) a context-dependent "indexical" value, that indicates whether or not a classificatory mother-in-law is present as an audience in the speech event. Note that every vocabulary item in Djirbal must be specified on both these dimensions.

Now, as it turns out, the number of vocabulary items in the everyday set is about four or five times that in the mother-in-law set, and so there seems to be a many-to-one relationship in terms of referring to any particular entity, as shown in (1). Where in everyday vocabulary, there are five separate words (of masculine gender class) for various lice and ticks, in the mother-in-law vocabulary there is only one term, that can refer to the same total range of things as the whole set of everyday items. Similarly, where the everyday vocabulary has six separate words (of the edible flora gender class) for loya vines of different species and stages of growth, the
mother-in-law vocabulary has one cover term. As any structuralist knows, if there are a different number of elements that enter into referential opposition, dividing up an "ethno-classificatory" realm, then there must be different word-senses, a different structural contribution each item of everyday vs. mother-in-law vocabulary makes to sentences containing them. And yet, as shown in (2), from the point of view of Djirbal speakers, in actual situations of discourse there is equivalence of understood reference in the everyday and mother-in-law speech contexts, but there is difference in indexing or indicating mother-in-law as audience or not.

(2) Formulable use relations of the two styles

Pragmatic reference:

\[\text{"Everyday" = "Mother-in-law"}\]

Presence of affinity:

\[\text{"Everyday" \neq "Mother-in-law" (no vs. yes)}\]

Dixon brilliantly seized on this apparent contradiction in semantic structure vs. pragmatic implementation, in order to elucidate the meaning of Djirbal verbs. To do so, he had to rely on the native speakers' ability to engage in metapragmatic discourse about language use in these two situations, their ability, in other words, intentionally to talk about utterances that are equivalent in referential effect in these two contexts of use. He used a two-way elicitation procedure as follows. First, Dixon asked how to say the same thing as some given everyday utterance using the mother-in-law style, as shown in (3a): "Bala bangul nudin' wiyaman djaluydja?" ("How does one say, 'Bala bangul nudin' ["he cut it"] in Djaluy [mother-in-law style]?") This stage of elicitation yields many-to-one relationships of various sets of everyday vocabulary items to one mother-in-law item, as shown for example in (3a) for verbs of "telling." Such sets were gathered together in orderly files from separately-elicited word equivalences. In the second stage of elicitation, Dixon asked speakers how to say the same thing as some given mother-in-law utterance, using the everyday style. This stage, remarkably, yielded one-to-one equivalences, as shown in (3b), the mother-in-law item wuyuban yielding everyday item buwanju and no others. Finally, Dixon's hypothesis that both of these styles must have distinct but compatible word-sense structures (deducible from the universal properties of grammar, and hence really just the assumption that Djirbal is a natural human language) led him to ask, for each item of vocabulary in the various everyday sets he generated in the first stage, how one would say that and only that in the mother-in-law style (there is a construction meaning "exactly" or "only" in Djirbal). In this third stage, he induced precisely the differences of referential value he suspected. The one item of everyday vocabulary that showed one-to-one translatability in stages one and two still had this characteristic, as shown in (3c), while the other items in each such set showed complex mother-in-law constructions with various grammatical structures of mother-in-law words used to indicate exact, context-independent referential distinctions. This last kind of data showed some variability, moreover, just as we would expect for attempts at folk-definition.

(3) Typical elicitation process for equivalence relations

(a) "Bala bangul nudin' wiyaman djaluydja?"

\[\text{"Everyday"}\]

\[\text{buwanju}\]

\[\text{djinganju}\]

\[\text{gindimban}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}}paran}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} justify}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}}wuyuban}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban}\]

(b) buwanju

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban}\]

(djinganju

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyubuyuban [redup. "do to excess or iteratively (sc., to many people)"]}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyubuyuban [niungul "ouc", -mbal "do (it)"]}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textit{\textast}}} wuyuban djilbuya [djilbu "nothing," -nga "locative"]}\]

I must stress here that the native ability accurately and explicitly to formulate relations of use, the native ability to talk about utterances appropriate to specific contexts, is critical to Dixon's enterprise. Here, as shown, the speakers are aware of the pragmatic equivalence of referring with the specific terms of everyday style and the vague or general terms of mother-in-law style, and they are aware of the difference of context signalled by these vocabulary switches. Also, they are aware of the asymmetry of reference, as shown by the back-translation of stage two of the elicitation. And finally, they are aware of ways to make mother-in-law style referentially precise, which is not the custom in using this style, but can be, as in stage three, induced on the data. I want to claim that there are three crucial factors that play a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, role in this awareness, this availability of everyday vs. mother-in-law styles of use for conscious metapragmatic discussion. The first I call their \textit{unavoidable referentiality}; the second, their \textit{continuous segmentability}; and the third, their \textit{relative presuppositional} quality vis-à-vis the context of use. (See 4a, b, c.)
(4) Semiotic properties of these pragmatic forms
(a) Unavoidable referentiality: in isolating the aspect of the signal that enters into the pragmatic opposition in question, we have thereby identified a constituent that enters into referential oppositions, e.g., “formal” vs. “familiar” pronouns for hearer (French vous vs. tu, Russian ты vs. ты, German Sie vs. du) but not phonetic markers of socio-economic class affiliation of speaker (cf. W. Labov’s Sociolinguistic Patterns, Philadelphia, 1972)
(b) Continuous segmentability: the pragmatic signal can be identified as continuous stretches in actual speech, segmentable as overt meaningful units of the utterances in which they occur, e.g., whole sentences: The man was walking down the street; continuous phrases: The man, Was walking down the street, Was walking, Down the street, The street; words: The, Man, Was, Walking, Down, The, Street; suffixes and prefixes: -ing; but not Progressive Aspect, expressed by “Be -ing” (Observe there is no “The man wasing walk down the street”)
(c) Relative presupposition: a specific effective instance of a pragmatic signal is linked to and requires, for its effect, some independently verifiable contextual factor or factors, e.g., English demonstrates this and that (presupposing sight or sound of some entity, or co-occurring verbal description, or previous reference in temporally prior speech); but not phonological markers of class or regional affiliation of speaker (the “Haavd Yael” phenomenon), deference and politeness markers (“Roger” vs. “Prof. Brown”).

Unavoidable referentiality is the property of those pragmatic (effective context-dependent) signals that are automatically identified by identifying the elements of speech that refer, or describe. Reference, or statement-value, is that aspect of the meaningfulness of speech which relates speaking to a logical calculus of propositions, ultimately related to the notions of truth and falsity. In general, our whole western view of grammar is based on this kind of meaningfulness, the detailed exposition of which I will not enter into here. But I will insist that the identification of so-called grammatical categories, sentence and construction types, and lexical items (or word stems) with various senses, all ultimately come from looking at language as a system of reference in this manner. Now, if, in identifying the utterance-fractions (or constituents) of speech that have some identifiable pragmatic function — that enter into pragmatic oppositions — we thereby also isolate utterance-fractions that form units of reference, these pragmatic utterance-fractions are unavoidably referential. Thus, one of the well-known pragmatic systems of many European languages signals (broadly) deference-to-hearer vs. solidarity-with-hearer by the alternation of two pronominal forms, say “second or third person singular” vs. “second person singular,” e.g., French vous vs. tu, Russian ты vs. ты, German Sie vs. du. And these forms are at the same time the very units of referring to, or picking out, the hearer in a speech event. The deference vs. solidarity system is thus unavoidably referential. We can contrast on this dimension such pragmatic alternations as certain North American English phonetic markers of social stratification isolated by Labov in many famous studies, where the signals of socio-economic class affiliation of the speaker reside in subtle pronunciation effects within certain phonemic categories, which operate independent of any segmentation of speech by the criterion of reference. To be sure, we know from various psychological experiments of Wallace Lambert and others that these markers are readily understood by native speakers of English, inasmuch as the experimental subjects categorize the speakers of such alternate pronunciations quite readily. But, in isolating the relevant pragmatic signals, we do not thereby isolate units of language that play a role in the system of reference. In the Djerbal case under consideration, the alternation of everyday vs. mother-in-law forms in normal usage consists of a kind of word-by-word substitutability. The very lexical elements of reference to things and events are precisely isolated (up to but not including their grammatical inflections) in isolating the pragmatic speech-fractions at issue.

Continuous segmentability is the property of those pragmatic signals that can be identified as continuous stretches of actual speech, segmentable as overt meaningful units of the utterances in which they occur. Thus, any word-stem, prefix or suffix, word, continuous phrase, or even whole sentence is a continuously segmentable element. In any utterance, such units of language are realized as continuous stretches of overt signal behavior. Note that this criterion cross-cuts that of unavoidable referentiality. For example, take any statement of the sentence, The man was walking down the street, as a referential event, one that simply states this as a proposition. If we had recordings of such fluent executions, we would find that the whole utterance, “The man was walking down the street,” would be, in our sense, continuously segmentable; it would be realized in a continuous temporal stretch of speech behavior. So also would be the phrases, “The man,” “Was walking down the street,” “Was walking,” “Down the street,” “The street.” So also would be the words, “The,” “Man,” “Was,” “Walking,” “Down,” “The,” “Street.” So also would be the suffix “-ing” on “walking.” However, still under the hypothesis of referential (or propositional) meaning, the single referential unit expressing the Progressive aspect, the complex of forms “was -ing,” is not continuously segmentable; it is a discontinuous combination of parts of the overt utterance that together signal the progressive aspect in English. That they form a referential unit is quite clear (Chomsky’s 1957 Syntactic Structures is essentially a whole theoretical monograph built on this fact). But they can never be in continuous temporal order, as is easily seen from trying to say, “The man wasing walk down the street.” Observe that the Djerbal case under discussion involves the alternation of word-stems as the effective pragmatic signal, and hence each of the alternants is continuously segmentable. Each word-stem occurs in a continuous time fraction of the utterance.

Relative presupposition is a relationship whereby a specific effective instance of a pragmatic signal is linked to and requires, for its effect, some independently verifiable contextual factor or factors. Relative creativity of a particular pragmatic signal, at the opposite pole of this continuum, essentially brings some contextual factor into existence, serving as the unique signal thereof. I hope that this dimension of contrast does not seem too terribly abstract; it is trying to capture the degree to which our
knowledge of the contextual factors linked to specific pragmatic instances comes
from other signals or depends on the occurrence of the very signal at issue. A
pragmatic instance that depends on other signals for its effectiveness "presupposes"
the establishment of some contextual factor by those other signals, whether they be
signals in the same or some other sensory modality. Thus, for a valid pointing out of
something with an instance of English "this" or "that," we presuppose one or more
of the following: (a) non-speech verifiability of the presence of some entity, by sight
or sound or whatever; (b) the presence of some entity that verifiably satisfies some
verbal description that accompanies the "this" or "that"; or (c) prior reference (in the
proper sequential position in speech itself) to some entity. Failing the satisfaction of
one or more of these presuppositions, the instance of "this" or "that" fails to point.
There is little creative potential in such linguistic units. Contrastively, elements of
speech that signal class or regional affiliation of the speaker, or that enter into the so-
called "politeness" system, are by and large the unique signals of these understood
contextual dimensions to which they are linked; their creative potential is very great.
In saying "Haevid Yád" (Harvard Yard in regional class accent) and similar forms, I
communicate and establish my membership in a certain dialect group of American
English. In addressing someone with a particular form of name, as Brown and Ford
long ago showed, the speaker establishes the contextual dimensions of power
relationships and familiarity between him/herself and the addressee. In the Djirbal
case under discussion, one does not create a mother-in-law by the instantiation of the
mother-in-law vocabulary. This relationship is known on other grounds for appro-
priate use in the first place. In other words, the mother-in-law style of vocabulary is
relatively presuppositional of the very aspect of the context to which it is pragmatically
linked, the kin relationship between speaker and audience.

So, to sum up, this example of Djirbal mother-in-law vs. everyday vocabulary
alternation is readily subject to accurate native metapragmatic testimony and manipu-
lation. I want to claim that this is bound up with the three semiotic properties
the alternation has as a pragmatic system, unavoidable referentiality, continuous
segmentability, and relatively presuppositional usage. In contrast, I want to point
out an elicitation failure, in my own Kiksh (Wasco-Wishram Chinookan) work,
where direct appeal to native metapragmatic awareness leads nowhere, and where,
interestingly enough, the situation differs on all three semiotic dimensions.²

In this Native American language of the Columbia River, as in many languages of
the Western U.S., there is an alternation of forms that comes under the rubric of the
gradation "augmentative"-"neutral"-"diminutive." Every form can be uttered in up
to six different ways, as shown in (5), by changing certain features of the consonants,
and, marginally, of the vowels, in entirely regular fashion, depending only on what
are the shapes of the "neutral" forms

(5) Examples of gradation of forms ("augmentative" > "neutral" > "diminutive")

| i-mi-ga:diq > i-mi-q-a:qa.ta > i-mi-k’ak,sta.k > i-mi-k’ak’t’a.k’ | "your head"
| id-mi-b’ > id-mi-p’ > i’-mi-p’ | "your foot"
| i-sa-[q]b-d’a > i-sa-[q]a: > i-[q]a: > i-[q]a:k’ > i-[q]a:k’ | "enormous...", "little"
| a-i-p’a > a’-his immature penis [dim., cf. a-ga-p’a i’ "her nipple"
| q’a-la-ba:il | "damnit!" [aug., cf. qana-na "just like, rather like"]

Consonants: voiced stops, affricates > voiceless > glottalized (b > p > pl)
nonstrident affricates > strident (A > c)
hushing stridents > hissing stridents (l > l)
uvular > velar > labiodental (q > q’)
guttural > labial > labiodental (q > q’)

From textual evidence, from spontaneous recorded conversation, and from certain
frozen (or "lexicalized") examples, the pragmatic meaning of this alternation is clear.
Taking the neutral form as the point of departure, the augmentative form addition-
ally expresses the speaker's feeling that the referent of some lexical item is large for
what it is, or to excess, if an activity; that it is repulsive to the speaker – in short, a
speaker evaluation of oversize, overmuch, and affectively negative. The diminutive
form, on the other hand, expresses the speaker's feeling that the referent is small, or
subtle; that it endears the speaker – in short, a speaker evaluation of undersize,
restricted, and affectively positive. Baby-talk forms (including the child's kinterms)
are in diminutive or super-diminutive shape; mocking and insulting speech is in
augmentative.

What can native speakers do when asked about these linguistic forms? Can they
talk about the augmentative-neutral-diminutive gradations? Can they produce
series of forms on demand, given one of the alternants? Can they accurately char-
acterize the uses? Many attempts at direct systematic elicitation proved, ultimately,
to be unsuccessful. Ever watchful for such forms, and for the opportunity to ques-
tion consultants about them, I heard, in a piece of delicious gossip, the form
"icamuqbal" "she with rotten old big belly" as an epithet for a loose woman, clearly
the augmentative of the neutral form "icamuq"al "she with big belly" or "her
paunch," as shown in (7).

(7) Attempted elicitation

icamuqbal, aug. of i-ca-ma:q "al "her paunch," "she with big belly" occurs spontaneously;
icamuq "al, neut. form is "repeated" by informant, even, to tape-recording;
i-sa-ga:icamuq "al "it-is-large her-paunch" given as translation equivalent.

Here was the opportunity to bring the consultant to conscious awareness of the
change! So I asked for a repetition, and, as you may guess by now, the consultant
"repeated" "icamuq "al," the neutral form. "But you just said -muqbal' didn't you?
That means 'great big one,' no?" I insist. "No, it's icamuq"al." Playing the tape-
recording back was of no avail. Eventually, I ask for the form: “Well, how do you say, ‘her great big belly’?” “Oh, iagái içamuq’äl” — this last expression being a fully referential or descriptive phrase, “her belly is large” or “she has a big belly” (and note the neutral form of the word for “large” as well). What is subject to conscious manipulation is the referential or descriptive component of Wasco-Wishram, but the augmentative–neutral–diminutive gradations are beyond this kind of metapragmatic characterization. This particular consultant (whose name I can no longer give, since she has recently died) was one of the more sensitive in matters linguistic; on another occasion she could tell me, for example, that all the forms I produced with diminutive effects “sounded kinda cute,” but she just could not grasp the metapragmatic task of producing them on demand, though her spontaneous speech was replete with examples.

This failure of metapragmatic elicitation is quite telling, in contrast to the Djjirbal case of mother-in-law switches (or in contrast to my own ability to elicit mother-in-law vs. everyday forms among the Worora of northwestern Australia). For here we are dealing with pragmatic forms of speech that systematically contrast along all three dimensions we have so far seen. First, recall, the augmentative–neutral–diminutive alternations operate on certain sound properties (or “features”) of consonants and of some vowels wherever and whenever they occur in free positions in speech. So, in isolating the signals of the alternations, we are isolating not segments of speech, but phonological features of some of the segments; we are not isolating thereby any units of language that themselves have referential value. So the gradations of form here are not unavoidably referential; they operate on utterance-fractions that are completely independent of the units of reference. Second, the proper formulation of the gradation is in terms of features of the sounds in speech that appear in the contrasts here-and-there in the course of speaking. In such forms as (augmentative) “gāgādaq” vs. (diminutive) “k’ak’st’ak’,” the first, third, fourth, fifth, and final sound segments undergo feature change; the rest of the shape of the stem remains the same. So the gradations of form here are clearly not continuously segmentable. Third, the alternations of form here are essentially the unique signal of speaker attitude toward what is talked about; in using such an augmentive or diminutive (vs. neutral) form, the speaker communicates his attitude to the hearer, and this attitude becomes a contextual reality with effects on how the interaction then proceeds. (You don’t tell a salacious story about someone who has just been referred to diminutively, at the risk of offending the prior speaker!) Such forms presuppose merely the constitution of a speech situation with speaker and hearer, something guaranteed just by the fact of speech occurring. Basically, then, the augmentative–neutral–diminutive shifts are highly creative elements of Kiksh.

I want to claim that these formal and functional differences in the two cases are, at least in part, characteristic of the causes of the difference in the way the pragmatics of languages are available for conscious metapragmatic discourse. But we are not finished. I want briefly to present two more dimensions of contrast of pragmatic forms, dimensions I have called decontextualized deducibility and metapragmatic transparency. The first three dimensions presented, in shorthand, referentiality, segmentability, and presupposition, deal with whether or not a native can give evidence of accurate metapragmatic awareness. These last two dimensions deal with how native speakers treat the forms in metapragmatic discourse.

The fourth dimension, decontextualized deducibility, can best be approached by asking the following question. Given the occurrence of some pragmatic form, what proposition expressible in language follows from the fact that the particular pragmatic form has occurred? In a logical sense, we would ask, what proposition formulable in the language is entailed by the occurrence of this form, independent of anything in the context of speaking linked to (indexed by) the form? (cf. 8.)

(8) A fourth dimension of metapragmatic contrast (cf. (4) above):

d) Decontextualized deducibility: what proposition, formulable in the language, is entailed (follows as true) by the effective occurrence of a pragmatic form? E.g.,

In English, a truly referring noun phrase My brother... entails I have a brother;
In English, a truly referring noun phrase The present King of France... entails There is now a King of France.

Suppose, for example, that the pragmatic form in question is an instance of the referring item, “My brother...,” as contrasted pragmatically with the form, “I have a brother.” If the form “my brother...” correctly refers to someone, then from this instance of correct reference we can deduce that I have a brother. Note that any occurrence of the statement, “I have a brother,” entails no such consequences; it may be perfectly false, and the hearer of such a form can say, “Are you sure?” or “Wasn’t that formerly your sister?” or some such. Philosophers talk always about Russell’s classic example, “The present King of France is bald,” and why it is odd. They speak in terms of the “presuppositions” of any utterance of this form, of what propositions must be true in order for the proposition coded in this utterance to have any truth value. The crux of the example is the noun phrase the present King of France, for, as we can now reformulate it, from any valid instance of referring with this phrase, picking out an actually existing entity, the proposition “There exists now a King of France” is deducible as true. And this, of course, was not true even in Russell’s day. So there can be no valid instance of a truly referring form, “The present King of France”; for if there were, by the pragmatics of English the proposition about there now being a King of France would be entailed.

Such examples from English serve to introduce a rather nice parallel from Wasco-Wishram, arrested in my field records. This involves what can be called the “evidential passive” form of the verb, a pragmatic alternant for saying that there is evidence in the situation of discourse, to the speaker’s knowledge, that leads him or her to think that someone or something has been the object of someone’s action. Let me outline its properties in terms of what we have seen so far in the other examples.

The evidential passive form is a particular configuration of the transitive verb with a special suffix -ix. It contrasts with several other possible verbal formations that have the same, or related referential effect. Note that for a typical transitive verb, such as “to boil,” we can have a regular straightforward “active” form, as shown in (9), like English “he boiled them long ago,” “ni-č-d-u-čxm”; a so-called “antipassive” form, like English “he was doing boiling long ago,” “ni-g-i-ki-čxm-all,” that does not tell us what were the objects of his endeavors, just that he was engaged in some activity; an “indirect agent” form, like English “somebody boiled them long ago,” “ni-q-d-u-čxm”; a “collective agent” form, like English “they boiled
them long ago,” “ni-lk-d-u-čxm”, used by contemporary Wasco-Wishram speakers in about the same way as the English nonanaphoric or generic “they”; and a “transitional passive” form, like English “they became boiled” or “they got boiled,” “ni-d-u-čxm-xit”.

(9) Conjugational forms in the Wasco-Wishram verbal paradigm:

| Active:     | ni - čz - d3-y u- čxm | “heq became them1 long ago” |
| Antipassive:| nųg - i3- ki - čxm-al | “they was doing boiling long ago” |
| Indefinite Agent: | ni - q3- d3-y u- čxm | “somebody2 became them3 long ago” |
| Collective Agent: | ni - k3-y u- čxm | “they2 became them3 long ago” |
| Transitional Passive: | ni - d3-y u- čxm-xit | “they3 became boiling long ago” |
| Evidential Passive: | d3-y u- čxm-ix | “they3 must have been boiled” |

Additionally, when the speaker sees some evidence in what he or she understands to be the results of some activity, (s)he can use the “evidential passive,” “d-u-čxm-ix,” which I translate as “they must have been boiled” (because, for example, (s)he sees that they are all mushy, or (s)he tastes that they are soft, or whatever).

Clearly, this form is isolable just by isolating the parts of utterances we are interested in from the point of view of reference; it consists of nothing but a transitive verb form inflected only with a prefix for the undergoer of the activity, plus a suffix -ix that occurs in a number of formations, with much the same referential value as the English deictic word “there.” So we would say that the particular evidential passive construction is unavoidable. Here, the form of an evidential passive, by contrast with all the other forms a transitive verb form, meaning “they must have been boiled” because, for example, (s)he sees that they are all mushy, or (s)he tastes that they are soft, or whatever.

We are in fairly good shape, then, as we engage them in metapragmatic conversation, we find that they tell us about the presupposed contextual requirements, as we would expect, and then give the “meaning” of these forms as the deduced proposition which must be true if the evidential passive is validly used. Let us look at some field records, transcribed from continuous tape-recordings, with all but the actual forms under discussion translated into English (the work proceeded partly in English and partly in Kiksht).

In the first case, in (10a), I am trying to talk about the evidential passive of the form “cause someone to cry,” which, as a morphological causative, is about as good a transitive verb as one can get. I start from a form gathered earlier in a text, “I made them cry recently.” The consultant volunteers “nanug“ičáxmid-a,” a fully-inflected transitive verb form, meaning “I made him cry recently.” Then she offers the form for a collective object, “nanug“ičáxmid-a “I made the bunch cry recently.” And, having gotten the hang of the form, we have several more examples, “I made her cry.” “He made me cry,” and so forth. Seeing that she controls the regular “active” inflection, I then ask for the first person evidential passive form by specifying it: “somebody made me cry,” “nanug“ičáxmid-a. The form understood by the consultant

10. Elicitation of evidential passive forms

(a) Cns: Wonder how’d you say that now, nanug“ičáxmid-a “I made them cry. I’m real sure but it’s kinda hard. a’m, you could say one-for one- you can say nanu-nanug“ičáxmid-a “I recently caused him to cry.”

MS: nanu...

Cns: g“ičáxmid-a, I made him cry.

MS: nanug“iča...”


MS: ah. And how ‘bout like if he made me cry. you say načnu... Cns: načnu-načnu načnu “ičáxmid-a, he made me cry.

MS: I see. Interesting. ah. Could you say like, a’, somebody made me cry; could I say, a’, nanug“ičáxmid-a?

Cns: nanug“ičáxmid-a? O h, person - the way you can tell a person, she looks like she was crying, igčáxmit -

MS: How?

Cns: u-g“ičáxmid-a. [a]-u-g“ičáxmid-a “she must have been made to cry.”

MS: ah, –

Cns: Like if you see somebody, she been cryin’, like it looks somebody she – she musta been cryin’, see?

MS: – Yeah –

Cns: u-g“ičáxmid-a, her eyes shows it. u-g“ičáxmid-a. u-g“ičáxmid-a. Igučáxmid-a or somethin’, they made her cry I guess.
is the feminine singular, “she must have been made to cry,” “ng”iłgicaxmidix,” which is carefully explained in terms of the presupposed context for its occurrence – “she looks like she was crying...her eyes shows it” – and then in terms of the deduced proposition the truth of which is guaranteed by the proper usage of the evidential passive form – “ilgicaxmidix...they made her cry, I guess.”

A second case of this sort, shown in (10b), involves the verb for “pinching.” Having established the regular “active” form, both iterative “I was pinching her” (insanxap’iyantk) and noniterative “I just pinched her” (insanxap’iyatk), the investigator asks for the evidential passive with a first person, “I’m pinched...sxnap’iyatgix.” Note that the consultant responds with the form, and gives the deduced proposition in the same breath – “sxnap’iyatgix...ilsxnap’iyatgix ‘they just pinched me’” – explaining that the meaning is “like” this. Now, pressing for the correctness or incorrectness of the evidential passive, I repeat the form, and the consultant says this could be used if the speaker shows the presupposed evidence – “if you show where you were pinched.” Again, from the point of view of native speaker metapragmatic awareness, the evidential passive is characterized in terms of its presupposition of evidence in the context of speaking, and the deduced full propositional form which must be true if the form is to be used correctly.

(10b) Cns: -ansanxap’iyantk, that means two or three times I guess – i-n-s-a-n-s-xap’iya-n-tk “I was just pinching her”
MS: -Oh, I see -
Cns: - But inckayin’iiansanxap’iyatgix that’s just once. i-n-s-a-n-s-xap’iya-tk “I just pinched her”
MS: Can you also say like, s’-o-’-o-’-could you say, I’m pinched? Could you say, sxnaps’iyatgix? Cns: Yeah -
MS: - How? -
Cns: I’m pinched. snxap’-sxnaps’-
MS: -sxn-
Cns: -sxnaps’iyatgix. xsnaps’iyatgix – i-lk-s-x-n-s-xap’iya-tk “they just pinched me”
MS: ah.
Cns: Somebody pinched me like.
MS: You could say sxnaps’iyatgix though?
Cns: ah! If you show where you was pinched.
MS: - on the behind.
Cns: On the behind.

(11) Cns: iniit t’aq too you can say you bumped into something, iniit’laq. i-n-i-l-t-a-q “I just bumped into it (masc.)”
MS: ah. How ‘bout I’m going to? –
Cns: “dala’ax anildag’a”. dala’ax a-n-i-l-da-g-x “perhaps I will bump into it”
MS: Is it -dag’a or -dag’a?
Cns: -dag’a.
MS: ah.
Cns: the dala’ax anildag’a. MS: ah. ah. Could you also say ildaqux? ildaqux.
Cns: ildaqux. O – “h, like if he’ll leave a mark or something somebody run into it. That’s what it means, somebody nili’t’aq lga “they probably came and bumped into it a while back”
MS: ah.
Cns: ildaqux. MS: But could you say ildaqux?
Cns: ildaqux, yeah! That’s the same thing.
MS: ah.
Cns: ildaqux it means that it shows where it’s been bumped.
MS: ah.

So, as these examples show, the “meaning” of the evidential passive construction in Wasco-Wishram can be specified in terms of (a) the presupposed evidence that must be in the context of speaking, and (b) the communication of speaker estimate that the evidence is the result of some Agency, doing some specified action named by the verb stem used. The occurrence of an evidential passive allows the hearer (and the speaker) to deduce that “Somebody did such-and-such to the object that shows the evidence therefor.” And, from the native speaker’s point of view, this deducible entailed proposition is “the meaning” of the form. It is what is available to conscious metapragmatic discourse.

The final dimension of metapragmatic awareness I will discuss here is _metapragmatic transparency_, as shown in (11). This is the degree of sameness between any metapragmatic utterances that could be used to talk about a pragmatic form, and the pragmatic form itself. Thus, a pragmatic form is metapragmatically transparent to the extent that, in metapragmatic discourse describing some use of speech, native speakers can duplicate the very forms under discussion. Consider the familiar speech event of a person giving a lecture and, noticing the audience becoming restless, speaking the following: “Just a few more minutes.” Now consider an identical situation, except that the speech event is signalled by “I promise to stop talking soon.” The utterance “Just a few more minutes” may indeed function pragmatically in
could answer as native speakers, interval starting at the moment of speaking. But the second utterance, “Just a few more minutes,” is not. For, if asked to describe what went on in that speech event—what action, in other words, transpired that depended on speech—we could answer native speakers, “He promised to stop talking soon,” duplicating in the description the effective pragmatic forms of the second utterance at issue. Observe that this same metapragmatic description could be used for the first utterance, “Just a few more minutes,” as well as several other possible descriptions, such as “He indicated that the lecture would not continue much longer,” and so forth. But in each of these last instances of metapragmatic characterization, there is a radical difference between the form of the description and the form of the particular effective pragmatic signal. In short, when we seek the forms of possible metapragmatic descriptions to which it is susceptible, the utterance “Just a few more minutes” shows little metapragmatic transparency.

(11) A fifth dimension of metapragmatic contrast (cf. 4 and 8 above):

(e) Metapragmatic transparency: a pragmatic form is so to the extent that in metapragmatic discourse describing its use, native speakers duplicate the form under discussion, e.g., I promise to stop talking soon, uttered as a commitment of the speaker to stop talking soon after utterance; but not Just a few more minutes, uttered for precisely the same purpose.

Now obviously, given some occurrence of speech, some event instantiated as an effective speech signal in a certain context, there are many ways in which a native speaker can answer the question, “What happened?” or “What went on?” He or she can describe the event as a whole, if there is some means of referring to this totality; he or she can describe the presupposed context (as we have seen); he or she can describe the signal, in the most obvious case, that of so-called “direct quotation,” just duplicating it, and in less obvious cases, so-called “indirect quotation,” duplicating certain aspects of the signal. Or the native speaker can characterize the change(s) in the context effected by the speech signal in answer to the question, “What happened?” But for analytic purposes, the pragmatic meaning of any signal used in speech must be a statement of the presupposed and created contextual factors, that is, a description of what must independently be so about the context for the instance to be effective action, and what must be so about the context from the occurrence of the effective action. So any transparent pragmatic form is a signal that can be used both in effecting specific contextual changes and in describing them.

And the description can focus on any of the components of the speech event: speaker, hearer, audience, referent, channel, signal, time, locus, or some relationship between these. And we would, in a fine-grained discussion of the matter, have to differentiate among these factors by their potential contributions to transparency, something we do not have space for in this discussion, but which emerges by example in the material now to be presented.

If we look at the last set of data, on English “directives” as analyzed by Susan Ervin-Tripp, we find that there are numerous directive forms, pragmatic signals for getting someone to do something.3

(12) Kinds of directive utterances in American English

(a) Need statements: “I'll need a routine culture and a specimen.”
(b) Imperatives: “You private will repeat the preparatory command and ‘aye aye, Sir!’”
(c) Embedded imperatives: “Why don't you open the window?”
(d) Permission directives: “May I have change for a dollar?”
(e) Request questions: “Is Dean Lehrer in?”
(f) Hint: “Mrs. Terry, quite noisy in here.”

As is shown in (12), these include (a) statements of what the speaker needs, some object of the addressee’s action, such as “a routine culture and a specimen,” or some action on the part of the addressee, “I’ll need you to put your finger on the knot.” They also include (b) our traditionally-analyzed “imperatives,” which communicate just the action the addressee is to carry out; as well as (c) embedded imperatives, which are usually of the “Why don’t you…” question-form with embedded specification of the action the addressee is to do, but having distinct stress and intonation contours terminating in falling instead of level-or-rising pitch (and hence distinct from an interrogative form). Other forms collected include two interrogative types, (d) questions of permission for the speaker to accomplish something, and (e) questions of a seemingly informational content. Finally, there are (f) hints, which are statements about the context uttered with directive force. There is, to be sure, a finer subdivision possible on linguistic and other grounds, but this classification of Ervin-Tripp’s will do for our purposes.

(13) Characteristics of directives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Neutralization</th>
<th>Discourse Constraints</th>
<th>Obvious**</th>
<th>Social Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Need</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>excuse</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>subordinates, subordinates, familiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Imperative</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>excuse</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>subordinates, familiar equals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Embedded imperatives</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>unfamiliar; or different rank; task extraordinary; compliance expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Permission</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>compliance expected superiors (?); unfamiliar possible non-compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Request</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>answer/ inference</td>
<td>no***</td>
<td>possible non-compliance; familiarity, or routine roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Hint</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>(reply + inference)</td>
<td>no***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Expected verbal response to adult; when complying or not complying.
** Routinely understood as a directive under these social conditions.
*** Some are routinely understood as directives, depending on familiarity, etc.

Note 1: Ervin-Tripp codes “yes” here; but data do not show neutralization in first person.

What are the characteristics of use that Ervin-Tripp has discovered for these different kinds of directives in (Berkeley?) American English? We see in (13) that...
the formal and functional properties of these expressions can be scaled in a rather regular array. For each directive type, indicated in the rows of the chart, we give Ervin-Tripp’s criteria in columnar fashion. Neutralization (indicated as “yes” or “no”) means that the actual overt signal form potentially serves both as a directive and as some other pragmatic signal. Thus, imperative forms in row (b) never count as anything but directives, while “requestions” in row (e) are ambiguously either a directive or a request for a “yes” or “no” answer of an informational sort. (Remember the old joke, “Do you have Prince Albert in a can?” “Sure.” “Well, let him out!”) The discourse constraints on compliance or non-compliance with the directive indicate what the addressee of the directive must do in the way of verbal behavior, in either of these two situations. Thus, to an embedded imperative, such as the example (c) already given under (l2), one either agrees with “Sure” or “All right” and opens the window, or one says why one cannot, e.g., “Sorry, my hands are full” (or “... full of —”). Note that to comply with a hint of type (f), one must infer what one must do that follows in some way from the situation described in the hint; not to comply, one must answer the statement with a contrary, such as, “It’s not very noisy” or “... cold” or “Wait until the record stops,” or “Wait until the noxious fumes clear from the air,” or whatever. The social features of the speech situation describe what is presupposed about the relationship between speaker and addressee, or about the understood obligations of the addressee vis-à-vis the particular action demanded. Finally, in terms of these criteria, the obviousness of the utterance as a directive is indicated by “yes” or “no.” What interests us here is the metapragmatic transparency of these forms. If we look at the various types, and consider the way that a directive event would be specifically described, then the types of directives at the bottom of the chart are minimally transparent, and those at the top of the chart are maximally transparent. The hint of type (f) can be accurately described as “the speaker asking Mrs. Terry, the addressee, to be quiet” or “... to turn off the radio” or whatever (see 12f), using metapragmatic description that has no formal commonality with the actual directive signal under consideration. On the other hand, the need statement of type (a) can be described as “the speaker asking the addressee to do whatever is routinely done to get a culture and a specimen,” naming the goals that the mand requires of the addressee. This matches that part of the directive signal, “a routine culture and a specimen.” Again, the types (b) and (c) directives are relatively transparent, and the descriptions can be formulated in the very same terms as the part of the signal that describes the action to be done by the addressee. Type (d) is less transparent, in that the signal describes something to be true of the speaker, but the metapragmatic description would have to be in terms of what it is that is demanded of the addressee. And type (e) is less so, since no actual action is described in the directive signal, only some presumably relevant referent being named; and yet, the metapragmatic description would have to say, for example, that “speaker is demanding of the addressee that he or she allow speaker to speak with Dean Lehrer” for (12e). Each type of directive signal, then, has what I suggest is a constantly decreasing metapragmatic transparency in the order given. Ervin-Tripp reports on two unpublished studies of native speaker evaluations of these different directives, working from actual examples. Subjects were asked to compare various directive forms and rank them essentially in terms of politeness. As
might be expected, the subjects ranked the various types in more-or-less the order given here. Now of all the characteristics on our chart, I do not see any that would explain why there is a regular, linearized ranking of these different directive types. Clearly, there is no regular orderly formal relationship, like syntactic complexity, or any kind of purely formal politeness machinery in English (unlike, for example, in Javanese, where you can get more and more polite by changing more and more of the vocabulary and syntax, in a kind of regular progression). Nor are any of the other characteristics singly or in combination easily linearized on a single explanatory scale, certainly not the properties called “social features” in our chart (13), which we might expect to be the explanation, since they come from very diverse realms. I propose that it is the scale of metapragmatic transparency of these forms that makes them subject to evaluation and manipulation as most directive like, and hence, in our culture, least “polite,” down to least directive like, and hence most “polite.” Those directive types which are maximally transparent are much more vividly brought to awareness as directives; which bald fact results in their being termed maximally impolite. And inversely, the tremendous disparity between the form of minimally transparent directives and their metapragmatic descriptions makes them least salient as directives, most veiled in terms of expressing speaker intention in social interaction, and shrouded in so-called politeness, or, if you will allow, in indirectness: for “politeness” is essentially the antithesis of giving “directives” in our society, and hence that directive is most polite that is the least directive. This scaling effect deserves much more careful investigation in terms of clarity of responses, salience and scatter of responses, etc., before we can be certain of the interpretation.

In final summary, now, let me turn briefly to two areas in which I think this approach sheds new light, and indicates a means for more intensive research. One such area, harking back to the (alas, misunderstood) work of Benjamin Lee Whorf, seeks understanding of the cognitive bases of the many functions of language. The other area is what methodological lessons might be learned here about the investigation of cultural phenomena in general. I do not have space to develop these implications at any length, and content myself with utterances that you will no doubt take to be overbroad historiography. But I think what follows can be documented in a more elaborate treatment.

Whorf, who developed all the themes of Boasian linguistics to their sharpest formulation, inquired into the classic Boasian problem, the nature of classifications of the cultural universe implicit and explicit in language. In passing, he invented the notion of a “cryptotypic,” or, as we now say, “deep” or “underlying” semantic structure that lies behind the overtly segmentable forms of speech. This cryptotypic structure of referential categories constituted the real “rational” classification of the sensory modalities implemented in fully propositional speech, the highest function of language to the Boasian way of thinking. But, the native speaker, faced with tasks that require orientation to an immediate and urgent environment, trying to “think out” a response, or even to “think about” the referential properties of his or her native language in specific situations, is hopelessly at the mercy of so-called “phenotypic,” or as we now say “surface” lexicalized forms of the language. The native speaker tends to reason from the misleading surface analogies of forms to which, in piecemeal fashion, he or she attributes true referential effect in segmenting the
cultural universe. Whorf is thus contrasting native awareness of the suggestive referential patterns of surface lexical forms, with the linguist's awareness of the cryptotypic semantic structure behind those surface forms, achieved by excruciating analysis in a comparative framework. He claims that insofar as reference is concerned, the native's awareness is focussed on continuously-segmentable ("lexical" in his terms) units, which presuppose the existence of things "out there" that correspond to these units one-to-one on each referential use of speech. Of course, the native is only partially correct, and is generally inaccurate in his or her "awareness.

What we have done here is to generalize Whorf's observation for the whole range of functions of speech, reference being just one function that is clearly at the center of the whole ethno-linguistic system. We have claimed that we can best guarantee native speaker awareness for referential, segmental, presupposing functional forms in his or her language. And we can bound the kind of evidence the native speaker can give us in terms of deducible referential propositions about functional forms maximally transparent to description as speech events.

The case is well illustrated by the gradual recognition of non-referential aspects of "meaning" in language within our own tradition of linguistics and related disciplines. Just as we would expect, our Western philosophical theories of language - what I like to call our naive ethnotheoretical tradition - have traditionally started from word reference, in particular from proper names, which native speakers feel to be concrete, pointing out an absolute reality "out there." Such theories have tried to generalize the notion of how language means from this maximally aware metapragmatic sensibility. With the advent of Frege, and of Saussure, the domain of analysis was broadened to propositional reference, and to structural analysis of referential systems, culminating in the explicit underlying-structure methodology of Chomsky. At the same time, ordinary language philosophy with Austin finally discovered certain lexical items - segmental, referential, presupposing, deducible, maximally transparent forms - called "performatives," that seemed to be a key to the non-referential functions of one's own language. It is not by chance that these performatives, such as promise, christen, dub, etc. were discovered first by the linguistically naive speakers of Oxford; they satisfy all our criteria. But unfortunately, accurate though they may be for certain of our more transparent speech functions in English, they cannot merely be treated as a universal set to be ferreted out by inaccurate translation techniques in the most remote corners of the globe, as some of our colleagues are wont to do. Indeed, they represent only a tiny fraction of the functioning of our language, though a fraction that is easily susceptible of native awareness. The further we get from these kinds of functional elements of language, the less we can guarantee awareness on the part of the native speakers - accurate metapragmatic testimony that can be taken at face value. Hence, for the rest, the more we have to depend upon cross-cultural analysis and the accumulated technical insight based upon this, for native speaker metapragmatic testimony is not going to be necessarily accurate for the general analysis of language.

There is a sense in which our generalization of Whorf's principle, now formulable in terms of limited metapragmatic awareness, has a wider relevance for social anthropology. As many of us are beginning to realize, the linguistic models that have been applied to cultural phenomena have usually been motivated within linguistics itself precisely by the facts of the pure referential system that is unique to language, among all the meaningful social codes. I think, however, that we can show how the other functions of language are always being assimilated to reference in terms of native speaker awareness, and are in fact subject to conscious metapragmatic testimony only to the extent that they are assimilable to reference, or "ride along" on referential structure. Thus, how vastly more complicated are the testimonies of native participants in a society, how fraught with danger is our taking at face value any statements by participants about various pragmatically-meaningful action. If we were to generalize from the experience with language reported here, then we would suspect that most of what is of interest to the social anthropologist is beyond native participant testimony as to its "meaning." But, beyond this purely negative statement, we would also expect that, more generally, the limits to pragmatic awareness of social action are also definable, constrained, and semiotically-based.

This, I want to lay before you, is the program for social anthropology, to understand the properties of ideologies and ethnotheories, that seem to guide participants in social systems, as part and parcel of those social systems, which must be seen as meaningful. The salient aspect of the social fact is meaning; the central manifestation of meaning is pragmatic and metapragmatic speech; and the most obvious feature of pragmatic speech is reference. We are now beginning to see the error in trying to investigate the salient by projection from the obvious.

NOTES

[This paper is a transcript of a lecture originally given in 1977. For this reprinting, following the author's request, a few editorial changes have been made and a few references have been added, but the informal tone of the original working paper has not been altered. Ed.]

