Chapter 2: Quantitative Analysis

Introduction

Between 1998 and 2003 the Slovak Republic was brought before the global monitoring body responsible for overseeing violations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) three different times.¹ The complaints all assert that Slovakia systematically violated the rights of the Romany minority in the fields of housing² and public dining.³ What makes these petitions unique are their authors, individual citizens residing in Slovakia of Romany descent directly petitioned the CERD monitoring body against their own government. International relations scholars often contend that human rights treaties are mere cheap talk, rarely altering state behavior in meaningful ways.⁴ Yet, the mechanism in the CERD that allowed these individual citizens to petition the body brought such pressure, both directly from these individual citizens and from regional NGO’s⁵ that a comprehensive national anti-discrimination law was pushed through the Slovakian parliament in June of 2004.⁶

Generally human rights treaties are considered little more than hollow declarations about a states commitment to democratic ideals. Rarely do international relations scholars consider ratification of human rights treaties costly for states.⁷ Yet

³ Lacko v. Slovakia.
⁴ Downs, Rocke and Baroom suggest that states only ratify treaties with which they are already complying, implying that the treaties themselves do not alter state behavior.
⁵ The most influential NGO in this field is The European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC). Information on this organization is available on the web at: http://www.errc.org/English_index.php.
⁶ Information on the passage of the Slovakian law is available in English from the Stop Violence Against Women Project available online at: http://www.stopvaw.org/29Jul2004.html.
⁷ See Downs, Rocke and Baroom (1996) on this point.
little known mechanisms found in four global human rights treaties allows citizens to file complaints of human rights abuses against their governments in global tribunals. These mechanisms serve to bring states to justice before global bodies while giving their citizens unprecedented access to the venues of international law. These mechanisms are commonly referred to as individual petition mechanisms (IPMs) and are available in:

- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Optional Protocol)
- The Convention Against Torture (Article 22)
- The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 14)
- The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (Optional Protocol)

In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women, states must ratify both the treaty as well as the optional protocol in order to allow their citizens to submit petitions to the relevant oversight committee. For the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination states ratify the treaty and must then separately declare (under Articles 22 and 14 respectively) that they accept the competence of the oversight committee to receive complaints on behalf of their citizens. In all cases states can ratify the treaty without accepting the competence of the oversight committee to receive complaints from their citizens.

The increasing rates of ratification of these IPM’s are puzzling. States can ratify the treaties associated with the IPM’s without actually ratifying the IPM’s. From the

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8 This mechanism also exists in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights.
States stand to gain little more than psychic satisfaction, back-patting from the international community or perhaps, at best the ability to appease a domestic interest group interested in human rights. Indeed, as evidenced by the Slovakian experience with the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination- ratification can be extremely costly. If the costs are relatively high (reduction in policy autonomy) and the benefits so low, why do states ratify human rights treaties at all?

I attempt to answer this question by testing a theory about when and under what conditions state leaders ratify individual petition mechanisms in human rights treaties. I argue that ratification of IPM’s in human rights treaties serves as a signaling device. States ratify these mechanisms in human rights treaties after periods of regional crisis as a way to attract aid from the major international donors. This theory predicts that periods of intense regional political crisis will be followed by waves of ratification of human rights treaties. I test this theory against the two dominant explanations for ratification in the international relations literature: domestic democratic lock-in and the socialization hypothesis. This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section I explain my theory and discuss trends in ratification of global human rights treaties using descriptive statistical analysis. In the second section I test my theory against the dominant explanations for ratification in the literature using survival analysis.

A Theory of Ratification of Human Rights Treaties

Moravcsik (2001) has famously argued that leaders of unstable democracies will be likely to ratify treaties that allow them to lock-in their policy preferences for the future. He argues that leaders calculate the tradeoff between a reduction in policy
autonomy today with the potential for political uncertainty tomorrow. In the hopes of
locking in democracy into the future many leaders will participate in global agreements
that lock-in their preferred policy outcomes into the future, even if that means fewer
policy options in the current period. Moravcsik’s test for this hypothesis consists of a
consideration of the timing of ratification of the European Court of Human Rights.
Indeed newly established and unstable democracies in Europe in the post WWII period
do appear likely to ratify in order to lock-in democracy. Moravcsik’s theory brings to IR
a novel approach to understanding why states that might otherwise be unlikely to ratify
human rights instruments are actually inclined to do so.

Yet there are a whole range of interesting questions that Moravcsik’s work leaves
unanswered. For example, why do trends in delegation to global human rights institutions
tend to follow regional patterns in the post World War II period? Why are states slower in
ratifying the constraining articles in these treaties (IPMs) then they are in ratifying the
treaties themselves? How can we explain delegation to human rights institutions among
autocratic states? In this section I outline a theory of ratification of human rights
agreements as well as regional trends in ratification.

The theory advanced here differs from previous work by focusing on delegation
both by newly established democracies as well as autocracies. Much of the current
literature on democratic lock-in recognizes that the governments of newly established
democracies use ratification of global treaties as a way to lock-in democratic political
institutions. However, as demonstrated in chapter 1, existing theories have difficulty
explaining both the regional pattern and the rates of ratification among autocratic states. Both newly transitioning democracies as well as autocratic states have a similar need that has been largely neglected by current work—attracting foreign aid. Signaling that they intend to remain democratic or even that they are making strides toward incorporating democratic institutions by delegating to global human rights institutions can result in substantial material benefits from the international community.

There are two bodies of literature that suggest that grants of aid from the major international donors have become increasingly dependent upon the strength of a state’s democratic institutions as well as the state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens. In a comprehensive study of the determinants of foreign aid from the 21 OECD countries between 1985 and 1997, Neumayer (2003) finds that respect for civil, political and personal integrity rights are universally significant determinants of aid. Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that political rights have a positive impact on the amount of aid given by Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the UK, and the US. Apodaca and Stohl (1999) examine the link between US grants of bilateral aid and recipient country human rights policies between 1976 and 1995. They find that during the Regan and Bush Sr. administrations that human rights practices in recipient countries were a significant determinant of military aid. During the Clinton

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9 Autorcratic governments (defined as a Polity score below 0) ratified the individual petition mechanism in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights more often than established democracies (defined as a Polity score above 6).

10 On foreign aid see: Svensson (1999), Neumayer (2003), and Alesina and Dollar (2000).

11 In a more recent study Heckelman and Knack (2005) finds that dependence on foreign aid serves to undermine the strength of democratic institutions by encouraging rent-seeking, corruption, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies. The implication of this study is that donors should seek out countries with already stable democratic institutions and donate aid to them.
administration human rights practices were a significant determinant of economic aid.\textsuperscript{12} Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) find that Latin American countries that were not gross human rights violators were much more likely to receive military aid from the United States in 1982 than those states that had violated the human rights of their citizens.\textsuperscript{13} Much of the work of Steven Poe has confirmed that there is indeed an important link between grants of aid and human rights policies. In a 1994 piece Poe and Sirirangsi test the impact of human rights policies on grants of aid from the US for 133 countries between 1983 and 1988. They find that when aid allocation is characterized as a two stage process, recipient countries are selected in the first stage and the level of aid is determined in the second, that human rights practices are an important predictor of economic aid. In another piece Poe et al. (1994) find strong evidence that human rights practices in recipient countries played a major role in both grants of economic and military aid from the United States.

Taken together these studies suggest that grants of aid from the major international donors are influenced by the strength of democratic institutions and human rights policies in recipient countries. This link suggests that there may indeed be substantial economic benefits to countries that can successfully communicate their intentions to remain or become democratic to the international community. Ratification of individual petition mechanisms within existing human rights treaties provides one way for countries to communicate this signal. Theories on signaling games in international relations suggest that in order for a signal to be credible it must be costly.\textsuperscript{14} Costly signals

\textsuperscript{12} For additional information on the link between foreign aid and recipient state human rights policies see Poe and Sirirangsi (1993) and Poe, Pilatovsky, Miller and Ogundele (1994).
\textsuperscript{13} Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985), 554.
\textsuperscript{14} Fearon (1994).
allow for the differentiation of type. Here, the differentiation of type is of paramount concern because those states that can successfully signal that they intend to introduce or maintain democratic institutions can expect to attract more aid. Fearon (1997) suggests that there are two ways to send costly signals tying hands and sinking costs. Tying hands consists of undertaking commitments with audience costs to be paid \textit{ex post} if the state does not follow through on its commitment. Sinking costs consists of paying up front to demonstrate commitment- Fearon uses army mobilization as an example of sinking costs.

Ratification of individual petition mechanisms allow states to tie their own hands and hence send a costly signal to the international community that they intend to maintain their democratic institutions or, for autocratic states to enhance the transparency of extant institutions- making them more attractive aid recipients. Unlike ratification of traditional human rights treaties, which at best amount to cheap talk ratification of individual petition mechanisms require a deeper level of commitment from states. IPMs allow citizens from ratifying states to petition global tribunals if states violate their rights guaranteed by the treaty. Individual petition mechanisms work in the same way that the European Court of Human Rights does- essentially serving to guarantee the rights of citizens from incursions by their own governments. If states fail to respect their citizens’ rights, the state can be held accountable in a global tribunal and suffer the audience costs associated with reneging on their commitment to human rights.

\textbf{The Role of Regional Crises}

My primary hypothesis is that, contrary to the received wisdom in international relations states ratify human rights treaties in order to attract aid from the international community; ratification is used as a signaling device by governments. Yet, without a
theory about the timing of ratification this theory would predict very little because the need for capital is ubiquitous across time. In this section I also attempt to identify when states will be most likely to send this signal. I argue that this need to incur audience costs to demonstrate commitment to democracy and attract aid should be particularly intense during times of regional crises.

Regional military and political crises intensify the need for aid not only within the state experiencing the crisis, but also in those states that share borders and are geographically proximate. There are three specific ways in which a crisis in one state can spill-over and trigger a crisis elsewhere, also intensifying the need for economic stimulus. First, regional instability can alter the domestic distribution of power, privileging one group at the expense of another. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, served to alter the domestic distribution of power between once dominant communist party officials in satellite states and once dormant opposition groups. Second, regional politics can alter the preferences of domestic elites. Gleditsch and Ward (2003) argue that as more and more states become democratic the costs associated with refusing to transition may be too high to bear. In this way regional politics affect individual state behavior. Finally, military conflicts near the border of one’s state may require a shift in resources to state security and away from other public goods.

In response to regional crises I expect states in the same geographic region to have a heightened need to compete with one another to attract aid. Namely, regional threats can quickly become local threats. So, during times of regional crisis the need to find a way to send a credible single of commitment to democracy should mean that geographically proximate states should compete to find ways to send this signal.

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15 I discuss these models at length in Chapter 1, pgs 28-32.
Ratification of individual petition mechanisms allows states to tie their own hands and send this signal.

**Hypotheses**

If the regional crises are indeed the impetus behind ratification then neighboring states and states in the same general region should have relatively homogenous preferences for ratification because they have similar a need to signal their commitment to democratic ideals in order to attract aid. I expect to find regional clustering of ratification among geographically proximate peers. The null hypothesis is that ratification of individual petition mechanisms in global human rights institutions does not follow any distinctly regional pattern. It is important to note that this hypothesis could potentially overlap with a lock-in model. If transitions to democracy cluster regionally, then regional clustering of ratification could either be the result of common regional crises, as I suggest or ratification could stem from regional clustering in transitions to democracy as a lock-in model would suggest. In the quantitative analysis I test simply for the presence of regional clustering. In the subsequent case study chapters I have intentionally selected a set of states from a primarily democratic region (Eastern Europe in the 1990’s) and from a primarily non-democratic region (Central Asia in the 1990’s). This selection method allows me to control for the effects of regional clustering of democracy. If regional patterns are identified across both of these sets of cases then, this would suggest that regional crises, rather than regional clustering of transitions to democracy explain ratification. The model also suggests that higher rates of regional instability should be met with higher rates of ratification. Hypotheses one and two follow from these predictions.
H1: Ratification of individual petition mechanisms clusters regionally.16

H2: As the rate of regional instability increases, the rate of ratification of individual petition mechanisms also increases.

The model presented above implies that newly established democracies and autocracies will draw the greatest benefit from ratification and should thus be more likely to ratify than other types of states. If newly established democracies and autocracies are successful in signaling their intentions to remain democratic or, in the case of autocracies their intentions to enhance the transparency of their domestic institutions they stand to gain significant material benefits from the international community. Entrenched democracies have little need to signal their type to the global community and therefore will draw less benefit from ratification than newly established democracies and autocracies. Comparatively, a social constructivist model of ratification suggests that established democracies should be the most likely to ratify because these states are primarily responsible for the spread of humanitarian norms. Lock-in models of ratification point to newly established or tenuous democracies as the group of states most likely to ratify, because governments in these states have a special need to lock-in democratic institutions. My model focuses on ratification as a way to attract much needed aid during times of regional crisis and therefore does not make any assumptions about underlying political institutions. Hypotheses three and four follow from these predictions.

H3: Newly established democracies and autocracies are more likely to ratify than established democracies.

16 Support for this assertion is contained primarily in the rates of ratification displayed in Figures A2.1 - A2.4 in the appendix.
Following the ratification of individual petition mechanisms, newly established democracies and autocracies should receive a greater share of aid relative to other states that have not ratified.

In the following section I identify trends in ratification of the four treaties under investigation in this project.

Trends in Ratification

International relations scholars have sought to explain why states both ratify human rights treaties (Moravcsik 2000; Hathaway 2002; Vreeland (unpublished), and why they adopt human rights practices such as women’s suffrage (Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997) and labor regulations (Rodrik 1997). While many of these works find that democracy- namely pressure from domestic publics, is the primary explanation for ratification of human rights treaties and adoption of human rights practices, recent work suggests that regional pressures may also be important in explaining a number of state actions. Recent scholarship has pointed to regional variables to explain the trend toward legalization in international monetary affairs (Simmons 2000), the decision to adopt democracy (O’Laughlin et al. 1998, Pevehouse 2000), and patterns of peace and conflict (Gleditsch 2002). Comparatively little attention has been paid to regional trends in the adoption of national human rights policies.¹⁷

Critics often contend that ratification of human rights treaties accounts for little more than cheap talk (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996). They suggest that states only ratify treaties with which they are already compliant. From this perspective the treaty itself is irrelevant, allowing for a cheap and hence meaningless signal to be sent to the

¹⁷ The exception to this is an unpublished paper by Beth Simmons.
international community. In an attempt both to elucidate the link between regional pressures on states to ratify global human rights treaties and to avoid the concern of critics that these treaties are mere cheap talk I have compiled a data set that includes ratification data for individual petition mechanisms in global human rights treaties. If a state has ratified one of these treaties they can then opt to ratify the individual petition mechanism. Individual petition mechanisms allow individual citizens within the ratifying state to file a complaint about violations of the terms of the treaty with a global tribunal. Individual petition mechanisms give individuals unprecedented access to the institutions of international justice. In ratifying these mechanisms, states open up their domestic human rights policies to review by a global tribunal. A dataset has been compiled for this project, spanning the years 1964-2001. All countries in the world are included and data is drawn from United Nations Treaty data, EuGene, Polity IV, and the World Development Indicators.

Rates of Ratification of Treaties and Individual Petition Mechanisms

Figure 2.1 displays the cumulative percentage of states that have ratified the four treaties under observation in this project. These data suggest that the majority of states that ultimately ratify the treaties do so primarily within the first ten years that they are open for ratification. Thirty-one states (out of 190 possible) ratified CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by 1981, the second year that the treaty was open for ratification. Similarly, thirty-six states ratified CERD, the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination by 1965 the fourth year that the treaty was open for ratification. The majority of ratifications for the

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18 This is akin to the argument Fearon (1994) makes because these treaties do not allow for the accumulation of audience costs their use as signals to the international community is low.
torture convention (CAT) cluster within the third and seventh years that the treaty was available for ratification, between 1987 and 1991.

[Figure 2.1 about here]

Again, this suggests that states that plan to ratify human rights treaties do so, approximately within the first ten years that the treaty is open for ratification. In addition, a high percentage of states tend to ratify human rights treaties. Table 2.1 identifies the rates of ratification of these treaties. The numbers range from a low of 65.5% of states in the world that have ratified the Convention against Torture to a high of 86.3% for the Women’s Convention.

[Table 2.1 about here]

These findings are not surprising. High levels of ratification of human rights treaties are consistent with scholarly expectations in international relations literature because these treaties contain little more than hortatory declarations about the importance of human rights in a given field. Levels of ratification of these treaties should be high because they allow states to engage in cheap talk—declaring respect for human rights without placing limitations on domestic policy options. The speed with which states tend to ratify these treaties also suggests that there is little strategy involved. When the treaties become available for ratification state leaders ratify them because the costs of ratification are so low.

States should be relatively less inclined to ratify individual petition mechanisms (IPMs) within these same treaties because ratification of the IPMs allows global tribunals to oversee domestic human rights policies and hence limits domestic policy options for state leaders. In a state that has ratified the IPM in the Torture Convention (CAT),
citizens have the opportunity to complain about allegations of torture to the CAT monitoring body thus helping to keep governments from violating the rights of their citizens.

Rates of ratification of the IPMs in these same treaties are considerably lower than the rates of ratification of the treaties themselves. This is consistent with scholarly expectations in international relations. Because these treaties don’t appear to offer any tangible benefits to signatories, states should be less likely to ratify the oversight mechanisms associated with the treaties. However, the rates of ratification are not negligible. Table 2.2 illustrates these rates of ratification. 52.1% of the states in the world have ratified the individual petition mechanism in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 30% of the states in the world have ratified the IPM in the racial discrimination convention (CERD), while 27% have ratified the IPM in the torture convention. The rate of ratification of the IPM in the women’s convention is very low at .07%, but that IPM was only open for ratification for two years in the dataset compiled for this project. A comparison of Figures 2.1 and 2.2 suggest something interesting about the timing of ratification of both the treaties and the IPMs. If states intend to ratify human rights treaties, they tend to do so quickly, generally within the first ten years the treaty is available for ratification. The same is not true for IPMs.

States take their time ratifying IPM’s. Like the treaty, the IPM for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was available for ratification for 34 years in the current dataset. In the first seventeen years that the IPM was available for ratification forty states ratified, but in the second seventeen years that
the IPM was available for ratification fifty-nine states ratified. 19% more states ratified in the later period. Figure 2.2 below suggests that states are not as quick to ratify IPMs as they are to ratify human rights treaties. What accounts for this lag time and why are states so much slower in ratifying individual petition mechanisms than treaties?

[Figure 2.2 about here]

**Regional Rates of Ratification of Treaties and Individual Petition Mechanisms**

The lag time between ratification of treaties and ratification of individual petition mechanisms are only half of the story. There are also strong regional trends in ratification in both treaties and IPMs. States tend to ratify the treaties and IPMs that those in their geographic peer group ratify. Table 2.3 lists the percentage of states in each region that have ratified both the treaty and the accompanying IPM. The Appendix to this chapter contains four charts that plot the regional rates of ratification of the treaties against the regional rates of ratification of the individual petition mechanisms. States within the same region generally make the same choices with respect to the treaties and IPMs they choose to ratify. Rates of ratification among regional peers tend to be either extremely high within a region (approaching 100%) or extremely low (approaching 0), but not in the mid ranges (between 30-60%).

[Table 2.3 about here]

While these statistics offer a broad overview of the rates of ratification among regional peers, the more remarkable stories lie beneath these broad trends. Using event

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19 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women has been left off of this chart because the IPM was only open for one year during the period under investigation.
20 Figures 2.1 -2.4 in the Appendix to this chapter plot the regional rates of ratification of the treaties against the regional rates of ratification of the individual petition mechanisms graphically for each region in each treaty.
history techniques borrowed from biostatisticians I can use the same data to estimate the
risk of ratification for any region at a given time in the dataset. This is essentially the
same as introducing regional variation into the frequency charts (Figures 2.1-2.2) but
with one important advantage. The survivor function in event history analysis allows for
the estimation of ratification without biasing the estimation. This problem is called right
censoring and occurs when some of the observations in the data set are still “alive” at the
end of the observation period.\(^{21}\) Without the assistance of event history techniques, these
“alive” cases, or those states that have still not ratified the treaty at the end of the
observation period in my dataset are treated as though they ratified in the final year of
observation. This has the obvious effect of biasing the estimators of ratification upward.
The survivor function fixes this bias by removing those cases that are still alive from the
denominator of the survivor function only at the time that they are right censored.\(^{22}\)

I estimate the survivor function for each region for the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) because this treaty has been open for ratification for
35 years in the data collected for this project, allowing for a greater number of
observations than some of the other treaties. I can then compare the survivor functions for
each of the regions to see if region affects the time until ratification both for the treaty
and the IPM. Curves that plunge deeply suggest that a high number of states have ratified
and hence that the number of states still at risk at time \(t\) is small. Shallow curves suggest
that there are still a high number of states at risk of ratification at time \(t\). Figure 2.3
estimates the survivor functions for ratification of the ICCPR treaty.

\(^{21}\) For more on the problem of right censoring in event history analysis see Box-Steffenmeier and Jones
\(^{22}\) Kouser (2005) discusses the ways in which survivor functions limit the biases associated with right
censoring in his book on terms limits in the United States Congress. See pages 73-75.
These curves represent the percent of states in each region that are still at risk of ratifying after the amount of time on the x axis. Eastern Europe and central Asia, represented by the solid line have the highest number of ratifications of the ICCPR. But this region has also ratified the treaty quicker, relative to the other regions. After twenty years, only 30% of states in the region had failed to ratify. East Asia represents the opposite extreme, after twenty years 75% of states in the region had failed to ratify the treaty. The additional benefit to using the survivor curves is that they allow for log rank tests which serve as an initial test of the statistical significance of difference between regional rates of ratification. Here the statistical significance between regional rates of ratification is significant at the .001 level.

Figure 2.4 below plots the survivor curves for the individual petition mechanism for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These curves appear shallower than those in Figure 2.3 because, states generally take longer and are less likely to ratify individual petition mechanisms than treaties. The states in eastern Europe and central Asia (again represented by the bold line) began ratifying the IPM in this treaty immediately. While the states of Western Europe have overwhelmingly opted to ratify the IPM in this treaty, it took nearly twenty years for 50% of states in this region to ratify. Similarly, in Sub-Saharan Africa it took nearly ten years before a single ratification of the IPM occurred. Even after thirty years the rates of ratification of the IPM are considerably lower than the rates of ratification after the same period for the treaty. Even though both the treaty and the IPM (as an optional protocol) were available for ratification at the same

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23 These regional distinctions are also statistically significant at the .001 level.
time states chose to wait longer to ratify the IPM. The decision to ratify the IPM appears to be a strategic one, rather than a simple reflexive response, as one could argue ratification of the treaty itself might be.

[Figure 2.4 about here]

Before going moving on to the tests it seems important to discuss who ratifies. That is, are established democracies ratifying at a rate greater than unstable democracies or autocracies? To get an initial idea about which states are ratifying individual petition mechanisms I again use the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and plot the rates of ratification among established democracies\textsuperscript{24}, moderate democracies\textsuperscript{25} and autocracies\textsuperscript{26} in Figure 2.5 below. The curves suggest that while autocracies are slower to ratify than either established democracies or moderate democracies, they are ratifying the individual petition mechanism in the ICCPR at very high rates. After the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which contains the individual petition mechanism was available for ratification for twenty years 50% of the autocracies in the world system had ratified. This is an interesting finding when compared with the relatively low rate of ratification among unstable democracies after twenty years (approximately 25% had ratified). This finding is not wholly inconsistent with my expectations. Unlike established democracies which have little need to signal their type by ratifying human rights treaties, autocracies and tenuous or newly established democracies have a strong need financial incentive to demonstrate that they will respect the human rights of their citizens. In this context, high

\textsuperscript{24} Scoring between 6-10 on the Polity scale.
\textsuperscript{25} Scoring between 1-5 on the Polity scale.
\textsuperscript{26} Scoring between -10 -0 on the Polity scale.
rates of ratification among autocracies make sense as they can be attributed to the desire to attract aid.

[Figure 2.5 about here]

**Explanation of Variables Used in Empirical Tests**

In the following quantitative analysis I test the predictive power of regional instability in explaining ratification of IPMs against three other explanations for ratification offered in the IR literature. The data are arranged in a time-series-cross-section format. Following recent trends in political science I use event history techniques borrowed from biostatisticians to better account for time in the regressions.\(^27\) I run a series of multinominal logit regressions on three different models. The data span the years 1964-2001 and include all of the states in the world.

I test my explanation of ratification against Moravcsik’s domestic lock-in hypothesis using dynamic democracy scores from the Polity IV Project. These variables range from a possible score of -10 (very autocratic) to +10 very democratic. If Moravcsik’s theory is correct then states with mid range levels of democracy should be the most likely to ratify. In the regressions I use their lagged values, labeled Polity (lagged value) in the tables.

Normative explanations of commitment to human rights rely on the assumption that nation-states are increasingly “constructed from and influenced by world models of progress and justice set forth by universalistic scripts for authentic nation-statehood.”\(^28\) These standards should result in greater nation-state isomorphism emphasizing the proper

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\(^27\) For more information on taking time into account in time-series-cross-sectional analysis see Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). For information on the use of event history analysis in political science see: Box-Steffenmeier and Jones (1997).

\(^28\) Wotpika and Ramirez (unpublished), 10.
role of the nation-state with respect to human rights policies. Yet, prevailing standards of behavior are not equally likely to emerge from all international actors. Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that members of the community of liberal democracies are not only less likely to fight each other but are also more likely to create institutions to serve their common interests and ideals. From this perspective established democracies should be more likely to ratify both treaties and individual petition mechanisms. Here, again I rely on the dynamic democracy score from the Polity IV project. High scores on the democracy scale (generally between 6 and 10) should be associated with high levels of ratification.

Normative explanations for the adoption of human rights practices also focus on the extent to which the practice in question has become a global standard. If the standard has become well-entrenched in state behavior, other states should be likely to adopt the practice as well. To test this hypothesis I include three variables. The first takes into account the number of other states in each year that have ratified the treaty associated with the individual petition mechanism for each respective treaty. So, for example, I test the impact of ratification of the ICCPR treaty on ratification of the individual petition mechanism in the ICCPR. For the racial discrimination convention, I test the impact that ratifying the treaty has on the likelihood that a state will ratify the individual petition mechanism. If normative explanations are correct then high rates of ratification of these other treaties should make states more likely to ratify. These variables are labeled: “CEAFRD World Rat Rate,” “CEDAW World Rat Rate,” “ICCPR World Rat Rate,” and “CAT World Rat Rate.”

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29 Risse-Kappen (1996), 397.
30 This is also often referred to as a norm cascade. See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), 895.
Second, recent work has suggested that these norm cascades occur regionally so I developed a variable for each treaty and each IPM that takes into account the percentage of states in each region that have ratified in each year. These are labeled: “CEAFRD Regional Rat Rate,” “CEDAW Regional Rat Rate,” “ICCPR Regional Rat Rate,” “CAT Regional Rat Rate.” Finally, I include another test of the socialization hypothesis. If states have been effectively socialized by the world community then they should be more inclined to sign the core United Nations human rights treaties. I include three of these treaties and I assign a score between 0-3 depending upon the number of treaties that the state has signed. The more of these treaties that a state has signed the more likely they should be to ratify other human rights treaties. This variable is labeled “Socialization” in the regressions.

I also include a number of variables that seem likely to affect ratification of human rights treaties. The IRGC provides data that consider the level of corruption in government for each county. This variable is scored from 0 (highest level of corruption) – 6 (no corruption). The variable is labeled “Corruption in government” in the results table. The IRGC also assigns scores for government respect for the rule of law. This ranges from 0 (lowest rule of law score) – 6 (highest state respect for rule of law). This is labeled “Rule of Law” in the dataset. Finally, I include a variable that takes into account bureaucratic quality. This also comes from the IRGC and is scored between 0 (lowest

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32 I borrow this indicator from Simmons (unpublished). The three treaties are: The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), and The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CEAFRD).
level of bureaucratic quality) and 6 (highest level of bureaucratic quality). This is labeled “Bureaucratic Quality” in the dataset.

To test for the presence of regional instability I have created three indicators. These include:

(1) Regional Political Crisis: This variable will test for the presence of a regional political crisis in a given region in a given year. I use the Polity IV democracy indicator to construct this variable. States that drop more than 3 points below 7 on the democracy scale in a given year are characterized as having a political crisis. I then generate the proportion of states in a given region in a given year that are undergoing a political crisis. The result is a proportion that estimates the average amount of political instability in a given region in a given year. I expect that higher scores on this indicator will be associated with higher levels of ratification of individual petition mechanisms. In the dataset I used the lagged value of this variable. I used lagged values for 1 year, 3 years and 5 years before ratification. These are labeled “Regional Political Crisis (1 year lag),” “Regional Political Crisis (3 year lag),” and “Regional Political Crisis (5 year lag).”

(2) Magnitude of the Regional Political Crisis: This variable will assign a score between 1 (minor political crisis) and 4 (major political crisis) to capture the magnitude or severity of the regional political crisis. The higher the severity of the crisis, the more likely states in the region should be to ratify.

(3) Years since the last regional political crisis: The year variable captures the number of years since the last regional political crisis. The higher this number the less likely states

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33 For more detailed explanations of how these variables were constructed please see the Appendix to this chapter.
should be to ratify because a higher number suggests a longer period free of regional political crises.

**Results of Empirical Testing**

Because I am interested in the variables that contribute to the ratification of individual petition mechanisms in the four global human rights institutions that possess them (CEDAW, CAT, ICCPR, CERD) I have four separate dependent variables- one for each treaty under investigation. The dependent variables are binary- in each observation year states are either assigned a score of “1” if they have ratified or “0” if they have not. In the year that the state ratifies they are assigned a score of “1” and in the following year that state falls out of the data set. Again, this is a common method used in survival analysis to prevent bias in the coefficients. I have created three different models as a test of the robustness of my explanation. I report the results here by treaty.

**Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)**

CERD calls for states to eliminate all policies that have the effect of privileging one racial group over others.\(^\text{34}\) Among the many requirements for protecting racial minorities and preventing racial discrimination contained in the CERD, the treaty also requires that national legislatures in members’ states make the dissemination of ideas, propaganda, and the groups that promote racial superiority illegal.\(^\text{35}\) Article 5 of the treaty contains an extensive list of economic, social, and political rights that states must guarantee for their citizens. For this treaty, states may declare that they accept the authority of the oversight committee under Article 14, which allows their citizens the right to submit petitions to the committee. Because states can ratify the treaty without

\(^{34}\text{Article 2, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.}\)

\(^{35}\text{Ibid., Article 4.}\)
declaring that they accept the competence of the oversight committee, ratification rates of
the treaty itself are quite high. The treaty allows states to make rhetorical declarations
about the importance of racial equality without actually requiring any policy adjustments.
Those states that have particularly beleaguered racial minorities should be less inclined to
accept Article 14.

In many ways regressions with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination provides the best test of my hypothesis because the IPM for this
treaty has been open for the greatest number of years\(^\text{36}\) and consequently provides more
observations for testing\(^\text{37}\). Also the value of \(r^2\) is high at 36.94\% suggesting that this
model accounts for a many of the factors involved in explaining ratification of the IPM in
the CERD. The regional political crisis variables are robust predictors of ratification of
this convention. The socialization variables are also found to be good predictors of
ratification; however, the impact of these variables on ratification is modest compared to
the regional instability variable. Models one and three provide excellent support for
hypothesis two-that ratification of individual petition mechanisms follows periods of
regional political crisis. I forgo discussion of Model #2 here because none of the
variables in this model are significant. I discuss the implications of this with respect to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention against
Torture.

**Model #1 (testing against the socialization hypothesis)\(^\text{38}\)**

The regional political crisis variable (lagged 3 years) is highly significant at the
.01 level. Also, it has a very strong impact on the likelihood of ratification- the largest

\(^{36}\) Since 1964.

\(^{37}\) The number of observations for this model is 4502.

\(^{38}\) Table 2.5 in the appendix to this chapter.
impact of any variable in this investigation. When the proportion of states in a region experiencing political crisis increases from .045 to .9 individual states are 88% more likely to ratify the individual petition mechanism in the CERD treaty. This is by far the largest impact on ratification found here. The variable that takes into account the years since the last regional political crisis is nearly significant at the .1 level but the sign is in the wrong direction and the impact is very small.\textsuperscript{39}

Normative models predict that states will be socialized to participate in global institutions and promote global norms. The results of this test support socialization as an explanation for ratification of the individual petition mechanism in the racial discrimination convention. The socialization variable is highly significant at the .001 level, meaning that states are more likely to ratify the IPM in the CERD if they have ratified three of the other United Nations human rights treaties. This conforms closely to constructivist expectations. However the effect on the likelihood of ratification is small—only increasing the likelihood of ratification by .12%.\textsuperscript{40} The regional rate of ratification is also significant at the .01 level suggesting that states are more likely to ratify the IPM in CERD when other states in their region ratify. But the impact of this variable is small making the likelihood of ratification .006% more likely at its peak.\textsuperscript{41}

Model #3\textsuperscript{42} \textit{(testing against the democratic lock-in hypothesis)}

Model #3 has been designed to test the explanatory power of the democratic lock-in approach to ratification against the regional political crises. The regional political crisis variable is a highly significant predictor of ratification.

\textsuperscript{39} Making the likelihood of ratification only .01% greater at its peak.
\textsuperscript{40} This is the first difference moving from 3 to 4 of the core United Nations human rights treaties.
\textsuperscript{41} This is the first difference moving from 26% of states in the region that have ratified to 30%.
\textsuperscript{42} Table 2.5 in the appendix to this chapter.
The findings of this regression lend tentative support to the role that regional political crises play in ratification of the IPM in the CERD. States that have experienced regional political crises in the previous three years are significantly more likely to ratify the IPM in the CERD than those states that have not experienced regional political crises. The magnitude of the regional political crisis variable, which captures the severity of the regional political crisis is also significant at the .01 level. Taken together these variables suggest that states that experienced severe regional political crises in the past three years are more likely to ratify the IPM in the CERD than those that have not.

Latin America during the 1960’s provides a good illustration of the predictive power of the regional political crisis variable. Guyana experienced an autocratic transition in 1966, Argentina experienced an autocratic resurgence shifting from -1 (mildly autocratic) to -9 (highly autocratic) in one year, and Brazil underwent an autocratic transition in 1964. Venezuela, a relatively strong democracy at the time (+7) ratified the IPM in the racial discrimination treaty in 1969 after the wave of autocratic transitions in the region. But Venezuela was not alone, Costa Rica and Brazil ratified in the same year. Uruguay and Mexico ratified within five years of the others three states. The Latin American experience with ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in the 1960’s illustrates two predictions from my model. First, this example lends support to hypothesis one- that ratification of IPM’s clusters regionally. Not only, do states in the same geographic region tend to emulate one another but they do so in quick succession. This example also suggests that newly established democracies are not the only states to ratify constraining articles in these

43 At the .001 level.
44 Polity scores for Guyana beginning in 1966 are 1’s and 0’s.
treaties. Brazil, which has just undergone an autocratic transition, also ratified the IPM in the discrimination treaty along with other states in the region.

In this model I find no support for Moravcsik’s hypothesis- that newly established and unstable democracies ratify in order to lock-in democracy domestically. Two variables test democratic lock-in as an explanation for ratification: Polity (lagged value) and Polity Durability. The scores on Polity (lagged value) are consistent with a socialization model. The more democratic a state becomes the more likely they are to ratify Article 14 of the Racial Discrimination Convention. This also contradicts my model, which suggests that autocracies and unstable democracies should be the most likely to ratify. The Polity Durability variable which tests the impact of political transitions on ratification is not a significant predictor of ratification. Moravcsik’s approach, which works well in explaining European ratification of the European Court of Human Rights cannot account for ratification of Article 14 in the Racial Discrimination Convention.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW)

This treaty compels states to take all possible steps to eliminate discrimination against women. It includes recommendations for special treatment for women in order to hasten gender equality. Article 7 requires signatory states to grant women the same political rights that men possess, such as voting, participation in non-governmental organizations and the opportunity to run for office. States are entreated to guarantee women legal protections equal to those of men in the following areas: education (Article 45 Article 4, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women

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10), employment (Article 11), and marriage (Article 16). The treaty also seeks to prevent discrimination against women from rural areas (Article 14). In order to allow their citizens to petition the oversight committee, states must ratify both the treaty and the Optional Protocol. Much like the CERD treaty, states can ratify the treaty without accepting the competence of the oversight committee, allowing a government to pay lip-service to preventing discrimination against women without allowing citizens to petition the tribunal if their rights have been violated.

Higher rates of regional political crises make states more likely to ratify the IPM in both the racial discrimination convention as well as the women’s convention. Yet, the democracy scores again are significant predictors of ratification of the IPM in the CEDAW, suggesting that the more democratic a state becomes the greater the likelihood that it will allow citizens to petition the global tribunal if their rights have been violated. However, the impact of democracy on ratification is again found to be modest.

**Model #1**

The IPM for this treaty has only been available for ratification for three years in the dataset employed for this project (1999-2001). Consequently, the number of states that have ratified in these three years is small which serves to limit the variables that can be used to test the normative explanations for ratification- particularly the world rate of ratification for the treaty and the regional rate of ratification for the treaty. Bearing in mind the limited conclusions that can be drawn from such a small population of cases I report the findings here for models #1 and #3.

The only variable that can be used to test the normative explanation for ratification of human rights treaties- socialization, is almost significant at the .1 level.

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46 Table 2.6 in the appendix
Because the variable is nearly significant I use CLARIFY to test the first difference to get a better idea about the impact that socialization has on the likelihood of ratification of the individual petition mechanism in CEDAW. The impact of a change in this variable is trivial- when states move from ratifying 2 to 3 of the core United Nations human rights treaties the coefficient is so small that it must be reported using exponents.\textsuperscript{47} Though not particularly problematic for normative models of ratification of human rights treaties because of the limited data available for this test, this suggests that high levels of democracy are not associated with high levels of ratification of the IPM in the women’s convention. This finding is particularly interesting because women in established, western democracies enjoy expansive legal rights and protections and hence ratification of the IPM in this treaty should be relatively costless for established democracies.

The regional political crisis variable, lagged by one year is significant at the .1 level. The relationship between regional political crisis and ratification is linear- with the likelihood of ratification increasing as the amount of regional political crisis experienced by a state in a given region increases. When a region experiences low levels of regional political crisis the likelihood of ratification, while significant is small. States that experienced high levels of regional political crisis in the last year are 13.2% more likely to ratify the IPM in the women’s convention than those that experienced low levels of regional political crisis.

**Model #3\textsuperscript{48} (testing against the lock-in hypothesis)**

My findings in this model contradict both my hypothesis and Moravcsik’s. The states most likely to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of

\textsuperscript{47} 1.58 \times 10^{10}  \\
\textsuperscript{48} I skip model #2 for this convention because the outcome does not vary enough for STATA to run the logit model. The statistical output for model #3 is reported in table 2.6 in the appendix to this chapter.
All Forms of Discrimination against Women are not autocracies or unstable democracies, but rather established democracies. The relationship between democracy and ratification is linear. Interestingly, I find no support for the link between political transitions and ratification. The “polity durability” variable, used to capture the number of years since the last political transition should exhibit a negative relationship if the domestic democratic lock-in hypothesis is correct- a low number of years since the last political transition should be associated with a high rate of ratification. While the coefficient is in the expected direction, the variable is not significant, suggesting that political transitions are not a significant predictor of ratification.

**International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)**

The ICCPR was one of the earliest and most comprehensive undertakings of the international community in the post World War II period. The treaty provides for extensive protections for self determination (Article 1), access to domestic courts (Article 2) restrictions on capital punishment (Article 6) and prohibitions on torture (Article 7). In addition, ratifying states are prohibited from engaging in the slave trade (Article 8) and employing extrajudicial detentions (Article 9). Many of the rights contained in the ICCPR mirror those found in the US Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech, assembly and association. In order for their citizens to submit petitions directly to the oversight committee states must ratify both the treaty and the Optional Protocol.

**Model #1**\(^{49}\) (*testing against the socialization hypothesis*)

The results of this model support normative accounts of ratification- states that have ratified human rights treaties in the past are indeed more likely to ratify the IPM in the ICCPR as well. Yet, at its peak this variable only impacts the likelihood of ratification

\(^{49}\) Results reported in Table 2.7 in the appendix to this chapter.
2.2%. However when states move from ratifying 2 to 3 of the core United Nations human rights treaties they are 2.2% more likely to ratify the IPM in the ICCPR.

Normative explanations of ratification of human rights treaties also suggest that individual states will be more likely to ratify as the number of other states in the world ratify. These accounts of ratification rely on tipping models- implying that once a critical mass of states have ratified others will follow and ratify as well. While the world ratification variable is highly significant, the coefficient is small. Individual states are only .067% more likely to ratify the IPM in the ICCPR treaty when the percentage of other states in the world ratifying the ICCPR treaty jumps from 45% of states in the world to 55% of the states in the world. Moving from less than half of the states in the international system (45%) to just over half of the states in the international system (55%) should be the critical tipping point at which ratification by other states should cascade.

And yet, the data suggest otherwise.

Only one of the regional political crisis variables are statistically significant in the regression. The magnitude of the regional political crisis positively impacted the likelihood of ratification of the IPM in the expected direction- though once again the impact was small. This variable assigns a score between 0 (no regional political crisis) and 4 (high regional political crisis). My theory predicts that higher scores on this variable will be associated with higher rates of ratification of IPMs in human rights treaties. Even moving from no regional political crisis (0) to the highest level on this variable only (4) makes individual states .2% more likely to ratify.

Model #2\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{50} Table 2.7 in the appendix.
This model tests the regional political crisis variables against other possible predictors of ratification—rule of law tradition, bureaucratic quality and corruption in government. States with a strong rule of law tradition and high bureaucratic quality could theoretically be more likely to ratify IPMs in human rights treaties because they are likely already protecting these rights. States with high levels of corruption in government should be less inclined to ratify because ratification of an individual complaint mechanism could allow the global tribunal to investigate government practices. However none of these variables are significant predictors of ratification of the individual petition mechanism in the ICCPR. This is an interesting finding. Ratification of the IPM in the ICCPR should be particularly costless for states that have a strong rule of law tradition, high bureaucratic quality and low corruption in government. This treaty requires that states maintain a functioning court system, avoid extrajudicial detentions and respect the rights of freedom of speech, press and religion. This finding challenges the assertion that states only accept global obligations with which they are de-facto compliant.51

States that have experienced political crises in their region in the last three years are significantly more likely to ratify the individual petition mechanism in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights than those states that have not experienced regional political crises. The regional political crisis variables, lagged by one year and three years are significant at the .01 level. This mirrors the findings for the discrimination convention and women’s convention.

Model #352 (testing against the lock-in hypothesis)

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51 For an example of this approach see Down, Rocke and Barsoom (1996).
52 Table 2.7 in the appendix.
Table 2.7 gives the results of the logit model testing the predictive power of the regional political crisis variable against the democratic lock-in variables. Polity (lagged value) and Polity Durability test the predictive power of Moravcsik’s democratic lock-in hypothesis. Interestingly, this is the only test that offers support for the link between political transitions and ratification. However, I find no support for the link between unstable or tenuous democracies and ratification. The more democratic a state becomes the more likely they are to ratify the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the impact of this variable is very small. While the coefficient is in the expected direction, even where it should impact the likelihood of ratification at its peak, in transitions from autocracy (-5) to democracy (0), states are only .045% more likely to ratify.

Another interesting result can be gleaned from this variable. Contrary to both Moravcsik’s hypothesis and that offered here- high scores on the Polity scale are associated with a greater likelihood of ratification. Figure 2.6 below suggests that the likelihood of ratification increases as democracy scores increase.

[Figure 2.6 about here]

The other variable of interest is polity durability. This variable counts the number of years since the last political transition. For this variable the predictions of my theory and Moravcsik’s theory overlap. In both instances recent transitions to democracy should make states more likely to ratify. This variable should exhibit a negative relationship between likelihood of ratification and years since the last transition. The coefficient for this variable is in the expected direction and is statistically significant at the .1 level. But
the impact of this variable is small. A state is only .005% less likely to ratify 50 years after a transition to democracy than they are to ratify 10 years after a transition.

Like Model #1 the magnitude of the regional political crisis is a statistically significant predictor of ratification. The likelihood of ratification of the individual petition mechanisms in the ICCPR increases as the magnitude of regional political crises increases. Figure 2.6 graphs the first differences to illustrate this.

A consideration of the timing of ratification for the IPM in this treaty among bordering states in North Africa illustrates the predictive power of the regional political crisis variable. During the 1980’s this region was composed entirely of autocracies that underwent backsliding and shifts in Polity scores that resulted primarily in autocratic control (Polity scores of -8’s, -9’s, and -10’s). In 1985, Chad ratified the IPM in the ICCPR, followed by Niger in 1986 and Algeria and Libya in 1989. Neither a democratic lock-in model, nor a socialization model can explain ratification by these states because none underwent a democratic transition during this time. Each of these bordering states in North Africa possessed moderate to severe autocratic political institutions, had just experienced a period of regional political crisis and ratified the IPM in the ICCPR in rapid secession.

**Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)**

The CAT is a relatively recent treaty, established by the international community in 1984. The treaty provides extensive protections for those that have been tortured (Articles 13-14). It does not allow exceptions for the use of torture under any
circumstances (Article 2). States must abstain from extraditing an accused criminal to a state where he or she may reasonably expect to be tortured (Article 3). States may accept the competence of the oversight committee after they have ratified the treaty by declaring their acceptance of Article 14.

**Model #1**\(^{53}\) (*testing against the socialization hypothesis*)

The results of this model provide support for normative models of ratification of human rights treaties. States are significantly more likely to ratify the individual petition mechanism in the torture convention if they have already ratified other United Nations human rights treaties. Normative models rely on norm cascades to explain why states choose to adopt global obligations-as a greater number of states ratify the building pressure to ratify eventually compels states to join in.\(^{54}\) This suggests that as the percentage of states that have already ratified approaches one-hundred each individual state should be significantly more likely to ratify. Yet, despite the relatively high rate of ratification of the IPM in the torture convention (30% of the states in the world) this variable is not a significant predictor of ratification. States are more likely to ratify the IPM in the torture convention if they have ratified three other United Nations human rights treaties but, contrary to normative models they are not influenced to ratify by other states in the world. These data do suggest, however that these states are influenced by the other states in their region that have ratified. The regional ratification rate of the Convention against Torture is a significant predictor of ratification in this model. This

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\(^{53}\) Table 2.8 in the appendix.  
\(^{54}\) Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
finding is consistent with recent work in the field that suggests that the regional context is an important factor in explaining the decision to ratify.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Model #2}\textsuperscript{56}

Very few of the variables in this model are significant predictors of ratification of the IPM in the torture convention. The rule of law variable is significant at the .1 level. After using CLARIFY to test the impact of this variable on ratification, regardless of the value of rule of law (1-very low respect for the rule of law- 6- very high respect for the rule of law) its impact on ratification is extraordinarily low.\textsuperscript{57} This also says something very important to those that suggest that states only ratify human rights treaties with which they are already compliant. If this were indeed the case then we’d expect a high respect for the rule of law, low levels of corruption in government and high levels of bureaucratic quality to be associated with higher levels of ratification of individual petition mechanisms in human rights treaties. Yet, this is not the case. Only one of these variables is significant in this model and its impact on ratification of the IPM in the torture convention is negligible.

\textbf{Model #3}\textsuperscript{58} \textit{(testing against the lock-in hypothesis)}

I find no support for Moravcsik’s domestic democratic lock-in hypothesis in this model. While the lagged value of the democracy score is highly significant at the .001 level, suggesting that established democracies are the most likely to ratify, the value for polity durability (the # of years since the last political transition) is not significant. Perhaps even more interesting is the impact of polity scores on the likelihood of

\textsuperscript{55} Ramirez, Soysal, and Shananhan (1997) and Simmons (unpublished).
\textsuperscript{56} Table 2.8 in the appendix.
\textsuperscript{57} These values are so negligible that they must be reported as exponents.
\textsuperscript{58} Table 2.8 in the appendix.
ratification of the Convention against Torture. Regardless of the first differences computed in STATA the impact of the change in polity scores on the likelihood of ratification is so small that the coefficients are reported as exponents. For example moving from an autocratic (-5) to a mildly democratic (0) score only increases the likelihood of ratification by 1.1 x’s 10^9.

The strong support found thus far for normative models of ratification suggests that neither regional nor domestic political crises swamp the impact of democracy on ratification. Contrary to both my expectations and a domestic democratic lock-in model established democracies are the most likely to ratify Article 22 in the Convention against Torture. This makes intuitive sense. While less democratic states may be willing to tie their own hands to signal for aid in discrimination treaties, they may be less inclined to give up torture as a political strategy. Because Article 22 allows individual citizens to petition the Committee against Torture for violations of the treaty, it is not surprising that we find high rates of ratification in those states that are unlikely to use torture.

**Region**

This quantitative analysis primarily employs a geographic approach to region, relying on the World Bank indicators to denote boundaries of geographic regions. Yet, defining world regions using physical geography can neglect other approaches to region that stress the cultural homogeneity of regional peers. From this perspective a region may be composed of states that are geographically isolated, yet share a common religion or a common colonial history. To capture this approach to region I ran a final model that tests the impact of common religion and common colonial experience on ratification of

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the IPMs in the four treaties being investigated in this project.\textsuperscript{60} The results of this test are reported in Table 2.9. None of these variables are robust predictors of ratification across all four treaties.

States that were annexed by the Soviet Union are significantly more likely to ratify the individual petition mechanism in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This is not a surprising finding. Many of the rights expressed in the ICCPR mirror those found in the United States Bill of Rights and include speech, press, religion and assembly, many of which were limited in satellite states during Soviet control. These same states are also significantly more likely to ratify the IPM for the Convention against Torture. Catholic countries are significantly more likely to ratify the IPM in the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture, but not in the racial and women’s discrimination treaties.

Hindu and Buddhist countries fall out of the regressions for the Convention against Torture, The Racial Discrimination Convention and The Women’s Discrimination Convention because these states have not ratified any of these mechanisms. There are only three countries in the world whose majority populations practice the Hindu religion: Suriname, Mauritius and India. It is difficult to draw a meaningful conclusion from such a small population of cases. Mongolia, Japan, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand and Singapore are the world’s only majority Buddhist countries. None of these states ratified the individual petition mechanisms in the torture or discrimination conventions. In addition to sharing a common religion these states are also situated in Asia, a region with characteristically low rates of ratification of human rights treaties. The decision not to

\textsuperscript{60} The colonial experience variable begins with colonial holdings from the year 1800. Both the religion and colonial history variables were constructed using data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book.
ratify may stem from religious beliefs, or it may be the nature of the treaties themselves, which express traditionally western values. Or, the reluctance to ratify may be the result of regional politics. Because Buddhist states are found exclusively in Asia, it is difficult to extricate the regional dynamics from the religious dynamics in explaining the lack of ratification.

[Table 2.16 about here]

**Foreign Aid**

Because this investigation has uncovered modest support for the link between regional political crises and ratification of IPM’s, I test hypothesis 4, which predicts that the states that ratify IPM’ will receive a greater share of aid relative to those that do not ratify. In order to test the effect of ratification on aid levels I employ an interrupted-time-series research design.\(^{61}\) This approach allows me to compare the percent increase in foreign aid levels between two groups of states: those that have ratified (treatment group) and those that have not (control group). For the treatment group I average the amount of inflation adjusted aid received for ten years before and ten years after ratification and then note the percent increase.\(^{62}\) For the control group I select a baseline year and perform the same calculation. I report the results here for three treaties. Again, the IPM in the Women’s Convention was only open for ratification in 1999 and therefore does not allow for significant aid levels after ratification to be considered. States that have ratified are more likely to experience increases in foreign aid after ratification at a greater rate than those states in the control group. However, in two of the three treaties, those states that did not ratify received a greater percentage increase in aid in the second period.

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\(^{61}\) For more on interrupted-time-series see Campbell and Ross 1968.

\(^{62}\) It is important to note that these levels vary significantly, decreasing in many cases.
**Convention against Torture**

For this treaty there are fourteen states for which foreign aid data are available and that have ratified the IPM in the Torture Convention. The control group consists of all 98 states that have either not ratified the IPM in the Torture Convention or have done so outside the range for which aid data are available. 74.5% of states in the control group experienced increases in the percentage of aid they received before and after the default year. However, in the treatment group 85.8% of states experienced increases in the percentage of aid they received after ratification. In addition to receiving a greater percentage of aid relative to the share they received prior to ratification, the states that ratified the IPM in the Convention against Torture also experienced a somewhat greater, average percentage increase in the amount of aid that they received when compared with those states that did not ratify. Ratifying states, on average received 114.2% more aid in the period after they ratified, then the control group, which on average received 111% more aid in the period after the default year.

**Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination**

The racial discrimination treaty was initially open for ratification in 1964. The available data for foreign aid levels only go back to 1961 so despite the high levels of ratification of the IPM in this treaty data limitations prevent robust inferences from being drawn. The control group consists of ninety-nine states that did not ratify the IPM in the racial discrimination treaty. Of this group 77.6% experienced increases in foreign aid levels after the default year. Of the five states in the treatment group, 100% experienced

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63 The states include: Algeria, Argentina, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
64 The default year is 1987.
increases in foreign aid percentages after ratification.\textsuperscript{65} Interestingly, those states that did not ratify, but experienced increases in aid on average received a 99\% increase in aid in the second period.\textsuperscript{66} States in the treatment group only received, on average a 68\% boost in the percentage of foreign aid after ratification. This suggests that while a greater proportion of states that did ratify received increases in foreign aid levels after ratification (100\%) those that did not ratify, on average received a greater increase in their percentage of aid in the second period.

\textbf{International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights}

The effect of ratifying the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is similar to the effect of ratifying the racial discrimination treaty. States that ratify generally receive increases in the percentage of aid they receive in the second period. 92.3\% of states in the treatment group experienced increases in their percentages of foreign aid after ratification of the IPM in the ICCPR, compared to only 71\% of states in the control group that experienced an increase. However, on average those states that did not ratify, but that experienced increases received 41\% more aid in the second period. While ratifying states only received 16.4\% more aid after ratifying.

The results of this investigation suggest that ratification of individual petition mechanisms in human rights treaties may indeed allow states to send a signal to the international community. These findings suggest that a greater proportion of ratifying states can expect to receive foreign aid relative to those that do not ratify, but they may not receive as great an increase as the control group. While ratification may increase the

\textsuperscript{65} The five states are: Algeria, Ecuador, Senegal, Peru, and Mexico.
\textsuperscript{66} Five outliers have been dropped from this calculation because the aid levels experienced by these states far exceed those levels experienced by any other states.
possibility that states will receive any aid, it negatively impacts the amount of aid they receive. In two of the three cases investigated here, states in the control group experienced a greater average increase in the percent of aid they received from the major international donors.

**Conclusion**

This project has uncovered some surprising trends in state ratification of individual petition mechanisms. Socialization models, which predict ratification by established democracies find robust support in all of the treaties under investigation. Indeed, level of democracy is the single most significant predictor of ratification in the discrimination conventions, Torture Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This finding undercuts both domestic democratic lock-in as an explanation for ratification as well as my third hypothesis, that newly established democracies and autocracies should be the most likely to ratify.

However other findings in this project call into question the motivation behind ratification for newly established democracies and autocracies. While, autocracies and unstable democracies are not significantly more likely to ratify than established democracies they are still ratifying IPM’s at high rates. Ratification among these states could be explained by a socialization model- as more states in the world ratify the pressure to ratify on each individual state builds encouraging them to ratify as well. However, the link between ratification and foreign aid is also compelling. States that ratify the Torture Convention, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Racial Discrimination Convention are more likely to receive foreign aid after they
ratify than those states that do not ratify. This suggests that human rights treaties can approximate trade and security treaties, namely by increasing the material benefits that flow to those that ratify. Despite the fact that promises of foreign aid are not formal components of these treaties, states can still expect a boost in foreign aid after ratification which may contribute to the decision to ratify.

My second hypothesis, linking regional political crises to ratification of individual petition mechanisms finds support in the Racial Discrimination and Women’s Discrimination Conventions. In these treaties, states that have experienced regional political crises are more likely to ratify than those that have not experienced these crises. Why do states ratify discrimination treaties rather than the Torture Convention or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights after periods of regional political crises? This may have something to do with the prohibitions on state policies that each individual treaty requires. The discrimination treaties prevent states from discriminating against women or racial minorities in employment, housing, and politics. Any benefit to the state derived from formal policies that discriminate against these groups might be undercut by the potential loss of foreign aid. In other words, states may evaluate the benefit of discriminating against a group today versus the cost of losing out on foreign aid tomorrow. In many cases it makes intuitive sense that states would forgo the benefits of discriminating in favor of more foreign aid.

However, states appear to be making a different decision with respect to torture and respect for civil and political rights generally. After periods of regional political crisis states are less likely to ratify the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil

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67 The Women’s Discrimination Convention is not considered here because the IPM for this treaty has only been available for ratification since 1999 which does not allow for a consideration of the amount of aid received after ratification.
and Political Rights and not significantly likely to ratify Article 22 in the Torture Convention. The use of political repression and torture are not strategies that states appear willing to forgo in favor of foreign aid. While policies that discriminate may only bring marginal benefits to the state, the use of torture or the suppression of political rights may be critical to the state and therefore explain state reluctance to ratify the latter treaties.

This investigation suggests that neither a purely global nor a purely domestic approach to explaining ratification of IPM’s is appropriate. Regional political dynamics also contribute to the decision to ratify and may, more importantly help states determine which treaties to ratify and which to avoid. In addition, there is a clear reward effect to ratifying these IPM’s. States that ratify can expect to receive more foreign aid than those that do not ratify. While I cannot discount the socialization approach to ratification this project has uncovered a paucity of support for domestic democratic lock-in and tentative support for regional political crises as the impetus behind ratification of individual petition mechanisms in global human rights treaties.

**Figures**
Figure 2.3

Survival Estimates: ICCPR Treaty

Analysis Time in Years

- E. Asia
- Latin America
- M. East & N. Africa
- S. Asia
- Sub Saharan Africa
- W. Europe
Figure 2.4

Survival Estimates: ICCPR IPM

Analysis Time in Years

W. Europe

E. Europe & C. Asia

E. Asia

M. East & N. Africa

Latin America

Sub Saharan Africa

S. Asia
Figure 2.5

![Figure 2.5: ICCPR IPM Ratification by Democracy](image)

- Established Dem = 1
- Moderate Dem = 2
- Autocracy = 3

Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of Ratification:
ICCPR Optional Protocol

![Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of Ratification: ICCPR Optional Protocol](image)
Figure 2.6: Predicted Probability of Ratifying the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR

Tables

Table 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>ICCPR</th>
<th>CEDAW</th>
<th>CERD</th>
<th>CAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of ratifying states/total number of states</td>
<td>149/190</td>
<td>164/190</td>
<td>155/190</td>
<td>124/190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of states that have ratified</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>ICCPR</th>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>CERD</th>
<th>CEDAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of ratifying states/total number of states</td>
<td>99/190</td>
<td>55/190</td>
<td>52/190</td>
<td>13/190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of states that have ratified</td>
<td>%52.1</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>.07%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2.3: Percentage of States in Each Region that have Ratified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>ICCPR Treaty</th>
<th>ICCPR IPM</th>
<th>CERD Treaty</th>
<th>CERD IPM</th>
<th>CAT Treaty</th>
<th>CAT IPM</th>
<th>CEDAW Treaty</th>
<th>CEDAW IPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; the Pacific</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>.07%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>.07%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
<td>.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>84.3%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>81.2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Polity Score</th>
<th>Likelihood of Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very autocratic (-10) - Less autocratic (-5)</td>
<td>.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less autocratic (-5) - Mid point (0)</td>
<td>.045%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid point (0) - More democratic (+5)</td>
<td>.070%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More democratic (+5) - Very Democratic (+10)</td>
<td>.12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix

Figure A2.1

Figure A2.1: Ratification of ICCPR Treaty & IPM

Figure A2.2

Figure A2.2: Ratification of CERD Treaty & IPM
Construction of Regional Instability Variables

1) **Regpolcrisis**: I use Polity IV to test for the presence of regional political instability. I use the threshold value of 7 as a ceiling. Any state in any year that dips 3 or more points (a 4 or lower) is characterized as having a political crisis. I
then generate the proportion of states in a given region in a given year that are undergoing a political crisis. The result is a proportion that estimates the average amount of political instability in a given region in a given year. I use the Polity II variable from the dataset, rather than the Polity variable. Because Polity II estimates unknown scores, while Polity assigns transition values (-88, -77, -66, etc)

2) **Magrepolcrisis**: I use Polity IV to test for the magnitude of regional political instability. I count the # of states in each region that have been classified as experiencing a political crisis (a drop of 3 or more polity points in a year from ceiling of 7) and then count the number of total polity points that each state in the region has dipped by in that year. I assigned the following values:
   a. 1 if the region experienced a relatively small political crisis- 3-6 drops in polity points among all of the states in the region in a given year.
   b. 2 if the region experienced a slightly larger political crisis- 7-10 drops in polity points among all of the states in the region in the year.
   c. 3 if the region experienced a large political crisis- 11-14 drops in polity points among all of the states in the region in the year.
   d. 4 if the region experienced a significant political crisis- 15 or more drops in polity points among all of the states in the region in a given year.

3) **YearsRegpolcrisis**: I use the Polity IV data and determine the number of years it has been since there was a regional political crisis in each region in each year. Years that experienced a crisis are assigned a 0 and the count continues for each year that is crisis free. For another crisis year the count starts over with 0, 1, 2… This measures the number of years since there has been a regional political crisis. Higher scores on this variable should be associated with less likelihood of ratification.
Table 2.5: Ratification of Article 14: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>(1) Testing Against the Socialization Hypothesis</th>
<th>(2) Testing Against the IRGC indicators</th>
<th>(3) Testing Against the Democratic Lock-in Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>1.078*** (.2623)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAFRD World Rat. Rate</td>
<td>-.0334 (.0326)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0239 (.0326)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAFRD Regional Rat. Rate</td>
<td>.0701*** (.0253)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>-.2778 (.2668)</td>
<td>.1432 (.9902)</td>
<td>-.4981* (.2758)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Last Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.0823 (.0528)</td>
<td>.1066 (.1017)</td>
<td>.1019 (.0642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (1 year lag)</td>
<td>-.6.873 (8.484)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-9.923 (7.965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (3 year lag)</td>
<td>20.64*** (6.626)</td>
<td>.5209 (28.08)</td>
<td>24.15*** (7.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (5 year lag)</td>
<td>-4.898 (9.173)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-6.707 (9.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-.0959 (.1883)</td>
<td>-.1303 (.2399)</td>
<td>-.1504 (.1280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (lagged value)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0053 (.0722)</td>
<td>.1024*** (.0374)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption in Government</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2939 (.5159)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Tradition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1056 (.4682)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1730 (.4850)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Durability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0156 (.0163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4502</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>3858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects were included in the regressions but are not reported.

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10
Table 2.6: Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Testing Against the Socialization Hypothesis</th>
<th>(2) Testing Against the Democratic Lock-in Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>.3050 (.1926)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>.1110 (.1518)</td>
<td>-.0146 (.1631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.4776 (1.369)</td>
<td>-.1807 (1.443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Last Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.3677 (.2357)</td>
<td>.2530 (.2542)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (1 year lag)</td>
<td>16.58** (7.789)</td>
<td>12.08 (8.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (3 year lag)</td>
<td>-3.244 (20.00)</td>
<td>-5.360 (20.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (5 year lag)</td>
<td>-9.894 (8.564)</td>
<td>-11.39 (8.895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (lagged value)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1495** (.0607)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Durability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0001 (.0125)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects were included in the regressions but are not reported.

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10
Table 2.7: Ratification of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Testing Against the Socialization Hypothesis</th>
<th>(2) Testing Against the IRGC indicators</th>
<th>(3) Testing Against the Democratic Lock-in Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>.9696*** (.1095)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR World Rat. Rate</td>
<td>3.066*** (1.015)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.785*** (.7194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR Regional Rat. Rate</td>
<td>4.396*** (.7148)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.3072*** (.1111)</td>
<td>-.1363 (.2651)</td>
<td>.2474** (.1085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Last Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.0101 (.0233)</td>
<td>.0434 (.0337)</td>
<td>.0245 (.0259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>3.147 (3.734)</td>
<td>14.74*** (5.768)</td>
<td>2.107 (3.411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (3 year lag)</td>
<td>3.878 (3.836)</td>
<td>14.53* (7.643)</td>
<td>3.267 (3.629)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (5 year lag)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-.0292 (.0662)</td>
<td>-.0783 (.0980)</td>
<td>-.0041 (.0531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (lagged value)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0917*** (.0287)</td>
<td>.0858*** (.0178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption in Government</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0175 (.2097)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Tradition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.2249 (.1913)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.3109 (.1940)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Durability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0209** (.0088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3977</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>3188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects were included in the regressions but are not reported.

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Testing Against the Socialization Hypothesis</th>
<th>(2) Testing Against the IRGC indicators</th>
<th>(3) Testing Against the Democratic Lock-in Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>.5912*** (.1601)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT World Rat. Rate</td>
<td>.0588 (.0358)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.0866*** (.0330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT Regional Rat. Rate</td>
<td>.0450*** (.0132)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnitude of Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>-.0083 (.2263)</td>
<td>.6409 (.8327)</td>
<td>-.1065 (.2455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Last Regional Political Crisis</td>
<td>.0109 (.0345)</td>
<td>-.0368 (.0480)</td>
<td>.0109 (.0393)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (1 year lag)</td>
<td>-1.037 (.360)</td>
<td>3.025 (11.14)</td>
<td>1.263 (7.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (3 year lag)</td>
<td>3.917 (7.335)</td>
<td>-.8852 (13.02)</td>
<td>4.250 (8.474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Political Crisis (5 year lag)</td>
<td>-6.249 (8.719)</td>
<td>-23.81 (16.29)</td>
<td>-7.100 (10.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0616 (.1688)</td>
<td>-.0655 (.1271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity (lagged value)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.1125*** (.0375)</td>
<td>.1173*** (.0318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption in Government</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.2098 (.2944)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law Tradition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.4310* (.2512)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Quality</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.1814 (.2833)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Durability</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.0061 (.0112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3188</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>2636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects were included in the regressions but are not reported.

***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ICCPR</th>
<th>CAT</th>
<th>CERD</th>
<th>CEDAW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Colony</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td>-0.952</td>
<td>-1.31</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese Colony</td>
<td>-0.617</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.685</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(.512)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Colony</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.924)</td>
<td>(0.810)</td>
<td>(0.671)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Colony</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>-0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)**</td>
<td>(.032)*</td>
<td>(.529)</td>
<td>(.551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Colony</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>-0.441</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(0.610)</td>
<td>(0.757)</td>
<td>(0.911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Colony</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>-0.820</td>
<td>-0.977</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian Colony</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(0.551)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust/Hung Colony</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)*</td>
<td>(.920)</td>
<td>(.754)</td>
<td>(0.050)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>(0.003)**</td>
<td>(.045)*</td>
<td>(.191)</td>
<td>(0.840)</td>
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<td>-0.440</td>
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<td>(0.496)</td>
<td>(0.602)</td>
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<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.709)</td>
<td>(0.785)</td>
<td>(0.790)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>(0.605)</td>
<td>(0.840)</td>
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<td>0.047</td>
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<td>(0.028)*</td>
<td>(.973)</td>
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Note: The entries are maximum likelihood estimates with z scores reported.
Works Cited


Diffusion of Democracy and Markets, University of California, Los Angeles, 7-8 March 2003.


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