Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies

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Recent research builds on the observation that democracies have more durable alliances to argue that democracies make more reliable allies. This need not be the case. Alliances serve as commitment devices, adding ex ante credibility to states’ claims about ex post behavior. Variation in alliance durability must reflect differences in the desirability of formalizing alignments. Put simply, democracies are “most improved” by formal commitments. We offer two related explanations for why democracies might actually be less reliable alliance partners. Information costs for participating in policymaking and the advantages of organized interest groups combined with distributional incentives generated by the periodic turnover of governments may conspire to make informal commitments on the part of democracies problematic. Determining the net effect of democratic virtue and vice is best done empirically. We test alliance reliability by focusing on intervention, rather than on the duration or the number of commitments. Our results suggest that democracies make less reliable allies.

Contemporary wisdom in international relations holds that democracies make more reliable allies. Public review and ratification of international agreements, combined with respect for international law, are said to fashion formal commitments that are effectively binding on democracies. As evidence, researchers point out that democracies tend to ally together and that alliances involving democracies are more durable (see Cowhey 1993; Gaubatz 1996; Reed 1997). This view of the effectiveness of democratic commitments represents a remarkable break with the more pessimistic conception that held sway previously. Earlier observers often argued that democracies are “mercurial.” Executives in democracies are necessarily reliant on shifting public opinion and transient coalitions, making commitments contingent and thus leading to less reliability as partners than stable autocracies (Kennan 1996, 135–36). Claims of democratic reliability also appear to be in logical tension with explanations for the democratic peace that emphasize the ability of citizens to veto the mobilization decisions of political elites.

The recent contest in Iraq highlights the impact of regime type on foreign policy. Bush administration officials initially sought significant assistance from U.S. allies. Contrary to the notion that democratic publics encourage adherence to international commitments, popular opposition to U.S. plans for a war led many continental democracies to interpret their NATO obligations as narrowly as possible.1 Similarly, while the “Arab street” voiced emphatic condemnation of U.S. policy, democratic Turkey,

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1In February 2003, for example, NATO members exhibited severe disagreement over a plan to dispatch military equipment to Turkey. Ankara took the unprecedented step of invoking article 4 of the NATO treaty, which requires members to “consult together when, in the opinion of any of them, their territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened.” France, Germany, and Belgium blocked assistance on the grounds that there was no threat to Turkey. U.S. authorities charged that opponents had given way to domestic public opinion and neglected their NATO duties. U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld complained of a “truly shameful” dereliction of NATO’s obligation to defend Turkey, and U.S. NATO Ambassador Burns declared that “NATO is now facing a crisis of credibility.”


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a close ally of long standing, was the lone U.S. ally in the region to refuse all U.S. requests.²

The Anglo-French response to German annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1939 provides the classical example of democratic unreliability. Czechoslovakia and France had concluded a defense pact, while Britain had publicly guaranteed the integrity of Czechoslovakia. Although the German attack in principle should have precipitated a war among the three powers, neither Britain nor France replied with force. France tendered a letter of protest after Hitler moved to occupy all of Czechoslovakia. Britain offered the legal ruse that it was not obliged to intervene since the declaration of Slovak independence terminated the state whose territorial integrity it had guaranteed. Popular opposition to war thwarted the ability to maintain security commitments by the two democracies, leading to abandonment of Czechoslovakia.³

Just as World War II was preceded by failed democratic commitments, the previous “great war” was precipitated in part by ambiguity over Britain’s obligation to France. A number of signals led German planners to discount British resolve to intervene (Lebow 1981; Levy 1990). Word that British Foreign Secretary Grey had authorized preliminary talks with French military officials designed to develop a contingency plan for joint mobilization resulted in calls for his resignation. Grey was forced to publicly disavow British support for France, even though the entente clearly contemplated such an effort (Ferguson 1999, 56–81). In spite of formal guarantees of Belgian neutrality dating back to 1839, public opposition in the U.K. to the draft and to any increase in defense spending led French officials to expect that British involvement in the war could be made redundant by rapid mobilization and decisive defeat of France (the Schlieffen plan). Reiter and Stam argue that “[t]he events of the July crisis leading to World War I clearly illustrate the problem that democracies face: potential aggressors do not believe that democracies’ commitments to come to the aid of one another are credible” (2002, 101).

Contemporary optimism about democratic alliance behavior is probably a healthy response to the excessive pessimism of the past. Still, a thorough examination of the determinants of alliance behavior suggests a complex relationship between regime type and reliability in which democracies offer both benefits and burdens as security partners. We believe that existing accounts suffer in at least two ways. First, the literature ignores the possibility that states have different incentives to ally. Differences in alliance behavior by regime type could be due to variation in supply (democracies are more reliable, and thus more sought after as allies) or demand (democracies are less reliable, and so have more need to institutionalize their security partnerships). If regimes differ in their utility for alliances more than they differ in their ability to honor commitments, then democratic alliance behavior may reflect relative unreliability. Second, existing arguments exaggerate democratic virtues. Popular ratiﬁcation of alliance treaties may augment commitment, but other features of democracy hinder reliability. Effective monitoring of government requires knowledge of the relationship between policies and outcomes. Yet, the pay-off for being attentive to policy evaporates as individual votes become inconsequential in the large selectocracies that characterize democracy.⁴ Although the broader public is attentive during crises, organized interests are likely to have disproportionate influence over the abstruse details of treaty provisions. The relative impact of public opinion and interest groups fluctuates along with issue salience, so that commitments stand different tests at different times in democracies. Similarly, regular leader replacement encourages incumbents to institutionalize policy.⁵ While institutions buttress the status quo, tensions between the interests of the administration that forges an alliance and the government that chooses whether to honor an agreement can lead democracies to be more brittle as security partners.

As the preceding anecdotes suggest, governments that are answerable to popular preferences face a dilemma when confronted by unpopular alliance commitments. Attending to domestic demands will occasionally anger strategic partners, while contradicting the wishes of citizens is only ever easy when the public has little say. We develop two formal models of reliability and regime type based on reselection of governments and special interests. The net effect of the perceived advantages and the less

²Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf autocracies chose to interpret their treaty obligations differently, providing access, basing rights, and other support, without which U.S. plans would have founders.

³Bullock argues that Hitler’s “skill in diagnosing the state of public opinion” allowed him to anticipate that “France and Great Britain, in their anxiety to avoid war, were prepared to go to great lengths to prevent the Czechs invoking the guarantees they had been given” (1955, 402–3). A leader in The Times suggesting that Czechoslovakia should cede the Sudetenland to Germany signaled widespread opposition to war. This effect of mass media is intentionally precluded in autocracies (see Van Belle 1997).

⁴Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) examine how varying the size of selectocrates and of winning coalitions influences policy. They argue that large winning coalitions (i.e., democracies) make it harder to buy off constituents with private goods (side payments, etc.).

⁵Alliances often exist for long periods. Democratic leaders are generally in ofﬁce for shorter periods than autocrats (see Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Autocratic successors are also often protégés of the autocrat, binding identities together and internalizing reputation across generations.
sanguine notion of “mercurial” democracies is difficult to ascertain deductively. Instead, we let empirical analysis adjudicate the respective impact of countervailing forces affecting alliance reliability. We find that democracies are less likely than other regimes to intervene in wars on behalf of allies.

The elements of our two related arguments will be familiar to any student of political science. Arrow’s (1951) possibility theorem tells us that it is impossible to prevent cycling over policy in any representative system. Over time, the social preference changes, even if individuals preferences remain the same. Institutions limit the effects of cycling, but only by somewhat arbitrarily assigning winners and losers in the political process. Determining the rules by which decisions are made is thus inherently strategic. Of course, the same should be true in foreign policy. Alliance commitments that constrain future choice making limit the tendency of democratic policies to cycle unpredictably, but they can do so only by limiting the responsiveness of a government to its citizens.

We accept that alliance commitments increase the probability that alignments will be upheld. However, this begs the critical question of the baseline. Institutionalizing agreements limits cycling, but only to the extent that it limits representation. Institutions are most desirable in situations where those in power fear that future choices challenge status quo interests. Democratic cycling means that the informal promises of incumbent governments must be treated with some suspicion by foreign powers. There is simply little reason for subsequent governments to feel bound by the weak commitments of previous administrations. The prospect that future governments will prefer dissimilar policies, and the effect of institutions in constraining choice, make it appealing for incumbent administrations in democracies to formalize their preferred policies, foreign or domestic. Democracies will tend to formalize international agreements in an attempt to generate greater stability and to overcome cycling, but this will only produce more reliable allies to the degree that democratic governments are unresponsive to shifting popular preferences. We find it implausible that democracies pay less attention to the evolving preferences of their constituents than do autocracies.6

Research on special interest groups and issue salience suggests a second way to explain change that leads to democratic unreliability. Special interest groups often wield disproportionate influence in democratic political processes by providing needed resources to leaders. Special interests will be most influential when salience is skewed (some groups care intensely about an issue while most others do not), or when policy involves complex technical issues where the price of informed participation is relatively high. A change in the salience or complexity of issues, however, will alter political participation and shift winning policy outcomes. Advocates have an incentive to formalize policy to block the impetus toward policy change following changes in political salience or the cost of participation. Special interests will play an important role in fashioning alliance commitments when the salience of such issues is relatively low, but salience will increase when alliance commitments are called upon. Efforts to institutionalize temporary political advantage cannot be absolutely irreversible without contravening majority rule. The ability of special interests to leverage foreign policy through formal commitments also means that democratic alliances are subject to domestic opposition, and thus to failure.

In the sections that follow, we first review the relevant literature on alliances and democracy. We then discuss our argument, presenting elements of two game theoretical models that formalize our claims about democratic politics and alliance commitments. In an empirical section, we test alliance reliability using interventions by third-party allies in interstate wars.

**Linking Regime Type and Alliance Reliability**

Why should one expect the behavior of countries in alliances to differ by political regime type? Linkages between alliance behavior and domestic politics have received considerable attention in the wake of research on the democratic peace. Siverson and Emmons (1991) find that democracies are more likely to ally between 1946 and 1965, though not during other historical periods. Simon and Gartzke (1996) argue that dissimilar regimes appear to prefer to co-ally. Lai and Reiter (2000) report that similar regimes are less likely to ally prior to World War II, but that democracies co-ally more often during the Cold War.

Some researchers assert that institutional features make democracies generally more likely to honor commitments. Cowhey argues that a system of division of powers, with each branch having a veto over policy, “makes it potentially harder to initiate new commitments but easier to maintain them” (1993, 306). Gaubatz (1996) holds that institutional constraints make democracies better able to

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6Schelling (1960) makes it clear that commitment involves an inability to alter one’s policies. For democracies to be more reliable, their leaders must be more tightly bound by prior agreements and less responsive to constituents than autocrats.
KEEP SECURITY COMMITMENTS. PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICIES IN DEMOCRACIES MOBILIZES POPULAR SUPPORT. DEMOCRACIES BY THEIR NATURE MUST DELIBERATE IN A MANNER MAKING COMMITMENTS MORE COMPLETE. THE "TRANSPARENCY" OF LIBERAL COMMITMENTS AND THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN BINDING CITIZENS TO THEIR PROMISES ARE SEEN AS KEY FACTORS MAKING DEMOCRACIES MORE RELIABLE.


OTHER STUDIES EXAMINE DURABILITY IN ALLIANCE DYADS. GAUBATZ (1996, 128–33) TESTS WHETHER DEMOCRACIES ARE BETTER ABLE TO COMMIT BY LOOKING AT THE DURATION OF ALLIANCES. HIS ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT ALLIANCES IN DEMOCRATIC DYADS TEND TO LAST LONGER THAN IN DYADS WHERE AT LEAST ONE PARTY IS AUTOCRATIC. REED (1997) REPLICATES GAUBATZ’S ANALYSIS WITH MORE ADVANCED ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND IMPROVED RESEARCH DESIGN.

WE ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER THESE EMPIRICAL TESTS OF ALLIANCE DURABILITY PROVIDE A BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT DEMOCRACIES ARE MORE RELIABLE ALLIES. BENNETT’S TEST CONSIDERS DEMOCRACY AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF AN ALLIANCE, SUMMED OVER ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS AND YEARS OF EXISTENCE, AND OFFERS AT BEST LIMITED EVIDENCE THAT DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCES LAST LONGER. THE SECOND SET OF TESTS SEEM WEAKLY RELATED TO THE THEORETICAL RATIONALE, PRESENTED AS MONADIC STATEMENTS ABOUT DEMOCRACIES, AS THEY CONSIDER THE DYADIC DURATION OF A DEMOCRACY’S ALLIANCE WITH ANOTHER DEMOCRACY, NOT THEIR ABILITY TO COMMIT TO STABLE ALLIANCES WITH OTHER STATES. GAUBATZ (1996), FOR EXAMPLE, FINDS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DURATION OF A DEMOCRATIC STATE’S COMMITMENT TO AN ALLY IN GENERAL DIFFERS FROM THAT OF AUTOCRACIES.

GAUBATZ SURMISES THAT THE DYADIC NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND ALLIANCE DURABILITY STEMS FROM “THE DISTINCTIVE PREFERENCES DEMOCRATIC STATES MAY HOLD FOR MAINTAINING THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH EACH OTHER OR...THE INSTITUTIONAL ELEMENTS THAT DEVELOP IN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC STATES” (1996, 135). INSTITUTIONALIZED ORGANIZATIONS TEND TO PERPETUATE THEMSELVES, AND ALLIANCES THAT HAVE LASTED A LONG TIME ARE MORE LIKELY TO ENDURE (SEE BENNETT 1997). THIS IS SOMETIMES OFFERED AS AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY NATO PERSISTS IN THE SEEMING ABSENCE OF ENEMIES (E.G., HAFTENDORN, KEOHANE, AND WALLANDER 1999). BUT DURATION IN THIS SENSE IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF THE STRENGTH OF COMMITMENTS OR THE SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE ALLIANCE. FINALLY, SINCE A DEMOCRACY/NONDEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY IgNORES DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL ORIENTATION AMONG AUTOCRACIES AND MANY CHANGES THAT MAY RESULT IN REALIGNMENT, THESE TESTS ARE PROBABLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF DEMOCRATIC SIMILARITY. DURABLE AUTOCRATS MAY HAVE ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS THAT ARE AS STABLE AS DEMOCRACIES. OVERALL, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE EXISTING STUDIES ON DURABILITY YIELD LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT DEMOCRACIES ARE GENERALLY BETTER ABLE TO COMMIT THAN OTHER STATES.

OTHER RESEARCHERS ASSESS ALLIANCE PERFORMANCE OR RELIABILITY BY EXAMINING WHETHER ALLIES FULFILL MILITARY COMMITMENTS DURING CONTESTS. IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE CORRELATES OF WAR (COW) PROJECT’S ALLIANCE AND WAR DATA, SABROSKY (1980) FINDS THAT ALLIES OFTEN FAIL TO ASSIST PARTNERS IN WARTIME. HE CONCLUDES THAT ALLIANCES ARE GENERALLY...
unreliable as deterrence mechanisms. Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) note that alliances often entail commitment to actions other than intervention, such as consultation in the event of certain contingencies. Even commitments to intervene are often highly specific: a state may for example only be required to help its ally in the event of attack by particular third parties. Using new data that codes the specific commitments and contingencies, entitled The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) project, Leeds, Long, and Mitchell (2000) offer a more optimistic view of alliance effectiveness, as allies carry out their commitments about 75% of the time over the period 1816–1944. However, Leeds and Gigliotti-Labay (2003, 31) find substantially lower reliability for commitments to intervene in the ATOP data for the period 1816–1991, as allies only intervene in defense of their partners 52% of the time.

A number of recent studies examine the relationship between democracy, alliances, and intervention in war. Werner and Lemke (1997) assess whether regime similarity and alliances significantly predict intervention patterns in third-party disputes. Their analysis shows that intervening states tend to join the side with the more similar regime type and with which they share alliances. However, although formal alliance commitments discriminate which side autocracies intervene on, defense pacts do not exert statistically significant effects for democracies (1997, 538–39). Werner and Lemke consider only those states that actually intervene in ongoing wars and overlook all states that potentially could have joined but decide not to intervene. Hence, their study cannot establish whether democracies are generally more or less likely to support allies or other democracies in conflict. In another study, Reiter and Stam conclude that “democracies are not more likely to intervene to save targeted democracies”, even if the two democracies are allied (2002, 91, 106–13). Smith (1996) tests the proposition that democracies are more likely to honor alliances by intervening on the side of allies in ongoing wars. His empirical findings, however, contradict the hypothesized relationship, suggesting instead that democracies are less likely to honor commitments. A dummy variable for democracy generally has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that democracies are less likely to assist their allies (see Tables 3 and 6, and Appendix Table 3a). Leeds (2003) finds that democratic allies are more likely to intervene in the ATOP data for the period 1816–1944. However, Leeds and Gigliotti-Labay (2003, 17)—using ATOP data for the longer period 1816–1991—find that only 34% of the leaders of democratic systems who find an alliance invoked by war fulfill their commitment, in comparison to 57% of leaders in nondemocratic systems. Hence, the findings in existing empirical studies—if not necessarily the conventional wisdom—are consistent with the argument we advance in this article. Both the ATOP and the COW alliance data indicate that democratic states are less likely to fulfill their alliance commitments in wars than autocratic states over the period 1816–1991. Unlike the earlier studies, however, we offer an explanation for why democracies face problems in carrying out commitments.

Looking at crisis behavior has some advantages over measures of duration, as intervention more clearly constitutes situations where alliance commitments or pledges of support come into play. However, as some researchers point out, looking at alliance behavior in disputes may be vulnerable to selection problems relating to the ability of alliances to deter aggression. Smith (1995; 1996) argues that potential aggressors possess rational expectations about the reliability of a state’s alliance partners. Reliable allies discourage aggression while unreliable partners do not, hence the sample of disputes involving alliances overrepresents alliance failures. For selection to influence our inferences about the behavior of the reliability of democracies in alliances, the share of “unreliable partners” among targeted alliances must differ systematically by regime type. We address the issue of selection bias in greater detail in our analysis, but find no evidence that selection bias can account for our results.

**Theory: Regime Type and Alliance Unreliability**

We have noted that existing work on regime type and alliance performance is based on evidence of duration that we find unpersuasive for demonstrating reliability or presents results suggesting that democracies may not be more reliable partners. In this section, we offer two versions of a theory of democratic unreliability. We start by discussing some deficiencies in the treatment of alliances in earlier research.

**Alliances, Principal-Agency, and Democracy**

A major shortcoming in existing studies of regime type and alliance behavior is the incomplete treatment of state motives. If democracies have more or more durable formal alliances, then it is likely that they use alliances in different ways than other regimes.

States often make promises that later they prefer not to keep. Commitment problems arise when incentives ex ante to make promises about ex post behavior clash with the incentives ex post to act on promises made
ex ante. A simple promise of security assistance may succeed in deterring foreign aggressors or mollifying friendly states. Yet, the incentives to avoid the costs of using force can make potential challengers and partners suspicious of such promises. The pooling of genuine and insincere promises in informal security agreements (alignments) can undermine deterrence and lead to bargaining failures.

Military alliances act as commitment devices, enhancing the credibility of promises to intervene by more closely tying a state’s reputation for reliability to its actions. The value of a reputation potentially forces states to abide by commitments that might otherwise not be carried out. States that abandon commitments find it more difficult to conduct credible diplomacy through words and may need to resort more often to military deeds. This gives states an incentive to honor commitments, particularly when agreements are formally documented.

Existing studies have tended to treat alliances as contracts between friends or expressions of similar interests. There is a risk of conflating alignments, or informal commitments, with formal alliance commitments. If states are unequivocal about their commitment to one another and can cooperate informally, then there is less need for formal promises to commit. Warring states eventually sign peace treaties precisely because enemies find value in detailing what friends take for granted. Alignments require formalization because parties have partly differing interests and need to clarify their basis for cooperation (Morrow 1991, 2000). Forming alliances imposes costs on members, such as autonomy loss, costs of integration, and higher vulnerability if abandoned to fight alone. Demonstrating a willingness to bear such costs can make commitments more credible.

Many claims about democracy and cooperation actually pertain to alignment rather than formal alliances. If democracies or similar regimes are better able to cooperate, then they may more often align. Yet, if democracies are better able to cooperate through alignments, they should have less need for formal alliances. Similar interests predict alignment, but whether alignments result in alliances depends on whether states need to bolster their commitments. We argue that attributes of democratic institutions make democracies more reliant on formal commitments than other regime types. The fact that democracies rely on formal alliances, then, should not be seen as an indicator of strength, but rather as a sign of the prevalence of problems with informal democratic commitments.

The agency inherent in democracy exacerbates the problem of commitment, since the actor promising action is likely to differ from the actor who must act. In democracies, elections serve as the primary instrument of control, threatening executives with replacement should they stray from the popular will (Smith and Hayes 1999). Periodic replacement of leaders enhances representation, but also separates the actors making commitments from those who ultimately determine whether to honor commitments. Principal-agency is an efficient political mechanism. It allows agents to specialize in government and leaves the principal free to engage in other tasks. However, this also means that agent preferences are imperfectly constrained by the principal, and the large selectorates in a democracy imply a collective action problem. Members of the selectorate can only evaluate leader performance once they are informed about the relationship between policies and likely outcomes. Monitoring costs thus serve as an effective curb on the level of political participation. Media and policy entrepreneurs can lower the cost of information, but the marginal product of being informed is extremely small under large constituencies.

Formal commitment devices enhance the credibility of commitments by linking promises more closely to actions. The more attenuated nature of democratic commitments implies a weaker link between reputation and action. Agency between leaders and their constituents, large selectorate size, and shifting coalitions can lead to an inherent dynamism in policy formation that in turn makes it more difficult for democracies to credibly commit. Since democracies must be responsive to be democratic, democracies fluctuate more in their policies than politically stable autocracies.

Democratic institutions exist in large part to address the tension generated by the difference in interests between principals and agents. If democracies rely on institutions in domestic decision making to address

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8 Fearon (1997) differentiates between "tying hands" (commitment) and "sunk costs" (signaling). We see these as linked since sunk cost alliances attach state reputation to ex post behavior.

9 A reviewer notes that our argument is akin to suggesting that people who really love each other do not need to marry. Economists such as Becker (1981) make precisely this point. Marriage indeed formalizes an underlying (informal) relationship. Lovers may profess undying (and uncommitted) affinity, but individuals in a competitive mating market often face incentives to renegotiate at some later date. Marriage makes it more costly and difficult to part, but if there is love and loyalty to the point that two parties have indistinguishable preferences, then marriage can do little to improve outcomes. Indeed, men and women who are romantically involved often hesitate to suggest formal obligations precisely to avoid giving the impression that one harbors doubts about the relationship or the other’s commitment. A stable marriage may display additional advantages (e.g., joint ownership, joint cooking for two is more efficient, etc.), but these can be achieved without a formal contract.

10 Leeds (1999) shows that similar regime types cooperate more than heterogeneous dyads.
collective action problems, then formal international agreements should be interpreted as serving a similar set of purposes. Formal agreements are developed when norms are unlikely to suffice. Similarly, alliances are evidence of commitment problems, rather than a sign of reliability.

**Democratic Cycling and Alliance Unreliability**

Where modern researchers focus on cycling—the tendency for winning coalitions to shift interminably—as a source of policy instability, Madison (1961 [1787]) in *Federalist* No. 10 saw a virtuous means of blunting the tyranny of majorities. Cycling means that commitments are subject to future challenge in a democracy. Institutions can minimize the effect of cycling by making policies “sticky,” and limit the ability of succeeding coalitions to replace existing policies. Gaubatz (1996) and others identify this status quo bias as a feature of democratic institutions that enhance commitments. Yet, to be representative, institutions must allow popular preferences to guide the selection of leaders and policies. Representative democracy balances majority rule with protection of minority interests. Elections poll the public will, but only at relatively arbitrary points in time. Stability is achieved by making government less responsive to the popular will. Democratic institutions thus embody a tension between populism and continuity, in which neither objective can be fully realized (see, e.g., Shepsle and Weingast 1981).

Institutions limit change so that even policies not strictly preferred by a majority of citizens are often maintained. But although existing policies are maintained as long as no significant momentum arises to revise policy, the prospects of substantial cost (war, military mobilization) can clearly challenge status quo policies. Time and cycling yield coalitions weakly opposed to a given commitment, but unwilling to invest in the effort to annul the status quo. In a crisis, however, weak preferences turn into strong preferences. Wars are costly, so citizens have incentives to reconsider commitments, even if intervention is “the law.” Further, winning coalitions can rarely be projected much into the future, since even a small number of issues yields a large number of possible winning coalitions. Whether liberal institutions are sufficiently robust to compensate for the effects of policy cycling in democracies is then open to question.

International commitments impose reputation costs on states that abandon allies. The agency problem in democracies, however, can make it particularly difficult to rely on reputation as an enforcement mechanism. Reputations are associated with states, not the coalitions that temporarily hold power. If an incumbent administration chooses to renege on an alliance commitment, society as a whole may suffer from damage to the state’s reputation, while private benefits of abandonment (not having to fight, continuing trade, etc.) can accrue to the incumbent administration and its supporters.

Alliances are designed to overcome commitment problems by making it costly for states to abandon security partners. Intervention, however, is invariably subject to a state’s decision to honor its commitments. Authoritative leaders face few limitations on the use of force and thus have slightly less need to ally because they are less likely to make commitments that they do not expect to fulfill. High-value democratic coalitions have additional incentives to ally to encourage subsequent administrations to intervene. Democratic alliances can thus be interpreted as attempts to induce greater policy stability across time and space.

We expect that the foreign policies of democracies display inherent instabilities that are particularly likely to show up in the change from decisions on alliance formation to decisions on intervention. For an ally, cycling necessarily makes democracies less predictable (and thus less reliable) as a partner. When most needed, democracies may simply fail to show up.\(^{11}\)

**Democratic Interest Groups and Alliance Unreliability**

Even without cycling, political participants must be informed about foreign policies and outcomes and be willing to actively exert influence. Principal-agent analogies such as the two-level games metaphor rely on constituents to monitor and act (e.g., Putnam 1988). Although citizens can display strong attitudes on some foreign policy issues, most of what we know about public opinion suggests that citizens are often poorly informed and display little interest in foreign policy compared with domestic issues (e.g., Aldrich et al. 1989; Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Almond 1960). Information about foreign policy clearly fluctuates with issue salience and motivation. Complex foreign policy issues such as the details of treaties are bound to be less carefully followed than the decision to go to war.

Information and transactions costs impose a high threshold on political participation. The marginal value

\(^{11}\) Democracies could offer other advantages that balance unreliability, for example by offering more power and resources if they do intervene (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Choi 2003; Lake 1992). Reiter and Stam (2002) find that democracies do not win wars because of greater resources, although this does not directly address aid to allies.
of voting decreases with selectorate size, while the costs of attempting to influence policy are often flat or increase. Even very modest transactions costs can be prohibitive in large selectorates. Indeed, rational voting theory concludes that it is often irrational for ordinary voters to cast a ballot (Austen-Smith 1993). When the salience of issues is low, high-value constituents can disproportionately influence decision making. Leaders who allocate public policy to maximize the probability of reelection can help themselves more by catering to interest groups that supply campaign resources (Denzau and Munger 1986). Organized groups have an informational advantage that limits the ability of the median voter to effectively monitor leader performance (see Lohmann 1998). Journalistic accounts often emphasize the role of special interest groups in policy formation. Wheatcroft, for example, argues that NATO expansion “was inspired . . . by [Clinton] ingratiating himself with ethnic lobbies. Historians will date NATO expansion to Clinton’s grovelling to a Polish-American audience in Chicago” (2000, 15). In a more academic vein, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) outline how interest groups shape economic sanctions.

Issue salience determines the degree to which foreign policy in democracies can depart from public opinion and be influenced by interest groups. If the preferences of high-value constituents diverge from that of the majority, then the policies a state adopts will depend on the relative political weight of special interests and the salience of issues. High-value constituents will tend to have a greater role in policy making when issues are abstruse, or when salience among the larger population is low. Policies will then fluctuate as consequences become more immediate or obvious.

Explanations for the democratic peace emphasize how liberal institutions constrain dispute involvement. Leaders intent on war must rally public support by justifying the recourse to violence. Yet, Gaubatz (1996) and others suggest that democracies are unresponsive to popular preferences when it comes to honoring alliance agreements. It seems peculiar to argue that the use of force in democracies is contingent upon public approval, but that domestic politics cannot influence the decision to intervene. Even if status quo policies are easier to maintain in democracies, mobilization for war is hardly politics as usual. The institutional features that make it easy to continue existing policies make it difficult for democracies to act decisively in a crisis. As Reiter and Stam put it, “autocrats tend to believe that democracies’ requisite needs to generate public consent handcuff their leaders, preventing them from taking swift military action to defend their national interests” (2002, 101).

Key assumptions about public opinion and domestic politics in the existing literature on regime type and alliance reliability seem questionable. Citizens are assumed to actively participate in an alliance decision and then deem the outcome binding on subsequent behavior. Opposition parties must refrain from seeking political advantage by challenging intervention decisions. Voters must be informed and actively involved in the minutia of fashioning an alliance treaty, but then resign themselves to alliance obligations at the moment of war. Public opinion data suggests instead that war decisions are far more salient than alliance decisions. A September 1997 poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, for example, reported that only 20% of U.S. respondents followed debates on NATO expansion and only 10% could identify a single prospective member. Although respondents were largely supportive of maintaining NATO after the Cold War, only a narrow plurality wanted expansion, and supportive respondents tended to cite broadly inclusive reasons such as “the larger the better.” In a crisis, such vague conceptions seem destined to be recast in terms of the perfidy and back room wrangling of malevolent politicians. A realistic view of democracy must involve a recognition of the autonomy of citizens. Chanting “hell no, we won’t go” is at least as consistent with democracy as honoring foreign contracts. In some cases, breaking commitments may enjoy widespread popular support, and emerging leaders sometimes campaign on promises to overturn decisions of their predecessors.

In sum, if the decision to ally is less salient to the public than war involvement, domestic support for an alliance and for mobilization may differ dramatically. Alliance decisions that involve complex assessments of contingent events are more likely to reflect special interests, while domestic audiences will remain pivotal in the choice to intervene. By contrast, autocratic commitment follows from the more-or-less consistent preferences of political elites.

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12Democracies often mobilize slowly: The U.S. Congress resisted military action against Iraq over the invasion of Kuwait even after Bush secured UN and popular support. Similarly, in December 1998, U.K. Prime Minister Blair argued that the air campaign to punish Iraq for obstructing UNSCOM had been delayed given the need to first “properly educate the public.”

13Opposition to the U.S. defense pact with Vietnam was initially modest, but grew steadily as the cost of honoring the agreement became clear (e.g., Gartner and Segura 1998).

14“What you’re going to see under a Bush-Cheney administration is the narrowing of commitments . . . .” (Rep. John Kasich on NBC News’ Meet the Press, 27 August 2000). Once in office, Bush moved quickly to reverse many of the previous administration’s policies.
**Modeling Regime Effects on Alliance Reliability**

In this section, we provide three versions of a formal model of alliance reliability. We first present a baseline (autocratic) model and then derive results for the cycling and interests group arguments. All models involve simplifications and generalizations. One can assume that democracies pay a higher price for abandoning allies and find that democracies less often abandon allies. Conversely, one can assume that democracies experience higher war costs or that democracies discount reputation and show smaller reliability. Alliances may involve initial costs or that democracies experience higher war costs or that democracies discount reputation and show smaller reliability. Given players’ ideal points, no equilibrium exists where A seeks to ally and B does not. For this reason, and to simplify exposition, we therefore treat B as nonstrategic.

Assume states compete over outcomes on a unit domain \(x\), where \([0 \leq x \leq 1]\) representing issues, territory, etc. Players’ ideal points are as follows: A: \(x_A \sim U[0,1/3]\); B: \(x_B = 0\), C: \(x_C \sim U[2/3,1]\). The status quo ante, \(x_{SQ}\), can be anywhere in the domain, but with no loss of generality, we assume \(x_{SQ} = 0\). Figure 1 details the game (payoffs are listed at terminal nodes). First, Nature (N) randomly assigns A and C ideal points. We initially assume that ideal points are public information, but we later relax this assumption. Second, A decides to ally with B (I) or not (\(~I)\). Third, C decides to fight (f) or not (\(~f)\). Finally, A intervenes (t) or not (\(~t)\). C wins with probability \(p_{ABC}\) if A intervenes and with probability \(p_{BC}\) if A does not intervene (where, \(0 \leq p_{ABC} \leq p_{BC} \leq 1\)). If A intervenes, B obtains its ideal point (0) with probability (1 - \(p_{ABC}\)). If A does not intervene, B wins with probability (1 - \(p_{BC}\)).

Alliances may involve initial costs \(k\) (where \(k \geq 0\), as does fighting \(w_i\) (where \(w_i > 0\), and where \(i \in \{A, B, C\}\)). Finally, A pays \(r\) (where \(r > 0\), equal to A’s reputation loss for failing to intervene. Players’ utility functions are:

\[
U_A = \{-(x - x_A) - tw_A - l[k + (1 - t)r]\} \tag{1}
\]
\[ U_B = [(-x) - lk - f w_B] \]  \hspace{1cm} (2)

\[ U_C = [(x - x_C) - f w_C] \]  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Payoffs are obtained by substituting one (1) for each affirmative decision in the decision variables and zero (0) for negative decisions. For example, if player A allies (I) but does not intervene (\( \sim t \)) while player C does not fight, (\( \sim f \)), then \( I = 1, f = 0 \) or \( U_A = [(-x - x_A) - k], U_B = [(-x) - k], U_C = [(x - x_C)] \). The formal statement of players’ optimal strategies and the subgame perfect Nash equilibria appear in the appendix.

**The (Democratic) Cycling Model**

We can modify the baseline model to represent the periodic election of leaders. Governments differ in their interests. To model this variation, assume that A is replaced by \( \tilde{A} \), a second random draw by Nature (\( N \)). As in the baseline, Nature first identifies ideal points for A and C. A next decides whether to ally with B. Nature then randomly reassigns A’s ideal point as \( \tilde{A} \). In stage four, C chooses whether to attack B. Finally, if A allied with B, \( \tilde{A} \) decides whether to honor the commitment. A’s alliance choice occurs before Nature’s revelation of \( \tilde{A} \). If allied, \( \tilde{A} \) intervenes with probability \( \left( \frac{r - w_A - x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \right) \), the portion of types \( \tilde{A} \) that will intervene (where \( x_A < \frac{r - w_A - x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \) and \( x_A \leq \frac{1}{2} \) is the typespace). The probability that \( \tilde{A} \) intervenes with no alliance is \( \frac{3 [x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A]}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \).

A’s alliance decision (imposing an alliance on \( \tilde{A} \)) also depends on the actions of C. If \( x_C \leq \frac{w_{BC}}{p_{BC}} \), C never fights and there is no point in allying. If \( x_C > \frac{w_{BC}}{p_{BC}} \), C fights regardless of A’s alliance choice. Yet, A can still prefer to ally if this forces \( \tilde{A} \) to intervene when it would not otherwise. A allies if \( x_C > \frac{w_{BC}}{p_{ABC}} \) and if the inequality in Equations 4–6 hold:

\[
Pr(\tilde{A} : t | I) (U_A^{l/t}) + Pr(\tilde{A} : \sim t | I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) \]

\[
> Pr(\tilde{A} : t | \sim I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) + Pr(\tilde{A} : \sim t | \sim I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) \]

(4)

Which equates to:

\[ \left\{ \frac{3 [r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})]}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \right\} \]

\[ \times \left\{ p_{ABC} (2x_A - x_C) - x_A - k - w_A \right\} \]

\[ + \left\{ \frac{1}{3} - \frac{3 [r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})]}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \right\} \]

(5)

Simplifying terms and solving for \( x_A \) produces:

\[ x_A < x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9 r} + \frac{p_{ABC} [2k + r (2 - 29 x_C)]}{18 r (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]

(6)

If \( \frac{w_{BC}}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_{BC}}{p_{BC}} \), then C only fights if \( \tilde{A} \) will not intervene. A allies if (7) and (8) hold:

\[
Pr(\tilde{A} : t | I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) + Pr(\tilde{A} : \sim t | I) (U_A^{\sim l/\sim t}) \]

\[ > Pr(\tilde{A} : t | \sim I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) + Pr(\tilde{A} : \sim t | \sim I) (U_A^{l/\sim t}) \]

(7)

Substituting, simplifying terms and solving for \( x_A \) yields:

\[ x_A < x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9 r} + \frac{p_{ABC} [2k + r (2 - 29 x_C)]}{18 r (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]

(8)

The inequalities are similar to the alliance decision in the baseline model but without a lower bound. All players A for which Equations 6 or 8 hold (subject to C’s war costs) ally. If alliance costs are small relative to the incentive \( \tilde{A} \) has to intervene, the region over which A allies is large, but this region is always (weakly) larger than in the baseline model. Players’ strategies and subgame perfect Nash equilibria are listed in the appendix.

To summarize, additional equilibria appear at nodes 1 and 2. Because A and \( \tilde{A} \) often differ in their preferences and because A decides whether to ally without knowing \( \tilde{A} \), A more often has incentives to make commitments, but these commitments in turn are ones that \( \tilde{A} \) will often fail to keep. Periodic replacement of leaders can make alliances less reliable. Future leaders may be less enthusiastic about protecting protégés, creating added incentives for incumbent administrations to form alliances to institutionalize foreign policy to increase the chance of intervention even as this increases the risk of abandonment.

**The (Democratic) Interest Group Model**

Assume S members of A’s selectorate (s \( \subseteq N \), \( S \sim U \{0, 1/3\} \)). Let \( s_i \) denote a member of the selectorate, where \( i \in [1, \ldots, S] \), and where \( x_{Ai} \) is \( s_i \)’s ideal point. Define \( V_j \subseteq S \{ (V + 1)/2 \} \subseteq N \), as a subset of the selectorate willing to pay \( (\varepsilon) \) for nonstochastic policy influence (where \( j \in [a, t] \)). Assume \( s_i \) are placed at intervals \( d = \frac{1}{3 (S - 1)} \), with \( x_{A0} = 0 \) and \( x_{AS} = 1/3 \), so that \( x_{Ai} = (\frac{V - 1}{2}) \). The median voter, \( \hat{v}_j = \frac{V + 1}{2} \), determines policy.
Modeling the interest group argument necessitates that alliance policy occur while members of $A$ are uncertain about factors influencing first the alliance decision and then the intervention decision. The cost of NATO expansion was a key focus of the ratification debate in the United States, and pundits offered widely divergent figures in attempts to influence decision making. Assume alliance costs ($k$) are uncertain $k \sim U[0, k_{\text{max}}]$, where $k_{\text{max}}$ is some arbitrary value. Assume as well that $C$’s ideal point is initially private information, but that $A$ knows $x_C$ before the intervention decision.

There are a number of strategic factors in collective decision making. For example, if attempting to influence policy involves costs, then actors that fail to obtain preferred outcomes would generally rather not participate (regret violates conditions of a Nash equilibrium). Of course, losing factions do participate. We assume sincere (simultaneous) decision making. Voters decide whether to seek to influence outcomes while ignorant of others’ preferences. Voters determine whether to vote by weighting outcomes by the probability that their vote is pivotal, subtracting participation costs.

$$\frac{1}{V_r} \left( E(U_A^i) - E(U_A^j) \right) + \frac{V_r - 1}{V_r}(0) > e$$

(9)

With no loss of generality, we assume that the decision to intervene imposes no participation cost ($e = 0$). $\hat{v}_t = \hat{S} \Rightarrow x_{Ai} = \frac{1}{6}$ is $A$’s intervention preference (labeled $\hat{A}$).

The fight and intervention decisions are similar to those in the previous games. The alliance decision is considerably different, however. Members of $A$ must estimate $C$’s decision and $\hat{A}$’s intervention response. The probability that $C$ fights is equal to the portion of $C$’s typespace that exceeds critical values of $C$’s objective functions with [i.e., $1 - \frac{C}{\bar{C}}(p_{ABC}^{-3})/(1 - \frac{1}{3}) = (3 - \frac{3W_{ABC}}{3W_{ABC}})]$ or without [i.e., $(3 - \frac{3W_{ABC}}{3W_{ABC}})]\hat{A}$’s intervening. Members of $A(s_t)$ estimate the probability of intervention using $A$’s objective functions, which are $x_{\hat{A}} < \frac{1 - W_A + xC(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - w_{ABC}}{2(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - p_{ABC}}$ with an alliance and $x_{\hat{A}} < \frac{1 - W_A + xC(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - w_{ABC}}{2(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - p_{ABC}}$ without. Since $s_t$ do not know $x_C$, they must estimate the portion of $C$’s typespace over which the appropriate inequality holds.

Large values of $x_C$ make acquiescing to a contest between $B$ and $C$ less appealing. Define $x_{\text{CCRIT}}(t) \equiv x_C$ s.t., $x_{\hat{A}} = \frac{(1 - x_{\text{CCRIT}}(t))(1 - \frac{1}{3})}{2(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - p_{ABC}}$, where $l = 1$ if the median voter (it) allies, else 0. Given $x_{Ai} = \frac{1}{6}$, $\hat{A}$ intervenes with probability $(1 - x_{\text{CCRIT}}(t))(1 - \frac{1}{3}) = 2 - \frac{2W_A - (1 - x_{\text{CCRIT}}(t))}{(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - p_{ABC}}$. The probability that the status quo obtains (nodes 3 and 4) equals the odds that $C$ will not fight $x_C \leq \frac{w_{ABC}}{p_{ABC}} \Rightarrow \left( \frac{3W_{ABC}}{p_{ABC}} - 2 \right)$ plus the product of the probability that $C$ only fights if $\hat{A}$ does not intervene and the odds that $\hat{A}$ will intervene if $C$ fights $(\frac{3W_{ABC}}{p_{ABC}} - 2W_{ABC})(2 - \frac{3W_{ABC} - W_C}{(p_{ABC}^{-3}) - p_{ABC}})$. Members of $A$ calculate the expected utility of participating in alliance policy as follows:

$$\left[ \left[ \Pr(\hat{A} : t; C : f | I(U^j_A)) \right] + \Pr(\hat{A} : \sim t; C : f | I(U^{j-\hat{A}}_A)) \right]$$

$$+ \left[ \Pr(C : \sim f | I(U^j_A)) \right]$$

$$- \Pr(\hat{A} : t; C : f | \sim I(U^{j-\hat{A}}_A))$$

$$+ \Pr(C : \sim f | \sim I(U^{j-\hat{A}}_A))$$

$$+ \Pr(\hat{A} : t; C : f | I(U^{j-\hat{A}}_A))$$

$$+ \Pr(C : \sim f | I(U^{j-\hat{A}}_A))$$

$$\left/ \left[ \begin{array}{c} 3(S - 1) \left[ x_{A\text{LOW}} + \left( \frac{1}{3} - x_{A\text{HIGH}} \right) \right] \end{array} \right] \right\}$$

(10)

$V_l$ is replaced by $\{3(S - 1)[x_{A\text{LOW}} + (\frac{1}{3} - x_{A\text{HIGH}})]\}$. Define $x_{A\text{LOW}} \equiv x_A$ s.t. $E(U_{x_A}^1) - V_l e = E(U_{x_A}^1)$ and $x_{A\text{HIGH}} \equiv x_A$ s.t. $E(U_{x_A}^1) + V_l e = E(U_{x_A}^1)$. Participation costs ($e$) and the number of voters influencing policy form a band of size $2V_l e$, whose center we define as $x_{A\text{ANNIV}} \equiv x_A$ s.t. $E(U_{x_A}^1) - V_l e = E(U_{x_A}^1)$. Members $s_t$, $x_{A\text{LOW}}$ and $x_{A\text{HIGH}}$ find it too costly to influence policy. Those between $x_{A1}$ and $x_{A\text{LOW}}$ and between $x_{A\text{HIGH}}$ and $x_{AS}$ absorb the costs involved in affecting alliance policy. $V_l$ thus equals the portion of the selectorate in these two regions. The structure of the game also implies that if $x_{A\text{ANNIV}} > \frac{1}{6}$, $x_{A1} = \frac{1 - V_l e}{3(S - 1)}$ $= \frac{V_l e}{6(S - 1)}$. Conversely, if $x_{A\text{ANNIV}} \leq \frac{1}{6}$, it follows that $x_{A1} = \frac{1}{3} - \frac{V_l e}{6(S - 1)}$. We then derive solutions for $x_{A\text{LOW}}$ and $x_{A\text{HIGH}}$ using simultaneous equations.

$$x_{A\text{LOW}} = -e(S - 1) \left[ 2k(p_{ABC} - p_{BC}) \right.$$

$$\times (p_{ABC}C_pBC - 3w_C) + 3p_BCw_C)$$

$$- 3r(p_{ABC}^23p_BC - 2w_C)$$

$$- 3p_Bcw_C(2w_A + w_C)$$

$$+ p_ABC(3w_C(2r + w_C - 2w_A)$$

$$+ 2p_BC(6w_A + w_C - 3r) - 3p_{BC}^2)\right)$$

$$- 3r(2k(p_{ABC} - p_{BC})$$

$$\times (p_{ABC}C_pBC - 3w_C) + 3p_BCw_C)$$

$$- 3r(p_{ABC}^25p_BC - 2w_C)$$

$$- 3p_Bcw_C(2w_A + w_C)$$

$$+ p_ABC(3w_C(2r + w_C - 2w_A)$$

$$+ 2p_BC(6w_A + w_C - 3r) - 3p_{BC}^2)\right)$$

$$/\left(36p_{ABC}p_{BC}r(p_{ABC} - p_{BC})$$

$$\times [3r + e(S - 1)]\right)$$

(11)

$17$Estimates of the cost of NATO expansion vary from $1.5$ to $125$ billions (Ek 1998). Informational asymmetries are another way to model our claims (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990).
\[ x_{\text{High}} = -e(S - 1)[2k(p_{ABC} - p_{BC}) \times (p_{ABC} - 3w_C) + 3p_{BC}w_C] - 3r(p_{ABC}^2(7p_{BC} - 2w_C) - 3p_{BC}w_C(2w_A + w_C) + p_{ABC}(3w_C(2r + w_C - 2w_A)) + 2p_{BC}(6w_A + w_C - 3r) - 7p_{BC}^3)] - 3r[2k(p_{ABC} - p_{BC}) \times (p_{ABC} - 3w_C) + 3p_{BC}w_C] - 3r(p_{ABC}(5p_{BC} - 2w_C) - 3p_{BC}w_C(2w_A + w_C) + p_{ABC}(3w_C(2r + w_C - 2w_A)) + 2p_{BC}(6w_A + w_C - 3r) - 5p_{BC}^3)] \]

\[/\{36p_{ABC}p_{BC}r(p_{ABC} - p_{BC}) \times [3r + e(S - 1)]\] 

(12)

Note that \( \frac{\Delta x_{\text{High}}}{\Delta k} = \frac{-e}{2[(3r + e(S - 1)]^2} < 0 \) and that \( \frac{\Delta x_{\text{High}}}{\Delta e} = \frac{\Delta x_{\text{High}}}{\Delta r} \) are large. A nonzero cost for participation tends to drive out “moderates” as the selectorate gets large. Panel (a) in Figure 2 offers an illustration of the effect of \( S \) on \( x_{\text{Low}} \) and \( x_{\text{High}} \) (\( p_{ABC} = 0.25, p_{BC} = 0.5, w_A = w_C = 0.1, r = 0.1, k = 0.1, e = 0.1 \times 10^3 \)). Recall that voters vote above and below the critical values of \( x_A \). Even with minute costs, large selectorates tend to result in policymaking at the extremes.

Partisanship alone does not explain why selectorate size can influence alliance behavior. Recall that members of \( A \) are uncertain about \( k \). \( s_i \) use \( E[k] = \hat{k} \) to decide whether to participate in alliance policy. The median voter (\( \hat{v}_i \)) confronts the actual \( k \) in determining whether to ally. This allows a continuum of interest. As the median voter departs from the selectorate median, \( A \) is more likely to accept an expensive alliance.

Panel (b) in Figure 2 describes the effect of selectorate size on the value of \( k \) needed to make the median voter just indifferent between alliance alternatives. The graph assumes that \( x_{\text{Low}} > \frac{1}{3} \), that the median selectorate member at least weakly favors allying at the mean alliance cost (here, \( \hat{k} = 0.1 \)). The area under the curve represents the portion of values of \( k \) for which the median voter is willing to ally. The probability of alliance increases with selectorate size.

How does willingness to ally affect alliance reliability? Recall that \( A \)’s alliance choice is based on estimates of probabilistic outcomes. The value of allying for \( \hat{v}_i \) depends on comparing preferred outcomes to commitment costs. Large selectorates exhibit greater partisanship, and thus more willingness to gamble on less reliable alliances. Panel (c) in Figure 2 plots the probability of abandon-

\(^{18}\)Since the key interest is the ability to make commitments that are costly to carry out, we believe that tests of alliance reliability should focus on whether states fulfill defense commitments rather than less costly formal obligations such as undertaking consultations.
Figure 2  Illustrations of the Interest Group Model

(a) Effect of selectorate size on partisanship of alliance policy

(b) Effect of partisanship on probability of alliance formation

(c) Effect of selectorate size on partisanship of alliance failure
cases where the originators of a war were involved in defense pacts at the onset of the dispute. We then create dyads paring the allied country B involved in war with its ally (A). These data give rise to 480 A-B defense pact dyads between 1816 and 1992.19

The COW alliance data have often been criticized for failing to identify the specific details of commitments, and it could be argued that many defense pacts in the COW data do not entail an actual obligation to intervene in defense of an ally. The ATOP data offer an advancement on the COW alliance data by the more specific coding of commitments. Unfortunately, the ATOP data currently in the public domain cover only the period 1816–1944. Given the limited number of democracies prior to World War II, this period seems poorly suited for testing differences between democracies and autocracies in alliances.20 Although we have been unable to obtain a copy of the ATOP data for the period 1816–1991, Brett Ashley Leeds of the ATOP project has generously reestimated our model on these data for us.

States may be more reluctant to honor a commitment if intervention means fighting against allies on the opposing side. We use a dichotomous indicator scored 1 if a state A has an alliance with some state C on the opposing side of a dispute.21

We operationalize regime type using the Polity 98d data.22 We code states as democracies if they score at least 6 on the Polity institutionalized democracy scale ranging from −10 to 10 (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). Regime type may change from the outbreak of a dispute to the time when a state actually intervenes. To facilitate comparisons with alliance parties A that do not become involved in disputes, we consider the regime type characteristics at the outbreak of the dispute.

Many factors other than regime type conceivably affect intervention. Some of these factors, such as wealth or capability, also correlate with democracy. We include several control variables to ensure that results do not stem from democracy serving as a proxy. Proximity to an alliance partner may influence a state’s willingness or ability to supply assistance. We include an indicator of whether state A and B in an alliance are contiguous by land or river borders, as indicated by the COW contiguity data, to control for the effects of proximity.23 As wealth or capability may influence intervention, we control for the overall capabilities of states A and B as measured by the Composite Indicator of Capabilities (CINC) scores from the COW National Material Capabilities data.

Although we expect to find systematic differences in behavior by regime type, we do not anticipate that these effects will be large. If a state’s primary concern in seeking to ally remains security, then it will generally avoid partners that do not favorably alter the state’s security situation. The fact that we identify the hypothesized relationship in spite of rational expectations (democratic unreliability should discourage alliance formation with the most unreliable democratic states, attenuating the observed effects) give us additional confidence in the validity of our results.

Quantitative Analysis and Results

In the COW data, autocracies honor alliance commitments by intervening on the side of allies in about 16.3% of all cases where allies are at war, while democracies intervene only in about 6% of the cases.24 This supports our claim that democracies are less reliable, but other factors may also affect intervention. Table 1 displays a multivariate logistic regression of the probability of a state A honoring an alliance with a partner B facing war as a function of regime type A and other characteristics. As can be seen from Table 1, the negative coefficient estimate for whether state A is a democracy indicates that democracies are less likely to intervene to assist allies than are other states. The coefficient estimate is significant at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. The odds of nondemocratic intervention are almost twice as high as for democratic allies A.

The other variables display effects on the likelihood that states will assist allies that are largely consistent with our expectations. Intervention is more likely when states A and B are contiguous. Capable states A are more likely to intervene to defend allies. The coefficient estimate for state B’s capabilities is negative, suggesting that a strong

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19 In cases where states A switch sides during a war, we use only the first intervention to assess reliability. There are no cases where originators B switch sides during a war.

20 Many studies of regime type and alliance behavior report differences before and after World War II (see Farber and Gowa 1995; Lai and Reiter 2000).

21 Leeds did not include this variable in the ATOP replication as she lacks precise dates for the duration of some of the alliances not involving defense commitments tested in wars.

22 Using the Polity 98d data, which provide the actual dates of regime change within years, helps ensure that we do not code regime type based on changes following dispute onset.

23 We have also examined the distance between capital cities as a measure of proximity, and the results are substantively equivalent irrespective of the measure used.

24 Sabrosky (1980, 176–78) measures the reliability for the alliance as a whole, based on whether at least one ally intervenes, with no allies intervening on the other side. Sabrosky’s measure yields a higher intervention rate than our dyadic measure. Interestingly, the proportion of democratic allies is lower in Sabrosky’s “reliable” alliances than in the “unreliable” alliances.
Alliance partner is less likely to receive assistance, but the result is not statistically significant. Finally, the coefficient estimate for whether a defender has an alliance with a state on the opposing side (state C) has the correct sign, but is not statistically significant. This provides only weak evidence that states with conflicting alliance commitments are less likely to intervene. In sum, although other factors influence the likelihood of intervention, these factors do not account for the observed differences between democracies and nondemocracies.

Other studies of regime type and alliance have focused on jointly democratic alliance partners. It may be argued that a democracy’s willingness to intervene depends on the regime type of its protégé. Adding a variable for whether state B is a democracy yields an insignificant negative coefficient estimate, suggesting that democracies are no more likely to receive assistance from allies. The coefficient estimate for state A’s regime type remains negative and statistically significant. Replacing the democracy terms for the individual states by a single indicator of whether both allies (A and B) are democracies also yields a negative coefficient estimate. This estimate is just below the usual thresholds for statistical significance. These results yield no support for the hypothesis that democratic allies are more likely to assist democratic partners, but strengthen our claim that democracies are generally less reliable.

Table 2 reports the results for our model estimated on the ATOP data, allowing us to see whether our previous findings stem from measurement error in the COW alliance data that in some way is systematically associated with regime type. Note that the dependent variable in Table 2 is scored as 1 for violation, or not honoring an alliance, following Leeds (2003). In these results, contiguous partners are no longer significantly less likely to violate commitments, and stronger states B are no longer less likely to receive support. This suggests that the COW data may include some defense pacts between large and small states where commitment is asymmetric, and the smaller state may not be obliged to defend the larger state. However, the positive coefficient estimate for whether state A is a democracy indicates that democracies are about 2.5 times more likely to violate alliance obligations than autocracies. These results reinforce our conclusion that democracies are less likely to intervene in defense of allies, even using a more restrictive identification of alliance commitments.25

25Leeds and Gigliotti-Labay (2003) similarly report a logit coefficient for democracy on the likelihood of alliance violation of 0.516 in their multivariate analysis, but argue that there are no differences between democracies and autocracies since the estimate is not statistically significant. Whether individual variables reach significance will depend on model specification. Leeds (2003) and her coauthors control for changes between the time of entering an alliance and the time at which a state must decide whether to keep an alliance commitment. Their results suggest that observable changes significantly increase the probability of an alliance violation (notably, democracies are particularly likely to violate treaties signed before transitions to democracy). Leeds suggests that even when a “new leadership does not officially abrogate past treaties, when it comes time to fulfill a particular international commitment, . . . a new leadership may have a different decision calculus than a predecessor” (2003, 816). Whereas Leeds assumes that democracies operate under stability, we see change as an essential feature of democracy: governments that are responsive to evolving public opinion and external conditions face additional challenges in making foreign policy commitments.
In many cases it may be difficult to separate the obligations of an alliance treaty from the implicit expectations of members. Alliance commitments may not be interpreted equally by all participants in a crisis, especially since contingencies will often pose different incentives, and expose the different interests, of alliance members. Expectations of what alliances are meant to achieve in terms of deterrence or coercive diplomacy may go beyond the details specified in treaties. The controversy between NATO members in February 2003 over assistance to Turkey illustrates the tension generated by different interpretations of alliance obligations and plausible threats. Conversely, Leeds and Gligiotti-Labay (2003, 14–15) hold that states sometimes may be satisfied when parties in defense pacts provide assistance short of intervening, even if they do not carry out the exact commitment stipulated by the alliance. Future research may examine more closely the implications of subjective evaluation of alliance obligations by members and other interested states.

Selection effects are a potential confounding factor in using wartime behavior to measure alliance reliability. One of the principal aims of an alliance is to deter war. Actually reaching war implies that alliance effectiveness may have been in doubt (Smith 1995). The sample of wartime intervention decisions on behalf of allies may thus overrepresent unsuccessful alliances. Selection bias can pose a problem if factors that influence observed behavior in a situation also affect the likelihood that cases are selected into the situation.

In the absence of a precise theory of how alliances get targeted it is difficult to establish whether selection bias poses a major problem for our analysis or not. If democracies are less reliable allies, then they should more often be challenged, and democratic alliances that are attacked should make up a larger portion of challenged alliances than the ratio of democratic alliances to all alliances. However, we can only observe whether states are involved in war, and our model cannot assess whether alliances make a difference to whether a state is targeted or not. Some institutional theories suggest that alliances may persist even after the disappearance of the threats that initially gave rise to them. Establishing who initiates disputes is also wrought with difficulties in the existing MID data.

Sample selection can be addressed by two-stage equation estimation approaches (Greene 1997). Such models are appropriate when the situation of interest is observed if and only if another factor z exceeds some threshold value. The selection equation stipulates the sample selection process (the likelihood of observing the situation of interest in the main equation). The outcome and the selection equations are estimated jointly, allowing for correlation between the error terms in the two equations.

We are skeptical as to whether one can predict which alliances will be targeted on the basis of structural or observable factors alone (see Signorino 2002). Nonetheless, we can test whether augmenting the Model in Table 1 with a selection equation for war involvement as a function of democracy and attributes of alliances yields different results. We construct a sample of nonwar cases from all the years where neither member of an alliance dyad is involved in a war. We randomly select the assignment of defender state A and protégé state B in nonwar cases. The selection equation stipulates the risk of an alliance dyad being targeted by third parties (i.e., one party becomes involved in war) as a function of whether at least one of the two parties to alliance A and B are democracies, their capabilities, and whether the states are contiguous. Results of the model appear in Table 3.28

The large positive estimated \( \hat{p} \) in Table 3 suggests that there exists significant correlation between the error terms of the two equations. Nonmeasured factors in the model that increase the likelihood that an alliance dyad will be involved in a war also increase the likelihood that states will assist their allies. The coefficient estimate for democracy in the selection or war equation is negative, indicating that alliance dyads involving a democracy are less likely to experience war onsets. However, allowing the error terms in the two equations to be correlated does not change our inferences about the effect of democracy on the likelihood that a state will intervene in support of an ally. The coefficient estimate for democracy in the assistance equation remains negative, indicating that democracies are less likely to come to the aid of defense pact partners in a war.

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26 For example, NATO chose to treat the retaliation against Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda in the wake of 11 September as pertinent to the alliance since the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon involved a member state. However, Afghanistan itself was not accused of having attacked the United States, but targeted for not cooperating in the counterattack against Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. The United States and many European allies differed in their assessment on whether Iraq was a legitimate target in the war on terrorism and a plausible threat against member countries. Decisions to invoke alliances will be shaped by perceptions about what actions or initiatives might achieve consensus. Ferguson (2001) reminds us that “not even the most extreme Unionists were prepared to bomb Boston in retaliation . . .” against Americans who provided “the lion’s share of the money that financed the IRA” (2001, A31).

27 Leeds is at the present not able to replicate our selection model with the ATOP data as she lacks precise dates for the duration of some of the alliances not involving wars in the post 1944 period.

28 Bivariate probit is generally more efficient than Heckman probit (see Reed 2000). Heckman probit estimation yields a similar negative coefficient estimate for democracy (results available on request).
Table 3  Bivariate Probit of Democracy and Other Variables on War and Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Coefficient Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>z-value</th>
<th>p-value†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selection: Alliance challenges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−2.362</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>−84.18</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least one democracy A and B</td>
<td>−0.370</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>−9.10</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contiguous</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC A</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC B</td>
<td>5.668</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>19.32</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome: Intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>−3.141</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>−42.93</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A is a democracy</td>
<td>−0.509</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>−3.37</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC A</td>
<td>2.278</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC B</td>
<td>2.866</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and B</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†p-values for one-tailed tests, expect for the intercept.

We are hesitant to infer too much from the results in Table 2, given the problems with the model and the lack of a strong theory on selection into wars. However, these results lend no support to the idea that selection into war undercuts the findings in Table 1 and thus strengthens our conclusion that democracies face problems in credibly committing.

Conclusion

Regimes differ in their foreign policy behavior, but not necessarily in the ways that many have come to expect. Distributive domestic politics and informational asymmetries enhance the political leverage of high value minority coalitions on many issues, rendering explanations that emphasize constraining domestic audiences suspect in some areas of foreign policy. Pacifying domestic constraints may induce differences in conflict involvement between political systems, but public opinion is unlikely to influence decisions to enter formal alliances as much as whether to honor treaty conditions. Consistent with our argument, leaders in democracies appear to face different incentives when choosing to form alliances and when deciding whether to intervene to assist an ally. We show that democracies are less likely to intervene in wars on behalf of allies than non-democracies. For democracies to make reliable allies, they must overcome the structural weaknesses that have previously been interpreted as strengths. We suggest that democracies do not overcome these weaknesses.

The utility of alliances is that they reinforce partnerships. Democratic alliances are both a sign of democratic unreliability and of the potency of alliances in mitigating democratic weakness.

Appendix

Solutions for the Alliance Reliability Game

The appendix lists optimal strategies and equilibria for each of the three variants of the alliance reliability game discussed in the main text.

Optimal Strategies in the Baseline (Autocratic) Model.

\[ A: \quad l = 1 \text{ if } \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \leq x_A \]

\[ \quad < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]

\[ \text{and } \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \]

\[ \text{and } x_A \leq \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - k}{2 p_{BC}} \]

= 0 if else.

\[ t = 1 \text{ if } \begin{cases} l = 1, & f = 1, \\ 0, & f = 0. \end{cases} \]

\[ \text{and } x_A < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]

or if \( l = 0, f = 1, \)

\[ \text{and } x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]

= 0 if else.

\[ C: \quad f = 1 \text{ if } t = 1, \text{ and } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \]

or if \( t = 0, \) and \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)

= 0 if else.

Equilibria in the Baseline (Autocratic) Model.

[Node 3] if \( \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}}, \)

\[ \text{and } k < p_{BC} (x_C - 2 x_A), \]

\[ \text{and } \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \leq x_A \]

\[ < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{Node 4: if } x_C \leq \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \]
\[ \text{or if } \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}}, \]
\[ \text{and } x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{or if } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}}, \]
\[ \text{and } x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{Node 5: if } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \]
\[ \text{and } x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{Node 6: if } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \]
\[ \text{and } x_A \geq \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{or if } \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}}, \]
\[ \text{and } x_A \geq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \text{or if } \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}}, \]
\[ \text{and } k \geq p_{BC} (x_C - 2x_A), \]
\[ \text{and } x_A \geq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \]
\[ \begin{array}{ll}
\text{Equilibria for the (Democratic) Cycling Model.} \\
\text{Node 1: if } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \\
\text{or if } x_C < \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A \leq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \\
\text{Node 2: if } x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A \geq \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \\
\text{or if } x_C < \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A \leq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \\
\text{Node 3: if } x_C \leq \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{or if } \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A \leq \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \\
\text{or if } x_C \leq \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \\
\text{and } x_A \geq \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \end{array} \]
[Node 5] if \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \)
and \( x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
and \( x_A \geq x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9r} \)
\( + \frac{r - 2w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)

[Node 6] if \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \)
and \( x_A \geq x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9r} \)
\( + \frac{r - 2w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
or if \( \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)
and \( x_A \geq x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9r} \)
\( + \frac{r - 2w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
or if \( \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)
and \( x_A \geq x_C - \frac{(r + k)}{9r} \)
\( + \frac{p_{ABC} [2k + r (2 - 9x_C)]}{18r (p_{BC})} \)

\( x_{A_{Indiff}} \equiv x_A \text{ s.t. } E (U^l_{x_A}) = E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) = 0 \) if else.

\( \hat{A} \): \( t = 1 \) if \( l = 1, f = 1 \),
and \( x_A < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
or if \( l = 0, f = 1 \),
and \( x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
= 0 if else.

\( C \): \( f = 1 \) if \( t = 1 \), and \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \)
or if \( t = 0 \), and \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)
= 0 if else.

Equilibria for the (Democratic) Interest Group Model.

[Node 1] if \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \)
and \( x_A < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)

[Node 2] if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) > E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_A \geq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
and \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)

[Node 3] if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) > E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_A \geq \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
and \( \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} < x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)
or if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) > E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \) and \( x_C \leq \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)

[Node 4] if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) \leq E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_A < \frac{r - w_A + x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
and \( \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \geq x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)
or if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) \leq E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \) and \( x_C \leq \frac{w_C}{p_{BC}} \)

[Node 5] if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) \leq E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_A < \frac{x_C (p_{BC} - p_{ABC}) - w_A}{2 (p_{BC} - p_{ABC})} \)
and \( x_C > \frac{w_C}{p_{ABC}} \)

Optimal Strategies in the (Democratic) Interest Group Model.

\( A \): \( l = 1 \) if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) > E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_{A_{Indiff}} > \frac{1}{6} \)

it follows that \( \hat{V}_1 = \frac{1}{2} (V_l + 1) \)
\( \Rightarrow x_{\hat{V}_1} = \frac{(V_l - 1)}{6 (S - 1)} \)

if \( E (U^l_{x_A}) > E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \)
and \( x_{A_{Indiff}} \leq \frac{1}{6} \)

it follows that \( \hat{V}_1 = \frac{1}{2} (V_l + 1) \)
\( \Rightarrow x_{\hat{V}_1} = \frac{1}{3} - \frac{(V_l - 1)}{6 (S - 1)} \)

where
\( V_l = \left\{ 3 (S - 1) \left[ x_{A_{Low}} + \left( \frac{1}{3} - x_{A_{High}} \right) \right] \right\} \),

\( x_{A_{Low}} \equiv x_A \text{ s.t. } E (U^l_{x_A}) - V_1 e = E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \),

\( x_{A_{High}} \equiv x_A \text{ s.t. } E (U^l_{x_A}) + V_1 e = E (U^{u-}_{x_A}) \),
References


