#### Political Science 12: IR -- Second Lecture, Part 3





#### Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

# Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

- 1. Interests: actors and preferences
- 2. Interactions: cooperation, bargaining, public goods, and collective action
- 3. Institutions

### Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

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#### Who are the actors?

## What do they want? Different actors have different preferences




Table 2.1: Key Categories of Actors and Interests in World Politics

Actor	Commonly ascribed interests	Examples
States	Security, power, wealth, ideology	United States, Canada, China, Switzerland, India, Uruguay
Politicians	Re-election/retention of office, ideology, policy goals	President of the United States, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives
Firms, industries, or business associations	Wealth, profit	General Motors, Sony, the pharmaceutical industry, National Association of Manufacturers, Business Roundtable
Classes or factors of production	Material well-being, wealth	Capital, labor, land, human capital
Bureaucracies	Budget maximization, influence, policy preferences; often summarized by the adage of "where you stand depends on where you sit"	Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
International organizations	As composites of states, they reflect the interests of member states according to their voting power. As organizations, they are assumed to be similar to domestic bureaucracies.	United Nations, International Monetary Fund, International Postal Union, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), often transnational or international in scope and membership	Normative, ideological, or policy goals; human rights, the environment, religion	Red Cross, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Catholic Church

#### Map 2.1: The Middle East



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
#### Interactions

Actors are *purposive*; they develop strategies that they believe are the best response to the anticipated strategies of others.

#### Interactions


*Strategic* interactions: each actor's strategy or plan of action depends on the anticipated strategy of others.

- Two or more actors adopt policies that make them better off than they were before.
- This can create additional value.



gets \$1,000 **A's we** B gets \$0

- Coordination
- Collaboration



#### Interactions: Bargaining


#### Coercion or threat



## Interactions: Bargaining

Depends on BATNA **B: BEST** A: ALTERNATIVE T: TO N: NO A: AGREEMENT

## Interactions: Bargaining



## Putting It Together: Preferences and Interactions

- Ordinal preferences
- Ranking preferences

#### **The Game Matrix**

#### Figure 2A.1: A Game Matrix

A2 С D 4,4 1, 2 С **A1** 2, 1 3, 3 D


#### The Prisoner's Dilemma

#### Figure 2A.2: The Prisoner's Dilemma: A Collaboration Problem

A2			A2		
	С	D		С	D
C <b>A1</b> D	Both prisoners get out and split the loot.	A1 goes to jail; A2 goes free and keeps all the loot.	C <b>A1</b> D	3, 3	1, 4
	A1 goes free and keeps all the loot; A2 goes to jail.	Both go to jail and split the loot later.		4, 1	2, 2*

#### The Prisoner's Dilemma

#### Figure 2.4: U.S. and Soviet Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010



## Cooperation Problems and Public Goods

- Public Goods
- Free Riding
- Collective Action Problems

## Cooperation Problems and Public Goods

#### Figure 2A.3: Chicken

	A2		A2		
	С	D		С	D
C <b>A1</b> D	Both drivers swerve; neither is humiliated or harmed.	A1 is "chicken"; A2 "wins."	C <b>A1</b> D	3, 3	2, 4*
	A1 "wins"; A2 is "chicken."	Both drivers are killed in a serious wreck.		4, 2*	1, 1

## Cooperation Problems and Public Goods

#### Figure 2A.4: The Stag Hunt

	A2		A2		
	C	D		С	D
C <b>A1</b> D	Both hunters split the stag.	A1 goes hungry; A2 eats the rabbit.	C <b>A1</b> D	4, 4*	1, 3
	A1 eats the rabbit; A2 goes hungry.	Both hunters split the rabbit.		3, 1	2, 2*

## Interests, Interactions, and Institutions

 Interests: actors and preferences
Interactions: cooperation, bargaining, public goods, and collective action

3. Institutions

#### Institutions



### Institutions

- Numbers: the more, the more difficult
- Iteration and linkage
- Information

- What role do institutions play?
- How do institutions balance rulebased interaction with power?

# How Institutions Promote Cooperation

- Enforcement or punishment
- Self-enforcing agreements (no incentives to defect)
- Setting standards of behavior: the clearer, the better

# How Institutions Promote Cooperation

- Monitoring and surveillance
- Reducing costs of joint decisionmaking
- Resolving disputes

Institutions are not neutral.

## How Institutions Promote Cooperation



### Institutions

- Most states follow the rules most of the time.
- Institutions can facilitate cooperation that would have been unlikely without institutions.
- It is less costly to use existing institutions, even if imperfect, than to establish new ones.

#### Political Science 12: International Relations

