

Political Science 12: IR -- Fourth Lecture



4

Domestic Politics and War

Domestic Politics and War

1. War Model Review
2. Domestic Groups and War
3. Institutions and War

Domestic Politics and War


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Domestic Politics and War

Can internal characteristics of states explain why states go to war?

Domestic Politics and War

Figure 4.1: The Price of Oil, 1957–2012




War Model Review

It is usually more rational to bargain than to go to war.

War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain

Figure 3.2: The Costs of War and the Bargaining Range



War as Outcome of a Failed Bargain: A Model of War



CASTLE A




CASTLE B

A Model




A Model of War




The object of contention (the green line) can be anything that states are in conflict over.

A Model of War




A Model of War




A Model of War


Net value of
fighting to A



Net value of
fighting to B



A Model of War




Range of possible border settlements that both A and B prefer to fighting


A Model of War

B's proposal for
a new border

Current Border



A Model of War



For any A and B, if

- war is costly, and
- the object of contention is divisible,

then there is always at least one negotiated settlement that A and B will both prefer to war.

Domestic Politics and War

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Domestic Groups and War

- War may serve the interests of some domestic groups
- Groups may have selfish interests contrary to national interests
- Types of groups

Domestic Groups and War


Collective action

- Smaller groups tend to be better organized.
- Larger groups suffer from free riding.

Groups may shape policy to support their narrow interests


Leaders and War

Figure 4.2: Rally Effects and Popularity of President George W. Bush, 2001–2004




Leaders and War

Figure 4.3: Rally Effects and the Bargaining Range



Leaders and War



- Deals that A prefers to war
- Deals that B prefers to war
- Red line = bargaining range

Leaders and War




- Bargaining range when Rally effect added to A's payoffs

Leaders and War



Leaders and War

Figure 4.4: U.S. Battle Deaths and Public Support for War




Leaders and War

Figure 4.A: War Outcomes and the Fate of Leaders



Leaders and War

Figure 4.B: Democracy and the Fate of Wartime Leaders



Groups and War

- War to satisfy the military or interest groups
- Costs fall on society as a whole; benefits may accrue a specific group


Groups and War



Hawks and Doves


- Hawks favor war
- Doves oppose war

Hawks and Doves



Bargaining with hawkish interests in State A

Hawks and Doves




Bargaining with dovish interests in State A


Hawks and Doves

Figure 4.5: Domestic Interests and International Bargaining

(i) Bargaining with dovish interests in State A



(ii) Bargaining with hawkish interests in State A



Domestic Politics and War

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3. **Institutions and War**

Institutions and War

- Are democracies less prone to go to war?
- Features of democracies

Institutions and War




Institutions and War




Institutions and War

Map 4.1: Democracy and Freedom



Institutions and War

Figure 4.6: The Spread of Democracy, 1800–2010



Institutions and War



Political Science 12: International Relations

