MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_01D00258.E8D8BC00" This document is a Single File Web Page, also known as a Web Archive file. If you are seeing this message, your browser or editor doesn't support Web Archive files. Please download a browser that supports Web Archive, such as Windows® Internet Explorer®. ------=_NextPart_01D00258.E8D8BC00 Content-Location: file:///C:/A1195D13/Altruismnotes.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii"
Altruism: Its
definition, nature and sources
Definition:
&=
nbsp; Narrow,
technical: ‘Incurring a cost in your own reproductive fitness to prov=
ide
a benefit to another’
&=
nbsp; Broader,
informal: ‘Being unselfish’
Nature:
&=
nbsp; Calculated
(‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’/tit for tat)
&=
nbsp; Th=
is
is not directly amenable to a Darwinian analysis
&=
nbsp; Uncalculated:
the spontaneous impulse to be helpful, kind
&=
nbsp; Th=
is
is amenable to a Darwinian analysis
Sources:
&=
nbsp; On
the simplest possible interpretation of ‘natural selection for reprod=
uctive
advantage’, altruism is not expected. But:
&=
nbsp; Cultural/developmental
sources (Sunday School, parents, peers…’socialization’)
&=
nbsp; Evolutionary
sources: natural selection is fully compatible with strong developmental
influences, indeed it may provide a genetic
foundation on which socialization can build:
&=
nbsp; Ge=
netic
predisposition to empathy, goodwill
&=
nbsp; Ge=
netic
predisposition to conformity (aids socialization)
&=
nbsp; Ge=
netic
predisposition to consider what is ‘fair’? (Capuchin monkeys, <=
/span>Capuchin
cooperation and fairness )
When is an action altruistic?
&=
nbsp; Prototypical
example: risking death to rescue a drowning non-swimmer: clearly not
reproductively advantageous
&=
nbsp; Psychological
decision process: calculation vs impulse…=
the
genetic background is presumably relevant to both types of motivation, thou=
gh
more directly in the impulse case.
&=
nbsp; 1.
Calculation scenario: no ‘=
;tit
for tat’ here, leaving aside any likelihood of reward. So
simple reciprocal altruism does not apply here. But, calcul=
ated
acts of generosity can be motivated by possible benefits to the individual
including improved social standing and self-esteem. The=
se considerations are introduc=
ed by
socialization acting on a genetically favorable foundation.
&=
nbsp; If
motivated by self-esteem: the decision to rescue expresses an inherent
altruistic disposition. That such a person may in a sense ‘get someth=
ing
out of’ the experience of being altruistic doesn’t show that the
altruism is not genuine.
&=
nbsp; If
motivated by social standing: as a calculated move, this might fairly be
considered not true altruism in a psychological sense. But it is still an
altruistic action from the standpoint of evolutionary theory, and its
explanation involves aspects of our nature, such as caring about ones social
standing, that are traceable to our origin from natural selection.
&=
nbsp; 2.
Impulse scenario: a natural
inclination to help others, without calculation and with little regard to t=
he
selfish cost. This poses Darwin’s problem: Why would natural selection
make us so inclined to care about others? (Or perhaps it didn’t, and
socialization is the whole story??)
The answer was given most explicitly by Hamilton and by Trivers: kin selection in evolution cou=
ld
give rise to the altruistic impulse expressed in empathy, cooperation and
generosity. Even in the absence of socialization, propagation of your genes=
may
be favored by sacrifice for your relatives, and this may generalize to give
rise to goodwill toward conspecifics in general=
, if
those whom our ancestors encountered tended to be relatives. Further, the potential for
socialization may itself be traceable to natural selection, as discussed by
Boyd and Richerson among others.
&=
nbsp; On
this view, goodwill toward strangers
could be regarded as an accident, where generalization from relatives occur=
s as
a default. The kin selection idea provides a clear basis for the limited
range of our goodwill toward strangers, and for the essentially tribal natu=
re
of our morality, which makes =
us
simultaneously supportive of our ‘kith and kin’ and indifferent=
or
even hostile to those we classify as ‘outsiders’.