The following article was drafted in 1977, but (for reasons I do not remember) never submitted for publication. It is now too dated to be proposed for publication. There has been a great deal of change in Taiwan since it was written, and a great deal of additional study of the island. Taiwan is no longer under martial law; and national offices are more broadly filled by direct election. However this essay still represents one of the very few ethnographic studies of village vote-buying as a stage in the development of a more complex political culture. This version has been scanned from the typed original and minor editorial changes made. Footnotes are placed within the text to facilitate the next step: movement to my web site.

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A CHINESE “CULTURE OF ELECTIONS”
or
THE DECLINE OF HONEST BRIBERY
by David K. Jordan, University of California, San Diego*

(1) This paper has benefited by the criticism of Marc J. Swartz. and Samuel L. Popkin

Honest bribery is on the skids in Taiwan (Tâiwânp)å). It has got so bad that a corrupt politician who buys a vote cannot even depend upon getting delivery on it any more. And even huge sums of money paid out to influence a local election can no longer guarantee more than a meager proportion of the vote. If present trends continue, corruption as we know it may become a thing of the past.

The beginning of an overzealous propaganda piece about to launch into praise of the government of “Free China”? Not at all. Examination of an indigenous evolution in election behavior and attitudes in one region in southwestern Taiwan seems to show that the trouble with corruption is that it does not work very well.

“Corruption,” of course, is a loaded term, not very suitable for cross-cultural analysis. So is “bribery.” And perhaps “influence.” And seeing evolution on the basis of elections in so small an area is a very dangerous undertaking. Still, southwestern Taiwanese elections are changing, and one of the changes really is that a candidate cannot easily buy a vote and be sure of getting it at the ballot box any more. These changes, and how they can be understood, are the subject matter of this paper.

PART I: ELECTIONS AND CULTURE

Voting

With political independence in non-totalitarian countries come elections at all levels. And voting for local and national officials by secret ballot has become a very widespread phenomenon in the modern world. To the extent that a secret-ballot election is “honest,” one imagines that variations are but trivial in the procedures for marking a ballot and putting it into a locked box, after which the votes are counted and announced.
In anthropological jargon, secret-ballot voting is a fairly well integrated culture trait. However the basis of a voter’s decision to vote for one candidate rather than another, or the procedures for deciding which people may be listed on the ballot as candidates seem to exhibit much more significant variation from land to land and from election to election.

And oftentimes selection of officials is therefore pursued in ways that seem puzzling to us “senior democrats” in countries that already have a long history of elections and electioneering. We find that what accompanies the ballot box in many countries does not conform to our experience of what accompanies it among ourselves. Those bizarre foreigners keep “cheating” in the most degenerate ways, and then “play fair” in the very places where we senior democrats know that any rational person would cheat. Restated in jargon, voter motivations and procedures and the strategies for accessibility to candidacy are not well enough integrated parts of the trait complex of secret-ballot elections to have diffused uniformly with secret-ballot voting.

The process by which a candidate attempts to elicit votes (the “campaign”) and by which the voter awards votes is an important locus of political life that is closely related to wider cultural themes and stereotypes in any society. Candidates’ styles, from “Checkers speeches” to “Win buttons,” and voters’ expectations, from messianism to mountebankery, exhibit tremendous variation. Nevertheless the range of variation in any one country is limited (broad though it be). What attracts votes in one country is likely to repel them in some other country. This is part of the reason why it is possible to speak realistically (if often unclearly) of the unique style of (say) “Latin-American politics.”

If the cultural anthropologist can shed any light on the electoral process, this is the very area where he is likely to be most useful, for the behavior patterns of voters as a collectivity are very much in the realm of culture: that is to say, a voter’s selection of one candidate rather than another depends upon his understanding of the situation, and patterns of voting behavior depend upon patterns of understandings: culture.

The ideas, grave or trivial, which members of a society share about voting constitute a culture of elections just as surely as their ideas about the supernatural constitute their religious culture. When elections are suddenly thrust upon a population that does not already have an established “culture of elections,” we can expect two phenomena: One is that people in one society (for example that of Taiwan) will almost certainly not understand the purposes, mechanics, and strategies of elections quite the same way these are understood in another society (for example our own). They may. But we can hardly assume they will.

And secondly we may expect that rarely will a very uniform or well-defined “culture of elections” appear immediately when a population is suddenly and newly allowed the privilege of secret ballot democracy. We expect, in other words, that on the one hand we will see behavior that strikes us as awfully queer for democracy as we understand it, and that on the other we will see a period of indecision and false starts as the population gradually develops shared cultural constructs appropriate to running one’s affairs by the secret ballot.(1)

(1) A few newly democratic societies may already possess preadaptive cultural constructs, just as others may have cultural forms which are maladaptive to the secret ballot. Secret-ballot voting will be adopted at different rates and transformed in different ways. Of course.
In some newly-democratic countries competing candidates represent clearly different public policies, and different events are likely to befall the voters if one candidate rather than another is elected. Voters may or may not understand this, and they may or may not understand it accurately. But to the extent that they do view different candidates (rightly or wrongly) as auguring dramatically different political futures for them, it is safe to assume that they will mostly vote for the candidates they think most likely to benefit them or least likely to harm them. (2)

(2) What matters here is how the voters view the issue not what the truth actually is. The reader can readily think of voters he knows who consistently over- or under-estimate the significance of A being elected to an office rather than B. When consistent over- or under-estimation of the significance of the results of an election is general in a population, it too becomes part of the “culture of elections,” but that leads us somewhat afield from the present point.

On the other hand when (as in Taiwan) the candidates are not viewed as representing radically different political futures for the voters, the relationship between voter and candidate must be based on something else, upon understandings: new ones or ones growing out of pre-existing cultural constructs.

In this paper I shall suggest that the process of developing a “culture of elections,” at least for local-level elections, may proceed on the basis of analogies between the voter-candidate relationship being defined and various other role relationships that are already part of the cultural repertoire. As a particular case, we shall be concerned specifically with the way in which rural people in Taiwan have tried to develop a definition of the voter-candidate relationship in the years following the retrocession of Taiwan from Japan to China in 1945, when democracy was established on that island for the first time in its history.

What we shall find is that these analogies have not worked very well. The secret ballot is a very distinctive and subtle institution, and the attempt to cope with it on the analogy of traditional role relationships has not proven logistically practical. The rural Taiwanese local “culture of elections” is still abuilding, still unstable. Its evolution seems to me to be in the direction of a system less “corrupt” than it once was, which is of course a source of some satisfaction to friends of democracy, but “corruption” is not really the issue. The real issue is political culture, where it comes from, and how it works.

For purposes of exposition the focus is one particular election in the rural township (xiāng 鄉) (1) of Xīgāng 西港 in the southwestern part of the island. I observed this election in the course of other studies as a resident of a village I have called Bāo’ān 保安, about which I have written elsewhere (Jordan, 1972).(2) My data are heavily from this village and from one faction in the election. (3)

(1) Romanized Chinese words are italicized only on first occurrence.
(2) That period of fieldwork was supported by grants 5-FI-MH-24,257 and 1-R04-MH-13526-01 of the United States National Institute of Mental Health and by a small grant from the Department of Anthropology of the University of Chicago. A year of fieldwork in 1976, mentioned below, was carried out on sabbatical leave from the University of California, San Diego, and was supported by a small grant from that institution and by a fellowship from the Chinese
Cultural Center of New York. The generosity of all of these institutions is most gratefully acknowledged.

(3) Although I have tried to be as careful as possible, it is difficult to correct potential biases in material of this kind. The general point that emerges about models for the relationship between candidate and voter would be unaffected by any but the most extreme types of error that might inadvertently have crept into the picture here developed, however.

Taiwan

Taiwan is one province of the Republic of China. It is at the moment the only complete province (shěng 省) administered by the Central Government of the Republic, which also controls the Special Municipality (tèbiéshì 特別市) of Táibēi 臺北 and the islands of Jīnmén 金門 and Mǎzǔ 馬祖 in Fújìàn 福建 province. There are accordingly both national and provincial governments in Taiwan, as well as the Táibēi Municipal Government, deemed co-equal to the provincial government. Each governmental level includes a representative assembly and an executive head. The pattern of representative assembly and executive head is replicated also at lower levels of government. Thus Taiwan province is divided into counties (xiàn 縣) and sub-provincial municipalities (shěngxiáshì 省轄市), each with an assembly and an executive head; the counties are subdivided into townships (variously called xiāng 鄉 and zhèn 鎮) and sub-county municipalities (xiànxiáshì 縣轄市). These too each have an assembly and an executive head. Finally townships are divided into villages (cūn 村 and lǐ 里), with mayors, and these are ultimately divisible into hamlets (lín 臨) with headmen. (See Table 1.)

TABLE 1

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces (Shěng) and Special Municipalities (Tèbiéshì)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Counties (Xiàn) and Sub-provincial Municipalities (Shěngxiáshì)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Townships (Xiāng and Zhèn)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Villages (Cūn and Lǐ)</td>
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<td>Hamlets (Lín)</td>
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At all levels below that of province governor, the executive heads are elected by popular vote, and all assemblies are elected. (Representatives to the National Assembly, the “Legislative Yuan” [Lìfǎ Yuàn 立法院] from outside of the territory under Nationalist control are those elected in 1948.)

As popularly viewed from the village level, the executive head at one level has about the same power and prestige as an assembly member of the level above him, at least in the lower levels. Thus in Bāo’ān village the village mayor was viewed as about equal in prestige with the representative to the township assembly, and the township head was viewed as about equal in prestige with a representative to the county assembly.

The most intense local elections, those that bring about the greatest interest on the part of rural people, are those for county (xiàn) assemblyman and below. This is the level at which
candidates may be known directly to the voter or to someone he knows, and at which local people are importantly involved in political campaigning. In the case of county assemblymen, this effect is amplified somewhat by free election of assemblymen from a slate of at-large candidates elected within a group of Townships rather than at-large within the county as a whole or individually within a single township. Xīgāng is blocked with four other of the 30 townships of Táinán 臺南 county to elect county assemblymen. (The others are Qīgǔ 七股, Bēimén 北門, Jiālì 佳里, and Jiāngjūn 將軍.)

This broad array of elected officials is a democratic luxury of the Nationalist period in Taiwan. During the period of Japanese administration (1895-1945) the island was administered as a colony, and all officials were appointed with the partial exception of village mayors. The election of 1948 was therefore the first experience most Taiwanese had with popular suffrage. Elections have been held at regular intervals ever since, and elections for local offices in particular have become occasions of great public interest and very extensive public participation.

The rules and procedures for these elections have changed somewhat during the postwar period. The development of local elections has been traced by Bernard Gallin in a provocative article (1968) in which he points out a gradual shift from domination, of local-level politics by acknowledged elites whose power was based heavily upon kinship ties to a patchwork of short-term regional political factions, and from general voter apathy to a sense of involvement in the inter-factional politics of a region. Gallin describes two important changes in the electoral system. One took place in 1959, when the election of the township governors was shifted from election by the township council to popular election. The other in 1961 when townships were blocked into voting districts that did not correspond with villages; this shifted representation so that the representatives had constituencies more nearly the same size, but it also forced campaigns to be waged beyond the confines of a single village, and therefore required techniques of alliance and persuasion that went beyond traditional village-level decision-making. Gallin also details the “discovery” of the potential of the election system by men who were not part of the traditional elite, to whom political power was suddenly seen as available for the first time, and who were willing to seek it outside of the traditional system of elite-manipulations.

We shall return to Gallin’s discussion of the rise and implications of regional factionalism presently. The point here is to describe the more general cultural model of elections that has gradually been developing among Taiwanese rural people.

PART I: TWO TAIWANESE ELECTIONS

The Family and Its Votes

The fact that every adult has a vote does not imply that each voter makes up his own mind how best to cast his vote. In general votes, like other resources, are thought of as being household property, and their expenditure is carefully considered by the whole family and a collective decision is made as to how each vote is to be cast. Frequently it is decided that all will be cast the same way. Sometimes the family’s electoral “resources” are distributed among different candidates. The ultimate authority in this decision, as in all decisions, is the household head, and in general men have more say than women. Since the voting is by secret ballot, there is of course no way that the family can enforce its collective wisdom on any one of its members, but informants are
unanimous in the opinion that the family members rarely if ever deviate from the agreed plan when voting. (1)

(1) The fact that there is no check on this and that deviation is considered unthinkable, at least when the question is openly discussed, probably provides the necessary fudge-factor for the occasional maverick.

A number of considerations are weighed in deciding how the votes at a household’s disposal will be distributed. The first claim on a family’s votes is the claim of kinship, and the closer the kinsman, the firmer his claim on the family’s votes when he runs for office. Most candidates, to their sorrow, are not kinsmen of most voters, however, and often no direct claim can be made on the basis of kinship. Next are the claims of friendship. A candidate is likely to have more friends than close kinsmen among his constituents, and the families of these friends owe the candidate their support. When they are friends with more than one candidate, they split their support among them. Finally, in the ethnographic present of 1968, voters related to the candidate by neither friendship nor kinship are typically induced to give their vote in return for a gift of money, an unstable situation that we shall consider in some detail below.

The claim of kinship or friendship upon a family is not always made directly by the candidate. A family may be swayed in its decision by kinship or friendship with a firm supporter of the candidate. Thus the candidate can generally expect to receive the votes of near kinsmen of his friends and close friends of his kinsmen, except insofar as these people overlap with the set on whom a rival candidate may have a similar or closer claim. It is widely (and probably correctly) believed that a candidate who does not have a good network of friendship and kinship of this second, rather extended type is unlikely to be elected. The position of friend of the candidate is therefore an important one. The candidate depends upon his friends, particularly those who are able to influence a large number of their own kinsmen and friends to vote for him. Being the trusted friend of the candidate and in fact delivering many votes to him is obviously the mark of achieved power and influence. Being the trusted friend of a successful candidate is in addition an increment to one’s power and influence, for the candidate’s friend is also his political creditor, as well as a man whose voice must be heard on public issues and in the selection of future candidates. One route to fame for the politically ambitious is therefore to support a candidate and to deliver a particularly large proportion of the vote.

There are not formal political parties at the local level, and though the Nationalist Party may provide some financial backing to one of its members running with its endorsement for a local office, a potential candidate is primarily dependent upon an informally recruited group of politically important people being willing to give him public support and upon his (and their) ability to deliver votes and to raise campaign funds to “buy” less directly available votes. Some such people are senior and/or leading members of traditional coalitions of surname groups; some are not. (V. Jordan, 1972: 12-26.) Some are permanently aligned with each other and tend to work as a group for the election of selected candidates, while others throw their support in the company of different men in different elections. In most cases, however, the whole system works well enough that different candidates and their supporters are able to predict in advance the proportions of the vote that they will get in each village with uncanny accuracy, or were until 1968.
A Township Representative Election

Let us now turn our attention to two particular elections, both of which took place in the Xīgāng area in 1968. I take them in reverse chronological order because, as it happens, the second was considered to be more “traditional” than the first, but both of them represent the kinds of problems that have arisen in the development of a uniform culture of elections.

In May of 1968 an election was held for representatives to the Xīgāng Township Assembly (Xiāngmín Dàibiǎohuì 鄉民代表會). Village loyalties of course played a large part in this. A village “owes” its support to one of its own should he run for office, and the failure of a candidate to win his own home territory is an embarrassment not only for him, but for the people who did not support him. (1)

(1) In Gallin’s village of Hsin Hsing (Xīnxīng 新興), lineage-loyalties appear to have played a more important role in early voting behavior than village loyalties, but in any case both were being overridden by the middle 1960’s Bāo’ān, which has always apparently had a fairly firm sense of its identity as a village, seems to have held on to the notion of village loyalty a little longer than Hsin Hsing, and perhaps will continue to do so. The difference does not seem very significant, however, since the direction of change is the same.

In 1968 assemblymen were to be elected at large throughout the township, but to assure a reasonably even distribution of them villages were clustered into voting districts (qū 区). The district which included Bāo’ān included also one other village, which we may call Huálín 華林. The two villages were to elect two candidates from among three competitors, one from Bāo’ān, and two from Huálín. Each voter could vote for one candidate. The man from Bāo’ān, though formerly a popular local political leader, had taken an unpopular and transparently self-interested stand on a controversial issue the year before and was suffering a lag in his popularity.(2)

(2) Filially following direct orders from his ancient father, he had refused to tear down a privy that stood too close to one of the village roads, which were at that time being widened and paved. In the end the road had to be accommodated to the privy, a fact which particularly infuriated people who had torn rooms off of their houses so that the new roads might be straight.

Many people thought it in poor taste for him to stand as a candidate under the circumstances. But most leaders of village opinion maintained that a poor showing for the candidate of Bāo’ān would be embarrassing for the village as a whole. It was clear that some village people would resolutely refuse to vote for the Bāo’ān man, village prestige or no village prestige. And this, it was felt, made it all the more important to have the votes of everyone else. (A merely good showing rather than a 100% showing in the home village was thought desirable as a courtesy to Huálín.) The distribution of votes was calculated by the leaders of opinion to be a satisfactory compromise, and households were told how to vote to make the proportions come out properly. These estimates and plans and the actual distribution of votes are shown in Table 2.

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<th>Projected Distribution</th>
<th>Actual Distribution</th>
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<td>Bāo’ān’s candidate:</td>
<td>450 votes (75%)</td>
<td>421 votes (69%)</td>
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Huálín’s candidate A: 120 votes (20%) 143 votes (24%)
Huálín’s candidate B: 30-40 votes (5%) 35 votes (6%)
Spoilt ballots: - 7 votes (1%)
Total 600 votes (100%) 606 votes (100%)

This election, because the candidate from Bào’ān was known to all the voters and related to a large proportion of them, and because the difference between insider and outsider was so clear, did not provide an arena for attempts to influence voting by passing money and “buying” votes. People voted in response to various vectors of village face, hostility to the Bào’ān man, kinship, desire to co-operate with village leaders, and the like. The results, as given in Table 2, are therefore very close to the projected distribution.

Close as these figures are, accurate as the predictions were, at least one village man who had been intimately involved with the planning was furious about the slippage. Township-level elections always had been (or at least were believed to be) more closely predictable than this. It was disgraceful, he maintained, that support for the Bào’ān candidate had been lower than predicted. And it was disgraceful that people in Bào’ān would agree to vote one way and then vote another. Although the secret-ballot system made it impossible to discover who had “cheated” by voting differently from the earlier agreements, it was clear to him that some people were using the secret ballot system to keep secrets, and this was seen as betrayal of the community at large.

This election for township assemblyman is not without interest for a number of reasons, but I present it primarily to illustrate two points. One is the uncanny accuracy with which informal political leaders are and feel they ought to be, able to predict the probable outcome of an election. Even better ability to anticipate election results had been typical for earlier elections. That is apparently why anger and frustration was inspired by the fact that the proportion of the vote for Bào’ān’s candidate was 6% lower than the prediction, and why people felt some voters had acted improperly in voting differently from the way they “had agreed” to vote.

The high predictability of elections because they are worked out by village leaders ahead of time is a pattern also described by Gallin for Hsin Hsing up through the early 1960’s. He writes (1968:385):

...This desire for consensus and the elimination of competition was very evident on the village, [township], and even [county] levels. It was not unusual to have one main candidate and, in order to give the appearance of a competitive and democratic election, have one or two other people serve as mock candidates who would receive several votes. Even in the less important elections of [hamlet] heads this desire was evident. Although an actual vote took place, the election of [hamlet] heads in the village was purely by consensus; the members of any [hamlet] discussed and decided the matter in advance.

In Bào’ān, at least in the 1968 township assembly election, a six percent error in the prediction was regarded as an unacceptably high future, representing a breakdown of public order and a breach of morality.
Besides the predictability of election results, the second point is that the reason for the frustration was not merely that people were not conforming to the prediction, to the “agreements.” There was in addition no way to identify the culprits and do anything about them.

The secret ballot, as a system, defeated any attempt to discover who was one of the six percent of cross-over voters. Now in this particular case the argument may be made that the Bào’ān man being in bad odor put special strains on Bào’ān voters. The voter who did not want to cast his vote for the Bào’ān man because of that man’s selfish non-conformity to village plans a year earlier, did not therefore necessarily want to cast a “protest vote” for an outsider, and village leaders were perhaps accurate when they feared that some voters would simply fail to show up, therefore avoiding the dilemma by not voting for anybody. On the morning of the election the village office was loaded with various gifts. Every voter would receive a gift, selecting by lot which was to be his. They ranged from cakes of soap of various qualities through hand towels to a couple of umbrellas, cheap plastic purses, and at the very top end a small two-speed electric fan. This inducement, leaders felt, would be irresistible, and they proceeded on the assumption that most villagers, forced to vote by their own greed for these inducements, would in the end vote for the Bào’ān man rather than an outsider.

There is no way to know what proportion of village people were potential non-voters and were attracted to the election by this device, nor is there any way to know how many of the votes cast by such people were cast for the Bào’ān candidate. One trusts to the Kulturgefühl of the local leaders that the device probably worked as they anticipated it would. The point is merely that local voters were under peculiar pressures in this particular election that were not extraordinary but were probably also not typical of other elections at the Township level. The effect of these pressures was that people took advantage of the secrecy which the secret ballot provided.

If village leaders were right in telling me that a 6% slippage had never occurred before, then this retreat into the secrecy of the secret ballot was a new discovery in Bào’ān. Voters had begun a new step in their view of elections, for they were voting their consciences about candidates rather than their consciences about agreements. And May of 1968 may have marked the beginning of a new integration of the culture of local elections.

A County Representative Election

But even as this election had a slippage of only 6%, forces were developing in another quarter that were to undermine the ability to predict and hence to bargain in advance about election results at a higher level.

Late in January of 1968 (earlier than the township-level election just discussed) another election was held, much grander in scale, this time to select candidates for the Táinán County Assembly (Xiànmín Dàibīǎohuì 縣民代表會). A voting district composed of five townships including Xīgāng was to elect eleven representatives from eighteen candidates running at large within the district. The actual number of candidates actively campaigning in any one part of the five-township district was rather smaller, however, since many candidates could depend upon “secure areas” in which their kinship, friendship, or local ties assured them very widespread support. Other candidates seldom ventured into these areas, but spent their time in areas where they thought there were more uncommitted votes. The strategy was to try to gain close to unanimous
support in areas where a candidate thought he was strong, and to abandon areas where his competition had a much better chance than he.

For each candidate, therefore, there was a target constituency. Even though he was officially running throughout the district, and might in fact pick up a few votes from any section of it, his election stood or fell on the basis of his ability to gain enough votes from this target area. Normally this included his home village and usually the villages immediately around it. I have the impression that for almost all candidates this target constituency was located entirely within their home townships unless they lived on the township line. Naturally some of these constituencies overlapped, and the overlap areas were the areas of most vigorous campaigning.

In Xīgāng township men named Huáng 黃 and Qiū 丘 put themselves forth as candidates (though their primary support came from areas other than Bāo’ān) to run in a constituency area that included Xīgāng town itself, Bāo’ān, and a number of villages near Bāo’ān. Both men attracted followers and began to lay formal campaign plans. A group of men centrally associated with the township administration in Xīgāng was balanced between the two candidates. By way of compromise they were inclined to seek instead a third man, acceptable to them all. One man, Mr. Lǐ, was acceptable to most members of their faction, but he lacked the necessary education to qualify for office under new regulations requiring candidates to have completed high school. The other potential candidate, Mr. Xiè 謝, was therefore selected.(1)

(1) Gallin’s article mentions a decline in the educational level of candidates for local office as a result of the election system allowing power to slip out of the hands of local elites to unscrupulous and power-hungry non-elites of the “black society” (a Chinese term for vaguely under-worldly people). Traditional elite education meant either classical Chinese education, privately (and sometimes illegally) acquired during the Japanese period, or education in Japanese. Presumably this is the kind of education to which Gallin refers. Correctly, neither is recognized as a qualification for political office by the present government in Taiwan, but for years the lack of an adequate number of candidates with modern Chinese education made required minimal educational qualifications impractical. The election of “less educated” candidates that Gallin describes would hardly have been applauded by the authorities of the Central Government, but it would also almost certainly have been viewed officially as the continued election of “uneducated” people or (to the extent that the “black society” candidates were younger and had spent some years in Mandarin schools) even as the election of more educated people.

One effect of the mid-1960’s requirement of a modern Chinese high-school education was to squeeze out the old guard, to be sure. Another effect, however, was to ensure that local officials would be able to cope with the rest of the government apparatus on Taiwan. Minimum education requirements came about as soon as they practically could, no later than they had to, and seem to me to have been a step forward. If Gallin’s observation that the educational level of candidates was dropping during the 1950’s (whatever the official view) is applicable to rural Taiwan generally at that period, then the education requirement was an even bigger step forward than officially made out to be. Although there were of course cases, like that of Mr. Lǐ, that made one very sad,
most of the local leaders who were excluded either were very elderly or have been able to maintain positions of prominence in informal village and regional politics.

Mr. Xiè, however, was a less than unanimous choice. It is not clear what their motives were, but at least three faction leaders urged him not to run. One of these offered him $750 (1) to stay out of the race. Another attempted to persuade the local Nationalist Party members to try to stop his candidacy. A third persuaded an ambitious young man to run against him in the same district and with about the same constituency. This man was named Guō 郭.

(1) Money amounts mentioned here and below are in 1968 U.S. dollars. The currency used was of course New Taiwan dollars, which at that time were 40 to the U.S. dollar, though the U.S. dollar has subsequently lost value with respect to the Taiwan currency.

Guō’s natural constituency covered most of the area from which Xiè expected to draw his votes. In addition Guō was a very popular figure there. He did not seem very interested in the political office as such, but was eager to demonstrate his influence in the area, and therefore seriously entertained the idea of running against Xiè as requested by those of the Xīgāng administration who did not support Xiè’s candidacy.

In November and December of 1967, large sums of money began to change hands in an effort to influence the men who would ultimately be responsible for acting as “friends of the candidate,” that is, for delivering the vote. I am dependent upon Guō’s estimates, which it was difficult to confirm or disconfirm in detail, given the under-the-table nature of most of these dealings. But the general outlines seem to be correct. The mayor of Bāo’ān village, an old friend of Guō’s, was offered and accepted an interest-free loan of $250 from Xiè in return for his support. The mayor promised that he could deliver half of the votes in Bāo’ān to Xiè, even if Guō ran against him. He promised about 90% of Bāo’ān’s vote should Guō not run.

By early November, Xiè’s war-chest had distributed about $5,000 to win “friends of the candidate” who could deliver votes. At the same time he offered Guō $1,250 to leave the race. Guō refused, though he did so with obvious pleasure at the thought that he alone was worth that much money to a candidate by virtue of his absence. Early in December Xiè’s father died. Since he was already under financial strain due to the money being spent on the campaign, the expensive funeral demanded by Chinese custom made him a pathetic figure, and much public sympathy was expressed towards him. Among other people affected by this was Guō’s father, who ordered the younger Guō not to run and thereby eliminated him from the race. The mayor of Bāo’ān was now ordered to make good on his promise to produce 90% of the Bāo’ān vote for Xiè.

Guō did not retire gracefully. His attraction to the campaign in the first place had been the hope of demonstrating his influence in the region, and he had taken great offence when the mayor had promised half of Bāo’ān’s votes even if Guō ran. Guō believed (unrealistically, I felt) that he could command about 80% of the Bāo’ān vote, through ties of kinship and friendship, and he felt it was essential to show this, even if he were not running himself. His position as political leader of the community (a position more coveted than commanded) had been challenged, and he was angry.

Guō’s determination now was not to throw the vote to any particular candidate but only to demonstrate that he had the ability to distribute it as he pleased. One course of action that he
entertained was to propose selling the votes of the entire village en-bloc to some other candidate and using the money for some civic improvement such as a public telephone. Unfortunately, as he thought about this grandiose plan, he decided that individual voters might be easily bought away from the collective plan if Xiè offered them money privately. Any plan to sell the votes would have to out-bid Xiè at the household level.

As his neighbors became aware of the vindictiveness with which Guō was attempting to discredit the mayor’s claim to be able to deliver 90% of the vote, they began to express sympathy for the mayor’s plight. Guō saw his own estimate of his ability to control the vote slipping from 80% to about half. A new scheme came to mind: He could semi-publicly give over his support to the mayor’s side in a gesture that he would announce was intended to help the mayor save face. By doing this semi-publicly Guō would cause the mayor to lose face (by having to have his face saved) and would simultaneously gain prestige for himself by his “noble” attempt to save the mayor. The intricacies of the maneuver, however, became overwhelming and he did nothing.

By early January votes were being committed. Representatives of Xiè were circulating quietly among the village people offering money in exchange for a promise that the votes of the household would go to Xiè. Desperately Guō encouraged the other candidates in the Xīgāng region, Huáng and Qiū, to send their representatives with similar promises, and he himself circulated from house to house encouraging people to accept money from Huáng and Qiū rather than from Xiè.

The candidates, in self-defense, agreed among themselves at the price per vote, lest they bid one another up and exceed their ability to pay. Huáng in a weak moment had assured his potential supporters (through his intermediates) that he would not pay less than $1.25 per vote regardless of what other candidates were paying. When, a few days later the three candidates, having discovered how fast they were running out of money, agreed to a price of 75¢ per vote, Huáng too agreed. Popular opinion swung firmly against him, and even those who accepted his 75¢ refused to vote for him because he had not made good his promise of $1.25.

The day before the 75¢ decision was announced, Xiè made a public gift to the coffers of King Chí (Chífū ēr Qiànsuǐ 池府二千歲), the patron god of the people in Bāōān named Zhāng 張, and a popular god in the area quite aside from his Zhāng connections. The Zhāng represented about 6% of the Bāōān vote, and the gift to King Chí was equivalent to about $1.25 per vote. This gift was costly to Xiè, but it had several advantages. For one thing, since it was a contribution to a god, not to voters, it was legal and could be openly discussed. For another, the sum was handsome compared with what candidates could spend beginning the following day: Xiè was very literally the last of the big-time spenders. Finally, in the confusion of private gains and cross-interests, there was something distinctly moral about providing a sum for religious purposes rather than trying to “buy” the votes of the Zhāng families. As well as could be told, the move worked as Xiè had planned, and the Zhāng did in fact ultimately support him in the election, though it is difficult to be positive that there were no exceptions.

Both Xiè and the mayor, threatened by Huáng and Qiū in their home area, had overextended their finances, and both were coming to be seen as clearly victimized by Guō. Sympathy was turning in their direction. Qiū methodically paid his 75¢ per voter to each household that would accept it on the assumption that those who had very strong ties to another candidate would not take it, and that those who did not would be committed to him and would have to refuse the next offer.
By the evening before the election the voters had accepted their money from agents of the various candidates and the vote was thought to be established, though each candidate knew only what proportion he had successfully bought, and could not be sure how much of the rest had been captured by his rivals.

Guō assessed the implications of various different election outcomes in terms of face. As he viewed the situation, in event of a Xiè landslide, Guō’s machinations would be shown to have been in vain; he would be revealed not to have as much influence in the community as he had claimed; and he would lose face. The mayor, correspondingly, would gain face. But under any other circumstances the mayor would be shown to have been unable to deliver the vote and would lose face.

There seemed to me, in contrast, to be a general feeling that the mayor could gain face with a Xiè landslide but that a split vote would not be a gain for Guō. Instead a split vote would mean that Bāo’ān had not been a crucial district for any candidate. The village, some people felt, would lose prestige if its votes could not be blocked together, and I was inclined to agree. The problem was how to unite them.

Thirteen percent of the voters had prior commitments to candidates other than Xiè (perhaps corresponding roughly to the ten percent that the mayor had never promised to deliver in the first place?). Two thirds of the voters had been paid on behalf of other candidates. This left only twenty percent of the voters committed to Xiè. Guō was optimistic; people were grumbling a good deal; and a Xiè landslide did not seem probable in Bāo’ān.

Unlike the case of the township assemblyman election discussed earlier, the ability of the anti-Xiè forces to estimate the result was not very impressive. No allowance had been made for the possibility of voters selling their votes twice. In fact, however, there was a slippage of nearly a third of the voters, about two hundred people, who accepted money to vote for Huáng or Qiū but who in the end voted for Xiè. The fact came as a shock to everyone concerned when the votes were finally tallied. The election had been dirty, fought over issues of face and influence rather than over the qualification of candidates or civic issues or the eventuality of Bāo’ān influence on an incumbent because of its importance in his electoral base. Most voters had been rather annoyed by election time. But however they may have felt individually about changing their votes from the arrangements they had made or about accepting money from more than one candidate, as a group they were appalled at their fellows and confused about how subsequent elections could possibly function. Bāo’ān shocked and depressed itself.

The result of the election and the predictions made the night before are displayed in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Before Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes free to others by prior commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes bought by others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually delivered 33%
Lost to Xiè 30%
Lost to others 3%
Votes bought by Xiè or free to Xiè 20%
Xiè: 47.3% (309)
Spoilt Ballots: 5.2% (34)
Total 100% 99% 100% (654)

(*) All figures are from the anti-Xiè faction except the election results. Those marked with asterisks are guesses and are probably wrong, since they are based on an assumption of no double payments. The distribution of votes “analyzed after election” is based on the anti-Xiè group’s estimate that they received only about half of the votes they bought.

It was tempting to attribute this breakdown of election procedure to the local antagonisms in Bāo’ān. The phenomenon turned out to be island-wide in this election however, or so it was rumored.(1) Whether or not double selling of votes was that universal, it certainly spread beyond Bāo’ān village or even Xīgāng township.

(1) Because the payment system was extralegal in the first place, it is difficult to discover how widespread it was or how completely it broke down at this election. The system was universal in southwestern Táinán, and people often quoted vote prices from other areas, so one suspects some universality, both to the system and to the breakdown of it.

In Jiālī township, just to the north of Xīgāng, one family confided that they had accepted money from three different candidates. The first paid them 50¢ a vote for their four votes, a total of $2.00. A second candidate paid them 75¢ a vote for the four votes, to a total of $3.00. Finally just before the election a rather desperate third candidate paid $1.25 a vote, or a total of $5.00. The family, in view of the third candidate’s higher bid, gave him two of their votes and gave each of the first two candidates one vote. The results are shown in Table 4. The effective prices that the candidates actually paid for each vote delivered were therefore $2.00, $3.00, and $2.50 respectively, much higher than they had anticipated, and much higher than they could afford. And ironically, the candidate who paid the most for each delivered vote was not the candidate who paid the most for each promised vote. In Jiālī, as in Xīgāng, people were asking themselves whether there could ever be another election, and were generally (and hypocritically) shaking their heads at the greed of their neighbors and wondering what was to become of the electoral system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Votes Promised</th>
<th>Total Collected</th>
<th>Votes Delivered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4

Two different points of interest emerge from the observation of this local election. One, of course, is the dynamics of face and prestige that so attracted Guō and ultimately so annoyed many of the voters. The more interesting issue, however, is the expectation on everyone’s part that even under such complex circumstances the estimates of voting behavior would be correct because people would vote the way they said they would, and the very obvious and rather complete breakdown of this system.

If we are not surprised at the breakdown of a system predicated on complete “honesty” among the electorate, then we may still be surprised that it worked as well as it did in earlier elections, in which the slippage was very little. If the system of buying votes used to work, why did it suddenly collapse? If it was not viable, then why did it work earlier? And why was the change an island-wide (or at least region-wide) phenomenon?

I am not sure that the following discussion really answers this triplet of questions, but it presents a line of thought that may prove profitable to explore, both in Taiwan and in other newly democratic nations, as more and better data become available about more local elections. First, we must turn our attention to what informants have to say about earlier elections in Taiwan. It was not always the case that candidates passed money on to voters in return for promises of support. On the contrary, the system of paying for votes was merely one of a series of stages in the development of devices to win electoral support, a series that can be seen as a kind of groping after effective models among indigenous devices for relating to people that for one reason or another were not suitable to the task at hand.

**PART II: WHY DID VOTERS SUDDENLY “CHEAT”?**

**The Voter As Gentleman (1948-1960)**

In the earliest election after the retrocession of Taiwan to China from Japan, informants report that candidates campaigned largely on the basis of promises of good works to be accomplished after they attained office. For the elections of 1948 and 1952, there seem to have been few material inducements to elect one candidate rather than another. By the election of 1956, candidates had begun distributing small gifts to supporters. Gallin describes the situation this way (1968:386):

...the political situation in the area even before 1957 did show a change; a new kind of people had begun to compete with the gentry-type leaders for office. They became known as “Black Society” people—an epithet used to describe local rascals and people seeking power, position, and their own economic advantage without particular regard for the traditional moral or normative rules for political behavior. These men realized that the post-restoration system of open elections made participation by almost anyone possible and that those elected to public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>price (\text{number} \times \text{price})</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate A</td>
<td>4 @ $0.50</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td>1 @ $2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate B</td>
<td>4 @ $0.75</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td>1 @ $3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate C</td>
<td>4 @ $1.25</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>2 @ $2.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
office, especially on the higher levels, could easily use their elected position to
derive economic advantages for themselves, their businesses, and the businesses
of their families. They became actively involved in politics.

So anxious were these people to win election and thus secure advantages for
themselves, they used any and all means to win. Buying votes became a common
practice. In 1957-1958, a villager vote for (county) assemblyman could be bought
for a few packs of cigarettes or some bath towels and soap. The villagers,
however in their own way were extremely moral on the issue of selling their
votes; as several villagers pointed out, “you can accept a gift from only one
candidate and then you are obligated to vote for him.” [Emphasis added; footnote
omitted.]

Such gifts were illegal, but could be distributed by the candidate’s friends at night with little
danger of official interference.

Soap and towels are not so strange a gift as they might at first seem, for these are also used
on some other ceremonial occasions, such as weddings and funerals. (So are cigarettes, though not
in packs.) As stereotyped vehicles for the expression of sentiment (such as gratitude on the part of
the bereaved for the sympathy of outsiders) they are (or until recently were) well incorporated into
a wedding or funeral. Indeed the sentiments commonly felt on those occasions by bereaved and
guests alike are so integral a part of the rites themselves, that it is hard to determine whether a son
wails more because he is grieved at the death of his father or because wailing is prescribed by the
ceremony at that point.

Similarly the requirements of etiquette at these occasions are formally incorporated into
ritualized forms, and the presentation of a hand towel or formerly of soap is a conventionalized
expression of appreciation on the part of the host of his guest’s concern for an event of family and
personal significance to the host. Whatever his actual motives the implication when a political
candidate makes such presentations is also that of humble gratitude for the interest and
solicitousness of the prospective voter in the candidate’s welfare. The form effectively expresses
this notion. (1)

(1) In Băo’ān, unlike Hsin Hsing, there seemed to be little association of gift-
giving with the infiltration of “black society” underworldlings into the political
system. “Black society” or not, however, there was an influx of new blood into
the political arena, and it is reasonable to attribute the beginnings of gift-giving
for votes to the beginnings of competition among candidates, quite aside from
their being or not being “black society” people.

The similarity between a candidate and a host breaks down, however, in that candidates
compete for voters, while hosts seldom compete for guests. Not only do weddings and funerals
seldom present conflicting demands upon a potential guest, but Chinese etiquette allows a guest to
leave one gathering early to attend another. For a voter candidates are always in conflict for his
attention, and no option is available to allow him to vote for both of them (though such a system
might be a most interesting development). The prior presentation of gifts of appreciation by a
candidate, although implying their candidate’s most courteous thanks, and indebtedness for a
personal favor, takes place in a situation which of necessity cannot be handled by the voter in the
way in which he can handle notice of a funeral or an invitation to a wedding. By accepting the gift,
the voter is acknowledging that the candidate is legitimately in his debt, i.e., that he will cast his vote for the candidate who presented him the gift. But there were strains in this: it was embarrassing to have to refuse such a gift, as well as potentially impolitic to be known to have refused to support an ultimately successful candidate.

As in Hsin Hsing, Bā’ān informants maintain no-one accepted the soap or towel without being willing to deliver the vote. Just as one would not attend a funeral without having offered a condolence gift, so one would not accept the soap or towel from a candidate without a symbolic offer going the other way. The point, I think, was one of honor. For people not related by kinship or friendship to the candidate or his immediate kinsmen or friends, one candidate was pretty much like another, and the fair exchange of a family’s votes for a candidate’s towel (both symbolic items) was considered a gentlemanly and ordinary sort of thing, even if refusals were occasionally awkward. (1)

(1) The basis for voting would be quite different, presumably, if the candidates were less similar. In Taiwan candidates do not differ in extreme ways in their positions on public issues. S. Popkin (personal communication) points out that in pre-communist South Vietnam, in contrast, candidates often stood for quite different courses of public action, and when this happened, votes were very much tied to the evaluation of the candidate as a potential government officer, not to agreements over towels or the price of votes. Towels and cash are apparently fall-back bases for decision making when no substantial policy differences are seen to be implied by the victory of one candidate rather than another. The Taiwan case has factored out extreme differences among candidates, allowing the underlying logic of choosing candidates according to non-political criteria to show more clearly.

The Candidate As Customer (1964-1968)

The transformation of gifts from symbolic towels to cash payments seems to have begun about the time of the 1964 election. The use of money changed the analogy somewhat. It is difficult to know exactly how the transformation occurred, although the amounts of money initially substituted for the towels were apparently quite small and may have been just as purely symbolic as towels — in Chinese etiquette money may be part of symbolic exchanges far more freely than in America. The use of money apparently very soon came to give the transaction a more commercial quality, however, and such terms as “calculation” and numbers of “dollars per vote” came to be used in discussing campaign strategy. Although towels had been “presented” (sòng 送), the money contrast was “given” (gěi 給) to the voter, who “sold” (mài 賣) his vote to a candidate who “bought” (mǎi 買) it. The candidate was now in the position of a customer paying in advance for delivery at a later date.

Initially the analogy of the will-call customer seemed to hold good. Taiwanese shops sometimes display a sign reading “we cheat neither the very young nor the very old” (giving rise to a popular jest that the middle-aged are to be on their guard). Like the merchant who does not cheat even the vulnerable, the voter seems to have felt he should not cheat a vote-buying candidate, rendered vulnerable by the secrecy of the ballot-box. People in an area would feel rather awkward,
one informant explained to me, if a candidate saw that the distribution of votes in his favor was less than he had paid for.

But the analogy of commerce proved no more viable than the analogy of formal courtesy. In real commerce an order is placed with a single merchant, not thousands of them. Delivery of merchandise can be supervised by the customer, and non-delivery of the merchandise pits the customer (with the law and public opinion on his side) against a single merchant who is vulnerable in that he can lose business by a bad name. The customer rarely needs do more than attract a crowd, the saying goes, and the merchant readily comes around.

The candidate has a harder time of it. The secret ballot makes it impossible for him to supervise the delivery of votes. And when he gets fewer votes than he bought, he has no way to identify the “merchants” who cheated him. The law is not on his side either, for buying votes is illegal. (1) And the threat of driving away other “customers” or withdrawing his own “business” is ineffective when the next “sale” is not until the next election. Indeed one could reason that a village would always have customers even if it defected from a customer previously, for the defection was necessarily in favor of another candidate, who also bought votes, and got his money’s worth.

(1) Enforcement is obviously a problem, but efforts are made, and the possibility of legal punishment is a very real one. In Xīgāng, at least, the example is well remembered of a former township leader who spent six months in jail for vote buying and now lives in self-imposed exile in a distant city out of embarrassment.

Further the morality of Chinese business practice does not stop at moral maxims on how to be an honest businessman. Rather it admits the legitimacy and even necessity of controls to avoid one party having complete and arbitrary control of the situation to the disadvantage of the other. The electoral “business” lacked those controls. It is possible that the arrangement would have held together better than it did, however, had not the “customers” aggravated the “merchants” by changing their prices, paying at different scales, and backing off of their promises. Many people felt embarrassed by the results of the election. But just as many or most people seemed to feel that the candidates merited what they got as just reward for an unscrupulous campaign marked by variations in the price per vote and a final price lower than that originally anticipated.

When the price got high enough to provide a temptation to win easy cash, the potential vague shame of the entire community if the votes were not distributed as bought became a trivial concern. It was not possible to trace which of the voters sold votes more than once, after all, without central collation of records belonging to different candidates (an unlikely event), and even if an accusing finger could be accurately pointed at some dissembling voter, nothing could be done about it, particularly by the candidate financially and politically weakened by defeat. A victorious candidate was obviously unlikely to launch an investigation into the unsavory details of his victory. The temptation toward free cash apparently was too much, and even “the very young and the very old” paid for more than they got as customer-candidates.

It would be going too far to generalize that cash is thicker than honor, however, even though in this case cash seems to have been. In this case, the cash prices had gone high, and the honor of the candidates had been damaged in the course of the process. As a result, although cash in the pocket of the individual voting family was being balanced against the vague sense of honor or dishonor of an entire community, it was honor or dishonor only in the only eyes of losing candidates already coming to be regarded as unscrupulous reprobates. With a choice between much
money in hand and unauditable honor in the eyes of the dishonorable, the balance tipped, and families succumbed to the not unnatural temptation of using the secrecy of the ballot box to protect their individual breeches of contract and to try to exploit each vote for the possible cash value by selling it several times.

Honor however was not abandoned. At least in Xīgāng, if some families felt pangs of guilt (or shame) about the possibility of their communities being thought less than honest, they could console themselves with the thought that the politicians were themselves behaving less than honorably by constantly changing the rules about what a vote was worth. And many families also tried to maintain a sense of honorable behavior by distributing their votes in proportion to the generosity with which individual candidates had approached them, as we saw in the example from Jiālī in Table 4.

The commercial analogy thus broke down in 1968. The analogy was not, for reasons we have seen, an appropriate one in fundamental structural respects, but its breakdown was associated not only with its inherent logical weaknesses but, at least in the Xīgāng area, also with local conflicts among candidates that exacerbated those weaknesses and provided the ideology as well as the temptation for taking advantage of lack of mercantile controls.

Public Heroes: The Next Step

Both voters and candidates are well aware of what they are doing. The problem was not ignorance of the models of the problems in the models, or of the risks in following them. Rather the miscalculation came in estimating the relative weights of the factors influencing the distribution of the vote and hence the viability of a model known to be imperfect.

After the election, speculation returned to a new native model that had been proposed a time or two during the campaign. We might call this the “public hero” model. If buying votes is ineffective because of secrecy at the polls, it was reasoned, the only way to win an election is by convincing people that you are the person they really want to have win it. And the way to do that is to demonstrate yourself a benefactor of humanity by building public works. Unlike individual payments to voters, public works can be constructed legally by the candidate and can bear his name. The contribution to the Zhāng surname-group’s cult activities is perhaps an example of this. Other proposed projects were a public telephone in the village, paving of dirt roads, and construction of bridges over irrigation canals. It was understood that candidates would be in competition once again, and once again they could have no guarantee of the gratitude of the community expressing itself at the polls. The advantage would be that the competition would be more visible and hence controllable. “And besides,” said one informant, “the individual payments obviously aren’t going to work any more.”

The relationship between a voter and a candidate is only one of a number of relationships that are involved in the pattern of voting in Chinese local elections, of course. We have seen that votes were cast on the basis of considerations of village face, kinship ties, friendship with other supporters, and so on. No information is available on the extent to which kinship or friendship ties among voters may have changed during the process of trying one model after another of the basic relationship between voter and candidate with no prior tie to each other.

One of the most striking and important relationships that has clearly not been much affected is the relationship among voters in an individual family. The election “breakdown” of 1968 was a
breakdown in village solidarity perhaps, but it was by no means a breakdown in family solidarity. It was families that decided to undertake the multiple sale of their votes, and the votes of a single family have consistently been promised or sold as a block and have been cast (as far as anyone knows) in accordance with the prearranged decisions of the family itself.

I noted earlier that the anonymity of the ballot box protects the nonconformist family member who, brimming over with public-school morality, decides to make his own decision contrary to the family strategy. However that incidences of this were traditionally low is evidenced by the same ability to predict election outcomes that demonstrated the low rate of defection from promises in earlier elections. And the general admission that families followed other family strategies accounts for the 1968 election without any reference to the possibility of individual defections within the bosom of the family. The election breakdown was a breakdown in the system of loyalties between voting families and candidates, not within the families themselves, which may even have been strengthened by their position as co-conspirators. I collected no confessions of anyone having defected from a family decision, no accusations of others having done so, and no suggestions that it might have occurred somewhere. The thought, so far as I could tell, never occurred to anyone that such a thing could happen.

I do not know whether subsequent elections in this part of Taiwan have seen the predicted competitions in public works projects or not. An attempt to elicit some information about this in 1976 was unsuccessful because I was not living in the village during an election then; there was little interest in discussing the matter, few individual issues were on people’s minds, and there was greater reluctance to wash dirty linen in front of me. People seemed content to say that nothing had changed much and let it go at that. An ethnographer who spends an election year in a politically divided village can collect this kind of information. One who seeks to learn it after the fact cannot.

It does not really affect my point here one way or another. The rural people of southwestern Taiwan are still experimenting with the use of traditional social relationships to find one that can be appropriated for the use of political candidates and their constituencies. The introduction of an electoral system in and of itself did not provide viable models for the process of decision-making about vote-casting. It did not produce an instant and uniform “culture of elections”. No clear set of ideas emerged about the relationship between the political candidate and the voter, and accordingly no clear set of ideas emerged about the behavior of one toward the other in the course of their co-operative enterprise of selecting local leaders. In the confusion, it is not surprising that indigenous models and the symbols appropriate to them emerged to order voting behavior.

But these models have not stood for long because the relationship between candidate and voter is something new in Taiwanese experience, and a new symbolic ordering capable of supporting a stable electoral procedure is still under construction. Meanwhile people must work with what they have.

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