Appendix

The Sources of Government Accountability in the European Union. Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Germany

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Contents

A. Detailed Description of the Data and Conjoint Experiment

My evaluation of how different signals of political competence influence voter support for alternative politicians is based on an original choice-based conjoint survey experiment in the fall of 2016 in Germany. The survey was conducted by *Respondi* over the internet on samples of the adult vote-eligible Germans. The survey received IRB exemption status at the [author's home institution]. All participants were informed that they participated in an experiment, and could not fill out the survey without giving their informed consent. The sample size was 2,540.

The survey results are based on an online survey in which respondents were recruited by Respondi, an international survey firm. Similar to most other online surveys, my sample was somewhat skewed towards the more educated voters (though not necessarily younger). Although I am mostly concerned with testing the internal validity of my theoretical argument, it is possible to use entropy balancing to re-weight the data from the online survey so that it matches the demographic margins from the voter population. In particular, I weighted on age groups, gender, and level of education. The sample is well balanced geographically. Table A-1 shows the demographic margins of the voter population, the raw online sample, and the weighted online sample.

The core of the analysis draws from respondent choices between two alternative politicians presented within a conjoint framework. I devised a fully-randomized conjoint in which each respondent is shown two alternative politicians in comparison and asked to choose between them. This forced-choice design allows me to analyze whether different types of political competence signals affect individuals' vote choice. The fully-randomized design does not force me to make assumptions about the functional form that maps competence signals into support, but allows me to identify the causal effects of the competence signals in a non-parametrical way.

I used two different conjoint experiments. Half of the respondents only received the first treatment; the other half of the respondents only received the second treatment. In the paper, I present the results of the first conjoint experiment. Both conjoint experiments were repeated for two policy fields. The first field is the policy on another financial rescue package for Greece.[1]

[1] In the following, I will use the terms "bailout" and "financial package" simultaneously. In

Group	*Voter Population*	*Online Sample (Raw)*	*Online Sample (Weighted)*
Age 18-29	15.8	15.5	15.8
Age 30-39	13.5	11.8	13.5
Age 40-49	16.2	17.4	16.2
Age 50-59	19.6	18.9	19.6
Age 60+	34.8	36.5	34.9
Male	49	51	49
Low Level of Education	40.4	23.8	40.2
Medium Level of Education	29.4	39.5	29.6
High Level of Education	29.5	24.9	30.1

Table A-1.: Demographics of the Survey Sample (in %). The table presents data on the demographic margins of the voter population, the raw online sample, and the weighted online sample. Data on the voter population are from the German statistical office (`http://www.destatis.de`) for the year 2015 (the most recent data available). Data on age groups are calculated for December 2015 based on the German census of 2011.

The second field is the policy on allowing for more immigration of refugees and asylum seekers into the European Union.[2]

I started out by asking respondents on their position on both policy issues. The question on financial aid for Greece was phrased as:[3]

> "Now, we are interested in your opinion about the debt crisis in Greece. Some believe that Greece should receive another financial rescue package from the EU. Others believe that Greece should not receive another financial rescue package from the EU. In general, how much are you in support for or in opposition to another financial rescue package for Greece?

The question on immigration policies was phrased as:[4]

> "Now, we are interested in your opinion on the European refugee policies. Last year, more than one million people have tried to immigrate into the EU. Some believe that the EU should accept more refugees. Others believe that the EU should not accept further refugees. Are you generally for or against accepting the immigration of further refugees into the EU?"

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the survey, I exclusively used the term "financial rescue package" (*Finanzhilfe*) as the term bailout tends to carry negative connotations.

[2]The terms "refugee," "immigrant," and "asylum seeker" are concepts to refer to different groups. In the survey, I decided to use the German word for refugee (*Flüchtling*) even though the current debate focuses more on asylum seekers who illegally enter the borders of the EU. However, the media tends to refer to the term refugee, and much of the public debate connotes the term in this matter. In the following, my discussion will therefore use the words "immigrants" and "refugees" interchangeably to refer to both refugees and asylum seekers.

[3]The question is translated from the German survey question: "Wir sind nun an Ihrer Meinung zur Schuldenkrise in Griechenland interessiert. Manche sind der Auffassung, dass Griechenland von der Europischen Union weitere Finanzhilfe erhalten sollte. Andere sind der Auffassung, dass Griechenland von der Europischen Union keine weitere Finanzhilfe erhalten sollte. Wie sehr sind Sie im Allgemeinen fr oder gegen weitere Finanzhilfe fr Griechenland?"

[4]The question was translated from the German question: "Jetzt sind wir an Ihrer Meinung zur europischen Flchtlingspolitik interessiert. Im vergangenen Jahr haben mehr als eine Million Menschen versucht, in die EU einzureisen. Manche sind der Auffassung, dass man weitere Einwanderer aufnehmen sollte. Andere hingegen sind der Auffassung, dass man keine weiteren Einwanderer aufnehmen sollte. Sind Sie eher fr oder eher gegen die Aufnahme weiterer Flchtlinge in der Europischen Union?"

For both policies, answer categories ranged from strongly in favor, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed, somewhat opposed, to strongly opposed.[5] The responses served as important baseline on which to draw expectations about respondents' reactions to politician's policy positions.

In addition, I asked respondents whether they believe that Germany's membership in the EU is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither a good nor a bad thing.[6]

The policy opinion questions were followed by the conjoint experiment. The directions for the conjoint experiment appeared two pages before the respondent began choosing between politicians. First, respondents were given detailed instructions. For the bailout conjoint, these instructions were:[7]

> Further financial aid for Greece would require negotiations between EU members. These negotiations also involve German politicians. These politicians can represent different opinions and have more or less influence on the outcomes of the negotiations. We will now show you some examples of such a negotiation behavior. We will show you among other things:
>
> - the position which the politician represented at the start of negotiations,
> - the position for which the politician voted at the end of the negotiations, and
> - the final result
>
> We will always show you two possible scenarios to compare. For each comparison, we would like to know which of the two politicians you would prefer if there was an election next Sunday. Even if you like or dislike both politicians equally, please let us know which one you would prefer to the other. In addition, we will ask you how likely you would vote for each politician if there was an election next Sunday. There are neither correct nor incorrect

[5] I randomly reversed the ranking of the response categories.

[6] The question was translated from the German question: "Ist die Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands in der Europischen Union Ihrer Meinung nach eine gute Sache, eine schlechte Sache, oder weder eine gute noch eine schlechte Sache? " I randomly reversed the ranking of response categories. Non-responses were possible.

[7] The exact German expression is available upon request.

responses for this question. *Please read the scenarios carefully before you make a decision.*

For the immigration conjoint, the instructions were:

> EU member states currently negotiate about a common refugee policy, in order to react to the increase of refugees in the EU. hese negotiations also involve German politicians. These politicians can represent different opinions and have more or less influence on the outcomes of the negotiations. We will now show you some examples of such a negotiation behavior. We will show you among other things:
>
> - the position which the politician represented at the start of negotiations,
> - the position for which the politician voted at the end of the negotiations, and
> - the final result
>
> We will always show you two possible scenarios to compare. For each comparison, we would like to know which of the two politicians you would prefer if there was an election next Sunday. Even if you like or dislike both politicians equally, please let us know which one you would prefer to the other. In addition, we will ask you how likely you would vote for each politician if there was an election next Sunday. There are neither correct nor incorrect responses for this question. *Please read the scenarios carefully before you make a decision.*

Respondents could not proceed to the next page until they spent at least ten seconds on the page with these instructions. On the next page, respondents were shown Figure A-1 with further instructions, explaining to them that the figure shows attributes of two possible politicians that they have to choose between, and informing them that the order of the features can vary.

Each respondent was shown two such binary comparisons for each policy field. For each politician that a given respondent considered, I measured a variable *Politician Support* and coded it 1 if the individual chose to vote for



Figure A-1.: Screenshot of Conjoint Instructions.

that politician, and 0 if she or he did not. In addition to asking respondents which of the two politicians they prefer, I asked:[8]

> "If you could vote on each of these agreements in a referendum, how likely is it that you would vote in favor or against each of the agreements? Please give your answer on the following scale from definitely against (1) to definitely in favor (10)."

This measure provides an assessment of the absolute support for a given politician.

Table A-2 shows the dimensions used in the conjoint experiment. All values were randomly assigned to each dimension based on the list of values in Table A-3 (the order of categories was also randomized). I added a number of politician characteristics that have been demonstrated to affect voter choice in past research. Aside from the politician's gender and political experience, whether the politician's partisanship is similar to the respondent's partisanship should play a crucial role in their vote choice.

	Politician A	**Politician B**
Negotiation Position in the EU		
Voting Behavior in the EU		
Negotiation Outcome in the EU		
Partisan Affiliation		
Gender		
Political Experience (in years)		
Your Choice	◯	◯

Table A-2.: Conjoint Experimental Design

[8] Half of the respondents received the answer categories in reverse order. The question was translated from the German survey question: "Wenn am nächsten Sonntag eine Wahl stattfände, wie wahrscheinlich wäre es, dass Sie den jeweiligen Politiker wählen würden? Bitte geben Sie Ihre Antwort auf einer Skala von sehr unwahrscheinlich (1) bis sehr wahrscheinlich (10).

Dimension	**Possible Values**	
	Financial Package	**Refugees**
Negotiation Position in the EU	In favor of financial aid Against financial aid	In favor of more refugees Against more refugees
Voting Behavior in the EU	In favor of financial aid Against financial aid	In favor of more refugees Against more refugees
Negotiation Outcome in the EU	More financial aid No more financial aid	More refugees No more Refugees
Partisan Affiliation	CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Greens	CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Greens
Gender	Male Female	Male Female
Political Experience (in years)	0 2 4 6 8 10	0 2 4 6 8 10

Table A-3.: Dimensions and Values for the Conjoint Experiment on Position Defending Behavior

B. Calculated Variables – Conjoint Experiment

Theoretically, I expect that vote choice does not depend on the absolute position that politicians have on particular issues but on their positions, strategies and success relative to the respondent's opinion on the issue. The same holds for electoral accountability that is based on diffuse regime support. For the main analysis, I therefore calculated the following variables:

- *Similarity of Partisanship* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the partisanship of the politician (CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, or FDP) is similar to the partisanship of the respondent, and zero otherwise.
- *Similarity of Gender* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the gender of the politician (male, female) is similar to the gender of the respondent, and zero otherwise.
- *Defense* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's position is similar to her or his final vote choice, and zero otherwise.
- *Success* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's vote choice is similar to the final outcome of the negotiation, and zero otherwise.
- *Responsive Position* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's position was similar to the politician's position.
- *Nonresponsive Position* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's position was not similar to the politician's position.
- *Responsive Vote* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's position was similar to the politician's vote choice.
- *Nonresponsive Vote* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the respondent's position was not similar to the politician's vote choice.
- *Anti-EU Position* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's position was the anti-EU position (less immigration, no bailout).

- *Pro-EU Position* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's position was the pro-EU position (more immigration, bailout).
- *Anti-EU Vote* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's vote choice was the anti-EU vote (less immigration, no bailout).
- *Pro-EU Vote* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the politician's vote choice was the pro-EU vote (more immigration, bailout).

In addition, in some policy specific support models I split the sample by respondents who support the policy and those who oppose it. I used responses of participants on their policy positions, and measured those as supporters of the policy whose value was 3 or smaller on the 5-point scale (1 being strongly in favor); opponents were those whose value on the scale was above 3 (with 5 being strongly opposed). In some diffuse regime support models, I split the sample by respondents who support EU membership and those who do not support EU membership (here, I exclude respondents who picked the "neither/nor" category).

C. Full Model Results – Conjoint Experiments

Full Tables for Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)

	Immigration		Bailout	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Negotiation Position	-0.024**	0.022*	-0.022**	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Vote Choice	-0.048**	0.020**	-0.030**	0.024**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Negotiation Outcome	-0.049**	0.011	-0.024**	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Partisanship	0.060**	0.030*	0.045**	0.065**
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.019)
Gender	0.009	-0.005	0.002	0.021**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Experience in Years (2)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.044**	0.001
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Experience in Years (4)	-0.005	0.005	-0.027	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Experience in Years (6)	0.013	0.004	-0.037**	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Experience in Years (8)	-0.003	-0.000	-0.037**	-0.010
	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Experience in Years (10)	0.001	0.013	-0.021	0.030**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Constant	0.553**	0.469**	0.562**	0.460**
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Observations	2484	1960	2364	2080

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 4 (Negotiation Position and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)

	Immigration		Bailout	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Negotiation Position	-0.021	0.020*	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Vote Choice	-0.067**	-0.006	-0.026	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Negotiation Outcome	-0.076**	0.007	-0.006	-0.010
	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Partisanship	0.177*	0.041**	0.001	0.061**
	(0.104)	(0.016)	(0.052)	(0.017)
Gender	0.008	-0.004	0.020	0.000
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(0.009)
Experience in Years (2)	-0.015	0.008	-0.026	-0.000
	(0.034)	(0.016)	(0.030)	(0.018)
Experience in Years (4)	-0.039	-0.002	-0.046	-0.002
	(0.036)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.017)
Experience in Years (6)	-0.006	0.007	-0.050*	0.011
	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.014)
Experience in Years (8)	-0.044	-0.006	-0.024	-0.003
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.017)
Experience in Years (10)	0.011	-0.007	0.023	0.012
	(0.043)	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.014)
Constant	0.593**	0.487**	0.541**	0.489**
	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Observations	720	2040	720	2040

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)

	(Immigration)		(Bailout)	
	Responsive	Nonresponsive	Responsive	Nonresponsive
Defense	0.036**	-0.040**	0.030**	-0.024*
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Partisanship	0.042	0.041	0.070**	0.039*
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Gender	0.008	-0.002	0.009	0.014
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Experience in Years	-0.005	0.006	-0.025	-0.020
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Experience in Years	-0.006	0.011	-0.026	0.006
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Experience in Years	-0.012	0.036*	-0.041**	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Experience in Years	0.005	-0.006	-0.030*	-0.018
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Experience in Years	0.011	-0.003	-0.015	0.017
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Constant	0.488**	0.500**	0.506**	0.495**
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Observations	2247	2197	2233	2211

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 6a (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support – Financial Aid for Greece)

	Anti-EU Position		Pro-EU Position	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Defense	0.028	-0.021	-0.018	0.006
	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.033)	(0.020)
Partisanship	0.009	0.058*	0.008	0.065**
	(0.101)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.031)
Gender	0.025	-0.020	0.021	0.015
	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.016)
Experience in Years (2)	-0.038	-0.013	-0.017	0.009
	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.042)	(0.029)
Experience in Years (4)	-0.079	-0.019	-0.010	0.012
	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.026)
Experience in Years (6)	-0.099	0.002	-0.006	0.019
	(0.071)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.023)
Experience in Years (8)	-0.028	-0.013	-0.033	0.008
	(0.050)	(0.032)	(0.062)	(0.029)
Experience in Years (10)	0.009	0.024	0.029	0.003
	(0.065)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Constant	0.528**	0.518**	0.499**	0.473**
	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.021)
Observations	346	969	374	1071

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 6b (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support – Immigration)

	Anti-EU Position		Pro-EU Position	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Defense	0.057*	0.007	-0.082**	-0.003
	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.019)
Partisanship	0.090	0.045	0.273	0.045
	(0.102)	(0.031)	(0.173)	(0.033)
Gender	-0.001	-0.022	0.031	0.012
	(0.032)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.017)
Experience in Years (2)	0.000	0.013	-0.053	-0.001
	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.030)
Experience in Years (4)	-0.070	0.016	-0.022	-0.025
	(0.063)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.040)
Experience in Years (6)	-0.017	0.041	-0.023	-0.032
	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.060)	(0.038)
Experience in Years (8)	-0.032	0.021	-0.064	-0.036
	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.033)
Experience in Years (10)	-0.012	-0.026	-0.012	-0.002
	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.074)	(0.033)
Constant	0.504**	0.481**	0.545**	0.515**
	(0.040)	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.028)
Observations	336	1007	384	1033

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)

	(Immigration)		(Bailout)	
	Responsive	Nonresponsive	Responsive	Nonresponsive
Success	0.033**	-0.032**	0.026**	-0.006
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Partisanship	0.033	0.054**	0.060**	0.044**
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Gender	-0.003	0.008	0.029**	-0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Experience in Years (2)	0.012	-0.017	-0.019	-0.022
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Experience in Years (4)	0.019	-0.023	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Experience in Years (6)	0.010	0.010	-0.020	-0.013
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Experience in Years (8)	0.015	-0.019	-0.030	-0.010
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Experience in Years (10)	0.010	-0.000	-0.016	0.022
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Constant	0.488**	0.499**	0.496**	0.495**
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Observations	2234	2210	2248	2196

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 8a (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support – Financial Aid for Greece)

	Anti-EU Position		Pro-EU Position	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Success	0.054**	0.012	0.023	-0.006
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.017)
Partisanship	-0.121**	0.075**	0.033	0.048*
	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.072)	(0.029)
Gender	0.027	-0.019	0.008	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.018)
Experience in Years (2)	0.031	-0.038	-0.072	0.039
	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.067)	(0.035)
Experience in Years (4)	0.031	-0.040	-0.096	0.037
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.032)
Experience in Years (6)	0.021	0.007	-0.103*	0.026
	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.027)
Experience in Years (8)	0.030	-0.080**	-0.064	0.069**
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Experience in Years (10)	0.059	-0.028	-0.009	0.055*
	(0.054)	(0.026)	(0.059)	(0.029)
Constant	0.450**	0.515**	0.530**	0.456**
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.025)
Observations	356	981	364	1059

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

Full Tables for Figure 8b (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support – Immigration)

	Anti-EU Position		Pro-EU Position	
	Opposition	Support	Opposition	Support
Success	0.127**	0.001	-0.060*	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.019)
Partisanship	0.117	0.049	0.208*	0.032
	(0.200)	(0.032)	(0.114)	(0.028)
Gender	0.005	0.008	0.013	-0.016
	(0.038)	(0.017)	(0.033)	(0.018)
Experience in Years (2)	-0.008	0.010	-0.016	0.009
	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.046)	(0.027)
Experience in Years (4)	-0.020	0.007	-0.049	-0.010
	(0.054)	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.031)
Experience in Years (6)	0.091**	0.031	-0.071	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.037)
Experience in Years (8)	0.082	-0.001	-0.160**	-0.008
	(0.061)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.028)
Experience in Years (10)	-0.001	-0.028	0.004	0.013
	(0.094)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.025)
Constant	0.438**	0.490**	0.536**	0.496**
	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.022)
Observations	342	1015	378	1025

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05

D. Results of Regressions without Entropy Weighting

This section presents the main results using models that do not use entropy weighting. Overall, the results are consistent and generally stronger using the unweighted data.

Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 4 (Negotiation Position and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 6 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(a) Bailout



(b) Immigration

Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 8 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(c) Bailout



(d) Immigration

E. Results of Weighted Regressions with Continuous Vote Choice

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions, using as the dependent variable the continuous vote choice of respondents. In particular, after respondents decided which of the politicians they would prefer in the comparisons, I further ask them the following question:

> If there was an election this Sunday, how likely would you vote for each of these politicians?

Respondents rated each politician individually on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).[9] The following tables present results using this dependent variable. The estimations are based on the re-weighted data (see previous section for a discussion).

The results are weaker as expected, but generally robust. The main difference is in Figure 3, where I do not find significant effects on politicians' negotiation positions on vote choice (the results of vote choice are robust), and Figure 6, where I do not find significant effects on position-defending behavior using regime support as underlying dimension.

[9] The order of categories was reversed for half of the respondents.

Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 4 (Negotiation Position and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 6 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(e) Bailout



(f) Immigration

Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 8 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(g) Bailout



(h) Immigration

F. Results of Weighted Regressions (Political Knowledge)

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions on a sub-sample that only includes respondents that answered at least two out of three political knowledge questions correctly. The three questions were:

1. Who is currently the minister of defense in Germany?
2. Which party received the largest number of seats in the German parliament in the general elections of 2013?
3. For how many years are members of the German parliament elected?

Overall, the results are relatively robust to excluding respondents with little political knowledge, and expectedly stronger in some cases.

Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 4 (Negotiation Position and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 6 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(i) Bailout



(j) Immigration

Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 8 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(k) Bailout



(l) Immigration

G. Results of Weighted Regressions (Attention)

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions on a sub-sample that only includes respondents that passed a relatively stringent attention test. Respondents had to answer the following question:

> "We are interested in a number of different topics, including colors. To show that you read this text, please pick the colors red and green from the alternatives below, regardless of your actual favorite color. Yes, please ignore the following question and pick those two colors. What is your favorite color"

The results, graphically depicted below, are slightly weaker than the main results, but still support the theoretical argument.

Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 4 (Negotiation Position and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 6 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(m) Bailout



(n) Immigration

Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 8 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Diffuse Regime Support)



(o) Bailout



(p) Immigration

H. Results of Weighted Regressions (Europhiles)

This section provides the results for re-estimating all main regressions for specific policy support on a sub-sample that only includes respondents considered themselves as pro-EU.

Figure 3 (Position-Taking Strategies and Vote Choice based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 5 (Position-Defending Strategies and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)



Figure 7 (Bargaining Success and Voter Support based on Specific Policy Support)