The Dark Side of Cooperation: When International Organizations Spread Political Vice
Emilie Hafner-Burton, Christina J. Schneider
July, 2016
Abstract
International organizations (IOs) influence a wide variety of domestic political outcomes. Understandably, much of the scholarly literature has focused on the beneficial value these organizations provide to members. Yet depending on the makeup of the organizations, some of the very same mechanisms that incentivize good governance among members can instead incentivize political vice. Our central argument is that state participation in vice-ridden international networks, through upholding memberships in IOs characterized by highly corrupt members, is likely to incentivize that vice domestically. This process may occur for two distinct reasons. The first reason involves monitoring and enforcement—or the lack thereof. Groups of vice-ridden states are highly reticent to monitor or enforce good governance standards against other member states. A second reason is socialization. Leaders may witness the value of political vice to their IO member peers and learn to act the same way. Using a variety of data sources and estimation strategies, we demonstrate that countries that are embedded in a network of highly corrupted IOs are significantly more likely to experience an increase in domestic corruption than are countries embedded in a network of more honest brokers. These findings hold across an array of bad governance indicators and highlight a darker side of international cooperation. IOs can have both positive and negative effects on member governments depending on who is cooperating.Keywords:
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