The Sources of Government Accountability in the European Union. Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in Germany
Christina J. Schneider
January, 2017
Abstract
How do voters hold their governments accountable for their policy choices in the European Union? This paper analyzes two sources of government accountability in the EU: diffuse regime support and specific policy support. I argue that specific preferences over particular policies induces voters to reward and punish governments for their policy actions at the EU level. Their diffuse support for European integration should be particularly important for opponents of the EU who have incentives to punish their governments for pursuing policies that are in the European interest. To analyze my theoretical argument, I present the results of a conjoint experiment that I conducted in a survey of over 2,500 Germans in the fall of 2016. The results reveal that both specific and diffuse support matter. Voters are more likely to vote for politicians who represent their favored policy position, defend this position throughout the negotiations, and those who are successful in achieving their preferred outcome. At the same time, the level of regime support tends to matter mainly for Eurosceptic voters who blame governments for taking and defending pro-EU positions and rewarding them for taking and defending anti-EU positions.Keywords:
European Union, electoral accountability, Germany, conjoint experiment