Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation: The Case of the European Development Fund
Christina J. Schneider, Johannes Urpelainen
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 58, No. 1. (Forthcoming, 2013), pp. 120-142.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments' willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments' financial contributions to the European Development Fund. The empirical analyses robustly demonstrate that partisan heterogeneity reduces governments' incentives to contribute to European cooperation on international development. On a more general level, we offer new perspective on the role of domestic politics in international cooperation.Keywords:
partisan politics, international cooperation, European Union