**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION**

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION ON VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION

Given concerns about the endogeneity of views on immigration, we endeavored to use ANES panel data to determine whether current party attachments predicted changes in how individual viewed immigration and immigrants. In the text of the paper, we present results from the basic results for 2008-2010 ANES panel.

Here we extend that analysis and presents results from the 2000-2004 and 1992-1996 panels. The key barrier in this analysis is that the ANES does not consistently include questions on immigration. In the 2008-2010 panel, only 2008 and 2009 have questions on immigration. In the 1992-1996 panel, only the 1992 wave includes immigration questions.

For the 92-96 panel, we were able to assess the effects of immigration views in 1992 on changes in party identification. The next table shows that whites’ views on their preferred level of immigration in 1992 have a significant effect on subsequent changes in their partisanship. Those who favor increased immigration are significantly more likely to shift away from the Republican Party than those who favored decreased immigration and the effects are substantial. A one standard deviation shift in immigration views is associated with .37 shift in the 7 point party identification scale.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assessing Temporal Causality: Immigration’s Impact on Subsequent Changes in Party Identification (DV is Party Identification measured in 1993)** | |
| **Party Identification (1992) (high=Rep)** | .85 (.02)\*\* |
| **Preferred Immigration Level (1992)**  **(high = increase immigration)** | -.12 (.04)\* \* |
| **N** | 572 |
| **Adj. R Squared** | .72 |
| **F** | 739 \*\*\* |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

The next table demonstrates that views on immigration in 1992 predict subsequent changes in partisanship even after controlling for a range of relevant issues.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assessing Temporal Causality: Immigration’s Impact on Subsequent Changes in Party Identification (DV is Party Identification measured in 1993)** | |
| **Party Identification (1992) (High=Rep)** | .81 (.03)\*\* |
| **Preferred Immigration Level (1992)**  **(high = increase immigration)** | -.10 (.05)\* |
| **Lib-Cons Ideology (high=cons)** | .06 (.02)\* |
| **Spending vs Taxes (high=taxes)** | .02 (.03) |
| **Warmth toward Military** | .00 (.01) |
| **Favor Gays in Armed Forces** | -.04 (.02) |
| **Increase Welfare Spending** | -.05 (.05) |
| **Support Abortion** | -.03 (.04) |
| **Favor Women’s Equality** | -.01 (.03) |
| **Help Blacks** | -.06 (.02)\* |
| **Favor Affirmative Action** | -.01 (.03) |
| **Increase Environmental Spending** | -.02 (.05) |
| **Education** | .00 (.01) |
| **Income** | -.00 (.01) |
| **Age** | -.00 (.01) |
| **Female** | -.05 (.09) |
| **N** | 571 |
| **Adj. R Squared** | .72 |
| **F** | 94 \*\* |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

For the 2000-2004 panel, we were able to examine the effects of immigration views in 2000 on party identification in 2002 and the effects of immigration views in 2002 on party identification in 2004. The effects of the immigration across the different waves are nearly identical. For brevity we present the results for the 2002 immigration views. The following table demonstrates that attitudes on border spending in 2002 significant predict future party identification net the effect of current party identification. Again the effect is substantial. A one standard shift in immigration views is associated with a .40 shift on the party identification scale.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assessing Temporal Causality: Immigration’s Impact on Subsequent Changes in Party Identification (DV is Party Identification measured in 2004)** | |
| **Party Identification (2002) (high=Rep)** | .94 (.02)\*\* |
| **Favor Increased Border Spending (2002)** | .17 (.08)\* |
| **N** | 654 |
| **Adj. R Squared** | .78 |
| **F** | 1142 \*\* |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

We can also use the 2000-2004 to assess the reverse causal effects of party identification on immigration views. The following table shows that lagged party identification does, in fact, predict subsequent views on immigration after controlling for lagged immigration views. The size of the effect here is marginally smaller. A one standard deviation shift in party identification is linked with a .15 shift in the 3 point border spending question. The relationship between party identification and immigrant-related views is reciprocal.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assessing Temporal Causality: Party Identification’s Impact on Subsequent Changes in Views on Immigration (DV is Border Spending Views measured in 2004)** | |
| **Favor Increased Border Spending (2002)** | .29 (.03)\*\* |
| **Party Identification (2002) (high=Rep)** | .03 (.01)\*\* |
| **N** | 657 |
| **Adj. R Squared** | .24 |
| **F** | 105 \*\* |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

TESTING THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES ON THE VOTE

In the text of the article, we outline and illustrate the effects of immigration on vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. Below we present the underlying regression results. These results confirm the important role that attitudes on immigration play for vote choice

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Views on Immigration and the White Presidential Vote – 2008 ANES** | | |
| **Support for the Republican Candidate in 2008 Presidential Elections** | | |
|  | **Vote Choice** | **Intended Vote Choice** |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  |
| **View on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive views)** | -.66 (.34)\*\* | -.62 (.27)\* |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  |
| **Education** | .10 (.09) | .07 (.08) |
| **Income** | .01 (.03) | -.02 (.03) |
| **Unemployed** | -2.75 (.93)\*\* | -1.5 (.68)\* |
| **Age** | -.00 (.01) | .02 (.01) |
| **Female** | .25 (.38) | -.22 (.31) |
| **Married** | .59 (.36) | .54 (.29) |
| **Union Member** | -17 (.49) | -.80 (.44) |
| **Jewish** | 1.25 (1.1) | 1.3 (.95) |
| **Catholic** | .73 (.48) | .37 (.39) |
| **Protestant** | -.26 (.45) | -.47 (.37) |
| **IDEOLOGY/PARTY ID** |  |  |
| **Liberal-Conservative (high=cons)** | 1.19 (.46)\*\* | .65 (.33)\* |
| **Party Identification (high=Rep)** | .82 (.12)\*\* | .76 (.09)\*\* |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Expand War on Terror**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | -.05 (.11)  -.18 (.12)  -.18 (.11) | -.02 (.08)  .15 (.10)  .13 (.10) |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **Approve President** | .30 (.29)  .66 (.16) | .42 (.22)  .55 (.13)\*\* |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes on Rich**  **Increase Welfare Spending** | -.33 (.18)  -.03 (.10) | -.26 (.15)  -.01 (.01) |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Favor Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | -.39 (.14)\*\*  .10 (.10) | -.03 (.01)\*\*  -.06 (.08) |
| **Other Racial Considerations**  **Warmth Toward Blacks**  **Warmth Toward Asians**  **Warmth Toward Whites** | .00 (.01)  -.04 (.02)\*  .03 (.01)\* | -.02 (.01)  -.01 (.01)  .01 (.01) |
| **Constant** | -3.04 (2.3) | .06 (1.8)\*\* |
| **N** | 556 | 633 |
| **Pseudo Squared** | .68 | .61 |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION VIEWS WITHIN EACH PARTY

To further test the role of immigrant and Latino views on the vote, we assessed the impact of immigrant-related views within each party. By looking *within* party, we get another look at how attitudes toward immigration matter beyond partisanship. Specifically, we separated out self-identified Democrats, Independents, and Republicans in the 2008 ANES.

The results follow an expected pattern as illustrated below. Among those who claim ties to the Democratic Party, views of illegal immigrants are significantly related to vote choice. The vast majority of Democrats vote for Obama but those who have more negative views of illegal immigrants are 6.5 percent less likely to vote for Obama than those with more positive views of illegal immigrants. This is a small sign that immigration is pushing whites Democrats away from their party. By contrast, the results indicate that views toward immigrants matter little for Republicans. This is, however, what we would expect to find if immigration is pushing whites in one direction—toward the Republican Party. Also as one might expect, views toward immigrants and Latinos have the largest impact on non-partisans. White independents who hold more negative views of immigrants are 67.7 percent more likely to vote for McCain than white independents who hold more positive views of immigrants.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Views on Immigration and the Presidential Vote – By Partisanship – 2008 ANES** | | | | |
|  | **Vote for Republican Candidate….** | | |  |
|  | **Among Democratic Identifiers** | **Among Republican Identifiers** | **Among Independents** |  |
|  |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  |  |  |
| **Views on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive)** | -2.62 (.93)\*\* | .17 (.53) | -1.46 (.48)\*\* |  |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  |  |  |
| **Education** | .32 (.21) | .10 (.14) | .02 (.14) |  |
| **Income** | -.11 (.08) | .09 (.05) | .03 (.05) |  |
| **Age** | .03 (.03) | -.01 (.02) | -.01 (.02) |  |
| **Female** | -.07 (.84) | 1.01 (.62) | -.19 (.52) |  |
| **Married** | 1.22 (.72) | .31 (.57) | .35 (.49) |  |
| **Union Member** | .76 (.92) | -- | -.06 (.62) |  |
| **Jewish** | 5.47 (2.09)\*\* | -- | 2.59 (1.56) |  |
| **Catholic** | 1.71 (1.08) | -.27 (.83) | .63 (.65) |  |
| **Protestant** | 1.30 (1.03) | -.72 (67) | -.52 (.67) |  |
| **IDEOLOGY** |  |  |  |  |
| **Liberal-conservative** | 2.45 (1.25)\* | 1.48 (.62)\* | 1.78 (.69)\* |  |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Expand War on Terror**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | .12 (.23)  .64 (.27)\*  .34 (.25) | .01 (.16)  .12 (.17)  .11 (.17) | .09 (.15)  .24 (.18)  .30 (.16) |  |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **Approve President** | .45 (.98)  1.15 (.40)\*\* | .19 (38)  .58 (.22)\*\* | .33 (.44)  .87 (.26)\*\* |  |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes on Rich**  **Increase Welfare Spending** | -.46 (.37)  .01 (.20) | -.32 (.27)  -.44 (.19)\* | -.34 (.26)  -.08 (.13) |  |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Favor Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | -.55 (.28)\*  .24 (.24) | -.35 (.23)  .05 (.15) | -.28 (.18)  .03 (.14) |  |
| **Other Racial Considerations**  **Warmth Toward Blacks**  **Warmth Toward Asians**  **Warmth Toward Whites** | -.03 (.04)  -.05 (.03)  .08 (.03)\* | .00 (.02)  -.03 (.02)  -.00 (.02) | .04 (.03)  -.04 (.03)  .02 (.02) |  |
| **Constant** | -8.5 (6.3) | -1.9 (3.5) | -1.5 (3.2) |  |
| **N** | 232 | 262 | 183 |  |
| **Pseudo R Squared** | .55 | .31 | .47 |  |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

CONTROL VARIABLES FOR 2008 ANES

One of the most difficult aspects of this empirical endeavor is ensuring that we include controls for all of the different factors that could drive white’s electoral decisions and be correlated with white views on immigration. With that in mind, we include measures for: 1) basic ideology – the standard seven point liberal-conservative self-placement scale (from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative”); 2) war, terrorism, and security – “Do you approve/disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in Afghanistan?” “Do you approve/disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in Iraq?” and “Should federal spending on the war on terrorism be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?”; 3) the economy and retrospective evaluations –“Do you approve/disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?” and “Would you say that over the past year the nation’s economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?”; 4) redistribution – “People who make more money should pay a larger percent of their income in taxes to the government than people who make less money,” and “Should federal spending on the welfare be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?”; 5) morality and religion - “Do you strongly favor… strongly oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination” and “Is religion an important part of your life?”; 6) views of blacks – the four standard racial resentment questions (i) "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." (ii) "Irish, Italian, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors." (iii) "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve." (iv) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class."; 7) other racial attitudes/ethnocentrism – standard feeling thermometers for “blacks,” “Asian Americans,” and “Whites.”; 8) other issues – in alternate tests we add questions on universal health care, women’s rights, the environment, abortion, crime, schools, science and technology.

CONTROL VARIABLES FOR ANES CUMULATIVE FILE ANALUSIS

Since policy questions vary from year to year in the ANES, we include a modified set of policy control variables. Specifically, we control for attitudes toward the military (should military spending be increased or decreased), the size and role of government (should government provide more services or spend less, should government guarantee a job and a basic standard of living), retrospective voting (presidential approval), the state of the economy (is the economy improving), women’s rights (whether women should have an equal role as men) and feelings toward other racial groups (feeling thermometers toward blacks, Asian Americans, and whites).

ASSESSING VARIATION IN THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ACROSS TIME AND THE TYPE OF ELECTIONS

Does immigration matter more where and when we should expect it to matter more? To try to answer this question, we examined each individual election for each year in the NES cumulative file as well as at the results for each of the other elections in the other surveys (2000 NAES, 2004 NAES, 2010-2012 CCES, 2008 ANES, 2010 ANES)

In all honesty, looking across elections, years, and data sets we could not discern a clear and consistent pattern. In terms of the vote, there is some suggestion that immigration mattered more often for statewide contests than it did for House elections. That might suggest that state-level dynamics are an important element of the immigration debate. And there is real variation in the impact of immigration on Presidential contests. We found strong effects for all three presidential contests in the 21st Century and more inconsistent effects in the 1990s and 1980s. This might hint at a growing role for immigration in American electoral politics. In the one set of presidential primaries that we examined, there was a greater effect in the Republican primary where the two candidates actively engaged and significantly diverged on immigration than there was in the Democratic primary where immigration was largely ignored. That could suggest either that the salience of immigration in the campaign or the policy divergence of the two candidates is consequential. Finally, in terms of party identification, in the ANES cumulative file, we found a significant link between views of Hispanics and partisanship after 1990 and no significant link before 1990 again suggesting that the role of immigration on American politics may be increasing over time.

But none of these differences are all that dramatic. Within the confines of the ANES survey, immigration-related views were relevant in some specific Congressional elections (e.g. 2010 and 2000) and irrelevant in some statewide contests (e.g. Gubernatorial contests in 2010 and 1976 and Senatorial elections in 2008, 1988, and 1984). Presidential contests in the most recent decade were always at least in part shaped by immigration but outcomes in presidential elections in 1976, 1984, and 1988 can also be linked to feelings toward Latinos. And across different surveys, patterns were just as varied.

Unfortunately, the available data are not particularly well suited for geographic or time-series analysis. All of the advantages of having different surveys with different samples and varying questions on immigrations that are so critical in trying to demonstrate robust effects now become a liability in trying to assess variation over time and across space. Is the smaller or null effect in one particular year, really because immigrant attitudes were less relevant for that year, or is it because a different set of covariates are available, because the specific question on immigration is less effective at measuring attitudes, or because of some issue with the sample? We generally cannot know why differences emerge from survey to survey, year to year, or contest to contest.

All we can say on this point is that immigration may be increasing in significance over time but before we can say that with any certainty much more empirical work needs to be done. It will be hard to generate more data on past contests but we will certainly have more comparable data for future races. Only then will we know if the role of immigration is increasing in a systematic and measurable way.

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION VIEWS ON PARTISANSHIP AND THE VOTE USING THE 2000 AND 2004 NATIONAL ANNENBERG ELECTION SURVEYS (NAES).

To test the robustness of our story, we repeated much of our basic analysis with the 2000 and 2004 NAES. The NAES has a more limited set of controls but allowed us to test the effects of immigration in different years, using slightly different questions on immigration (should the federal government do more to restrict immigration and is immigration a serious problem), and a different, larger, more geographically diverse sample (N=). Using the NAES we examined the link between immigrant related views and party identification in 2000 and 2004, vote choice in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, and intended vote choice in presidential (2000 and 2004), Senatorial (2000), and House elections (2000). In every case except for Senate elections, after controlling for a range of factors that were purported to drive electoral behavior in that year, views on immigration remained robust and in each case more negative views of immigration led to substantially greater support for Republicans.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Views on Immigration and the Vote - The 2000 National Annenberg Election Study** | | | | | | |
|  | **Support for Republican Candidate …** | | | | **Support for Bush:** | |
|  | **President** | | **House** | **Senate** | | **GOP Primary** |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  | |  | |  |
| **Immigration is a Problem** | .04 (.02)\* | .68 (.29)\* | | .09 (.32) | | .14 (.04)\*\* |
| **IDEOLOGY/PARTISANSHIP** |  |  | |  | |  |
| **Liberal-conservative (high=cons)** | .07 (.00)\*\* | .54 (.07)\*\* | | .58 (.08)\*\* | | .03 (.01)\* |
| **Party Identification (high=Rep)** | .11 (.00)\*\* | 1.09 (.04)\*\* | | 1.03 (.05)\*\* | | .04 (.01)\*\* |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  | |  | |  |
| **Reduce Income Inequality** | -.04 (.01)\*\* | -.41 (.12)\*\* | | -.41 (.14)\*\* | | -.01 (.03) |
| **Increase Taxes** | -.07 (.01)\*\* | -.28 (.15)\* | | -.50 (.16)\*\* | | -.07 (.02)\*\* |
| **Punish Criminals More** | .04 (.01)\*\* | .29 (.09)\*\* | | .18 (.10) | | .04 (.02)\* |
| **Economic Conditions Improve** | -.04 (.01)\*\* | -.15 (.08) | | -.18 (.09) | | -.04 (.02)\*\* |
| **Favor Gun Control** | -.04 (.01)\*\* | -.13 (.06)\* | | -.11 (.07) | | -.01 (.01) |
| **Cover Uninsured Health Care** | -.02 (.01)\*\* | -.37 (.09)\*\* | | -.23 (.11)\* | | -.00 (.01) |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  | |  | |  |
| **Education** | .07 (.25) | .09 (.31) | | -.01 (.36) | | -.09 (.05) |
| **Income** | .13 (.28) | .06 (.03) | | .06 (.04) | | -.00 (.07) |
| **Unemployed** | .02 (.04) | -.51 (.45) | | -.06 (.45) | | .10 (.10) |
| **Age** | -.00 (.01) | -.01 (.00)\* | | -.00 (.00) | | .00 (.01) |
| **Female** | -.03 (.01)\*\* | -.14 (.13) | | -.13 (.14) | | .02 (.02) |
| **Union Member** | -.05 (.01)\*\* | -.43 (.15)\*\* | | -.21 (.17) | | -.03 (.03) |
| **Jewish** | -.08 (.03)\* | -.21 (.49) | | .06 (.51) | | -.29 (.11)\*\* |
| **Catholic** | .03 (.02) | .52 (.19)\*\* | | .28 (.21) | | .05 (.04) |
| **Protestant** | -.06 (.15) | .53 (.16)\*\* | | .47 (.18)\* | | .11 (.03) |
| **Children** | .01 (.01) | .16 (.12) | | .07 (.14) | | .02 (02) |
| **Constant** | -.44 (.05)\*\* | -8.6 (.61)\*\* | | -7.5 (.68)\*\* | | .01 (.11) |
| **N** | 5716 | 3235 | | 2254 | | 1773 |
| **Pseudo R Squared** | .48 | .57 | | .54 | | .44 |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION VIEWS ON PARTISANSHIP AND THE VOTE IN RECENT ELECTIONS USING THE 2010 AD 2012 COOPERATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION SURVEY (CCES).

To see if views on immigration remain a potent force in American politics in recent elections, we repeated our basic analysis with the 2010 and 2001 CCES. These large, internet based surveys have a broad array of questions that allows us to test the role of immigration against most of the other factors deemed important in American politics.

The pattern of results in 2010 and 2012 confirms the important and ongoing role that views on immigration play in American politics. After controlling for other factors, views on immigration still significantly predict partisanship and the vote. In both years and across most elections, whites with more positive views of immigrants were substantially less likely to identify as Republican or support Republican candidates.

Effect magnitudes in the CCES are similar to those in the main ANES analysis. A one standard deviation increase in views on immigration in 2010 is, for example, associated with a 12 to 19 percent increase in the probability of voting Republican across the different contests.

In both years, views on immigration are based on one multi-step question that asked whether respondents favor citizenship for those with good employment records, increasing border patrols, and allowing police to question anyone suspected of being undocumented. The questions cohere well (alpha =.67 in 2010 and alpha=.77). Alternate tests with each individual question or with different combinations of the questions performed similarly. The effects are also robust to the inclusion of views on other policy areas like the environment, abortion, and gun control. Alternate tests in 2010 also show that views on immigration were related to the vote in state level contests for Attorney General, Secretary of State, State Senate, and State House contests. In all cases, more positive views of immigrants were negatively tied to support for Republican candidates.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Views on Immigration and White Partisanship and Vote Choice– 2010 CCES** | | | | | |
|  | | Favor the Republican Option: | | | | |
|  | | Party Identification | President 2008 | Senate | House | Governor |
| **IMMIGRATION** | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Views on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive)** | | -.09 (.01)\*\* | -.36 (.05)\*\* | -.19 (.07)\*\* | -.31 (.05)\*\* | -.35 (.05)\*\* |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Education** | | .04 (.01)\*\* | -.00 (.02) | .04 (.03) | .01 (.02) | .02 (.03) |
| **Income** | | .02 (.00)\*\* | .01 (.01) | .02 (.02) | .02 (.01)\* | .02 (.01)\* |
| **Unemployed** | | -.04 (.03) | -.25 (.13) | -.11 (.17) | -.02 (.12) | -.06 (.13) |
| **Age** | | .02 (.00)\*\* | .03 (.03) | .00 (.01) | .03 (.02) | -.01 (.01) |
| **Female** | | -.03 (.02) | -.14 (.07)\* | -.25 (.09)\*\* | .02 (.06) | -.00 (.07) |
| **Married** | | .01 (.02) | -.08 (.08) | .08 (.10) | .04 (.07) | .07 (.08) |
| **Union Member** | | -.16 (.02)\*\* | -.24 (.07)\*\* | -.30 (.09)\*\* | -.23 (.06)\*\* | -.22 (.07)\*\* |
| **Jewish** | | -.35 (.04)\*\* | .17 (.18) | -.41 (.24) | -.42 (.17)\* | -.26 (.18) |
| **Catholic** | | -.05 (.02)\* | -.01 (.10) | .32 (.13) | -.09 (.09) | .14 (.10) |
| **Protestant** | | .02 (.02) | .06 (.09) | .44 (.12)\*\* | .03 (.08) | .01 (.09) |
| **IDEOLOGY** | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Conservative** | | .65 (.01) | .64 (.05)\*\* | .62 (.06)\*\* | .63 (.04)\*\* | .67 (.05)\*\* |
| **PARTY IDENTIFICATION** | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **Republican** | | --- | .63 (.02)\*\* | .67 (.03)\*\* | .52 (.02)\*\* | .48 (.02)\*\* |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** | |  |  |  |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Expand War on Terror**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | | .04 (.02)\*  .39 (.01)\*\*  .05 (.01)\*\* | .29 (.08)\*\*  .63 (.04)\*\*  .10 (.04)\* | .05 (.05)  .67 (.06)\*\*  .06 (.05) | .10 (.07)  .40 (.04)\*\*  .14 (.04)\*\* | .17 (.08)\*  .43 (.04)\*\*  .09 (.04)\* |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **President Job Approval** | | -.00 (.01)  -.65 (.01)\*\* | -.09 (.04)\*  -1.29 (.04)\*\* | -.19 (.05)\*\*  -1.14 (.05)\*\* | -.18 (.04)\*\*  -.82 (.04)\*\* | -.20 (.04)\*\*  -.81 (.04)\*\* |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes** | | -.09 (.02)\*\* | -.05 (.09) | -.32 (.11)\*\* | -.31 (.08)\*\* | -.67 (.09)\*\* |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Support Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | | -.22 (.02)\*\*  -.00 (.01) | -.34 (.07)\*\*  .19 (.04)\*\* | -.20 (.10)\*  .03 (.05) | -.21 (.07)\*\*  .09 (.03)\*\* | -.26 (.08)\*\*  .04 (.04) |
| **Racial Resentment to Blacks**  **Blacks Get Special Favors**  **Discrimination Limited** | | .02 (.01)  .00 (.01) | .15 (.04)\*\*  .09 (.03) | .17 (.05)\*\*  .17 (.04)\*\* | .10 (.03)\*\*  .04 (.03) | .09 (.04)\*  .06 (.03)\* |
| **Constant** | | -.72 (1.16) | -1.82 (5.23) | -7.32 (7.02) | -1.16 (4.97) | -16 (5.5)\*\* |
| **N** | | 29692 | 26107 | 17752 | 23214 | 18651 |
| **Adj/Pseudo R Squared** | | .69 | .80 | .82 | .73 | .73 |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Views on Immigration and White Partisanship and Vote Choice– 2012 CCES** | | | | |
|  |  | Vote for Republican in… | | |
|  | Party Identification | President | Senate |  |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  |  |  |
| **Views on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive views)** | -.04 (.01)\*\* | -.15 (.08) | -.24 (.06)\*\* |  |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  |  |  |
| **Education** | .04 (.01)\*\* | .06 (.04) | .05 (.03) |  |
| **Income** | .02 (.00)\*\* | .08 (.02) | .04 (.01)\*\* |  |
| **Unemployed** | -.03 (.03) | .24 (.22) | .03 (.15) |  |
| **Age** | .00 (.01) | .01 (.01) | .08 (.03)\*\* |  |
| **Female** | -.05 (.02)\*\* | -.02 (.12) | -.21 (.08)\*\* |  |
| **Married** | .05 (.02)\*\* | -.18 (.13) | .04 (.09) |  |
| **Union Member** | .13 (.02)\*\* | .15 (.10) | .12 (.06) |  |
| **Jewish** | -.32 (.05)\*\* | .53 (.36) | .01 (.25) |  |
| **Catholic** | -.05 (.02)\* | .20 (.17) | -.21 (.11) |  |
| **Protestant** | .10 (.02)\*\* | -.16 (.15) | .03 (.11) |  |
| **IDEOLOGY** |  |  |  |  |
| **Conservative** | .36 (.01)\*\* | .10 (.06) | .26 (.04)\*\* |  |
| **PARTY IDENTIFICATION** |  |  |  |  |
| **Republican** | --- | .79 (.04)\*\* | .69 (.13)\*\* |  |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Terrorism**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | ---  .48 (.02)\*\*  .09 (.02)\*\* | ---  1.09 (.15)\*\*  .13 (.15) | ---  .67 (.10)\*\*  .16 (.09) |  |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **Approve President** | -.03 (.01)\*\*  -.96 (.01)\*\* | -.39 (.07)\*\*  -3.10 (.09)\*\* | -.26 (.05)\*\*  -.92 (.05)\*\* |  |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes** | -.02 (.00)\*\* | -.08 (.03)\*\* | -.02 (.00)\*\* |  |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Support Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | -.32 (.02)\*\*  .02 (.01)\* | -.60 (.13)\*\*  .29 (.06)\*\* | -.44 (.09)\*\*  .01 (.04) |  |
| **Racial Resentment to Blacks**  **Blacks Get Special Favors**  **Discrimination Limited** | .02 (.01)\*  .00 (.01) | .29 (.07)\*\*  .02 (.05) | .14 (.05)\*\*  .01 (.04) |  |
| **Constant** | -2.76 (1.11)\* | -31.1 (8.0)\*\* | 26.9 (5.7)\*\* |  |
| **N** | 26164 | 22425 | 15953 |  |
| **Adj/Pseudo R Squared** | .70 | .93 | .75 |  |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

USING LATENT PARTISANSHIP TO ADDRESS MEASUREMENT ERROR IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Given claims that much of the instability in party identification comes from measurement error (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, Green and Palmquist 1990, Goren 2005), we looked to see if immigration still predicted partisanship and vote choice after taking into account measurement error in party identification. To reduce measurement error, we created a series of latent party identification measures and then re-inserted these latent constructs into our original analysis of our main 2008 ANES data set as well as the 2010 and 2012 CCES.

We employed two different ways to get at measurement and to create a latent measure of partisanship. In one set of tests we used different indicators of the same construct (the standard party identification scale, feelings toward the Democratic Party, feelings toward the Republican Party, and actual party registration). In a second set of tests, we used the same indicator asked over time in a panel survey.

With the ANES panel we corrected for measurement error by creating a latent party identification alpha factor score that incorporated the same three different indicators employed by Goren (2005) – a standard party identification scale, a feeling thermometer toward the Democratic Party, and a feeling thermometer toward the Republican Party.[[1]](#footnote-1) Inserting this latent measure of party identification into the 2008 analysis did almost nothing to alter the results. As the table below shows, immigration still significantly predicted partisanship and vote choice net other factors. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect increases. A one standard shift in views on immigration is now associated with a 28 increase in the likelihood of voting Republican all else equal.

For the 2010 and 2012 CCES, we created a measure of latent party identification that was based on two standard party identification questions that were spaced several months apart (pre- and post-election) and a second latent measure of partisanship that was based on the pre- and post-election party identification questions and a third question that asked about actual party registration.[[2]](#footnote-2) We present the results for the first latent measure below but both latent measures led to nearly identical results. As the table below illustrates, we found that all of the significant immigration-related results from the 2010 and 2012 CCES remained robust.

It is also worth noting that for the 2008 ANES and the CCES, immigration remained significant factor predicting vote choice in other elections as well as predicting latent party identification itself.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Taking Into Account Measurement Error -The Effect of Immigration on the Presidential Vote** | | | | |
|  | Vote for the Republican Candidate | | |  |
|  | 2008 ANES | 2010 CCES1 | 2012 CCES |  |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  |  |  |
| **Views on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive views)** | -.58 (.28)\* | -.38 (.05)\*\* | -.15 (.07)\* |  |
| **PARTISANSHIP** |  |  |  |  |
| **Latent Partisanship (high=Rep)** | 2.58 (.31)\*\* | 1.31 (.04)\*\* | 1.66 (.08)\*\* |  |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  |  |  |
| **Education** | .10 (.09) | -.00 (.03) | .06 (.04) |  |
| **Income** | -.02 (.03) | .01 (.01) | .09 (.02)\*\* |  |
| **Unemployed** | -1.71 (.73)\* | -.25 (.12)\* | .21 (.22) |  |
| **Age** | .02 (.01)\* | .05 (.02)\* | .08 (.04) |  |
| **Female** | -.24 (.32) | .11 (.07) | -.04 (.12) |  |
| **Married** | .34 (.31) | -.08 (.01) | -.20 (.13) |  |
| **Union Member** | -.84 (.46) | -.24 (.07)\*\* | .15 (.10) |  |
| **Jewish** | 1.45 (1.02) | .18 (.18) | .47 (.35) |  |
| **Catholic** | .42 (.42) | .00 (.10) | .21 (.17) |  |
| **Protestant** | -.50 (.38) | .09 (.09) | -.12 (.15) |  |
| **IDEOLOGY** |  |  |  |  |
| **Liberal-Conservative (high=cons)** | .54 (.35) | .67 (.05)\*\* | .12 (.06)\* |  |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Expand War on Terror**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | -.01 (.09)  -.10 (.11)  -.07 (.10) | .30 (.08)\*\*  .64 (.04)\*\*  .11 (.04)\*\* | ---  1.15 (.15)\*\*  .09 (.14) |  |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **Approve President** | -.37 (.23)  -.47 (.13)\*\* | .11 (.04)\*\*  1.35 (.04)\*\* | .40 (.07)\*\*  3.16 (.09)\*\* |  |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes**  **Increase Welfare Spending** | -.22 (.16)  -.06 (.08) | -.05 (.09)  --- | -.01 (.00)  --- |  |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Support Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | -.03 (.11)  .09 (.08) | -.36 (.07)\*\*  .19 (.04)\*\* | -.61 (.12)\*\*  .29 (.06)\*\* |  |
| **Racial Considerations**  **Blacks Deserve Less**  **Blacks Get Special Favors**  **Discrimination Limited**  **Blacks Should Try Harder** | .59 (.16)\*\*  .23 (.19)  -.03 (.02)  .01 (.02) | ---  .16 (.04)\*\*  .09 (.03)\*\*  --- | ---  .25 (.06)\*\*  .04 (.05)  --- |  |
| **Constant** | 1.58 (1.92) | .82 (.22)\*\* | -28.4 (7.7)\*\* |  |
| **N** | 635 | 26107 | 22854 |  |
| **Pseudo R Squared** | .64 | .80 | .92 |  |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05 1 Recalled 2008 Presidential vote

Note: Question wording and coding is not identical across the ANES and the CCES.

TESTING TO SEE IF SWITCHING TO DUMMY INDICATOR VARIABLES FOR EACH POSITION ON THE LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION SCALES ALTERS THE RESULTS

Since it is possible that ideology and party identification do not have simple, linear relationships with the vote and each other, in a series of alternate tests, I created dummy variables for each position on the seven point liberal-conservative and party identification scales and substituted these dummy indicators variables into the analysis. Almost all of the different dummy variables were significant and there were some signs of minor non-linearities in the effects of ideology on partisanship and the effects of ideology and partisanship on the vote. However, the switch to multiple dummy indicators generally had no noticeable impact on the main results of the analysis whether it was done with ANES, the CCES, or the NAES. Typically results from the 2008 ANES are displayed below. Given the length of the ensuing table and the difficulty of displaying it on a single page, the paper contains the results with the original scales.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Views on Immigration and White Partisanship and the Vote – Controlling for Each Position on the Ideology and Party Identification Scales – 2008 ANES** | | |
|  | **Party Identification** | **Presidential Vote Choice** |
| **IMMIGRATION** |  |  |
| **View on Illegal Immigrants**  **(high=positive views)** | -.21 (.09)\* | -.51 (.25)\* |
| **DEMOGRAPHICS** |  |  |
| **Education** | -.01 (.03) | .07 (.08) |
| **Income** | .03 (.01)\*\* | -.02 (.03) |
| **Unemployed** | .10 (.24) | -.60 (.63) |
| **Age** | -.00 (.00) | .02 (.01)\* |
| **Female** | .09 (.11) | -.25 (.28) |
| **Married** | .26 (.10)\* | .36 (.27) |
| **Union Member** | -.40 (.15)\*\* | -1.07 (.42)\* |
| **Jewish** | -.31 (.41) | .58 (.99) |
| **Catholic** | -.05 (.14) | .13 (.35) |
| **Protestant** | .21 (.12) | -.53 (.34) |
| **IDEOLOGY** |  |  |
| **Liberal** | -.91 (.19)\*\* | .58 (.55) |
| **Weak Liberal** | -.22 (.19) | .44 (.48) |
| **Moderate** | .37 (.15)\* | .59 (.36) |
| **Weak Conservative** | .90 (.18)\*\* | 1.25 (.46)\*\* |
| **Conservative** | 1.61 (.81)\*\* | 1.61 (.55)\*\* |
| **Strong Conservative** | 1.39 (.29)\*\* | 2.95 (1.10\*\* |
| **PARTY IDENTIFICATION** |  |  |
| **Democrat** | --- | 1.02 (.51)\* |
| **Weak Democrat** | --- | .63 (.54) |
| **Pure Independent** | --- | 1.77 (.57)\*\* |
| **Weak Republican** | --- | 3.28 (.54)\*\* |
| **Republican** | --- | 3.31 (.54)\*\* |
| **Strong Republican** | --- | 4.66 (.90)\*\* |
| **ISSUE POSITIONS** |  |  |
| **War and Terrorism**  **Expand War on Terror**  **Support War in Iraq**  **Support War in Afghanistan** | .00 (.03)  .08 (.04)\*  .10 (.03)\*\* | .07 (.07)  .19 (.10)\*  .12 (.08) |
| **Economy/Retrospective**  **Economy Improving**  **Approve President** | .12 (.07)  .35 (.05)\*\* | .46 (.20)\*  .48 (.11)\*\* |
| **Redistribution**  **Favor Higher Taxes on Rich**  **Increase Welfare Spending** | -.17 (.05)\*\*  -.03 (.03) | -.22 (.13)  -.02 (.07) |
| **Morality/Religion**  **Favor Gay Rights**  **Religion Important** | -.05 (.04)  .06 (.03)\* | .03 (.10)  -.03 (.07) |
| **Other Racial Considerations**  **Warmth Toward Blacks**  **Warmth Toward Asians**  **Warmth Toward Whites** | -.01 (.00)\*\*  .00 (.01)  .01 (.00) | -.01 (.01)  -.02 (.01)  .01 (.01) |
| **Constant** | 5.72 (.58)\*\* | 1.21 (1.63) |
| **N** | 842 | 773 |
| **Adj/Pseudo Squared** | .53 | .60 |

\*\*P<.01 \*P<.05

TESTING THE EFFECTS OF AGGREGATE VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION ON MACROPARTISANSHIP

We turned to analysis of the relationship between aggregate views on immigration and white macropartisanship for two reasons. First, we wanted to see if immigration could account for the some of the large scale shift of whites from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party over the last twenty years. Second, we wanted to further address concerns about the direction of the causal link between immigration views and partisanship and to demonstrate that aggregate views on immigration can and do predict changes in macropartisanship rather than the reverse.

For the analysis we combine 21 Gallup Polls that asked whether immigration should be increased, decreased, or kept at the same level with 169 CBS/NY Times polls that asked the standard party identification question. Our unit of analysis is the quarter. Thus, we average the party identification score for all white respondents in a given CBS/NY Times survey and then average across surveys in a given quarter of a given year.

The basic results are reported in the text. The extended tests below show that the results are robust to a) different measures of the DV, b) separate categories of the IV, c) a larger data set of views on immigration that merges several different survey houses and d) a test of whether current macropartisanship predicts changes in aggregate views on immigration. For all tables, higher values on macropartisanship are more Republican and higher values on immigration views are more positive views of immigrants.

The first table shows that the proportion of the public that favors increased in the rate of immigration and the proportion that favors decreases both significantly predict changes in macropartisanship.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Impact of Aggregate Immigration Views on White Macropartisanship-Alternate DVs | | | | |
|  | Macropartisanship (high=Rep) | | | |
|  | Model1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |  |
| Lagged Macropartisanship | .44 (.15)\*\*\* | .38 (.15)\*\* | .39 (.17)\*\* |  |
| Lagged Immigration Views  Percent Favoring Increase  Percent Favoring Decrease  Percent Favoring No Change | -.61 (.25)\*\* | .28 (.12)\*\* | -.29 (.20) |  |
| Constant | 1.81 (.46)\*\*\* | 1.78 (.47)\*\*\* | 1.97 (.54)\*\*\* |  |
| N | 20 | 20 | 20 |  |
| Adj R Squared | .40 | .40 | .29 |  |

\*\*P<.01 \*\*P<.05 \*P<.10

The second table demonstrates that aggregate immigration opinion significantly predicts aggregate increases in Republican and Independent identity.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Impact of Aggregate Immigration Views on White Macropartisanship-Alternate DVs | | | | |
|  |  | Proportion that are…. | | |
|  | Macropartisanship | Republican  Identifiers | Independents | Democratic Identifiers |
| Lagged Macropartisanship | .39 (.15)\*\* | .32 (.17)\* | .51 (.18)\*\* | .47 (.14)\*\*\* |
| Lagged Immigration Views | -.22 (.08)\*\* | -.08 (.03)\*\* | .43 (.18)\* | .02 (.02) |
| Constant | 1.81 (.45)\*\*\* | 19.9 (5.9)\*\* | 25.7 (8.3)\*\*\* | 16.2 (4.3)\*\*\* |
| N | 20 | 20 | 19 | 19 |
| Adj R Squared | .43 | .31 | .46 | .44 |

\*\*P<.01 \*\*P<.05 \*P<.10

The third table incorporates data from all surveys in the Roper Center Archives that ask a question about the preferred level of immigration. This includes 69 polls from the CBS/NY Times, Quinnipiac, Fox, Global Views. If there is more than one poll in a given quarter, polls are averaged.. This doubles the number of quarters for which we have immigration attitudes (42 quarters) but it also introduces considerable error as each survey house uses different question wording and different samples. The biggest issue is that some surveys ask about the preferred level of “legal immigration” while others ask simply about “immigration.” That error likely reduces the statistical significance of the relationship considerably but we find, nevertheless, results that roughly mirror our findings from the Gallup data.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Impact of Aggregate Immigration Views on White Macropartisanship-All Roper Archive Polls | | | | |
|  |  | Proportion that are…. | | |
|  | Macropartisanship | Republican  Identifiers | Independents | Democratic Identifiers |
| Lagged Macropartisanship | .61 (.14)\*\*\* | .49 (.17)\*\*\* | .61 (.11)\*\*\* | .54 (.12)\*\*\* |
| Lagged Immigration Views | -.12 (.07)\* | -.06 (.03)\*\* | .29 (.11)\*\* | .01 (.02) |
| Constant | 1.16 (.42)\*\*\* | 15.4 (5.6)\*\*\* | 18.8 (5.1)\*\*\* | 13.4 (3.6)\*\*\* |
| N | 40 | 40 | 38 | 38 |
| Adj R Squared | .38 | .30 | .60 | .35 |

\*\*P<.01 \*\*P<.05 \*P<.10

Over-time analysis serves a second purpose in that it can help us establish the direction of the causal relationship between immigration attitudes and partisanship. When we reverse the test, we find that macropartisanship does not significantly predict changes in attitudes on immigration. Combined with our earlier results in the text, we conclude that immigration opinion granger causes macropartisanship.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| The Impact of Macropartisanship on Aggregate Immigration Views | |
| Lagged Macropartisanship | 9.4 (47.9) |
| Lagged Immigration Views | .71 (.22)\*\*\* |
| Constant | -39.7 (146.1) |
| N | 23 |
| Adj. R Squared | .30 |

\*\*P<.01 \*\*P<.05 \*P<.10

1. The latent factor fits the data well (alpha .78) and is correlated with the standard party identification measure at .91. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. All of the different CCES items effectively tap latent partisanship with item-factor correlations in the CCES all at .88 or above. Alpha factors scores range from .92 to .98. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)